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ABSTRACT
Throughout the eighties, and particularly from 1986, British broadcasting has
been understood as undergoing a fundamental change. Consequently, this thesis will
analyze, explain and assess the major developments which have taken place in the wake
of what has been widely perceived as an on-going transition within the British
broadcasting system. This reform has often been identified as a shift from a system
orientated around the concept of public service to one in which alternative core tenets
such as free enterprise, competition and commercialization have emerged alongside the
traditional paradigm. It has been motivated by a number of imperatives; the 'push' of
technology, convergence between the telecom and broadcast industries, the emergence
of new media actors, market-liberal ideologies and the political will of the Thatcher
government. This thesis will test the relative importance of these factors and consider the
crucial questions which are shaping the debate over the future of British broadcasting into
the second millenium.
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INTRODUCTION
The 1990 Broadcasting Act can be seen to mark the beginning of the
final stages of a British legislative cycle which started in 1982.' This cycle has
included official reports, policy documents and legislation. At the heart of this cycle
stands the 1986 Report of the Committee on the Financing of the BBC (The Peacock
Report). 2 In the period of the cycle preceding Peacock, the legislation (whilst being
market and technologically led) remained scant and peripheral. The report's
importance lied in its synthesis of deregulatory theories within broadcasting and the
ideological agenda it set for the following debate. Throughout Margaret Thatcher's
period in government (1979-1990) and, in particular, after her second electoral victory
in 1983, the attitudes, ideologies and policies directed toward British broadcasting
may be perceived as undergoing a significant change. These reforms were directed by
a number of factors including new technological developments; the encroachment of
market-liberal economic and political ideologies, arguing for a retraction of state
intervention, leading to general revisions within the economy promoted by the
Thatchente policies; alterations within the composition of the political elite and the
political relations between the government and the broadcasting institutions.
It is the intention of this thesis to analyze, evaluate and interpret the principal
developments which have contributed to and have taken place in the wake of what has
been generally comprehended as an on-going transition within the British television
system. This transformation has been frequently identified as a shift from a system
located around the concept of public service to one in which different core tenets such
as free enterprise, competition and commercialization sit astride the traditional
14
systemic principles.
Within this context, the 1986 Peacock Report has proved to be a key policy
document in channelling alternative ideas into an industry which had been founded
upon a series of precepts dating from the introduction of nationally available radio
channels in the twenties. This thesis will therefore test the extent to which the
deregulatory ideas exhibited within this report were borne out in the subsequent
development of the policy, resulting in the 1990 Broadcasting Act, and within several
key policy ends: television finance and regulation. The subsequent policy-making
period has been high-profile and controversial. It has been seen by some to have
exhibited many contradictions in the government's attitude and thinking towards
broadcasting. These issues and problems look set to continue as the resulting policy is
implemented. For example, the day after the Act had received Royal Assent, the
merger of satellite channels Sky and BSB was announced.3
Throughout this thesis, the terms of broadcasting and television policy will
become synonymous with one another. This is, in part, reflective of the government's
general merger of these terms. 4
 However, the focus of my study will be the British
television industry. This is not to say that radio was forgotten during this period
(although it certainly had a less significant place in the Thatcher government's
approach to broadcasting) as the 1990 Act had been responsible for the creation of the
commercial sector's Radio Authority, freeing up former BBC radio channels for
commercial tender and establishing a national commercial network. 5
 Substantial
changes have affected British radio and will no doubt be considered elsewhere.
15
Thus, I will outline the crucial reforms which have increasingly affected an
industry which has been perceived as being central to Britain's national and cultural
life. In statistical terms, the importance of television may be measured in the general
ownership and renting of television receivers. 6
 As television receivers have become
domestically marketable, the broadcasting industry has become a more visible and
potent force in creating profits both within a specific leisure economy and the general
economy. Therefore, it is not a study of policy-making in the strictest sense. It is not
my intention to look into all the considerations of policy organization or networks in
minute detail. 7
 Further, it does not focus on broadcasting simply as a case study of
policy management. Instead, it is concerned with the imperatives governing policy
within the broadcasting sector, which were both specific to this sector and also
referred to the more general aims which were being expressed during this period.
Moreover, the final two chapters of the thesis will assess the embryonic impact and
effects of this policy in the first two years of its implementation.
The thesis is relevant to political scientists as it investigates the
imperatives which shaped policy-making in a particular sector of the British economy.
These developments occurred throughout a decade in which a dominant political will
and perhaps, more problematically, an ideology entitled 'Thatcherism' was being
expressed. 8
 This drive for reform was formally located around the concept of
deregulation, which had been shifted from the marginal location of economic debate
throughout the seventies into a key method for organizing economic policy during the
eighties. 9
 Deregulation, alongside the pillar of privatization, proved to be
indispensable to a government whose polices were, at a surface level, grounded in the
16
economic monetarism of Milton Friedman and the political libertarianism of F.W.
Hayek.'°
In the case of British broadcasting, the system was seen to be ripe for reform
as it was organized as a publicly regulated duopoly, the British Broadcasting
Corporation (BBC) and the Independent Television sector (ITV), in which there was
no competition for funds between a public licence fee for the BBC and a monopoly of
advertising revenue for ITV." The system had been typically justified as it was
technically confined to a narrow band of available airwaves ('The Limited Spectrum')
and had been rooted within the concept of Public Service Broadcasting (PSB) in which
both the publicly funded BBC and the private ITV companies were legally required
and regulated to ensure that their programmes educated, informed and entertained.'2
These normative assumptions were to be challenged with the emergence of the new
media technologies of cable and satellite, which increased the number of available
channels, and the ability to manufacture domestic reception equipment for these
channels.' 3
 Such a series of developments provided a significant 'push' for new or
alternative methods of resource distribution to be attempted within the industry.
Principally, the wider availability of these channels supported the calls of market-
liberals for organizing the system upon the tenets of 'choice' and 'competition'.
However, as chapter one indicates the process and extent of deregulation has
been conditional upon the concepts, ideologies and structural foundations of the
industry that is to be deregulated. Moreover, this process has been shaped by other
factors comprising the national culture, the political will motivating such a policy, the
17
Table 1.
political relations demarcating the industry's position within the state, and elements of
opposition which, either due to ideological intransigence or inappropriateness in the
distribution of resources, may resist this drive for reform.'4
Therefore, the thesis is also germane in providing an understanding of the role
of British broadcasting within the body politic. Television has been often cited as a
principal source for providing the public with information.' 5
 In particular, television,
and to a lesser extent radio, have been interpreted as being vitally important in
allowing citizens to access world news as indicated by the following table:
1980
	
1983
	
1985
%
	
%
Television	 52
	
60
	
62
Radio	 14	 10
	
14
Newspapers	 33
	
28
	
23
Magazines	 0
	
0
	
0
Talking to People	 1
	
1
	
1
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As a consequence, broadcasting has been understood as having a crucial
political role as well as acting in an economic or social sense. These figures do not
demonstrate how people use television or whether an overt relationship exists between
the political meaning of a text and the audience interpretation of such meaning.'7
However, they do indicate, to some extent, why broadcasting is seen to occupy a
political position due to a model of political communication which perceives television
as one of the key mediating links between the political elite and the electorate due to
its central position in the distribution of information. In turn, this has meant that
18
broadcasting has been understood as being crucial in preserving political liberty and
promoting pluralism within the British liberal democratic system.
For this pluralism to be maintained, the independence of the broadcasting
institutions and private companies has been seen as vital. Formally, the British
broadcasting system has through a mixture of constitutional
	 the BBC Charter, the
buffer of the Independent Broadcasting Authority (IBA) 	 and financial	 the
licence fee and the indirect public payment of advertising 	 devices has been
perceived as occupying an independent position within the British polity.'8
Alternatively, the system has been subject to criticisms as broadcasting institutions
have been subject to covert intervention during crisis periods, have been governed by
dominant ideologies promoted through their evolution and the increasing politicization
of appointments, and may be subjected to state control through financial alterations
and pressures.'9
It is therefore a central concern of this thesis to consider the relationship
between broadcasting and the state. To this end, I will discuss how these relations
have been manufactured, and what the Peacock Report and the subsequent policy and
the implementation of this legislation demonstrate about this relationship. For the
advocates of deregulation, the economic reform of the system was not only intended
to dismantle the duopoly but to provide political liberty for the citizen through the
'Consumer Sovereignty' of choice and competition. 2° However, these policies were
being developed during a period of acute political tension between the government and
the broadcasting institutions.2'
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Throughout the period of my investigation, a strain of overt governmental
repression became evident through a series of highly visible incidents including the
controversy surrounding the BBC's documentary on Northern Ireland extremists 'Real
Lives', the Thames 'This Week' programme 'Death on the Rock', Special Branch's
seizure of tapes for a programme on the 'Zircon Spy Satellite' and the Home Office's
broadcasting ban on Sinn Fein. 22
 As a consequence, this thesis will consider how the
interface between market freedoms and state repression was negotiated and the extent
to which this dichotomy underpinned the subsequent legislation.
Therefore, this thesis is about the multi-faceted nature of a broadcasting policy
which may be seen to encompass several areas of British political life. It will provide
an examination of the issues of regulation/deregulation within Britain using the British
Television post-Peacock as a case study . This analysis is both relevant to the media
industries in other countries and to changes which have occurred in other policy areas
throughout the Thatcher government's period in office.
It is contributing to an on-going debate about the role of broadcasting into the
second millennium. The fundamental tenets of the traditional British television system
have been questioned as new technologies, changing ideological perceptions and
varying political wills have dominated the discourse. In this respect, topical questions
concerning the nature and future of public service broadcasting may be clarified by
discussing the imperatives which governed British broadcasting policy making
throughout the late eighties. A considerable body of literature has been devoted to the
20
British broadcasting system over the last few years which has stemmed from the
academy, newspaper journalists and the industry itself. 23
 The most public debate has
been divided between market-liberals urging greater reform of the system, politicians
arguing for increased efficiency, traditionalist broadcasters maintaining that certain
principles remain unassailable and a new generation of broadcast managers who have
started to embrace more commercial principles (personified by Canton's Michael
Green). This debate looks set to continue and is currently beginning to encompass
the role of public service broadcasting in a more commercial global media
environment. In this respect, questions of convergence between broadcasting and
telecom organizations are becoming more pertinent as new delivery systems
comprising digital compression and interactive services will become domestically
marketable.25
Secondly, the thesis is relevant to texts upon broadcasting as a subject in
itself, policy-making, liberal democracy and regulatory theory. The literature
produced by students of deregulation has largely focused on changes in economic
policies. The work of Dennis Swann, Susan and Martin Toichin, Cento Veljanovski,
Leigh Hancher and Michael Moran provides a useful guideline to understanding the
concepts and addressing how and why deregulation has been pursued. The most
pertinent studies to deregulation in the communications industries have been Jill Hills'
Deregulating Telecoms, Jeremy Tunstall's Communications Deregulation, Cento
Veljanovski's edited edition Freedom in Broadcasting and Kenneth Dyson and Peter
Humphreys' (with Ralph Negrine and Jean Paul Simon) Broadcasting and the New
Media Policies in Western Europe. Hills and Tunstalls' books clearly deal with wider
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issues within communications and Tunstall's book is solely concerned with a study of
the United States. Veljanovski's work draws together a number of eminent market-
liberal economists (notably Alan Peacock and Samuel Brittan from the Peacock
Committee) to discuss deregulation in broadcasting. The book's importance not only
lies in its analysis but as several of the authors were involved within the policy cycle
itself. Dyson and Humphreys take a cross-national perspective comparing deregulatory
policies and the implementation of these recommendations across several Western
European states.
These latter works also cross into the literature developed by political
scientists and media specialists. This field is broad and for convenience may be
categorized, with regard to this thesis, into a number of areas (which cannot
encompass the disparate nature of media studies itself) ; politics and policy making,
political economy and institutional analyses. The former may be seen to include works
such as Raymond Kuhn's edited edition The Politics of Broadcasting, Michael
Tracey's The Production of Political Television and Television and the Public Interest:
Vulnerable Values in West European Broadcasting edited by Jay Blumler. In respect
to the field of critical political economy the work of Nicholas Garnham in Capitalism
and Communication, the various contributions of Peter Golding and Graham Murdock
and the material produced by Richard Collins, Cohn Sparks and Vincent Porter within
the journal Media, Culture and Society remain important. 26 Finally, a number of
institutional analyses exist ranging back to Tom Burns' seminal study The BBC:
Public Institution and Private World through to more recent investigations such as
Jeremy Tunstall's Television Producers. Consequently, it should be acknowledged that
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this thesis builds upon the work of other scholars who have addressed these areas.
However, the originality of my contribution results from two main factors; its
approach to the material and inclusion of new empirical detail. First, it employs a
research methodology which is drawn from a literature concerning the theories and
implementation of deregulation in order to provide the theoretical constructs through
which this material may be analyzed. This literature enables the reader to discern the
arguments, ideologies and elements of political will which have contributed to the
evolution of this policy. Moreover, it will determine the nature and extent of
deregulation within broadcasting and consider the political position of the broadcasting
institutions, vis-a-vis the state, in the light of new or alternative policies. In order to
analyze such material the thesis will employ a structure suggested by a model for
broadcasting policy outlined by Jeremy Tunstall in an article in Parliamentary
Affairs. Tunstall has noted that the traditional broadcasting policy-cycle usually takes
twelve years and is reflective of the British media tradition of slow, incremental
reform. He suggests that 'public' broadcasting policy undergoes three major stages;
enquiry, political and operational:
First, there is the enquiry phase --- in this the 'public interest' is to the fore,
reflecting the consensus of the committee members who are the usual selection of
public persons from the law, the universities, big business, the trade unions, Scotland
and Wales. From their consensual focus on the public interest and from their scanning
of the evidence and the old reports of previous policy cycles, they go for proposals
which indeed stress the 'public interest', which is expressed in apolitical terms, are a
trifle unworldly and rather lack financial realism. Recommendations for new TV
channels, for example, tend to be short on financial detail.
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The second is the political phase. The report goes to the relevant government
minister and department. A White Paper may follow, then a bill and, after the usual
debates, a law is finally enacted. The act may reflect only quite a small part of the
public committee's recommendations, and even these may be adopted in altered form.
In keeping with the political nature of this phase, the neutral media coverage of
politics and politicians tends to be prominent, while the financial details and the
'public good' aspects more vague.
The third is the operational phase, which puts the legislation into effect. In
practice, the legislation has said very little about what a new TV channel, for
example, will carry; not only a programming policy and the crucial financial details
still need to be decided, but many institutional/organizational details have to be
worked out from scratch because they were little considered in the several previous
years of 'debate'. Evidence that the operational planning was hurried and unrealistic
seems to be provided by the fact that each of the new television channels (in 1955-56,
in 1964 and in 1982-3) ran into immediate major and foreseeable, but unforeseen difficulties."28
The post-Peacock policy cycle has been the fourth since television began to
assume a role of at the centre of the British mass communications medium after the
end of World War Two. Each of the previous three post-war cycles has been linked
with a report produced by a Royal Commission and the subsequent enactment of the
legislation, often varying from the intention of the report. This policy-cycle differs
from previous periods as it has been conducted in a context in which the post-war
political consensus was replaced by the determined and conflictual imperatives of
Thatcherism. Further, it was inevitably a more multi-faceted entity as it was reflecting
the complexity of audio-visual policy formulation in an era of rapidly changing
variables. 29
 Therefore, by using the policy-cycle criterion it is possible to compare
and contrast the eighties broadcasting policy with its predecessors.
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Secondly, this thesis is concerned with a relatively recent cycle of policy-
making and will discern how the 1990 Broadcasting Act has affected developments
within the broadcasting economy and regulation through a number of case studies. In
this respect it will be addressing original material concerning how the policy was
developed and how it has impacted on the broadcasting industry throughout the years
1990-1992. In order to make such a contribution, it will be structured as follows:
Chapter one will outline the principles, motivations and arguments which have
underpinned regulation. This chapter continues by considering how these arguments
were undermined by the failure of Keynesian Welfare Economic policies throughout
advanced western economies and big government, most especially in the United States
with the Vietnam War and Watergate. 3° This meant that the economic studies and
arguments of monetarists in resource allocation, in particular the 'Chicago School'
including Milton Friedman and George Stigler, led to the rise of deregulatory
theories. 3 ' These theories were increasingly put into practice within the advanced
western economies as financial crises became more prevalent. Such policies
circumvented the partisan nature of politics and were employed by both right-wing
and left-wing governments. 32
 The chapter, then considers how deregulation has been
applied to different national broadcasting systems including the United States,
Germany and France. A degree of national variation is detectable. 33 In Britain, this
policy was developed in tandem with the evolution of the new media technologies
(cable and satellite) and was drawn from market-liberal think tanks such as the
Institute of Economic Affairs.' The chapter concludes by arguing that the variations
within deregulation provide an analytical framework through which deregulation
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within British broadcasting may be studied. 35 The criteria include national cultures,
the appropriateness of the industry, the political will of the government and a concern
with intervention.
Chapter two delineates the development of British broadcasting between 1922
to 1982. Through a thematic study of this material one can determine how and why
public service broadcasting emerged within Britain. This broadcasting system has been
conditional upon economic, technological, social and political interests. The system
arose out of the twenties with the establishment of the BBC as a company in 1922 and
a public corporation in 1927. This development has been popularly associated with the
first Director-General John Reith. However it is necessary to ascertain the context in
which Reith argued for and developed the BBC as a public service broadcaster.
Moreover, throughout this sixty year period public service broadcasting has
come under review and a commercial competitor, ITV, was created in 1955. The
potency of the public service system, however, may be seen to have shaped attitudes
towards ITV in the manner in which it was regulated and financed and in terms of
programming. A highly visible debate occurred throughout the seventies with the
establishment of the Annan Committee (1974-1977) which considered how the fourth
channel should be organized. 37
 Throughout this period, alternative pluralistic models
were suggested which extensively questioned the traditional notions of political
accountability. 38
 Throughout this chapter, the relationship between the British state
and British broadcasting institutions will be assessed through a study of the
committees, legislation, institutional practices, political interventions and ideologies
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which served to govern the development of British broadcasting. This chapter is
therefore concerned with the arguments of formal independence which have been
promoted by broadcasters and a number of academic studies 39 , and is designed to
test, through the historical material, the extent to which these institutions have been
autonomous from state intervention.
The remainder of my thesis is concerned with the development of the most
recent policy cycle associated with broadcasting (1982-onwards). This emerged during
Margaret Thatcher's tenure as Prime Minister (although it should be noted that the
Thatcher government's first involvement within broadcasting dealt with the overlap of
broadcasting policy from the preceding Labour government concerning the fourth
channel which was finally legislated for in the 1980 and 1981 Broadcasting Acts and
established as Channel Four in 1982). The report stage is dealt with in chapters three
and four. These chapters are concerned with the establishment of the Peacock
Committee in 1985 and the conclusions of the report itself which was published in
July 1986.
Chapter three, therefore, looks at the development of an intellectual, market-
liberal critique of British broadcasting. Further,it will address the political climate of
the early eighties and the increasingly antagonistic relationship between the
broadcasting institutions and the government throughout this period. It is similarly
concerned with the financial inequity which grew between the BBC and ITV and the
development of new technologies. The government's response to these pressures upon
the BBC was to attack the licence fee which it perceived to be politically unpopular
27
and an unfair poll tax. In this respect, Peacock, in contrast to the previous reports
upon broadcasting, had a tightly defined remit --- to consider the effects of
introducing advertising on the BBC. The chapter provides a discussion of the
ideological context of the Peacock committee.
Chapter four is overtly concerned with the report. Through a close study of
the report it will be shown why Peacock rejected advertising due to the econometric
studies it commissioned. However, the committee's market-libertarians, Alan Peacock
and Samuel Brittan, saw the report as an opportunity through which wider reforms
could be targeted with regard to broadcasting. 4° The report argued that change was
inevitable as the new technologies of cable and satellite could allow for the
introduction of the market as the principal regulatory force through 'Electronic
Publishing'. 4 ' In turn, the closed duopoly could be replaced by an open market for
independent producers and wider consumer sovereignty. Against this, the public
service values were to be maintained by a 'Public Service Broadcasting Council'
which was to be essentially a non-interventionist body. 42 Underpinning the report's
conclusions was the linkage between economic reform and political liberty through the
employment of deregulatory strategies which called for state retraction and a greater
number of individual rights. The Peacock Report was pitched in the libertarian
political economic theories of Adam Smith and also shared the belief of Whig
Historians that the press was liberated from the state through the incorporation of
advertising finance throughout a series of historical repeals. Its conclusions are
primarily located around; the encouragement of a financial context for the
incorporation of new media technologies which have provided the pull for reform;
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substantive reforms to the traditional broadcasting organizations 'financial
arrangements in order to liberalise the market, and a concern with forging the
individual's political liberty by the removal of interventionist broadcasting regulatoiy
bodies.
Chapters five is concerned with the political phase of the policy. Chapter
five provides a textual analysis of the 1988 White Paper and 1990 Broadcasting Act
by comparing and contrasting these documents with the report in the areas of the new
media, broadcasting finance and regulation. This chapter is also designed to consider
whether the policy is internally coherent. It is concerned with the initial responses to
the report, the resurrection of some of its ideas and the imperatives of policy
management, clientelism, political will and ideology which contributed to the
evolution and creation of the 1990 Broadcasting Act. This period of governmental
policy-making was extremely complicated and was subject to departmental jealousies,
the dominant position of the Prime Minister within the cabinet, short-termism and
overt political intervention. A key irony of this process refers to the fact that the BBC
was initially the subject for government attention, but ITV actually became the subject
of the legislation. Fundamentally, the government was confronted with a report
advocating both economic and political freedom within broadcasting, whilst it
simultaneously pursued a crudely repressive policy by increasingly intervening during
periods of political crisis. It is therefore the purpose of this chapter to determine if the
government ever successfully reconciled the imperative of market freedom with its
own desire to tighten the flow of political communication.
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Chapters six and seven are concerned with the early implementation phase
of the 1990 Broadcasting Act. The implementation phase is divided into a numbeke
areas which I have drawn from Peacock's critique and recommendations for reform in
broadcasting; broadcasting finances (including the new media) and regulation.
Chapter six considers the effects of the legislation upon the finance of
broadcasting. It is concerned with the developments and changes which have occurred
as British broadcasting has started enter a new commercial phase. Therefore,it will be
concerned with the development of the new media channels, in particular the merger
of the two satellite channel companies British Satellite Broadcasting (BSB) and Sky.
The 1990 Act famously, or infamously (depending on your point of view),
included the recommendation to auction the ITV franchises. Although this
recommendation was substantially modified from the initial competitive tender
proposed in Peacock and the White Paper, as quality hurdles were included along with
an exceptional circumstances clause through a process of extensive industrial lobbying,
the subsequent franchise auction has removed significant sources of funding from the
ITV sector on an annual basis. The legislation also removed significant powers from
the Independent Broadcasting Authority's (IBA) successor, the Independent Television
Commission (ITC), in scheduling for public service commitments from the franchisees
and called for a Network Centre which would commission programmes. Therefore, it
is necessary to discuss how ITV has adapted to this more commercial system
dominated by advertising interests. The chapter outlines these developments and
considers whether the ITV system is more open or if a publicly regulated monopoly is
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being replaced by a commercial monopoly.
Further, it is concerned with the effect that this has had upon the BBC, which
is entering into a delicate phase as its charter is to be renewed in 1996. The BBC's
response has been to formulate a resources strategy entitled Producer Choice. This
chapter analyzes the policy, considers its genesis, the attitudes it reflects within the
BBC management and determines its significance within the corporation.
Chapter seven considers the issue of regulatory reform by analyzing the
regulation of commercial broadcasting with particular reference to the IBA's successor
---the ITC. This investigation considers the extent to which legal change has been
mediated through institutional and ideological continuity. Clearly, the regulatory body
is changing but has this change significantly exhibited the characteristics of
deregulation ? In particular, this chapter considers how the ITC supervised the 1991
franchise auction.
Therefore this study employs a mix of both a chronological and thematic
structure in order to analyze this policy and the policy outputs. Finally, in the
conclusion it will be necessary to draw the these strands together and comment upon
how this research may inform successive research work.
The cut-off date for the thesis is November 1992. This date was chosen partly
as it coincides with the second anniversary of the 1990 Act and with the Department
of National Heritage's (the new home for broadcasting) publication of The Future of
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the BBC and the BBC's response Extending Choice. 43 Although, there is a significant
overlap between the policy-cycle under investigation and the debate which will centre
upon the BBC's charter (which is particularly apparent in the chapter upon
broadcasting finance) this debate is presently unfolding and the future can only be
speculated upon. This further brings to notice a general problem with researching,
analyzing and writing a contemporaneous doctorate. Whilst, I believe that a number of
detectable trends can be drawn from the material, I remain mindful to qualify any
such conclusions with the inevitable possibility of unforeseen events, which might
significantly alter the shape and the outcome of any policy.
This thesis will draw upon the publicly available primary and secondary
material. The research sources include: official documentation from broadcasting
institutions and government departments; internal organizational documents; legal
documents, White Papers and Acts ; the minutes of Parliamentary debates and
Parliamentary committee debates ; reports on British broadcasting including the 1986
Peacock Report, the 1988 Home Affairs Committee report The Future of
Broadcasting, Charles Jonscher's report Subscription Television, the 1982 Hunt
Report and the 1977 Annan Report; published academic books, political memoirs and
journalistic accounts; specialist journal articles; an unpublished PhD thesis; written
evidence to the Peacock Committee ; trade journals such as Broadcast and TV Week;
the extensive use of daily press articles from The Guardian, the Financial Times, The
independent, The Daily Telegraph and The Times and legal reports. It should be noted
that a number of useful cabinet documents and official governmental memoranda,
including minutes of meetings, have been unavailable due to the thirty-year ruling.
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The thesis also has included selective interviews with policy-makers, regulators and
broadcasters. These interviews were not designed to be scientifically accurate, but
were used to test the accuracy of published material.
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CHAPTER ONE: DEREGULATION AND ITS IMPACT ON BROADCASTING
Throughout the last decade, and most especially since 1986, British
broadcasting has been perceived as undergoing a paradigmatic change. Therefore it is
the purpose of this thesis to analyze, explain and assess the major developments which
are occurring in the wake of what has been widely understood as an on-going
transition within the British broadcasting system. This transformation has been
commonly identified as a shift from a system orientated around the concept of public
service to one in which different core tenets such as free enterprise, competition and
commercialization have emerged alongside the traditional paradigm. Crucially,
questions pertaining to the future of the new media, finance and regulation within
broadcasting have been raised.
The broadcasting policy pursued by the Thatcher government (1979-1990)
evidenced a process of deregulation or regulatory reform' in which new policy goals
have become targeted such as 'light-touch' regulation and increased market-freedoms
(for example, freedom of entry for independent producers and actors from other
sectors of the media economy such as newspaper publishing). This developed in a
climate of economic and social libertarianism. As a political philosophy these
arguments have been termed 'Thatcherism' and may be seen as an amalgam of
market-liberal economic theory, an emphasis upon competitiveness and a return to
liberal theories stressing an emphasis of individual rights over state intervention.
Whether Thatcherism was a coherent philosophy remains questionable. 2
 However,
from such a perspective a partially nationalised, duopolistic broadcasting system was
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seen as apt for reform.
This implies that the developments affecting broadcasting can be seen to link
in with wider areas of British economic and social life. The Thatcher government was
understood as inaugurating an economic policy built upon the pillars of liberalization,
deregulation and most especially privatization. Indeed, some commentators have
suggested that Britain stood at the forefront of the privatization process and that the
strategies employed throughout the eighties have been exported to other advanced and
developing economies around the world. 3
 However, whilst privatization had an
important place in the Thatcher government's general economic policy and also within
the field of communications (for example, the selling off of British Telecom), it is not
directly applicable to the developments in broadcasting.
Privatization may take several forms including changes from public to private
ownership (for instance, the selling off of the public utilities including gas, water and
electricity) to the contracting out of public sector services to private companies (for
instance, local boroughs using private refuse collectors). While there may be
similarities in the government's motivations toward reforming broadcasting and a
number of parallels as the policy is implemented, it may be argued that rather
different processes located around deregulation have occurred. These may incorporate,
in their effects, the characteristics of privatization, but it was in terms of deregulation
that they were consciously pursued by the Thatcher government as a strategy.
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For example, there has been no essential alteration in British broadcasting's
pattern of ownership as is understood by students of Thatcherite privatization . The
industry has not been subject to the sell-offs which have affected other sectors of the
British economy as objective factors have meant that such a policy was deemed
inappropriate (for instance, the duopoly was founded upon a mixed economy of public
and private financing).
Thus, in order to the study the process of deregulation within broadcasting it
is necessary to consider the following: how has this policy evolved and what have
been the pressures and influences upon it? how will such a policy be implemented
and will elements of continuity or contradiction become manifest ? This chapter is
concerned with outlining an analytical framework through which these concerns can
be considered and to provide the reader with a background to the study of
deregulatory theories and policies.
It will be necessary to address the key arguments related to the concepts of
regulation and deregulation. Therefore, I will discuss the intellectual origins and
political currents which have contributed to the debate surrounding these concerns. As
deregulation has emerged from the United States, I shall draw on the academic
arguments and policy-making decisions which have been prevalent in America. In
turn, I will determine how these ideas were exported from the United States to other
advanced economies, in particular those within Western Europe, and I will
demonstrate the national varieties of deregulatory policy.
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I will discuss how these arguments were applied to the communications and
broadcasting industries. Again the arguments and policies of broadcasting deregulation
have emerged from the United States and it will be necessary to analyze how they
have reached fruition within the US political mainstream. The exportation of
deregulatory policies for broadcasting systems has paralleled developments in other
industries and I shall consider how they were taken up in Western Europe. The
national culture, the political constellation of forces, the nature of the industry and
the traditional regulatory environments have all remained of importance and have
shaped the variation of policies.
In the conclusion, I will consider the questions which are raised by an analysis
of international deregulatory policies and how they apply to the United Kingdom's
broadcasting policy. This analysis will crystallize the key issues and it will place this
study in the context of related academic literature.
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1:1. THE MOTIVATIONS. ARGUMENTS AND DYNAMICS FOR
DEREGULATION
The process of deregulation may be identified if its 'mirror'
	 regulation is
considered. Leigh Hancher and Michael Moran have stated that regulation can be
defined as either; the making and enforcing of a legal or administrative set of rules or
the means through which systemic equilibrium is maintained (for instance, a process
which allows for the stabilization and perpetuation of a system or order). 4
 Hancher
and Moran employ an analogy from nature commenting:
When a physical system is controlled by a 'governor' which automatically returns it
to a state of equilibrium, we commonly picture it as undergoing a process of
regulation. "
In turn, deregulation can be perceived as encompassing two inter-linked
processes. First, deregulation, in its most formal sense, may be seen as referring to
the abolition, alteration and amendment of administrative or legal rules which have
been employed to govern a specific economic or social activity. For instance, such a
policy may be pursued in an industry which has been controlled by a monopoly in
order to make that industry more competitive to the market.
However, in this simplistic account
	 deregulation's hidden complexity is
omitted. For example, any amendment of rules may take on a number of different
forms and create a reconstituted regulatory environment which could not have been
previously envisaged. It would appear that when a complete cancellation of rules takes
place a clear case of deregulation has occurred, yet such a cancellation may well mean
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that more general or other applicable rules come into consideration, thereby producing
a different regulatory order with its own set of dynamics. In addition, deregulation is
complicated as rules can alter but traditional implementation procedures may still
apply.
Thus, whilst such rule removals, amendments and alterations remain important
factors in regulatory policy, an analysis based solely on this understanding is mitigated
by its failure to provide an understanding of the phenomenon's complexity, most
especially within areas of ideology and motivation. Consequently, it is more helpful to
perceive deregulation in the light of the second definition of regulation --- systemic
equilibrium.
From this perspective, deregulation may be seen to occur when commentators,
policy-makers and actors from a particular sector of the economy or society concur
that regulation cannot successfully fulfil the objective of systemic equilibrium. It is
seen that there has been a breakdown in the mechanisms which have held the system
at a point of equilibrium or what Hancher and Moran define as systemic dislocation.6
This means that the search for new methods of "balancing changes in economic costs
and social benefits of regulation (are) the (stimuli) for deregulation." 7
 Ironically, the
purpose of pursuing deregulatory policies is to discover a solution for the disturbances
to the systemic equilibrium by attempting to dismantle or remove the governors which
previously held it in place.
To measure the nature and impact of deregulation, Hancher and Moran have
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employed the concept of regulatory space. 8 This concept requires definition and it
may be best understood by an analysis of spatial parameters. As Hancher and Moran
comment:
We can ... speak of 'regulatory space' whose dimensions and occupants can be
understood by examining regulation in any particular national setting, and by
analyzing that setting in terms of its political, legal and cultural attributes."9
Hancher and Moran continue by refining these broad themes into a more
complex description of the issues which affect the nature and extent of regulatory
control:
"The boundaries which demarcate regulatory space are defined in turn by a range of
issues, so it is sensible to speak of regulatory space as encompassing a range of
regulatory issues in a community. In these terms regulatory space may be furiously
contested. Its occupants are involved in an often ferocious struggle for advantage. Any
investigation of the concept involves examining the outcomes of competitive
struggles, the resources used in these struggles, and the distribution of those resources
between the different involved institutions. In other words the play of power is at the
centre of this process."°
This means that to analyze economic regulation, the reviewer's attention
should be focused upon the participants who occupy the arena of 'regulatory space', a
consideration of who is included and excluded within these relations and whether this
is a systematic process, a discussion of how power is devolved between major and
minor players and an analysis of the forces that shape regulatory ideology and
implementation. This is a study of the brokerage of economic power in western
societies. The key to understanding is founded upon the observation that the most
important relation in economic regulation is the relationship between competing
organizations. Accordingly economic regulation:
43
under advanced capitalism is therefore best conceived as an activity occurring in
economics where the public and private are characteristically mixed, where the
dominant actors are powerful and sophisticated organizations, and where the biggest
firms have taken on many of the features of governing institutions." 12
From this point of view, a number of issues need to be addressed, clarified,
explained and assessed: what organizations are included or excluded in exercising
influence upon regulatory policies? what has been the relative power of those
included companies? and what is the scope of regulatory issues?
The importance of setting and culture cannot be underestimated as they
provide the context in which regulatory rules and agencies are formulated and
realized. The common feature of the conditions for regulation is variation: variation in
terms of national setting, historical timing and industrial environment. This, in turn,
means that different expectations are placed upon regulation, upon who are the
legitimate players and about the consistency of relations between these actors. Thus an
analysis of culture signifies " an interest in the recurrent tension between common
structural forces shaping regulation ... and the idiosyncrasies introduced by unique
historical, national and industrial settings."3
As deregulation is the mirror image of regulation, it may also be conceived in
terms of 'regulatory space'. As with regulation, deregulation has a location in space,
in time and in particular economic and political settings. The origins and the speed of
the process are to be observed in where and when it takes place.' 4
 Therefore in
assessing deregulation a number of criteria can be used to tell one about the nature,
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speed and implementation of this process:
Place - a study of how the external challenge of deregulation has affected a
country's domestic political arrangements and an investigation of how the existing
national institutional structures have responded to such pressures. Therefore, the rate
of incidence of change in regulatory rulings and the extent to which the traditional
governors have been reformed or removed should be noted. Thus, it is necessary to
determine the resilience of the state's regulatory order which is invariably conditional
upon:
i) the nation's domestic culture which can be measured through a discussion
of the economic system, its institutional practices and its legal and political culture.
This national configuration of interests demonstrates how deregulators have to take
into account the interests which have supported the regulatory order and the effect that
powerful client groups can have upon regulatory reform; and
ii) the state's position in the international economic order. In recent years
deregulatory policies have been generally been exported from powerful national
economies to smaller ones. The success of deregulation in a particular country is, in
many ways, dependent upon the country's place in the world economic order and how
far its economic objectives are located around national or international market goals.
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Time - Two variables of time may be applied to deregulation. First,
deregulation is subject to historical time, for example deregulatory episodes are
closely associated with economic booms and slumps. Moreover, deregulation has been
allied to the rapid economic and technical developments which have been achieved
throughout the last two decades. The pace of change has been an important variable
for governments.
The second variable of time is 'regulatory' or 'deregulatory' time. This is
subject to two forms of temporal variation. Regulatory time applies to the length of
time a particular regulatory regime has been in operation. The establishment of
regulatory structures and the accompanying entrenchment of attitudes are crucial
factors. It also refers to the process of regulatory or deregulatory sequencing (for
example, was the nation an early or a late deregulator ?). The early deregulators have
been highly influential as they have not only laid the foundations for deregulatory
theory, but have also demonstrated how deregulation may be accomplished in practice.
This means that the patterns of regulatory reform may, to a greater or lesser extent,
be seen to have been exported from early to late regulators.
Arena - This factor is important in two senses; in assessing how far an
economic sector is a suitable arena for deregulation and in determining how policy
objectives are fashioned in relation to the 'economic arena' they refer to.
Even a broad inspection of government policies and practices demonstrates
different approaches toward certain industries. Some industries have evidenced major
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transformations in their supervision and economic structure provoked through the
implementation of deregulatory procedures. Other activities have remained lightly
touched due to the co-ordination of economic interests, the type of services they are
expected to provide and the normative objectives of the regulatory agencies which
have been created to supervise their running.
Several factors may shape an industry's suitability to deregulation. For
instance, technology may be an 'exogenous' factor which, by its very presence, means
that old regulatory frameworks and policies are forced to alter as they have become
outmoded and anachronistic. Invariably, economies which have undergone some form
of internationalization have become more susceptible to deregulatory reform, as the
international economic order has undergone a major transformation recently resulting
in the creation of an integrated international marketplace which is sensitive to
substantial changes in national economies.
The ability of an industry to undergo regulatory reform may also be said to
contribute to the definition of policy practices. A critical concern is the extent to
which an issue is allocated in a policy network or policy community. Important issues
comprise; i) whether an economic activity has been internationalized and ii) the extent
to which there are common procedures and goals, instead of loosely organized and
inarticulated demands. Moreover, if an industry is subject to technological innovation
policymakers are more likely to be impelled to pursue the arguments for greater
choice and market freedom.
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Therefore, with this organizational framework in mind it will be necessary to
determine how and why these concepts have become vital to governmental policy.
Further, through a consideration of these criteria it will be useful to analyze the nature
and extent of deregulation both in the general economy and the communications
industries. To carry out these objectives, I will begin by investigating the theories
which have been traditionally employed to justify state regulation.
1:2. THE THEORIES AND PRACTICES OF REGULATION
Regulation has been generally conceived in two ways. First, there are forms
of self-regulation which may be employed internally within an economic or social
organization. In the case of a company there may be a number of rules to define
practices, develop incentives such as promotion or administer discipline including
fines or dismissals. Second, external regulation may occur when regulatory control is
exercised by a body which stands outside of the regulated sector. This may take the
form of a governmental department or that of a professional body. I intend to focus
upon this second understanding of regulation.
External regulation is justified by the belief that the allocation of resources in
any economic or social endeavour can be improved upon rather than being left to the
market. It is contended that regulation, by providing systemic order, produces a more
efficient use of resources which is socially beneficial and may stem monopolization.
This efficiency argument underpins all forms of regulation providing the rationale for
state intervention. This has taken several forms, although it should be noted that there
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are no hard and fast lines between the different types of regulation.
First, there is economic regulation. The origins of economic regulation are
drawn from the Anti-Trust legislation which occurred throughout the late nineteenth
and early twentieth century, predominantly in the United States. State regulation was
primarily introduced when 'free competition' was considered to have failed the market
or ... in other words, the recognition that the market processes might operate
inefficiently led to the conclusion that, in principle, at least, government action was
justifiable to correct this inefficiency. 15 Moreover such inefficiency had allowed for
the proliferation of monopolies who could dominate the market at the expense of the
rest of the economy and to the detriment of the public interest. The early state
regulatory agencies were created with this concern in mind and took the form of
boards of inquiry such as the Interstate Commerce Commission who regulated the
U.S. railroad throughout the 1880s) 6
 Traditionally, economic regulation has been
seen to act in the public or consumer interest. As Jill Hills has noted:
To sum up, regulation by government of industry is intended to effect a transfer of
wealth from one group to another. In general, that transfer is intended to take place
from producers to consumers, and regulation is intended to benefit the consumer." 17
With the establishment of these 'public interest' tenets, economic regulation
was developed throughout the twentieth century in a variety of ways. Regulation on a
day-to-day level was not a fixed operational practice. Its realization was dependent
upon a number of objective factors which may be unique to the industry or service
which is being regulated.
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For instance, in certain industries monopolization may prove to be the most
efficient allocation of resources due to economic, technological or natural reasons.
However, as the monopoly should not be allowed to freely exploit its position in the
market, state regulations have been introduced to protect market and individual
freedoms. For instance, licensing may be used to control prices, profitability and
service. In broadcasting, a public monopoly allowed for the most efficient deployment
of resources due the restrictions of the 'limited electromagnetic spectrum' of airwaves,
which stemmed the number of possible suppliers. Thus, traditional state broadcasting
regulation has comprised of licenses to govern the industry's economic order (for
example, anti-trust style or cross ownership controls in the same geographic market),
and controls over programme content.
There are other industries in which the minimization of unit costs has dictated
the need for regulation. In the transportation industries the argument has taken on the
form of the destructive or excessive competition thesis. For example, the railway
industry's financial structure, including heavy and fixed investment and the relatively
low costs of operations, has meant that the sector was prone to price-cutting during
periods of recession or over-capacity, thereby provoking retaliatory cuts which
produced a situation where prices fall to a marginal cost. To preclude this likelihood
or to end such a cost-war, railroad companies have developed through a regulatory
framework price-fixing or market-sharing agreements.
In addition, such excessive competition can be seen as being detrimental to the
whole of the economy. For instance, if the banking system collapsed due to such
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tactics, the whole of the financial system would fall with it. Consequently, in the
United States a number of rules were introduced to stop individual banks from taldng
untenable risks and if these measures failed further protection was available via a
deposit insurance scheme. Moreover, in the last resort the Federal Reserve Board
existed as a final money lender in order to stem financial disorder.
As the last illustration demonstrates, economic regulation was deemed by
policy-makers to be mutually beneficial for both the citizen and the good of the
national and international economic system. Consequently, the theories of economic
regulation were enhanced as they became synonymous with the Welfare Economics or
Keynesian consensus within the general state and international economic theories. The
'public interest' would be most 'efficiently' served by interventionist state practices
including regulation.' 8
 In particular, standard economic theory produced a strong
argument for the regulation of monopolies, as monopolies were understood as
artificially restricting individuals from trading with each other:
"This is most obviously seen where a monopoly is formed through an agreement
between those already in a trade to restrict new entrants. If a taxi-cab must buy a
licence before he is permitted to carry passengers, his freedom to contract with others
has been clearly reduced. The number of taxis in the industry will be lower than it
would otherwise be, and we may surmise that there will exist both frustrated taxi-
drivers and passengers. From the point of view of the economist, it is the potential
benefits from enabling extra producers and consumers to contract with one another to
their mutual advantage that constitute 'efficiency gains' from regulating monopolies
and policing restrictive agreements."9
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The same arguments were employed by proponents of social and
environmental regulation. Historically, these types of regulation have only entered the
political mainstream in recent years, deriving extensively from United States President
Lyndon Johnson's 'Great Society' programme in the l960s. They are concerned with
pollution, consumer information, safety, workplace health procedures, racial and
sexual discrimination, and environmental protection.
They similarly hail from the market failure thesis. Thus, social regulations
were designed to safeguard public's interest which the market could not be expected to
fulfil through the operation of the profit motive. For instance, in the case of pollution
it is clearly in the public interest if noxious and toxic substances are properly disposed
of in spite of the expenses incurred by the manufacturer.
Moreover, the establishment of economic and social regulations in
governmental policy was enhanced through the proliferation of regulatory agencies
designed to govern finances and industries. Through the evolution of regulatory rules,
processes and their own working practices, regulators have played an influential role
in determining policies and setting out the procedures employed to conduct activities
within the sectors under their jurisdiction. Consequently, regulatory agencies have had
an extensive influence upon their respective sectors, and industries have been forced
to accommodate themselves to these institutions. This has resulted in regulatory
agencies being effectively placed at the crux of many areas of government policy.
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However, as Jill Hills comments by making these practices " public and
codified ... government comes under pressure to alter the rules in favour of certain
interests and it tends to have less flexibility." 20
 Therefore, as this development has
taken shape a paradox emerged as such institutionalism not only exposed the system's
growth in power, but opened it up to extensive criticisms which, combined with
economic recession and governmental insecurity, served to undermine its stability.
1:3. THE RISE OF DEREGULATION
The 'regulation-as-efficiency' model become questioned by economists who
brought different perceptions to the issue of regulation. These arguments were
developed principally in the United States (due in no small measure to the wide extent
of regulation within the US and its importance as an advanced economy).
Several sources may be cited in the development of this literature. An
investigation of regulation's historical origins revealed that owners' interests had
provided the original motivation for such practices. The revisionist historian Gabriel
Kolko studied early railway regulation in the United States and concluded that it had
been implemented to aid railroad owners. 2 ' The political scientist Marver H.
Bernstein wrote a study upon independent regulatory commissions and argued that
these organii.ations went through several stages: gestation, youth, maturity, debility
and decline. In this final stage, he posited that a commission will preserve the status
quo and act in the industry's, rather than the public, interest.22
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However, the crucial extension to this theory was drawn from the work of the
economist George Stigler. In a number of papers, Stigler considered the implications
of US regulation upon electricity prices and the securities market. In the former, he
compared prices between regulated and non-regulated states and discovered that once
certain factors were eliminated (for example, population density or the availability of
hydro-electric power), there was no evidence to show that prices were any lower in
regulated states than non-regulated areas. In another paper, he contrasted the
performance of new share issues both before and after the creation of the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC). Once again, it was discovered that if regulatory
costs were taken into account, it was doubtful as to whether the SEC could provide a
cost-effective service which benefited the consumer.23
From these studies, Stigler developed the economic theory of regulation,
which had severe implications for the efficiency model. His basic argument was that
government regulation existed as a commodity, upon which the forces of demand and
supply were applicable. 24
 As Veljanovski comments:
Regulations have an economic value because they redistribute wealth from one
group to another. The demand for regulation comes from interest groups and the
theory of cartels provides some clues to the factors influencing this demand. The
supply of legislation comes from politicians who are 'paid' for the product not in
money but in terms of votes and political patronage. Bureaucrats also have an
influence on the nature of government involvement and they are seen as essentially
national and self-interested."23
The emphasis was shifted away from a study of the motivation for welfare
economics to an investigation of how bureaucracies operated and the manner in which
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political decision-making occurred. The basic assumptions of this new approach were
founded upon an important value judgement:
that people in their political behaviour should not be assumed to be motivated by
fundamentally different forces than their private choice-making behaviour."26
This alternative approach evolved into the theory of regulatory capture. This
questioned regulation as a method of protecting the public interest. In place of the
public interest theory, it emphasised a process which meant that regulatory policies
had been enacted and implemented for the interests of the producer groups. It was
argued:
As a rule, regulation is acquired by the industry and is designed and operated
primarily for its benefit."27
In turn, the implications of these arguments were to be developed by the
followers of supply-side economics or monetarism, in particular the 'Chicago School'
including Stigler, Milton Friedman, R.H. Coase and Harold Demetz. 28
 Their work
proved to be of key influence throughout the Sixties and Seventies in informing general
economic policies in both advanced and developing nations. 29
 The gist of their
arguments can be found in Friedman's economic analysis which built upon the
connection between economic freedom and political liberty. 30
 From this perspective,
state intervention was regressive and insidious. He attacked state restrictions which he
perceived as including registration, certification and licensing.3'
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Regulation was equally seen as a pernicious force, as it mitigated the potential
market benefits of competition. Although 'Chicago school' members agreed with
Stigler's definition of regulatory capture, they were keen to extend their attack by
arguing for the benefits of deregulation. 32
 Whilst admitting that the market is far
from perfect, they contended that it was better than the other available regulatory
options. It was argued that the market is a self-regulatory system in which the
attraction of profits induces other companies to breech monopolist control and create
more efficient practices which can undercut the dominant firms. Thus the solution to
monopoly exists within the market itself. Therefore, as regulatory capture has been
accompanied by the perpetuation of monopolies, deregulation provides the only
mechanism through which resources may be efficiently allocated.33
A further justification for a deregulated market was based on the assertion that
the level of monopoly and the real inefficiencies within the economy were not that
significant. Therefore, the welfare economic arguments were inappropriate as many
of the practices they had defined as being either monopolistic or inefficient were
founded upon solid economic principles.35
Concurrent developments also served to challenge the arguments for
regulation. In particular, technology has acted as an agent of change and has altered
the structures of certain industries. 36
 For example, it has often meant that an
industry, which had previously been perceived as being most advantageously
organized through a natural monopoly, could become increasingly competitive.
Through technological alternatives, public expectations were increased thereby pre-
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empting the adaptation of regulatory governors despite institutional or ideological
resistance.37
This has occurred within the communications and broadcasting industries. For
instance, the US broadcasting regulator, the Federal Communications Commission
(FCC) was initially resistant to the proliferation of cable and satellite channels,
preferring to protect the existing terrestrial services. 38
 However, due to the demands
of pressure groups and private interests for greater access to the newly available air-
waves, it was forced to acquiesce. Consequently, technical advances, by reforming the
economic order of various industries, have encouraged greater regularity flexibility.39
In the United States this has meant that policy goals have been directed toward
deregulation.
Other economic changes have led to regulatory reforms and the introduction
of deregulatory policies, notably the chronic instability which affected advanced
western economies throughout the last two decades. Economic failures, such as
recession or inflation, have had a profound effect upon the regulatory policies and
agencies who were considered as contributory factors to such financial collapses. The
credibility of the welfare economics of Keynesianism were undermined by market
failure, and state regulations were also subjected to severe criticism.
Principally, economic regulation was seen to have led to an inefficient re-
allocation of resources. As competition was inhibited, the opportunities for
profitability, growth and investment were restricted. For example, US energy
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regulators balked at raising prices to combat rising costs, thereby constraining growth.
Moreover, regulation was characterized as being inept, inefficient and a distortion of
the market.
Whilst this phenomenon varied from nation to nation, due to differences in
national economic policy, culture and ideology, regulation was increasingly the target
of governmental and popular discontent. This was at its most extreme within the
United States where the population had developed a deep historical antipathy towards
regulation. In the United States distrust of the Federal government was further
precipitated by the failure of the Vietnam War and the Watergate Scandal. As Susan
and Martin Tolchin have commented:
regulation had become the natural whipping boy, and it was easier to lay the
blame at the feet of the faceless bureaucrats in Washington than on mismanagement,
(and) the greed of organized labour ... (in the mid) seventies the pendulum movement
so typical of American politics, public opinion began to swing inexorably toward the
private sector, in sympathy with its case against regulation: the uncertainty; the high
costs of paperwork; its unnecessary delays; the inequities; and the negative impact on
the market provision of individual industries within the world economy."40
These criticisms were echoed throughout advanced western economic thinking
as these economies had suffered from market failure, recession and decline. The
development of such arguments w
	 also conditional upon the nature of the country's
economy, political cultural and regulatory practices. For example, in Britain
deregulation was closely tied in with the imported arguments of monetarism which
were to influence Sir Keith Joseph's i re-think' in the seventies.
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In addition, the calls for deregulation were influenced by the consumer and
environmental lobbies. These pressure groups often attacked social and economic
regulatory agencies. The consumer movement's activities escalated throughout the
sixties and seventies, and European consumer groups were critical of the airline
regulations which had allowed a cartel of international airline companies to
monopolize the market through their control of routes and ticket prices.
Therefore the combination of new economic theories, economic instability and
reforming influences served to place deregulatory policies at the centre of the political
mainstream. Whilst the objectives of deregulation fostered a climate of consensus
within the advanced nation's economic and social policymakers, it remained to be seen
how the resulting policies would be enacted.
1:4. THE DEREGULATORY IMPULSE WITHIN POLICY
As it was the most regulated nation in the world, the United States was not
only the leader in developing the theory of deregulation, but further proved to the
leader in carrying out these reforms. Throughout the seventies and eighties, the
federal government's interventionist powers were reduced. During Ronald Reagan's
presidency, this dynamic was heightened by the administration's desire to dismantle
federalist powers by devolving them to the states. 4 ' Additionally, commentators have
concluded that the US's hegemonic role within the world economy has had a major
bearing on the exportation of deregulation:
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Deregulation in the US has exerted a very considerable influence in policy thinking
and policy actions in other parts of the world ... The particular feature of US
deregulation which has rendered it highly influential ... was its scope; across the
board the system of regulation was subjected to intense inquiry and in some cases
radical treatment."42
A leading example of the deregulatory impulse was the American airline
industry which had been subjected to comprehensive economic regulation through the
1938 Civil Aeronautics Act. This set up the framework for the government
subsidization of commercial carriers and, despite the phasing out of these subsidies
during the fifties, meant that the federal government was unwilling to encourage the
entry of new competitors. Moreover, the industry was governed by the Civil
Aeronautics Board (CAB) which was responsible for the certification of routes and
carriers. In this capacity, it held on to a tremendous degree of power and in practice
tended to rule in favour of the status quo by restricting alternative carriers' attempts to
bid for existing routes. As such, the industry was dominated by a cartel of major
airlines and regulatory capture may be seen to have characterized their relationship
with the CAB.
These regulatory powers were initially criticised by economists. However, the
combination of the introduction of wide body jets, the 1973 Oil Crisis and the CAB's
response to these imperatives enhanced the case for regulatory reform. In 1975 Gerald
Ford's administration began to develop legislation which would lead to the
deregulation of the industry. Throughout the following years, the CAB's control was
systematically loosened, as reforms such as 'supersaver fares' were introduced. After
several years of debate and incremental deregulation, the 1978 Airline Deregulation
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Act was passed. The Act's intentions are summarized by Steven A. Morrison:
"The thrust of the airline deregulation movement was to rely on market forces, rather
than the wisdom of regulators to allocate air transportation resources. The rationale
for this came from the belief that a more competitive environment would exist without
regulation because airline markets could satisfy the conditions for workable
competition: relatively free entry and no significant advantage to large firms. The
primary anticipated benefits of a competitive environment were a better mix of price
and service quality and lower labour costs."43
The Act was designed to remove the previous obstacles to the independent
entry, routes, fares and service differentiation. Moreover, it abolished the Civil
Aeronautics Board from January 1st 1985 and placed the remaining light-touch
regulatory functions into the hands of the Department of Transportation. This was
done to breakdown the perceived 'capture' of the Board and to limit the interventionist
powers of the successive regulatory actors.
Morrison has concluded that the implementation of these policies proved to be
dramatic. First, he comments that traveller s benefited from lower fares and
advantageous scheduling procedures. Secondly, he argues that the carriers gained, as
they could provide services on the routes they wished to fly and could charge fares in
relation to market conditions. In addition, he contends that groups such as airline
labour and small, outlying communities, who some had predicted would suffer under
deregulation, have not been that adversely affected. However, Morrison
inadvertently demonstrates that the industry's structure haJ not been significantly
altered, and essentially deregulation had merely loosened the oligopolistic ties which
had governed the industry, as the six major national carriers retained their status and
power.45
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The deregulation of the US airline industry was far-reaching. The influence of
these reforms was conditional upon the nature of the industry and the
political/ideological will which was exerted within the policymaking stages. However,
it not only demonstrated the scope of these policies, but made conspicuous the
qualifications upon this legislation. For example, in spite of the industrial
transformations the major airlines remained dominant.
Further, the airline industry illustrates how deregulation may be exported to
other nations. As the industry was subjected to international regulations, jurisdiction
has been shared equally amongst nations. Therefore, once the United States had
deregulated its national airline industry, other countries were forced to react as they
were responsible, within their own air-space, for overseeing companies who could
now alter prices and bid for alternative routes. From 1978 to 1983, the US
renegotiated most of its bi-lateral agreements with European and Asian nations,
thereby pre-empting the partial deregulation of the other countries' airline industries.
The role model for such agreements was the US-Netherlands bilateral agreement
which included the removal of capacity frequency restrictions by granting unlimited
charter rights between any point in either country.46
So whilst the exportation of deregulation may be partially accounted for by the
success of these arguments on the consciousness of political elites, the implementation
of these policies and the increased tendencies towards internationalization have
precipitated the deregulatory momentum. For example, Dennis Swann has shown how
the integrative nature of international financial markets has contributed to this domino
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effect:
Thanks to the technological developments all the main financial centres are now
linked --- this is often referred to as the globalization of the financial system. Once
one centre deregulates and process (continues) other centres are forced to follow suit -
-- otherwise trade is deflected to the lower cost centre."47
The importance of this form of deregulatory sequencing is crucial. As there
were early and late industrializing countries, there have similarly been early and late
regulators and deregulators. 48
 This sequencing is critical as regulation and
deregulation are social processes in which copying proliferates. They have evolved
through a process of diffusion as it has proved easier to reproduce an existing model
instead of formulating a new set of arrangements. Consequently, the influence of the
early deregulators has been vital in shaping the various forms of deregulation across
nations. Moreover, this movement has by-passed the traditional ideological split
between Left and Right, as, for instance, French Socialists (after the failure of the
Keynesian experiment in 1982) have been just as willing to embrace these policies as
the British Conservative Party under Margaret Thatcher during the eighties.49
However, it is an oversimplification to simply see the ripples of deregulation
emerging from the US epi-centre to the rest of the advanced and developing world.50
This fails to take into account the objective factors which have shaped national and
international deregulatory policies. The deregulatory impulse within Western European
states has substantively diverged from the American experience. Distinctive national
configurations and political cultures, mediated through bargaining and clientelism,
have influenced the politicians' and policymakers' receptiveness toward deregulation.
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Moreover, their attitudes and concerns may also be entrenched due to the longevity of
the existing regulatory regime.
For instance, in Denmark and Austria the traditional regulatory agencies and
rules received the support of powerful client groupings. Thus, deregulation in these
countries has tended to be circumscribed by the composition of elite groups and
normative practices. In contrast, in Britain,due to the national configuration of
political will, ideological reform and client groups, policymakers favoured
deregulation and were determined to activate and implement these policies throughout
the national economy. As Anthony Smith has commented:
"The term (deregulation) was imported to Britain in the mid-1970s, but more by the
new right than the left. Deregulation in Britain was rather different from that of the
United States, although the same term was used. The UK's deregulators wanted and
have very largely achieved a reform of the country's management-workforce
relationships; they wanted more industry to be available for private investment;they
wanted companies to serve the consumer with greater keenness, with better and more
competitive products and services and at lower prices. They wanted millions of people
to start accumulating shares and other property. They were trying in fact to revive the
whole industrial economy by ensuring better services and supports of all kinds,
especially in the newly burgeoning field of telecommunications. The term deregulation
acquired wider and wider usage in their hands. It had much more to do with changing
attitudes, with creating a new class of entrepreneurs, with manipulating change in
society at large than had deregulation in the US."5'
Therefore, the extent to which a regulatory regime is reformed is dependent
upon the mediation of competing interests and priorities at a national level due to the
position of national institutional structures, and legal and political culture. Thus,
deregulation's shape varies significantly from country to country.52
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Deregulatory policies are further shaped from industry to industry. Whilst a
number of industries have been subjected to vast administrative and organizational
changes, others have remained virtually untouched. This has been reflective of certain
industrial practices which have proved more accessible for the introduction of
deregulation due to their needs, traditional regulatory frameworks and their propensity
for technological advancement.
The attempts to deregulate the British financial system indicate how national
and industrial factors can shape these reforms. Historically, the British financial
system was founded upon anti-competitive and restrictive practices which often
suggested a de-facto, non-legislative and flexible approach to regulation. The system's
peculiarities also combined with a unique set of industrial characteristics which served
to differentiate it from other sectors. These comprised: a heterogenous industry
consisting of bank and security traders who, whilst sharing the same aims, employed
very different business practices; many conflicting macro and micro issues; constantly
changing market conditions ; new technologies and, with these constant alterations, a
series of new economic conditions resulting in the rise of the financial
conglomerations and the internationalization of the money markets. Consequently,
deregulation had to take into account a series of invariably conflicting imperatives.
David T. Llewllyn comments:
A major theme has been that the current pressures on regulation have been diverse,
and these in turn have produced regulatory arrangements, which have been equally
varied. The structure and operation of regulation has been changing in several
directions simultaneously. The conclusion is that deregulation is at best an ambiguous
concept when applied to the British financial system. A more accurate description is
that the regulatory matrix has changed with some aspects of deregulation matched by
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more intensive regulation."53
Therefore, two central factors related to deregulatory policy have become
apparent. First, throughout the advanced economic world deregulatory theories have
achieved a consensus amongst policymakers, despite these governments' political
position on the Left or Right. Second, in terms of implementation, the most consistent
finding has been the inconsistency of deregulatory policy as it has been conditional
upon national political, cultural and industrial requirements. It now remains to be seen
how these theories were applied and developed in the context of the communications
and, most especially, the broadcasting industries, and to note how these objective
factors have subsequently shaped the nature and scope of these policies within these
sectors.
1:5. THE APPLICATION OF THE DEREGULATORY IMPULSE TO THE
COMMUNICATIONS AND BROADCASTING INDUSTRIES: THE UNITED
STATES
Throughout the decade between 1975 and 1985, the deregulation of the
communications and broadcasting industries began in the United States. Two factors
may be perceived as contributing to this movement. First, a general consensus existed
between politicians, policymakers and sections of these industries that deregulation
would benefit both the national economy and specific areas within it. Jeremy Tunstall
has noted:
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Washington is a city of fashions. The political climate changes every two years, and
1974 was a year of exceptional change. There was the expansion of congressional
staffs, among whom was found a key deregulatory fervour. The staff of the House
sub-committee on communications was of this kind from 1976 onward. Deregulation
was the fashion, and the many subtle shades of deregulation made it all the more
attractive. "
Second, the communications technologies revolution meant that major
transformations within the distribution of communications were becoming available for
business and domestic use. Effectively, two decades of new technology had been let
loose in a single decade. The changes had emerged from the military experiments
carried out during World War Two. They comprised: a computer revolution hastened
by cryptography ; microwave technology drawn from radar and rockets, for launching
satellites, developed from German V 1 and V2 missiles. These developments combined
to enable access to greater number of communications links and also meant that new
or different broadcasters could enter the market to provide services.55
Jill Hills has commented that these new hardware devices provided a
challenge to the traditional monopolies who had dominated the communications and
broadcasting industries. 56
 The justification for a highly regulated broadcasting
monopoly had been founded upon the scarcity of the air-wave spectrum. Yet "the
liberalization of equipment (increased) the demand for the liberalization of
transmission which in turn (increased) the demand for the liberalization of
equipment." 57
 So while the technological limitations had resulted in the previous
compliance of these industries with the normative forms of regulation, the more recent
technological developments made these regulatory structures appear increasingly
anachronistic, irrelevant, bureaucratic and inefficient as a means for the proper re-
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allocation of resources. Moreover, the opening of the market-place to cable and
satellite provided opportunities for the hardware manufacturers to invest in research
and increase their profitability.
The combination of a deregulatory consensus and a radically reformed market,
instigated through technological change, has been understood by Tunstall as follows:
the twin revolutions in technology and regulation are indeed revolutionary,
especially if one takes them together. It is the combination of running technology on
'fast forward' while running regulation on 'fast backward' that has produced the
radical change. Or the image can be altered slightly to 'two steps forward and two
steps
The deregulation of the US communications industry conformed to this model. It was
a long-running process which took over sixteen years to produce its first substantive
piece of legislation, but in the meantime drastically altered the industrial and
regulatory conditions. It started in an ad-hoc manner in which specific areas of the
communications and broadcasting economies were targeted for reform during Gerald
Ford's brief interregnum presidency between 1974 and l977. This occurred
through the appointment of Clay Whitehead to the Office of Telecommunications
Policy and via legal judgements such as the anti-trust case against the national
telephone company AT&T/Bell.6°
Jimmy Carter's presidential term (1977-8 1) heralded an increase in the pace of
deregulation. The House of Representatives Communications sub-committee, chaired
by Lionel Van Deekin, set the agenda by attempting to alter the 1934 Communications
Act. 61
 From 1978 to 1980, a number of 'rewrite' bills were presented to the House.
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Although none of these bills was passed, AT&T/Bell's image was immeasurably
tarnished as a result. Competitive practices were also deemed to be beneficial by the
regulators themselves. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) revised its
long-held resistance to deregulation by reviewing radio and cable licences, and in
April 1980 passed the Computer II decision which gave AT&T greater freedom in its
transmission of data.62
When Ronald Reagan took office in 1981, communications deregulation
accelerated as it fitted in with the admintration's general monetarist policies. Reagan
appointed Mark Fowler as head of the FCC, and deregulatory activity peaked during
Reagan's first term (198 1-1985). This began with Congress's extension of radio and
television licences to seven and five years respectively, and culminated in the
showpiece 1984 Cable Telecommunications Act which massively deregulated cable
services. 63
 In between, two other decisions shaped the pace of change, both
occurring in January 1982. The old AT&T/Bell monopoly was relieved of its local
services control and IBM's dominance of the computer market was reinforced by its
release from an anti-trust case.M All these reforms were significant of an
increasingly competitive set of market arrangements.
Whilst this period evidenced the rise of deregulation, the implementation of
this policy has again illustrated the general features which have been understood as
accompanying deregulatory policy. The peculiarities of the national configuration of
interests, the regulatory structures and the industrial environment have all shaped the
nature and scope of deregulation within broadcasting. It should be noted that the
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American market model for broadcasting was based upon the private interest power of
the national radio (later television) networks --- ABC, CBS, NBC --- and the system,
apart from a peripheral public service, never received public funds.
The pattern of traditional US broadcasting regulation arose from a process of
bargaining and clientelism. There were a number of confusions to begin with. A US
court decision ruled that the Commerce Department should not be able to act as
licensor and then Congress attempted to reform the resulting chaos as the limited
spectrum of airwaves became over-run with national and local radio stations when the
1927 Radio Act entrusted the supervision of licences to the Interstate Commerce
Commission (ICC). 65
 As these arrangements proved to be unsatisfactory (as the
legislation had given little information upon how the ICC should enact its brief)
Congress decided to clarify the supervision of radio in the 1934 Federal
Communications Act which created a new regulatory body --- the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) --- to act as licensing body.
Although the FCC was a quasi-independent state authority and held a measure
of legal autonomy, it was subject to several pressures. Politically, the body's
composition was controlled by presidential patronage. In turn, the appointees had to
be ratified by Congress, and powerful Congressional committees could also exert
influence upon the FCC. 67
 Its decisions, in practice, were subject to judicial review.
The authority's major decisions had to pass through the District of Columbia Appeal
Courts and often went to the Supreme Court. This meant that the decision-making
process was unwieldy and could not easily respond to pressing demands.
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Finally, the broadcasting industry held on to a great deal of power through a
nexus of informal, de facto links. This was often exercised during the appointment
stage as incentives were offered to the chief commissioners and senior staff members.
In this respect, it has been argued that the FCC was subject to regulatory capture as
the industry's demands were put before the consumers' needs. Muriel and Joel Cantor
have stated:
Until the mid-1960s, the industry and Congress dominated the regulatory process so
that the FCC in effect seemed to be working with the networks rather than functioning
in an adversary role as a regulator."68
Martin Cave and William Melody cite the case of the Commission's
approval of cable to demonstrate how this worked in practice:
At first the FCC declined to take regulatory authority over cable. In 1965, however,
in response to the pressure from broadcasters who feared that cable would take away
their audiences, the FCC asserted that it had regulatory authority over cable and
imposed a range of restrictions on the signals that cable could carry. These prevented
a cable company from making available to its subscribers both certain pay-TV
channels and signals imported from commercial stations outside the region."69
The extent to which these deregulatory policies could succeed was shaped by
the industry's traditions. A number of commentators have concluded that the FCC has
promoted a wide number of deregulatory reforms as it became devoted to opening up
as many television distribution outlets as the market could support. The aim of this
policy was to minimize the government's intervention and liberalize the broadcasting
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market so that the new technologies and alternative services could be encouraged.
The high-point of this liberalization occurred with the ratification of the 1984
Cable Telecommunications Act. 7° This altered the cable industry by securing
franchise renewals, thereby protecting initial investments. This meant that local
governments could no longer 'unfairly' deny franchises and that if the licence was not
renewed the cable operators had to be paid their market value. The cable market was
also aided by the removal of all forms of rate regulation after two years and by
stemming the role of public pressure groups in the production of programmes,
although mechanisms existed to allow the public the right to comment.7'
Whilst this Act may be conceived as a victory for deregulation, its scope was
qualified by the inherent ambiguities of national and industrial configurations which
had previously governed the industry's regulatory structure. As Tunstall comments:
The deregulation (or minimal regulation) of cable illustrates some of the strengths
and weaknesses of this whole sphere of communications policymaking. The final
negotiations were between a House-Senate team of sub-committee staffers and a cities-
mayor team of local regulators. This long drawn-out process frequently broke out in
bitter public recriminations. Its ultimate achievement was to settle --- or to refer to
judicial decision --- most of the burning issues of the current or recent regulatory
chaos. What the process largely failed to do was to protect against the turbulence
ahead.
Tunstall has shown how deregulation, far from weakening the FCC's status,
perpetuated its bureaucratic power and made its operational practices less accountable
to the public. 73
 The FCC had planned to reduce its staffing figures from two
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thousand to below sixteen hundred. However its bureaux (Mass Media, Commerce
Carriers, Private Radio and Field Operations) received a massive increase in
applications to broadcast because of the increase in entry afforded by deregulation (for
example, it was estimated that the Private Radio Bureaux received 280,000
applications in 1983) and so these cutbacks could not occur and, if anything, the
department's bureaucratization was exacerbated. 74
 Moreover, the FCC failed to
produce data documents, preferring to commission a prodigious number of legal or
economic reports, thereby invalidating its role as a responsive regulatory agency.
Therefore, the impact of deregulation on regulatory practices has proved to be
problematic. The extent to which these policies have been seen to succeed or fail has
been coloured by the commentators' beliefs in the benefits or deficiencies of
deregulation. For market-liberals, the American response was coherent as it promoted
wider consumer choice and greater freedom of entry into the market. Thomas Hazlett
suggests:
These (the eighties) are the golden age of consumer welfare maximisation compared
with the sorry episode of broadcast television protectionism in the 1960s and
1970s."75
For critics, the American experience has exemplified the problems associated with
deregulation. Indeed Muriel and Joel Cantor have concluded that regulatory practices
can never be dispensed with:
The principal reason is that those already entrenched and in protected positions, ie
the networks and other media conglomerates, would not wish to lose the advantage
and special status they have attained over years of close collusion with the FCC."76
73
In conclusion, it may be stated that the consensus for deregulation in the US
political mainstream and the technological proliferation enhanced the appearance of
enormous opportunities for change. The nature of this change was conditional upon
the system, which was already dominated by private ownership, political will and the
balance of forces which had been evidenced in the traditional regulatory regime. As a
result, in the US experience the impact of deregulation has proved to display elements
of change with stability.
1:6. DEREGULATION AND WESTERN EUROPEAN BROADCASTING
SYSTEMS
As with other industries, the theories, arguments and practices for
deregulation within communications and broadcasting were exported from the United
States to the other advanced western economies. In Western Europe many national
broadcasting regimes were to.subjected to a partial or full implementation of these
policies. However, this does not mean that the American Market Model has been
transposed on to European broadcasting systems, as broadcasting deregulation has
made conspicuous features that have been unique to the national cultures and
regulatory systems in these countries.
Kenneth Dyson and Peter Humphreys have defined several imperatives for
deregulation in Western Europe:
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Firstly, new technologies including cable, satellite and video cassette
recordings have changed policymakers's attitudes toward broadcasting. Therefore their
receptiveness to regulatory reforms was not only in response to the 'shock-wave'
engendered by these new technologies, but also referred to the motivation of 'demand-
pull' as new ideologies and altering social habits expressed themselves.
Secondly, technology has produced a convergence within the communications
industries in which broadcasting can no longer be understood as being divorced from
other economic activities including telecommunications, publishing and consumer
electronics. This development radically altered the media market-place and enabled
new or different entrants to seek access in the provision of broadcasting services.
Throughout Europe new groups have sought entry, for instance, Bertelsmann,
Hachette, Maxwell and News International from book/newspaper publishing; Havas
from advertising and WH Smith from retailing.78
Thirdly, this combination of technological and market flexibility has provoked
an internationalization of the broadcasting market. Satellite signals can by-pass
national territories thereby allowing new entrants to operate multinational broadcasting
operations. In addition, this has opened up the possibilities of international investment.
For example Compagnie Luxembourgeoise de Teledefusion or CTL, a Luxembourg
based company, is predominantly funded by French and Belgk capital79.
Fourthly, such internationalization has resulted in the creation of a highly
integrated, international broadcasting environment and has consequently provided the
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context for the de-facto exportation of deregulation as once " one environment (the
US) ... (had changed) ... (it) forced change in another."8°
Finally, the combination of these factors had produced a complicated
broadcasting environment in which the traditional regulatory rules and agencies were
inadequate. Essentially, national sovereignty could be undermined. In 1982 the West
German company Bertelsmann lined up with CTL to broadcast the German language
station RTL from the media 'haven' of Luxembourg. 8 ' This meant that a national
Western German television station could be broadcast from outside of the country's
borders and consequently circumvent regulatory, business and scheduling procedures.
As Dyson and Humphreys comment:
Over twenty satellite channels were available in 1987. Their development raised the
spectre of circumvention of national regulation and a breakdown of state sovereignty
in broadcasting regulation. The proposal of 'offshore' operators had major
implications for broadcast regulation. These, new actors have exposed the 'Achilles
heel' of regulation in the age of transfrontier broadcasting." 82
However whilst a number of common imperatives for pre-empting change can
be identified, the nature and extent of deregulation throughout Western European
countries proved to be conditional upon the features of national particularism,
industrial structure and the resilience of the regulatory frameworks.
In contrast to the United States (in which the FCC supervised a number of
private monopolistic networks) most European states located their broadcasting
services around the principles, tenets and institutions of Public Service Broadcasting
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(PSB) 83• The PSB system may be generally defined, although each system has
nationally unique functions and variations, as one whereby the broadcasting
corporations or companies have a defined set of duties --- 'to educate, inform and
entertain' --- and one in which these organizations are financed to greater or lesser
extent through state collected revenues
	 a licence fee
	 so that channels do not
compete for funding. TM
 There are infinite variations between the systems in terms of
detail, yet the PSB model may be historically seen as being exported from the United
Kingdom to other Western European states. Therefore, within these nations, the
variations upon the PSB systems, along with the national culture, the configuration
of clientist interests and the political/ideological will of policymakers are all of
extreme importance. As Dyson and Humphreys state:
Development of broadcasting and new media policies in Western Europe appears to
be increasingly shaped by a dynamism of political and regulatory 'gamesmanship' at
national and regional levels, as governing parties seek either to maximise the
economic and cultural rewards for new media investment or to limit the damage to
their economic and ideological positions from a combination of market change, greater
political and administrative complexity and 'policy competition' for investment." 85
This has meant that there has been a wide variety of deregulation throughout
Western European broadcasting systems. In France, the state broadcasting monopoly
was dominated by the ruling political authorities who exercised control by appointing
sympathizers to run the radio and television. This resulted in the systematic
governmental manipulation of the broadcasting media and orchestrated state
censorship. 86
 The presidential election of Francois Mitterand and parliamentary
election of the Socialists in 1981 marked a change for the political composition of the
French government during the early eighties. The Socialists had been critical of
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Gaullist and Giscardian interference within the media and the subsequent 1982
broadcasting statute deregulating the broadcasting market was reflective of their desire
to liberate the system. Similarly in Italy 'deregulation sauvage' occurred after the
1976 Constitutional Court decision (when the ruling coalition was composed of
socialist and communist parties) declared that RAI was a public monopoly which had
been dominated by the ruling Christian Democratic Party for many years.88
Conversely, in Germany deregulation's impact was qualified due to the in-built
safeguards of the Federalist system. The German broadcasting system was a
self-regulating monopoly which was autonomous from state and sectional interests
containing a number of pluralistic, constitutional safeguards due to the fears of a
return to the propaganda exploits of Joseph Goebbels during the Nazi period of
totalitarian power.89
Therefore throughout these countries the dominant cultural, legal and
constitutional patterns were to substantially influence the debate, the development and
implementation of deregulatory policy as well as arguments for competition. However,
it should be again noted that in implementing these policies the combination of
national culture, the traditions of the regulatory regime and political will has been
profound. For instance, Raymond Kuhn has commented:
Broadcasting in France ... is ... in a process of transition. ... Yet the break with the
past is not quite as extreme as it may appear, at least in the short-term. The state
remains the predominant influence in the shaping of the French broadcasting system of
the future. The government is still accused of exercising political control over news
output, and not just by the opposition. ... While French broadcasting is undoubtedly
changing, very radically in many respects, it is also marked for the moment by an
element of continuity."90
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CONCLUSION: DEREGULATION AS A CONCEPT FOR THE STUDY OF
DEVELOPMENTS WITHIN BRITISH BROADCASTING
This chapter has demonstrated that deregulatory policies have become crucial
throughout national and international economies. In the main, such legislation emerged
in the United States and was exported to both advanced and developing economies.
Therefore, deregulation has been accompanied by a general acceptance within political
elite groups in spite of partisan attachments. However, the implementation of this
process has proved to be significantly different from nation to nation due to the place,
time and arena in which these policies are conducted. Certain states and industries
have proved to be conducive toward deregulation, whilst others due to the setting, the
regulatory traditions and the ability to be reformed have remained impervious.
For instance, the most consistent finding to be drawn from the deregulatory
experiences in US and Western European broadcasting systems has been the cross-
national inconsistency of these policies both in terms of policy-making and
implementation. The key reasons for this refer to the national culture, the particular
configuration of political and industrial interests, the resilience of the regulatory
agencies and the ideological will to deregulate. Thus, in the U S., where a minimal
form of regulation existed, the deregulatory policies have been reasonably well
pursued. Although, even in this environment they have remained qualified. From the
differences in regulatory backgrounds and the accompanying internal dynamics which
are produced, the emphasis for deregulation will either be partially or strongly
realized. As the French and Italian cases indicate, the political will to deregulate
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broadcasting has equally been drawn from the Left as well as the Right as certain
broadcasting regimes have become innately associated with the dominant political
parties (for instance, the Christian Democrats in Italy or the Gaullists in France).
Therefore deregulation's purpose was to provide political liberalization alongside the
introduction of more competitive practices. In Germany, however, the political,
economic and institutional cultures conspired against the widespread introduction of
deregulation within broadcasting. Moreover, in all these countries the impact of
deregulation has diverged with the American experience due to respective differences
in broadcasting's economic and political position. Therefore, these processes have
invariably been characterized by elements of changes and continuity.
As a consequence, these national differences in the diffusion of deregulation
raise a number of questions which I intend to explore in order to determine the nature,
direction and impact of regulatory reform in the British broadcasting (particularly
focused upon television) policy-cycle:
What was the nature of the British broadcasting system ? To address this
question I intend to consider the finances, regulatory traditions and political position
of British broadcasting throughout its history preceding the eighties policy-cycle. The
system has operated through a series of rules and has been responsive to a particular
constellation of technical, economic, social and political forces.
What was the role of the national political culture and changes within
technology in shaping the context for deregulation ? The climate of the political
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culture and nature of broadcasting relations with the government throughout the early-
to-mid eighties may be cited as being vital in considering how and why deregulation
was taken up by policy-makers. Clearly, deregulation (both generally and within the
broadcasting industries) has grown due to the realities of political will as well as any
prescribed ideology. Further, the deregulation of broadcasting was also seen to
respond !the proliferation of new channels and greater opportunities of entry to
independent producers afforded by the new media.
What was the intellectual background to this development ? In Britain, the
concept of deregulation particularly appealed to a number of policy-makers and think-
tanks who through the political organization and composition of the period had a
significant influence upon policy-makers. Throughout, the years a tradition of radical
economic theory was developed within these bodies. Therefore, it will be necessary
to trace the evolution of the notion of the deregulation of British broadcasting and to
discuss how these constructs were to inform the inquiry phase of this policy.
How was the inquiry phase conducted ? The central change in broadcasting
policy may be seen to occur when a report is commissioned in order to assess the
possible reform of the traditional system. Thus it is necessary to consider how the
report responded the ideological, economic and political imperatives of the period and
to discuss the vision which it laid out for the future.
What were the crucial imperatives of the policy-making phase between enquiry
to act ? Throughout the political phase of the policy-cycle the report's
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recommendations may be substantively altered due to the introduction of4 'umber of
imperatives. These comprise: the government's political will, the policy's
organization, the respective lobbying of interested parties and the inevitable bargaining
and negotiation which occurs amongst these actors. Another factor which may become
prominent is the extent to which the concept of deregulation may be usurped by other
imperatives such as commercialization which incorporate a number of similar
measures but are pursued for different reasons. How far has the British broadcasting
policy truly converged with the economic arguments and have serious divergencies
emerged?
How far have policies been implemented and what early effects have been
apparent within the broadcasting industry as a result ? To measure the impact of
deregulation it will be necessary to consider a number of case examples to determine
the extent to which industrial practices, regulatory structures and agencies have altered
or remained resilient.
These questions will provide the basis of my approach to the thesis.
Therefore, I am concerned with examining the issue of (de)regulation and will employ
the empirical data from the post-Peacock British television policy as a case study. This
study is relevant to the reforms which have been directed at British broadcasting, to
changes within other countries' media organizations and to other policy areas which
have been subjected to regulatory reform.
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CHAPTER TWO: THE BRITISH PUBLIC SERVICE BROADCASTING SYSTEM
"The existence in this country of two broadcasting organizations, financed by
different means and following quite distinct organizational patterns, may give the
impression that in broadcasting matters, the United Kingdom has two policies rather
than one. The facts of this position demonstrate that this is not really the case. One
has only to put side-by-side the documents governing the conduct of the two British
broadcasting organizations, the charter and the licences of the BBC and the Television
Acts under which the ITA (now IBA) operates, in order to be struck forcibly by the
essentially unitary character of the broadcasting system in the United Kingdom."1
The British broadcasting system (consisting of a public (British Broadcasting
Corporation) and commercial (Independent Television) sector) has evolved in an
integrated, rather than competitive fashion. It may be argued that different financial
arrangements, channels, ideas and structures have all been incorporated into a
cohesive order which was initiated under the first Director-General John (later Lord)
Reith at the British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) throughout the twenties and
thirties. Moreover, it can be discerned that the introduction of commercial television
did not herald a break from this tradition. Instead, this development followed the
prescribed pattern and the Independent companies' supervisory body, the Independent
Television Authority (ITA, later IBA) acted as a complementary regulator to the BBC
Board of Governors. 2
 Further, the development of broadcasting has been contingent
upon the support of the political elite. Therefore, as broadcasting was a social as well
as an economic commodity, its politicial position has been an important imperative.
This chapter's purpose to assess and clarify, through a review of the literature, the
dynamics and structures which have defined the course of British broadcasting. It will
test, through an analysis of the evidence, whether a unitary system has emerged and
determine how political relations between the state and broadcasting have been
conducted.
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The substance of my survey will extend from the creation of the British
Broadcasting Company in 1922 to the introduction of Channel Four in 1982. These
dates refer to the establishment and perpetuation of a public service broadcasting
system (PSB) It should be noted that a degree of overlap exists within British
broadcasting history, as the PSB system was subjected to the political antagonism,
which was to characterize the political discourse between the Thatcher government
and the broadcasters, before the introduction of Channel Four. These tensions, which
were either embryonic throughout this period or were specific to the eighties, cannot
be dated exactly. However, the election of Margaret Thatcher's government in 1979
clearly altered the ground-rules which had previouslystate-broadcasting relations. 4
 It
is a further provision of this chapter to demonstrate the historical context for these
crucial issues, which will be extensively dealt with throughout my thesis.
Two qualifications are required. First, it should be remembered that many
measures were pursued in relation to short-term political requirements rather than
being consciously developed to create an overall framework for broadcasting
activities. Second, within this lengthy time-scale it would be a mistake to believe that
all the important areas could be sufficiently dealt with in the available space below.
Thus, it has been necessary to place a number of limits on this work.
Inevitably such qualifications are, by their very nature, an arbitrary means through
which to judge the flow of historical information. However, a judicious selection of
detailed material will hopefully prove to be mendacious in aiding our understanding.
Jeremy Tunstall has suggested that broadcasting legislation follows a twelve-yearly
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cycle5
 and this model may be profitably employed in order to outline issues, trends
and themes from the evidence. Such an approach allows the key concerns to suggest
themselves out of the material, rather than being superimposed upon it.
This will be a survey concerning the creation and evolution of the
system. It will determine the establishment of patterns and indicate the interplay of
forces which have shaped the broadcasting environs. Important areas will comprise:
the basic tenets and institutions of public service broadcasting; the regulation of these
broadcasting organizations and their political position vis-a-vis the state.
Throughout this survey, I will analyze the arguments raised in respect to
broadcasting. In particular, I will consider the debate surrounding the 1977 findings of
the 'Report of the Committee on the Future of Broadcasting' (The Annan Report),
most especially in regard to the fourth channel. Such a focus may be criticized as
being narrow, yet I believe that the arguments raised over the fourth channel options
serve as a microcosm for the general issues which have occupied political thinking.
To some extent, 'Annan' can be perceived as crystallizing the concerns as the debate
re-iterated the resonance of Public Service Broadcasting whilst simultaneously
illustrating the system's flaws and internal tensions.
In my conclusion I will address the following questions: how valid have the
assumptions of unitary expansion been ? What does this material demonstrate about
the traditional modes of state-broadcasting interaction ? What were the redolent
tensions within the system ? Is it possible to detect nascent antagonisms which were to
flourish through the 1980s?
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2:1. THE 'LIMITED SPECTRUM OF AIRWAVES'
Until the last decade, both domestically available radio and television
broadcasts were limited to a narrow band of available airwaves. This 'limited
spectrum' consequently qualified the availability of channels and effected how
broadcasting would be organized. The early experience of the American radio system,
in which competing radio stations interfered with each other's frequencies,
demonstrated the practical need for a regulated system. However, it was realized that
the mass dissemination of communications raised political as well as economic
questions. For British policy makers this meant that a central dilemma had to be
addressed:
How (is it possible) to reconcile within a limited number of outlets the need of the
state to make judgements of national priority as to how these outlets should be used,
the need of each individual citizen for maximum freedom of choice in his search for
personal satisfaction and the need for the broadcaster to express the truth about the
world as he sees it."6
The solution arrived at, by the nature of the problem, should essentially be a
temporary one. This is due to constant societal changes which demand different
responses at different times. At best, a solution could only partially solve the dialectic
between the state	 broadcasting	 and the audience.
Yet, in the case of British broadcasting, the system's ground-rules have
remained consistently defined by the agreements reached in the early-mid twenties
with the creation of the BBC as a public corporation. Whilst, the particular
configuration of the twenties societal demands may have been resolved within this
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broadcasting framework, it does not follow that such a conception should be
intrinsically fixed. That such a perspective should have defined the course of British
broadcasting from the twenties to the late seventies is not so much a measure of its
fundamental correctness, but an indication of how broadcasting cannot be divorced
from the wider set of political and national interests. Although the BBC represented a
solution to a technical problem at one 1evelit was more significantly a sociological
invention of profound importance involving a consortium of different interests
including manufacturers, broadcasters, politicians and civil servants.
Two factors dominated the twenties' British government concern over
broadcasting. On one hand, political pragmatism meant that the government did not
want to involve itself within programme-making nor the commercial costs of radio.
However, its actions were also defined by what has been termed as a 'post-war
interventionism'7 . Although the market continued to define Britain's economic
relations, it was not perceived to be the most effective method to manage a vital and
limited 'national resource' such as broadcasting. The First World War had enhanced
the power of a nexus of state organizations in a number of areas including health,
insurance, coal and food-rationing as part of the war effort. As a consequence, the
political elite's conception of state control had expanded and regulated order was
deemed to be desirable. Jean Seaton comments:
"There was a widespread dissatisfaction with the ad-hoc nature of industrial
competition. Even in the 1920s, during the post-war slump, there was a sense that
there must be alternative ways to manage the distribution of resources."8
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Consequently, when the giant Marconi Company applied to broadcast, fears
were raised about the possible free-market exploitation of a valuable national resource
by a private monopoly. This concern, tied with the technical qualifications of the
'limited spectrum', pressured the government into taking an interventionist role in
broadcasting. Thus a bargaining process between public and private forces to find a
solution occurred. Underpinning this process was the 'public utility' ethos which
proved to be vital in channelling the governments arguments and determining their
approach toward broadcasting. In 1922, a publicly organized company --- the British
Broadcasting Company (BBC) --- was created to provide a public service. It was
jointly financed by the rival manufacturers such as Marconi and Metropolitan Vickers.
By 1927 the British Broadcasting Company was replaced by the British Broadcasting
Corporation. A Royal Charter governed the corporation for a ten-year period by
setting out the basic tenets of public service broadcasting (PSB).
This response by policy-makers, in the twenties, to a technical issue
demonstrated a number of key features which were to characterize British
broadcasting policy over the years. Throughout the course of broadcasting's
development, it has been conceived as a vital national resource which was to be
regulated, in terms of institutional development, programme output and supervision, in
the public's interest. Further, this response was indicative of a particular
understanding of the social purpose of mass communication, which, inspite of a
transition throughout the years, has underpinned the British broadcasting system:
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the concept of social communications, and thus broadcasting, is closely linked to
the more general notion of culture. ... The (British) definition points back to the
nineteenth century, to Matthew Arnold's moralistic conception of culture as exposure
to 'the best that has been thought and felt', to his horror of bad taste and vulgarity.
Philistinism and parocholism were the enemies. The function of cultural institutions
was to embody the 'collective' best-self."9
2:2. PUBLIC SERVICE BROADCASTING
Over the following decades an incremental television duopoly has developed.
This is not to say that the BBC and ITV were identical structures; there were
significant differences in funding, regional composition, institutional ethos and
regulatory organization. However, there was a convergence between the public and
commercial sector underpinned by the tenet of public service broadcasting. This
common understanding has been defined in the following eight principles:
- geographic universality - everyone should have access to the same services;
- catering for all interests and tastes;
- catering for 'national identity and community';
- detachment from vested interests and government
- one broadcasting system to be funded directly from the corpus of users;
- competition in good programming rather than numbers; and
- guidelines to liberate programme makers and not to restrict them.'°
These tenets provided the duopoly with its core motivation both in terms of
institutional growth and programming output. The British PSB system has also
evidenced the contribution of the national economic and political culture. Its
development has been closely associated with state statutes, committees, reports and
regulations. As Dyson and Humphreys comment:
95
In the past broadcasting policy had involved roughly twelve-year cycles, revolving
around major committees of inquiry ... which unleashed lengthy debate about the
major issues.""
Indeed, some commentators have deemed it as the most regulated television system in
the world.12
Effectively, the BBC and ITV became two halves of the same system which
derived from a "single root and it is interesting to observe how these branches, instead
of diverging over the years have stabilised their concentration more or less in
parallel. "'
2:2.1 THE CREATION OF A DUOPOLISTIC STRUCTURE
Unlike other national broadcasting systems (for example, the United States)
the British broadcasting system has been composed of two broadcasting organizations
who have competed for audiences rather than revenues. This has meant that a
circunYscTbed form of competition has existed. On one level BBC and ITV producers
have competed against each other for their reputations, critical renown and audience
approval. At another level, this division has been mutually beneficial as neither side
attempted, usurp the other's funds. It has enhanced these organization's finances and
status. In many ways, the formation of this system was dependent upon the roles
played by individual actors, institutional practices and how these forces interacted with
the concurrent, prevailing socio-economic-political forces. Several historical phases
have marked the development of British broadcasting.
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The first broadcasting policy-cycle marked the transition between the BBC as
a company to becoming a corporation. The corporate development of the BBC has
been sustained through the principle of universality of provision. In order to create a
national, centrally scheduled output, John Reith argued for assured sources of funding
and the brute force of monopoly. To this end, he achieved support from the 1926
Crawford Committee. Therefore, the BBC was publicly funded by an annual, national
poll-tax -- licence fee --- raised from the population and collected by the Post-Office.
The committee also unquestioningly approved a broadcasting monopoly, and stated
that the British Broadcasting Company should be replaced by a 'Public Commission
operating in the national interest'
	 It unanimously recommended that this authority
should not be representative of any vested interests and should involve " persons of
judgement and independence, free from commitments ... men and women of business
acumen and experienced in affairs." 5
 It completely rejected any demands for private
control commenting that:
The United States system of uncontrolled transmission and reception was
unsuited to Britain and ... no company or body (would be) constituted on trade lines
for profit, direct or indirect."6
The second policy-cycle saw a challenge to BBC's monopoly after its Charter
expired in 1946. Whilst the corporation expected that its licence would be
automatically renewed, Parliament felt that the war had made the BBC an instrument
of the state. ' In 1949, the Labour government created a committee chaired by Lord
Beveridge, famous for his recommendations for health and welfare reforms, and
including within its membership the Conservative backbencher Selwyn Lloyd.
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Although it argued that the public monopoly remained the most effective way to
organize broadcasting, it was highly critical of the system. The report recommended
that the licence should be renewed, however it felt that the BBC was not publicly
accountable. The governors, who acted as public trustees, were ill-equipped to deal
with their responsibilities. The Beveridge committee recommended a number of
safeguards to stem " the four scandals of monopoly: bureaucracy, complacency,
favouritism and inefficiency."8
As the report was published in January 1951, its recommendations were
largely ignored due to the 1951 General Election. Instead, the Conservative party's
victory centred the debate upon commercialization. The Churchill government
speedily announced that:
(it had) come to the conclusion that in the expanding field of television provision
should be made to permit some element of competition."9
The dissenting minority report of Beveridge Committee member Selwyn Lloyd
proved to be the platform for this approach. Lloyd disagreed with the perpetuation of
a public service broadcasting monopoly and felt that it should be challenged by
commercial stations to be run in competition with the BBC. He believed that
sponsorship could be used to fund this service and would stem the monopolization of
resources. The subsequent debate highlighted the BBC's overweening bureaucratic
rigidity and its possible acquiescence to an 'extreme' government who, during crises,
might take control of the corporation's output. Consequently, it was argued that a
commercial service should compete with the BBC to stem monopolization, to provide
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popular programming and to promote greater political liberty.
In contrast to the BBC, the ITV system was to be financed through
advertising revenues. To this end, the government preferred funds to be raised
through spot advertising rather than sponsorship. This meant that television companies
would retain programme responsibility whilst agreeing to commercial breaks, at
specific points, in return for advertising revenues. However throughout the 1954
Television Act's committee stage an important provision emerged; the public
regulation of a private enterprise. This represented a compromise between the more
traditionalist members of the Conservative party (influenced by Lord Reith who felt
that the commercial station would be a disaster), who feared that broadcasting would
be forced to go down-market, against the aims of the commercial lobby. This concern
was to prove vital within the 1954 Act and the subsequent interpretation of its
recommendations during the founding of Independent Television (ITV). As Stephen
Lambert states:
"The public service conception of broadcasting was thus substantially maintained in a
compromise mediated between the State's claim to regulate and the claims of free
enterprise. The Government congratulated itself with the thought that such a
combination of effective control on one hand, and greater freedom on the other, was
'a typically British approach to this new problem1. "20
The 1954 Act licensed a new service comprising of regional contractors who
would provide both local and network programming. It outlined regulatory,
commercial and constitutional measures. A series of elaborate prohibitions were
included in order to stem any form of 'commercial vulgarization'. They comprised;
instructions to maintain 'impartiality', restrictions on taste and decency, a quota of
British originated production designed to stop the proliferation of American imports
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and limitations stemming the advertiser's control over the schedule and programming.
To ensure that these financial arrangements would be adhered to, a public regulator
the Independent Television Authority (ITA) --- was created.2'
Thus, commercial television was fashioned in the image of the BBC. It was
regulated by an interventionist body which had licensing and programming powers.
Moreover, due to its five-yearly licence renewal, it was subject to Parliament in much
the same way as the BBC, whose charter was granted on a ten-yearly basis. Indeed,
the Act legitimised a confusion by euphemistically calling the system 'Independent
Television'. As Gerald Beedle, a future director of BBC Television, ascertained it was
"a mistake (to allow) the newly created British Commercial Authority to call itself
the Independent Television Authority. The adjective was intended to imply
independence from the BBC ... but was taken to mean independence from the
government. "
The eariy development of the commercial network enhanced convergence with
the public broadcaster. ITV was designed as a plural system to promote competition
and regionalization. However the subsequent crisis in profitability (due to the i1Juity
of advertising revenues throughout the regions) meant that the ITV companies
centralized their organization to minimize the financial risk. Each contractor
contributed to the network's total output at an agreed rate of payment proportional to
its wealth. Therefore, smaller regional companies could enjoy the fruits of nationally
syndicated programmes which would attract audience and advertisers.
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Simultaneously, the larger contractors could cover their costs by selling their
programmes nationally. The commercial 'carve up' indicated that cartelism was to
become the key organizing principle for commercial television. The plural system was
effectively replaced by a unitary order, in which the 'Big Four' (Rediffusion, ATV,
ABC, Granada) dominated the network's institutional (for example, control boards)
and programming (for instance, national schedules) affairs. The smaller companies
occupied a non-competitive subsidiary position chiefly providing local programmes.
The commercial system which took root, with its compromise between the free-
market, a centralized schedule and control structure and the values of public service,
became a complementary service to the BBC.
The movement toward duopoly, however, was to suffer from a formative
tension. By 1960, the financial inequity between the BBC and ITV had grown as
ITV's advertising revenue totalled £60 million against the BBC's paltry £15 million
from the licence fee. In response, the Conservative government instituted a third
broadcasting policy-cycle by creating the Pilkington committee to provide a wide-
ranging review of broadcasting. The committee included Richard Hoggart who had
written The Uses of Literacy. The 1962 report reflected Hoggart's concern that the
working class was being absorbed into the middle class and that working class values
were being eroded due to the industrialization of leisure practices. From this
perspective, television was understood as an agent which could either profitably or
detrimentally influence the masses. It was posited by the committee that television
was one of the major long-term factors that could shape the moral and mental attitudes
of the time. " According to this logic, if television's purpose was to enlighten
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through raising educational standards and moral awareness. The committee praised the
BBC for performing this task. Conversely, it felt that ITV had produced worthless,
populist programmes which had been aimed at the lowest common-denominator. The
ITA was castigated as an impotent watchdog and it recommended that the commercial
sector should be reformed.25
The report's arguments were largely ignored by the government who preferred
to be selective in its interpretation of the report. For instance, it supported the
introduction of the 625 line system and the creation of BBC2. Revealingly, the key
proposals to be found in the 1963 and 1964 Television Acts were those which, when
removed from the report, laid the foundation for a 'planned co-existence' 26
 between
the BBC and ITV. The 1963 Act increased the ITA scheduling powers. The ITA was
to agree the basic schedule with the contractors through a series of network and
S
regional committee. Further, the authority could 'mandate' a quota of documentary
1'
and current affairs programmes during peak-hours. As a consequence, the ITA
increasingly took on the characteristics of the BBC board of governors.
More importantly, Section 7 of the 1964 Act placed a direct tax or levy on ITV
contractors to stem excessive profits. This was an additional payment over and above
the rentals paid to the ITA. The proceeds went into the Exchequer depending on the
contractor's advertising revenues. For the first £1.5 million of revenue there was no
taxation, on the next £6 million the rate stood at 25 percent, and companies receiving
receipts above £7.5 million were levied at a level of 45 percent. In such a manner, it
was posited that the financial inequity between the BBC and ITV could be partially
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eradicated .'
Although, in many respects, these measures were adf hoc, had been
determined by short-termism and were hotly disputed, they added up to more than the
sum of their parts. Taken together, the levy and the increase in the ITA's
interventionary powers meant that the ITV companies's were forced to re-invest their
profits into programming (to avoid excessive taxation) and to conform to greater
public service commitments. In many ways they could be seen as a prescription from
government for the running of a national broadcasting service. 28 The legislation had
settled a framework for integration and the television duopoly had been firmly
established. As Tom Burns noted:
Whatever may have been the case in the first ten years, what we have now is the
BBC and ITV pacing rather than competing with each other."29
2:2.2 'PEACEFUL CO-EXISTENCE'
During this period of 'peaceful co-existence' 3° a number of features became
apparent:
First, the duopoly operated as the sole supplier of programmes due to the
limitations of technology and market entry. This meant that the BBC and ITV had a
monopoly over production resources, creative talent and the dissemination of their
product. In effect, a vertically integrated broadcasting system emerged in which both
public and commercial sectors acted as both programme-makers and broadcasters.
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This resulted in the development of a command economy, in which the money
received from the licence fee and advertising, entered the broadcasting market in
order to spend in the resources sections as the broadcasters pleased. Moreover, the
national interest obligation secured a home production quota to stem a flood of
foreign programmes on the television channels.
Simultaneously, the BBC and ITV network increased their output, enlarged
their number of employees, widened their activities and developed their organi ition.
Their growth was underpinned by an incremental increase in broadcasting finance.
The BBC's income was enhanced by the turnover from black and white to colour
licences. ITV's growth was heightened by the ITA's re-allocation of the company
franchises in 1968 and the general increase in advertising expenditure. As Towyn
Mason, Deputy Secretary of the BBC, comments:
"Throughout the sixties and seventies there was tremendous expansion within both the
BBC and ITV. These were the 'Fat Years'. There was increases in real terms within
the licence fee which was then negotiated every year ... and the advertising market for
the ITV. The BBC and ITV could afford to be lavish. During this period, labour
practices were relaxed and agreements grew up. "
Moreover, the financial controls were designed to enhance new programmes. The
hourly costs for original programming are necessarily high due to the labour in
writing, producing and developing a production. In 1984-1985, the average
expenditure for a first-run production was £52,000 per hour. The following table
indicates the total amounts required by the broadcasters in order to schedule new
programmes, either home initiated or acquired:
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Table 2.
Source: Richard Collins clii. THE ECONOMICS OF TELEVISION
Second, as the number of employees grew the industry's labour practices
became demarcated through unionization. The unions made wide-scale agreements
with willing managements over wages, working hours, security of tenure and craft
specialization. In order, to gain employment within either the BBC or the ITV
companies, a technician had to become either a member of the ACT!' or BETA.
These closed shop practices secured the labour market and, along with the general
expansion of the time, created an intensively manned labour force.
Third, broadcasting exhibited the growth of professionalism as a series of
cultural codes and perceptions formulatthe sector's practices. Several factors
contributed to this development. The broadcasters, within BBC and ITV, often shared
similar backgrounds, values and attitudes. Invariably they were male, white, middle-
class and Oxbridge university educated. This ethos was enhanced through the seepage
of personnel from the BBC to ITV during the late fifties. For instance, throughout a
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six month period between 1955 to 1956 nearly five hundred BBC staff members left to
pursue careers in ITV. Moreover, due to the specialization of skills required within
broadcasting, individuals with residuals talent and connections could weave a career
path between the BBC and ITV companies. The alumni have included Paul Fox,
Melvyn Bragg and Michael Grade. These factors served to establish a core
broadcasting elite. Moreover, this linkage contributed to a standard set of shared
internal conceptions and practices, mediated through the ideology of public service
broadcasting. In many respects, this has been a self-fulfilling process. Garnham, for
instance, describes it as follows:
"Broadcasters have been induced to underwrite the legitimising myths of our
broadcasting institutions because those myths have in part been designed precisely to
maintain the internal cohesion of the institutions and control those at the top by
flattering the broadcasters. Isolated from his audience by the nature of the medium,
the broadcaster has allowed professional standards, validated by the judgement of his
peers, to become an end in themselves and very real barrier between him and the
public. "33
Fourth, the programming principles of educating, informing and entertaining
have remained at the core of the public service system. This conception for
broadcasting demonstrated that elite groups have felt that British mass communications
should chiefly have a social rather than economic value. The duopolistic period
marked a streamlining of Reithian standards with programming to encourage cultural
diversity, regionalism and entertainment.
Reith had felt that broadcasting should be primarily educational in order to
train 'character' and promote a sense of moral obligation. A paternalistic attitude was
introduced as the BBC's purpose was to authorize cultural values rather than represent
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listener interests. A 'mixed programming policy' was employed to enhance the
coverage of a wide number of subjects, whether they be trivial or serious. In order to
be 'educated' the audience had to encounter everything that could be heard.
Therefore, radio was to act as a disseminator and filter for accepted values. He stated
in 1924:
"It is occasionally indicated to us that we are apparently setting out to give the public
what we think they need - not what they want ... But few know what they want and
very few know what they need."3'
The BBC's programme policy, from the twenties until the late fifties, reflected
an assumption of national cultural homogeneity which perceived culture as a single
and undifferentiated force. 35
 The BBC was to be significantly challenged with the
advent of ITV. The ITV mix included action series, comedies and quiz shows which
popular ratings winners. The success of ITV meant that the BBC's share of the
audience had been reduced to a mere 28 percent by 1957. Theoretically, the
corporation could afford to ignore ITV as it continued to receive a secure income
through the licence fee. 36
 Yet, the BBC understood that the political ramifications of
such a drop in audiences could prove to be disastrous for the licence fee which was a
legally binding poll-tax. To retain this funding the BBC realized it would have to
develop popular programming to attract approximately half of the national audience
and significantly adapt Reithianism. Under the leadership of Director-General Hugh
Greene the BBC moved in this direction by producing new or alternative work such as
'Face-to-Face', innovative drama, and the coverage of General Elections, alongside a
staple diet of popular light entertainment situation comedies and entertainments such
as the 'Black and White Minstrel Show'.
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This was a two-way process. Whilst the BBC had been forced to alter, it was
argued that the quality of ITV programmes was raised through this competition for
audiences. This shared outlook was reinforced by the ITV network's organi ation.
Independent Television was arranged to keep outright commercial values distinct from
the programming. Therefore, there were no sponsored programmes and ITV
companies were legally required to conform to the tenets of public service
broadcasting. Although it was not immediately apparent, the monopoly within ITV
secured this aim as it created a cohesive system which was easier to regulate and
place into the context of the public side of British broadcasting. Intrinsically,
competition meant convergence in practice. As Ralph Negrine comments:
With these two institutions (BBC and ITV) in competition for the audience, their
policies converged towards the demands of the audience. The process of competition
(had) to some extent eroded the differences between the commercial and publicly-
funded television services."37
Throughout the sixties and seventies self-regulating programme codes were
developed. For instance, complrnentary scheduling arrangements were built up
between the BBC and ITV companies. Gradually, and ineluctably, the two sectors
stemmed the competition for audiences as nightly schedules were orchestrated to
ensure a parity of viewers. Current affairs programmes were 'twinned'. BBC Director
of Television Huw Weldon explained that "if Panorama ran opposite a movie on
ITV, and if World in Action ran opposite a comedy show on BBC 1, the audience of
both Current Affairs programmes would drop steeply." 38
 Such a compact was
mutually beneficial as it created a rigged market and it enabled advertisers to predict
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ratings and target their audience. Further, both sides conformed to a 9:00 pm
watershed after which more adult programming would be shown.
Therefore the duopoly's proponents felt that it had been a great success as it
assured that money was directed into programming and talent. This had resulted in a
higher technical standards and quality in content. Many have argued that the sixties
and seventies were a 'golden age for British broadcasting' as innovative programmes
were backed and series, which perhaps had not been initially successful, were allowed
to find their audiences. The British broadcasting system was often lauded as the best
in the world and increasingly held a position within the national mythology receiving
praise from the public and the more conditional support of the political elite. It was
argued that the licence fee was relatively inexpensive and provided good value for
money. Simultaneously the growth in advertising and the public regulations of ITV
meanjthat overt commercialism had been contained. Fundamentally, the duopoly was
perceived as an intrinsic " part of (the) national anatomy ... (a) part of (the) social
system and (a) part of the national way of life. "
2:2.3 THE REGULATION OF BRITISH BROADCASTING
Constitutionally, the BBC governors were public trustees whose
responsibilities included the representation the BBC to Parliament and the public, and
the reviewing of the corporation's output. Thus, the board was constructed to ensure
that corporation pursued public service programming strategies, remained accountable
to its audience, maintained editorial independence and deflected state intervention.40
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In day-to-day terms the actual power of the governors has been circumscribed. The
board members have traditionally been part-time laymen who are responsible for
general rather than detailed policy. They have consequently been dependent on the
full-time secretariat for their working knowledge of the corporation. Their functions
were defined by Reith and BBC Chairman John Whitley in(93 1 Whitley Document.
This limited the governors' interventionist powers by delineating their role as
guardians of the national interest. Real power was vested in the corporate executive:
"The suggestions sometimes made that the Governors should be appointed as experts
or specialists in any of the activities covered by the Broadcasting Service is not
regarded as desirable. ... With the Director-General they discuss and then decide upon
major matters of policy and finance, but they leave the execution of that policy and
the general administration of the Service in all its branches to the Director-General
and his competent officers."4'
Conversely, the ITA (later the IBA after the launch of independent radio in
1973) has had a more hands-on role in the public regulation of the ITV sector. Whilst
its board was similarly composed of part-time members, the authority has been
serviced by a full-time management headed by a Director-General. Since its powers
were enhanced in 1964 Act, its functions included the licensing of the programme
contractors and advertisers, whilst applying prohibitory regulations when required in
its capacity as the legal broadcaster. As the IBA was the broadcaster, upon whose
transmitters the ITV companies would broadcast programmes, it was an interventionist
body which could dictate programme schedules in accordance to public service
criteria. The IBA's programming and scheduling powers enabled it to commit the
contractors to providing minority programmes during peak periods as one-third of the
total output should be of a documentary or factual nature. Moreover, it had the power
110
to revoke the contractor's licence if it did not conform to this public service element.
This safeguard was again designed to mediate the commercial imperative of
advertising revenue.
As a consequence, the British broadcasting system has been supervised by
interventionist regulators in relation to programming, scheduling and financial affairs.
However, the formal elements only provide a limited amount of information regarding
the regulation of the British broadcasting system. The minimalist broadcasting policy
indulged in by governments has meant that regulation is not so much a legally defined
framework as a practice which sets out precedents. This form of regulation has been
termed 'private interest government"2 and may be characterized by the invisibility of
government intervention, a secretative regulatory process, clientelism, establishment
politics and self-restraint. 43
 For instance, the relationship between the IBA and ITV
companies has been criticized for exhibiting elements of regulatory capture in which
the regulator has acted in the interests of the industry rather than the public.
Moreover, this development may be seen as promoting covert manoeuvring between
professional broadcasters, amateur regulators and politicians. As Kenneth Dyson
comments:
"Defacto the BBC developed a system of self-regulation, underwritten by state
power, a form of royally-chartered arrangement for professional self-regulation.
This system was overlain and indeed sustained by discrete, informal political pressures
from ministers;the threat of political irtervention served to tighten self-regulation. The
BBC was effectively licensed as a 'closed shop', treated by the state as the sole
representative of British broadcasting (until 1954) and enabled to control who
broadcasts what, with legal rules kept to a minimum."4'
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Throughout the years, the BBC governors and the IBA's accountability to the
public, rather than to the broadcasters or the political elite, has been questioned. Their
respective positions have proved to be ambiguous. They have either been understood
as acting as buffer between state and broadcasting, or seen as a mechanism through
which state control may be covertly exerted. For instance, a series of 'informal
linkages' ' have been constructed to allow for a variety of conscious and
unconscious forms of 'dealing' to occur. Therefore, the regulator's position leads into
a series of wider questions about the relationship between broadcasters and the state,
and returns the focus of attention back to the central dilemma of broadcasting; is it
possible to resolve within a limited number of outlets the demands of the state, the
citizen's freedom of choice in his/her search for personal satisfaction and the
broadcasters' desires to express the truth as they perceive it?
2:3 THE POLITICAL POSITION OF BRITISH BROADCASTING
The broadcasting institutions have often proclaimed their political
independence from state control. They argue that they are free to broadcast within the
confines of the law. This liberal-pluralistic position has argued that through a number
of legal, institutional, funding and ideological devices that the broadcaster have
resisted the external pressures of government intervention.
Constitutionally, the BBC was described by Reith as being an institution
within the constitution 46 as it was technically subject to the Crown but simultaneously
required to follow the pluralism of Parliamentary Democracy. The BBC was governed
112
by a Royal Charter which enabled it to be resistant to overt state pressures as an
'arms-length' relationship was seen to exist. Whilst the licence fee has provided
assured funds for programming requirements, it was more crucially devised to
preserve the corporation's political independence from the state. It meant that the BBC
was not dependent upon state funding for its revenue and could thus fulfil its role as
an independent broadcaster. 47
 The corporation has been guided by the notion of
impartiality in its representation of political affairs. Whilst the BBC formally rejects
any political control of content, its accountability to the public, in contrast with the
press's position as 'The Fourth Estate p48, is mediated through the governors and by:
(its acceptance of) Parliament as a natural pole and ... (its interpretation) ... (of its)
task as one of reproducing 'a picture of political discourse dominated by Parliament.
[Broadcasting] ... operates (an) impartial brokerage within a prevailing political
system."49
The I1'V system's political independence has been ensured through a mixture
of advertising revenue and regulatory control. ITV's finances were indirectly drawn
from the public rather than the state. This funding mechanism, it has been argued,
similarly allowed for the development of a free press in Britain. 50
 The IBA's position
as a broadcaster	 also meant that if the state attempted to intervene, the regulator
would act as a cushion between the government and the programme-makers. Thus, in
any court case the IBA would act as the responsible party instead of the regional
contractor. As with the BBC, the IBA has also seen Parliament as its natural pole and
has understood that it should provide impartial information within the dominant
political system.
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Moreover, the minimalist broadcasting legislation (meaning that the BBC
Board of Governors and the IBA had a relatively free-hand in how they interpreted
directives), has also been consciously developed to stem state intervention and enhance
broadcasting freedoms. Further, supporters of this position would argue that as the
Home Secretary has never technically employed his veto power over broadcasting that
democracy has been served.
Against this, it may be argued that the Home Secretary has never had to effect
such powers due to the in-built self restraint and ideological adherence of the
broadcasting institutions to the dominant political culture.
2:3.1 ALTERNATIVE PERSPECTIVES ON THE POLITICAL POSITION OF
BROADCASTING: THE CASE OF BROADCAST JOURNALISM
The pluralistic model of the relationship between broadcasters and the state
has been subject to several critiques. In particular, the liberal interpretation has been
criticized from Marxist interpretations of the media. The neo-Marxist critique has
descended from the theory of false consciousness and basic belief that capitalism does
not only own the means of production, but the cultural means of production. As Jean
Seaton and Ben Pimlott state:
"The ... (Marxist) ... school ... sees the media primarily not as a restraint on rules
but in effect, as their servant. Thus in modern Britain, the media should be regarded
as an agent of consensus; directed towards producing agreement, acceptance or the
acquiescence of the masses towards policies or attitudes which are not of their making
nor necessarily in their interest. "
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However, there is no single Marxist approach to the media. Traditional Marxists
perceive the public sphere as an arena for capitalist class domination in which elites
(political or economic) may disorganize opposition through ideological indoctrination.
Therefore, the public duopoly was straightforwardly seen to have been structured,
controlled and located within the dominant framework of captialist class interests. On
the other hand, Gramscians such as Stuart Hall have determined that the ruling class is
an alliance of competing social strata and that its ideology has consequently been
subject to tensions because of this unstable constellation of forces.
Although, the Marxist approach has been subject to extensive criticisms, the
usefulness of this approach (in particular the Gramscian notion of competing political,
economic and social elites) is that it draws the attention away from the traditional
paradigm of a broadcasting system upon which political forces are exercised. The
broadcasting system is no longer perceived as existing within a vacuum but is
understood to interact with the political elite and consequently a more complicated
variant emerges. For example, Stuart Hall has commented upon the 'external
pressures-resistance model':
"The question of 'external influence' (on broadcasting) is a thoroughly inadequate
way of framing the problem. It is predicted on a model of broadcasting which takes at
face value its formal and editorial autonomy: external influences are then seen as
illegitimately encroaching upon this area of freedom ... the real relatiànship between
broadcasting, power and ideology is thoroughly mystified by such a model."52
A variation upon Hall's analysis has appeared in a number of diverse works
on British broadcasting such as Michael Tracey's The Production of Political
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Television, Anthony Smith's Television and Political Lfe, Ralph Negrine's Politics
and the Moss Media in Britain and Philip Schlesinger's Putting 'Reality' Together.
Although these academics could not be described as constituting a particular 'school'
of criticism, throughout their work broadcasting is seen neither as "a temple of liberty
nor as a cudgel of oppression but an instrument of political negotiation, neither good
nor bad, to be used or abused by those who seek to influence public opinion".53
Therefore, although they share Hall's interest in exploring the relations
between the broadcasters and the state, they are not overtly driven by the assumptions
of class, ideology and indoctrination. Instead, their analysis is concerned with the
practicalities of the broadcasting systenT positions within the body politic. Anthony
Smith has argued in 	 'Britain: The Mysteries of a Modus Vivendi' how an informal
nexus of like-minded individuals have been appointed to regulate and manage
television and has stated that political leaders may employ television as a 'megaphone'
to propagate their concerns whilst the medium itself is not inherently structured to be
monolithic or persuasive in itself.M
From this perspective, the political position of broadcasting is contingent upon
institutional practices, varying understandings of accountability and political liberty,
periods of tension and accommodation with particular groupings of the political elite
(by-passing partisanship), contradictions, and compromises.
In particular, a paradox has informed the practices of broadcast journalism
and has led to a number of notable crises in which broadcasters have attempted to
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reconcile their commitment to balance and objectivity, alongside their obligations to
the national interest. Whilst, the broadcasting institutions have claimed to be impartial
and objective, they have always acknowledged that they are orientated within the
hegemony of the state and have willingly accepted the notion of parliamentary
democracy. The former editor of 'Panorama', Roger Bolton has commented:
"The BBC itself has no opinions on matters of public debate but it does demand of it
employees professional adherence to certain principles. It supports parliamentary
democracy, for example, it opposes racial discrimination, it defines objectivity and
balance and requires both of its journalists.
Those who do not believe in these things will believe that the pursuit of them involves
censorship of other ideas and beliefs, will believe that the organization recruits in its
own image, and perpetuates 'bias'."55
This dichotomy was evident during the BBC's response to the 1926 General
Strike. As the sole source of national, direct and immediate information about the
disorder the BBC stood in a powerful position. Principally, it determined that its role
was to provide the nation with an impartial account of the strike under the aegis of the
law. This proviso meant that the BBC excluded anti-governmental support, as the
High Court had declared the strike to be illegal. Reith argued:
There could be no question about our supporting the Government in general,
particularly since the General Strike had been illegal in the High Court. This being so,
we were unable to permit anything which was contrary to the spirit of that judgement
and which would have prolonged or sought to justify the strike."57
Therefore, instead of overtly supporting the status-quo through propaganda or
open censorship, the broadcasters employed more subtle techniques such as selection,
presentation and omission to tacitly aid the government's arguments. For instance, the
BBC acquiesced to the government's demand to exclude all forms of oppositional
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political leadership. The Labour Party leader Ramsey MacDonald and other trade
unions leaders, despite requesting appearances on the radio, were refused any
opportunity to put their case. Another speaker who was rejected was the
Archbishop of Canterbury and news editorials reiterated constant calls for calm.59
The BBC's ambiguous position in the General Strike was heightened through
the organizational links which were created between employees and members of the
government who jointly formulated news strategies and shared offices in Admiralty
House. 6° As Philip Schlesinger has noted:
In effect the BBC's personnel were mobilized, with the Company itself being
declared an 'essential service' by the government 'so that no member of staff could
volunteer for other duties'.
But the connection between the BBC and the state went further than discernable
organizational links. There was also an ideological consonance between the views of
Reith and those of the 'moderate' members of Baldwin's Cabinet. Reith, like the
government, took the view that the Strike was a threat to the Constitution.
the BBC was politicized by making it into an emergency service, and
incorporating its top echelons into the government information machine ... There was
as nothing as crude as planting a censor in the makeshift newsroom. It simply was not
necessary as Reith and his staff knew what had to be done, and moreover, fully
accepted its propriety."6'
Throughout the strike, the divergence between maintaining impartiality and
perpetuating the national interest meant that the BBC was forced to pass off
government interjection by declaring that such decisions were taken in the public
interest by the corporation. This was further apparent in 1935, when a BBC producer
proposed a series on the British Constitution to include talks with the Fascist Oswald
Mosley and the Communist Harry Pollitt. 62 The Foreign Office objected to Pollitt's
involvement as he stood for armed revolution. Against this, the BBC claimed that
these speakers could not be muzzled under the terms of the Charter but only in respect
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to direct state intervention. The Foreign Office responded that the question could be
resolved if Mosley's anti-democratic undesirability was made the central issue. This
proposal was deemed to be unsatisfactory until the matter was curtailed by the Post-
Master General, who wrote to Reith reminding him the licence was up for renewal
and it would be wise to comply with the government. The series was dropped and
there was no mention of government interference. This incident reflected the
continuous and incremental interdependence between the broadcaster and state. 63
Alternatively, the dilemma between serving the principles of impartiality or
the national interest has led to the BBC resisting state pressure. For example, during
the 1956 Suez crisis the BBC withstood direct governmental pressure by broadcasting
critical reports in both home and world service bulletins of Anthony Eden's
	
1J(
governmental policies. Moreover, when Eden requested a television ministerial, the
BBC believed that they should follow the rules of ministerial broadcasts so that
Labour leader Hugh Gaitskell could reply for the opposition. The severity of
Gaitskell's criticisms led the Eden government to request that his transmission should
be toned down.M The BBC, however, rejected this proposal. Whilst this may be seen
asxample of broadcasting asserting its independence from the state, Negrine has
commented that in many ways the BBC was duplicating the concerns of the Parliament
as the 'national interest' was unclear, as the government's wider motives were
generally being questioned and as
The BBC's handling of the Suez crisis ... was in line with its own practices;
practices it had helped to formulate many decades earlier. Clearly, had there been no
political party in opposition to the Government's actions, or widespread disquiet
nation and in the press, the BBC would have found it much more difficult to pursue
an impartial line. The reproduction of the Parliamentary struggle, though it does
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expose broadcasting organizations to numerous threats, does not ultimately place it in
mortal danger since it is only balancing competing and legitimated parliamentary
views. So long as it employs those general principles which had been established in
order to govern the relationship between broadcasters and the political parties in
Britain, its independence is secured."65
As Negrine's comments indicate the practices of broadcast journalism refer to
the methods through which the broadcaster's political independence is mediated and
channelled. Whilst, the case of the Suez crisis may be perceived as a clear example of
the broadcasters asserting their autonomy from the state, it is also apparent that the
absence of a defined argument by the government and the political furore that existed,
enabled the BBC to be critical of the Eden. Elsewhere, throughout its history,
broadcasting's political position has been complicated by its accommodation to the
national interest during periods of crisis, most notably during the General Strike. In
that climate of political turmoil, in which Winston Churchill had advocated the
commandeering of the BBC for crude propaganda purposes, Reith was quick to
seize the opportunity to demonstrate to Baldwin's government how broadcasting could
be advantageously employed for state interests throughout this dispute.67
Throughout its history a close relationship between politicians, civil servants
and the BBC's management has continued to define relations. Therefore, it is possible
to detect that a series of internal and external contraints have existed in governing
broadcasting institutions approaches to political issues. Consequently, the location of
the BBC and ITV in the political system is paradoxical. On one side, state
intervention has been aided by the system's minimalist legislation, regulation, and
governing ideologies. However, whilst underlying structural characteristics may be
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seen to be apparent, a number of complexities are also present. Many broadcasters
themselves believe that they are both constitutionally and ideologically independent
from the political elite. Moreover, a dialectic of de facto and covert powers has
existed between both sides and produced an environment that simultaneously exhibits
shared aims, continuity and tension. It is thtjore necessary to consider how the
relationship between broadcasters and the political elite has evolved and been
conducted.
2:3.2 BROADCASTING'S RELATIONS WITH THE POLITICAL ELITE
The principles of public service broadcasting were drawn from the emerging
concordance of interests amongst broadcasters and politicians which had evolved in
the mid-twenties, in which an expedient bargaining process defined relations.
Raymond Williams has outlined three factors which combined to underpin the British
broadcasting system. These were; the 'nationalization' of culture which had been
fomented through Britain's early industrialization and the small geographic area for
communications; the easy assimilation of public service values, based upon
paternalism and responsibility, by broadcasting practitioners due to the established
version of the dominant national culture which had been perpetrated through an
unusually compact ruling class; 68 and:
the character of the British State which, because of the compactness of its ruling
class, proceeded in many matters through appointment and delegation rather than by
centralised state administration. This permitted the emergence of a state-regulated and
state-sponsored public corporation which was yet not subject to detailed state control.
The flexibility which was latent in this kind of solution, though continually a matter of
dispute, permitted the emergence of an independent corporate broadcasting policy, in
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which the independence was at once real, especially in relation to political parties and
temporary administrations, and qualified, by its definition in terms of pre-existing
cultural hegemony. "
As a consequence, the realities of the system contrast with its formal
objectives. Whilst, British broadcasting has acquired a prescriptive set of legislative
and regulatory rules over the years, state power has been characterized as being
minimalist. Throughout this period, there was no media department of state and
regulations were left to be interpreted by the regulatory bodies. However, it was
through this apparently loose form of political organization that state power was
exercised. Broadcasting has reflected the British political tradition of an unwritten
constitution whereby authority has been applied through an informal structure of
precedence, bargaining and dealing. 70
 The private nature of the relationship between
broadcasters and politicians, has meant that the system proved to be more responsive
to discrerL pressure than any legal intervention. In turn, the broadcasting institutions'
freedoms have been defined within a set of clear parameters. Therefore a number of
understandings have underpinned the nature of British broadcasting:
The concept of balance has provided a core understanding to the relationship
between broadcasters and politicians. This had led to shared aims over the
development of the system and a concurrence upon what is politically acceptable.
Balance has extended beyond party politics, as it has structured the whole system:" as
a direct restriction on programme output; between public service and commercial
impetus; between centre and periphery; professionalism and accountability; integrity
of broadcasting and access."7' This has meant that impartiality and objectivity are to
be contained within the dominant political consensus.
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In turn, this principle has been enhanced by the BBC's, and later ITN's,
practice of recruiting from a narrow strata of university graduates, in particular
Oxbndge, whose class background made them predisposed to established standards.
Further, institutional practices have tended to re-inforce this ideological adherence to
the normative practices. The BBC News and Current Affairs departments have
emPloedjeferrin up' system in which the individual maintained autonomy as
editorial independence was devolved and s/he was expected to only take orders from
his/her immediate superior. This centralized chain of command has served a political
purpose by enforcing conformity within the corporation.72
This notion has contributed to the doctrine of rselfcensorship I . Both the BBC
and ITN are aware of the acceptable norms they must operate within. In particular, as
they conform to the notion of parliamentary democracy, broadcasters are loathe to
propagate extra-parliamentary positions and morally objectionable positions such as
racism in spite of proclaiming impartiality. However, self-censorship has also been
extended to what have been deemed to be politically sensitive subjects in which the
national interest has been perceived as overriding impartiality. In particular, whilst it
has been the subject of many controvenses between state and broadcaster, the BBC's
coverage of Northern Ireland has been closely guarded by editorial control,
managerial intervention and an, albeit sometimes reluctant, accencé of the British
state's position.73
However, state power can also be exercised through more tangible, if similarly
covert methods of control:
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The state has had both a direct and indirect control over broadcasting's
financial structure. The government has exercised its power through the annual setting
of the licence fee and was instrumental in channelling these central funds to the BBC.
For many years, the government was only prepared to relinquish a small part of the
licence fee. Although, the BBC argued that it was directly funded by its listeners and
viewers, in reality, governments have effectively directed the flow of money raised by
the fee.74 This economic control has been tacitly employed to gain a financial
leverage over the BBC. As the 1923 Sykes committee made evident:
(the BBC could be) as partisan as it pleases about political or economic or other
questions (but) ... the Licence would never be renewed."75
Another political control has been mediated through the appointment process.
Both BBC governors and IBA board members have been state-appointed, first by the
Post-Master General, and later by the Home Secretary. These individuals are usually
drawn from the narrow strata of the 'great and good' (public figures, industrialists,
academics, trade union leaders) and it may be seen that their social composition would
indicate that state interests would, at the very least, be complemented. Moreover,
throughout the development of British broadcasting governments have attempted to
place political allies and sympathizers into important positions.
Most notably, Harold Wilson throughout his tenure had attempted to force his
will upon the broadcasters through exclusion or the politicization of the appointment
process. Throughout the late sixties and early seventies broadcasting's relations with
the Wilson Government (and Wilson's Opposition) were strained. The Labour
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government felt that the BBC had been infiltrated by Conservatives and relations were
problematic with Director-General Hugh Greene. This led to Wilson appointing Lord
Hill, the former Conservative MP and chairm.n of the ITA, into the chairmanship of
the BBC Board of Governors to temper Greeh 6 These issues were to come to a
head, when the BBC showed a.
	 . programme in 1971 entitled 'Yesterday"
Men' concerning Wilson's shadow-cabinet. Wilson claimed that he had been the
victim of the BBC's political bias and as a result the BBC reformed its institutional
practices. In this respect, Hill, in his capacity of chair, intervened to judge upon
the editorial content of the programme and took on an executive role. 78
 This marked
the first transgression of the governors into the domain of the management.79 Hill's
actions may be seen to have had an overtly political purpose by taming the BBC.
Therefore the British broadcasting system has been structured, through a
mixture of legal rules, regulation and precedence, in such way that political power
might be covertly exercised. It should be remembered that both the BBC and ITV
gained tacit support from the political elite in relation to their development.
Ultimately, the state's influence over broadcasting demonstrates a deficiency in the
notion of an independent public service broadcasting system. 8° Instead political
interests have channelled through a concordance of ideologies, purpose, and
consensualism. Such a unanimity of interest was made inadvertently cbnspicuous by
the 1936 Ullswater Committee:
Where the interests of the State appear to be at all closely involved, it is open to the
Corporation to consult a Minister or Department informally and of its own accord.
This method leaves decision and discretion in the hands of the Corporation."8'
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It should be noted that within this series of unwritten rules that a number of
ambiguities exist. In particular, politicians have been ambivalent towards television.
On one level all politicians enjoy using televison to propagate their messages, against
this the medium can expose their weaknesses and flaws to the general public. This has
promoted a series of political tensions throughout the years when government have felt
that their interests have been undermined.
In particular, Harold Wilson felt that the BBC was liable to political bias
against his government and determined that the system should be reformed.
Throughout, his tenure the Post-master generals looked into methods to bring
advertising upon the BBC and undermine its position. Therefore the government's
power was enhanced by the threat of an enquiry into broadcasting. To this end in
1974 the Labour Home Secretary Roy Jenkins, in his new capacity as minister
responsible for broadcasting, revamped a committee to address the future of
broadcasting to be chaired by the Provost of University College, Lord Noel Annan.82
The committee's terms of reference were broad and no institution was expected to be
seen as sacrosanct. Further, it would be responsible for providing recommendations
upon the allocation of the fourth channel. The debate, instigated by the Wilson
government to attack what it perceived as a political opposition, was to be revealing
as the public service system was scrutinized and further as the normative political
processes made themselves apparent.
126
2:4. THE FOURTH BROADCASTING POLICY-CYCLE: THE ANNAN DEBATE
The fourth broadcasting policy-cycle occurred in the early to mid-seventies
and has been described by Jeremy Tunstall as having a three consecutive and
analytically seperate phases - the enquiry phase, the political phase and the operational
phase. This cycle was associated with a Royal Commission (The Annan Committee)
and subsequent policy-making phase in which the legislation was developed. In this
section, it is my purpose to discuss the enquiry and political phase of the Annan
debate.
2:4.1 THE ENOUIRY PHASE
The fourth channel debate opened up a series of different models for the
running of broadcasting as " all the main issues in broadcasting policy - the question
of editorial control, of finance and organizational structures ... (and) the relationship
of broadcasting to the state" 83
 - were raised. In part, this was due to the political
climate, as the focus upon the fourth channel was played out primarily during the
Labour period in power. In part, it was motivated by an academic concern over the
traditional organization of broadcasting.84
The growth of media studies as academic discipline during this period
subjected broadcasting to widespread and extensive criticism. 85 First, the system
was accused of insularity, for example the '76 Group' complained about the 'closed'
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entry for independent producers. Secondly, there were general complaints about the
lack of accountability. The system was seen as being unrepresentative, monopolistic
and unable to respond to the public's needs. In effect, the public service broadcasting
system was perceived as becoming increasingly anachronistic in solving the dilemma
between state and the democratic flow of information it originally supposed to resolve.
The needs of the state to judge the use of a scarce national resource tended to
outweigh the citizen's rights to freedom of choice and the broadcaster's need to
express his/her perception of the truth.
In this respect, the concerns of the literary critic Raymond Williams proved to
be vital. Williams argued that the central concern of mass communications or the
'long revolution' was the extension of social communications in order to enhance the
learning process and restrict elitism. In order to achieve this, a suitable broadcasting
system was required. Williams rejected the market as it qualified human experiences
and as broadcasting represented social rather than fiscal capital. He argued for a
cooperative trust which would encourage communal broadcasting and democracy.86
As a result, a number of different broadcasting models were proposed to
encourage pluralism, diversity and viewer choice. This was shaped into a coherent
perspective by the 'Standing Conference on Broadcasting' (SCOB). SCOB challenged
the establishment by carefully orchestrating a public campaign which called for a
central funding scheme, increased worker participation within policy and management,
and a school for research. In particular Anthony Smith advocated an 'open access
policy' in which free-lance broadcasting groups would make their own programmes
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under contract. The groups would be offered the technical back-up to produce
alternative programmes.87
Whilst the 1977 Annan report supported the public service system in general,
it mediated a path between tradition and reform. 88 The committee's chapter upon the
fourth channel concurred with the reformers. After dispensing with the arguments for
I1'V to run the channel, Annan concentrated upon Smith's electronic publishing model
(Smith, whilst being left off the committee, in the typical fashion proved to be a
leading intellectual power as he had taken some influential research projects for
Annan). 89
 Smith had declared:
"What (has) to be achieved is a form of institutional control wedded to a different
doctrine from the existing broadcasting authorities, to a doctrine of openness rather
than balance, to expression rather than neutralisation."9°
The committee felt that Smith's notion of a National Television Foundation
would provide a suitable framework through which to encourage such a service. In
effect, they replaced the idea of a foundation with the idea of a an authority --- the
'Open Broadcasting Authority'. This interpretation of Smith's ideas came from the
need to exercise some form of editorial and regulatory supery'ison over 'publishing on
the airwaves'. 9 ' The OBA would operate like a publisher and would broadcast
programmes made by independent companies, rather than produce them. In contrast to
the vertically integrated system which existed in ITV, the fourth channel's schedule
could consist of ITV contractor programmes or, more importantly, independent
productions which would encourage community access and democracy. The OBA
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would be limited in liabilities as it would only intervene to make certain that
programmes were not libellous, did not incite riot and were not obscene. The
authority was to be light-touch and should have as much freedom as Parliament would
deem possible. In many respects, these ideas were to be later echoed, with a different
emphasis and theoretical framework, in the market-liberal model which was advocated
by the 1986 Peacock report.
A substantive difference between Annan and Peacock was the funding method
that was recommended. It proposed the fourth channel should be financed through a
mixture of sponsorship, interest groups and block advertising. Further, it decided that
the OBA would sell spot advertising space rather than the ITV companies. This
multiplicity of funding was conceived by Smith to ensure political independence.
Moreover, in contrast to the later report, Annan's reforms were pitched upon the
social rather than economic purpose of broadcasting to provide a pluraliiy of voices.
The OBA represented a break from the traditional mode of broadcasting
regulation, which in many ways appeared to be a desirable model for encouraging
diversity on the new station. However, many of those who favoured it in principle
remained doubtful about the plan's practical application as "the difficulty of
persuading any government to relax its controlling powers over broadcasting"93
remained a potent reality.
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2:4.2 THE POLITICAL PHASE
The policy process demonstrated the extent to which the more radical
elements of the Fourth channel debate were ameliorated by political will, lobbying,
compromise and broadcasting tradition. Annan's political success was mitigated by the
Labour and Conservative government's reactions to its recommendations. The Labour
government was split between Home Secretary Merlyn Rees who rejected Annan's
proposals on the fourth channel commenting that they were unnecessary, impractical
and too expensive, against the Prime Minister James Callaghan who favoured
reform. In the event, this dispute was overtaken by the course of events as the
Labour government lost the May 1979 General Election after the 'Winter of
Discontent'.
The installation of the Conservative Party under Margaret Thatcher, as we
shall see, represented a change in the state's approach to broadcasting. However, in
respect to the Fourth channel a degree of governmental overlap was apparent, inspite
of the poor relations which were almost immediately going the characterize the
government's relations with the broadcasters. In this first main area, the Conservative
government proved to be more traditionalist in its approach. As Jeremy Isaacs
commented:
"Those who argued for pluralism ... may have won the argument. They lost the
vote.
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The new Home Secretary William Whitelaw had demonstrated his opposition
to the OBA whilst occupying his Shadow-cabinet portfolio. He concurred with the
IBA and ITCA that the OBA would be a financial catastrophe as it would be forced to
sell advertising against the established ITV companies whilst simultaneously requiring
the channel to be innovative and inventive. The regulator and the companies argued
that the fourth channel should be organized within their remit. Their calls were, in the
main, to be answered as the legislation was introduced to develop a fourth channel
under the supervision of the IBA and subject to strict safeguards. In this moment, the
alternative regulatory model of the OBA died Y7
One approach beganominate and shape the government's thinng. It was
first articulated by Jeremy Isaacs, then Director of Thames Television, in his
influential 1979 MacTaggart Lecture at the Edinburgh Festival. This suggested a
compromise, in which, the fourth channel would still act as a publisher pursuing a
distinct service, but would be subject to the regulatory supervision of the IBA and the
financial support of ITV, who would sell the company's advertising space and would
contribute, through the levy, to funding the new station. He expressed the notion that
the 'fourth channel should be different, but not that different'98:
"We want a fourth channel that will neither simply compete with ITV-1 nor merely
be complementary to it. We want a fourth channel that everyone will watch some of
the time and i bne all of the time."
These principles were again articulated by Whitelaw at the Cambridge Royal
Television Convention who felt U we are looking for ... a fourth channel offering a
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distinctive service of its own ... appealing to and, we hope, stimulating tastes and
interests not adequately provided for on existing channe1s". As a consequence,
1980 Broadcasting Act created a fourth channel that would be supervised by the IBA
(whose life was to be extended until 1996), and the ITV companies would sell
advertising. Simultaneously, the channel would be managed on day-to-day level by a
corporate body consisting of chair, board and Chief Executive and would commission,
akin to a publisher, programmes from independent companies who, through a mix of
favourable financial rules, would be encouraged to increase their output. The channel
was also legally required to be educative, innovative, experimental and to cater for
minority audiences by providing a diversity of programmes, thereby ensuring a
multiplicity of voices.' 0' Therefore, as Docherty has commented:
Although the Conservative government which was elected in 1979 eventually
decided to adopt many of (Annan's) ideas of the fourth channel, they cocooned it
within the safe regulatory protection of the Independent Broadcasting Authority."°2
In accordance with this legislation, the IBA fleshed out the day-to-day affairs
of the new service, to be known as 'Channel Four'. A company was established to
formulate policy and carry out the commissioning of programmes, programme
acquisition, schedule planning, and the appointment of staff. The company was to be
supervised by a board of twelve directors, of whom four would be drawn from ITV
and five from the independent sector. The company was to be largely autonomous,
although its annual budget would be set by the IBA and authority could intervene by
appointing non-executive board members, by approving the executive board and by
determining the overall balance between Channel Four and ITV.
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It was composed of a mix of traditional figures and new actors. The board's
membership included the former Trade Secretary Edward Dell as chair and actor/film-
maker Richard Attenborough as deputy-chair, alongside ITV representatives and
ironically Anthony Smith. This criterion was also emphasized by the staggering of
personnel to run the new service. In order to fulfil the managerial positions a number
of non-broadcasters and broadcasters were employed. This had been a deliberate
policy by the channel's first two appointees; Chief Executive Jeremy Isaacs'°3 and
Controller of Programmes Paul Bonner. Bonner explained the strategy:
"If we are to do something different then it is quite important that the old
compartmentalised structures that grew up in the BBC and were replicated to a certain
extent in the ITV companies should have a chance to be modified in practice. This
will create a flexible and hopefully, creative overlapping, blurring the edges of strict
programme	 '°"
In terms of output, the policy was to encourage new talent and encourage
alternative or minority programmes, whilst complementing the ITV service. The IBA
maintained that:
" This means not only that it (Channel Four) will provide as far as possible a choice
at any one time between two programmes appealing to different interests, it means
also that both the fourth channel and the present ITV service will be able to schedule
programmes with less concern than is possible on only a single channel without the
potential loss of a majority of the audience."°5
This statement indicates, that Channel Four represented a concern with
modifying the existing structures rather than providing an alternative structure.
Therefore, through the 1980 Act and the implementation of its provisions, the fourth
channel was slotted into a unique, but not a fundamentally different position within the
134
context of broadcasting duopoly. It proved to be a complementary service, pitched
within the norms of the public service institutions, as the government and the
broadcasting lobby mediated a middle path between pluralism and regulatory order.
Effectively the more dramatic elements within the Annan report were reduced in their
impact and the requirements of a 'professional broadcasting service' were maintained
to be run by traditional regulators. The political debate demonstrated, the continuing
need of broadcasting to retain support from the political elite and
	 how the informal
pressures upon the system could be exercised to stem outstanding reform.
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CONCLUSION
From this body of material, a number of conclusions may be drawn.
The British broadcasting system has evolved in an incremental fashion through a
mixture of political negotiation, interventionist regulation, precedent and institutional
development. The ideology which has underpinned these factors and provided the
system with its 'modus operandi' has been Public Service Broadcasting.
This conception initially emerged from the compromise between
manufacturing and state interests which resulted with the creation of the British
Broadcasting Company. It was seen as the most effective and socially useful
mechanism to efficiently use a vital national resource which was limited to a narrow
band of airwaves. It was particularly channelled by the first BBC Managing Director
and Director-General John Reith who tapped into a series of arguments, supporting
the 'public service utility' concept, which had curried favour amongst the political
elite of the time. In spite of the commercial push that gave rise to ITV, the 1954
Television Act by placing the system under the supervision of an interventionist
regulator the ITA (later IBA) again used normative methods of control and
organization to shape the Independent system. The authority had the power to enforce
public service scheduling patterns upon the contractors. Although ITV is strictly
composed of private companies who are funded by advertising, the system that
subsequently evolved retained many of the characteristics c' the public sector.
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This development was mediated by the cultural concerns of the 1962
Pilkington Report, which resulted in a levy being placed upon the ITV companies to
stem excessive profitability and re-inforce that money was re-invested in quality
programmes. It was also exacerbated by the cartelism which quickly emerged within
the system with the introduction of networking. The scheduling side of this practice
was later to be mirrored in the complementary schedules between BBC and ITV.
Moreover, through the process of socialisation, as the BBC became the training
ground for ITV executives, technicians and administrator further served to perpetuate
a common series of ideologies in relation to programme output and the worth of the
respective public service broadcasting institutions. Indeed, institutional practice, as
much as programming, has served to define the meaning of this term. The regulatory
bodies which supervise the system have also enhanced the trend toward convergence.
These developments have a political dimension. When broadcasting's growth
is viewed through the perspective of its fundamental dilemma (as defined by
Garnham'°6) --- the rights of the individual to access information, from a limited
national resource, against the needs of the state to regulate that resource to maximum
efficient potential --- it is apparent that the public service resolution has remained
contingent on the goodwill and support of the political elite. This arrangement
illustrates that a subtle form of state hegemony has been negotiated through the
ideological, cultural and institutional practices which have defined British
broadcasting. Although there has been a long tradition of political disputes between
broadcasters and the government, a number of 'informal linkages' between the
broadcasting and political elite were manufactured, alongside a series of ground-rules
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which were demarcated through practices such as 'self-regulation'. This understanding
harks back to the crucial phase of negotiation between Reith and the government to
transform the BBC from a company to a corporation, which co-incided with the 1926
General Strike. Throughout this strike the BBC demonstrated its worth to the
government by providing a national information service which was legitimised through
the concept of impartiality. The strike, also demonstrated that the company would
provide tacit support to the state through its belief in parliamentary democracy, the
law and its constitutional position. Moreover, in spite of the lack of competition for
funds and independence this was meant to ensure, the BBC, in particular, has been
subject to covert pressure through the government's ability to annually set the licence
fee, although it is not directly responsible for collection through the Exchequer.
As a corollary to this central dilemma, it is clear that broadcasting through
this period did not really fundamentally alter due to societal needs. Instead of a
dialectic between the public and broadcasting, a compact between the state and these
institutions defined their expansion and growth. This meant that at the core of the
system a flaw began to emerge as the system's lack of social adaptability meant that
the institution's values became an end within themselves and the system became
increasingly removed from the central dilemma it was meant to resolve.This factor
was clearly apparent throughout the Annan debate, when the emphasis changed to a
social accountability at the programme ends, rather than institutions.
The pluralistic model provided a significant challenge to the traditional
justifications and norms of the public service duopoly. The transitional model was a
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National Television Foundation which was synthesized by Annan into the notion of an
Open Broadcasting Authority. The political tradition of these debates was located in
work of Locke and Mill. Primarily, this debate was characterized by the social
purposes of a independent broadcasting institution within a democratic state providing
freedom of choice and speech.
In this manner, the Annan debate was to provide a marker for arguments and
debates that were to surround the Peacock report, although these were not only to be
pitched in very different terms, but were to occur in fundamentally different
ideological circles and within a very different political climate. The redolent tensions
both for and against the traditional norms of the system were to reach fruition in the
mid-to-late eighties, although the position of the broadcasting institutions vis-a-vis the
government had significantly altered due to serious political fall-outs, the system's
financial inequity (which had been an underlying structural problem disguised by trend
to change from black and white to colour receivers and the subsequent windfall in the
licence fee) and the push of the new media technologies (cable and satellite) which
meant that the technological qualification of the 'Limited Spectrum' had been
removed. However, the arguments, debates, policy decisions and initiatives were to be
significantly grounded in the understanding and broadcasting order which has been
described in this chapter.
The Annan debate further demonstrated how modifications to the system have
required the tacit approval of the state. Without this it is impossible to foster any
qualitative change. The duopoly, and the inclusion of Channel Four within its domain,
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evolved because it was deemed to be the most acceptable and acquiescent form of
organizing broadcasting by the political elites. In this respect, it should be noted that
British broadcasting policy has been conditional upon a number of competing
pressures; bargaining, clientelism, politicial negotiation and industrial interests.
Therefore, by the early eighties the British television system was founded
upon public service principles. It was governed by interventionist regulators and
organized as a duopoly. The BBC and ITV competed for audiences rather than funds,
as their finances were assured by the licence fee and advertising. Politically, the
broadcasting institutions were formally independent, although political power was
conducted through an informal system based upon consensualism. The system
appeared to secure. However, as the Annan debate demonstrated alternative models
for broadcasting were becoming more prevalent. Moreover, by this stage a number of
problems were becoming conspicuous; the rise in new technologies, financial inequity
between the public and commercial sector, a political climate characterized by conflict
rather than consensualism and the development of an ideological position which
questioned the integrity of the public service model.
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CHAPTER THREE: THE ENOUIRY PHASE PART I: THE PEACOCK DEBATE
With Channel Four's introduction in 1982 one British broadcasting policy
cycle had ended (1974-1982) and a new one had begun (1982-onwards)'. The fourth
post-war policy cycle may also be seen to have comprised of three chronological, but
analytically distinct phases; an enquily phase --- closing with a report suggesting
various recommendations for legislation; a political phase --- resulting in legislation
which may or may not concur with the report and an operational phase --- culminating
in the legislation's implementation 2• In this chapter I will concentrate on the enquiry
phase. Jeremy Tunstall comments:
in (the enquiry phase) the 'public interest' is to the fore, reflecting the consensus
of the committee members who are the usual selection of public persons from the law,
the universities, big business, the trade unions, Scotland and Wales. From the
consensual focus on the public interest and from their scanning of the evidence and
old reports of previous policy-making cycles, they go for proposals which stress the
'public interest', which are expressed in apolitical terms, are a trifle unworldly and
rather lacking in financial realism."
Writing in 1984, Tunstall could not have predicted the extent to which it
would become problematic to make a distinction between what was perceived as the
'public interest' and what was seen to be 'financial realism' by the actors involved
within broadcasting policy-making over the following years. In this respect, 'financial
realism' became inextricably bound with notions of 'public service' and it is possible
to detect a fundamental shift in the agenda for broadcasting policy in the mid-to-late
eighties.
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The key policy document within this process was the 1986 Report of the
Committee on Financing the BBC (The Peacock Report). This was not only unique
under Tunstall's criteria, but also when compared to previous agenda-setting
broadcasting enquiries. The committee had not been envisaged by the Home Office as
a Royal Commission which would suggest a broad set of reforms for broadcasting (in
contrast to the 1977 Annan Committee). Instead, it had been called in response to
direct political will. The BBC was an anathema to the Thatcher government who
distrusted its corporate status, its bureaucracy and its ideology. Therefore, the
government's primary aim --- to incorporate advertising within the BBC --- was
apparent within the report's remit:
" (i) To assess the effects of the introduction of advertising or sponsorship on the
BBC's Home Services, either as an alternative or a supplement to the income now
received through the licence fee, including
(a) the financial and other consequences for the BBC, for independent television and
independent local radio, for the prospective services of cable, independent national
radio and direct broadcasting by satellite, for the press and advertising industry and
for the Exchequer, and
(b) the impact on the range and quality of existing broadcasting services, and
(ii) to identify a range of options for the introduction, in varying amounts and on
different conditions of advertising or sponsorship on some or all of the BBC's Home
Services, with an assessment of the advantages and disadvantages of each option, and
(iii) to consider any proposals for securing income from the consumer other than the
licence fee."
Thus, the Thatcher government may be accused of forcing the committee into
reaching a conclusion even before it started its investigation.
This was reflected by the political composition of the small number of
committee members. Their selection was an obvious attempt by Home Secretary Leon
Brittan to 'stack' the committee with market-liberals who would favour advertising
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upon the BBC. To this end, the libertarian economist Professor Alan Peacock was
appointed to chair the committee. 5
 Further, the other leading libertarian committee
member Samuel Brittan had written extensively on regulation, state control and
political liberty.He favoured extensive financial reform for broadcasting. As he was
the Home Secretary's brother, his inclusion also attracted cries of nepotism. For
political balance, Alastair Hetherington, former Controller of BBC Scotland, appeared
to be the most supportive member for the maintenance of the licence fee. However,
after a row over his position he had ended up running the BBC's smallest local radio
station, Radio Highland and had left the BBC acrimoniously. 6
 Further, the
government did not include any trade union representatives or anyone who was
associated with the Labour party.7
Moreover, Peacock's chairing of the committee and its focus led to
accusations that he had confined the investigation to economic rather than social
issues. This was achieved by defining the brief of the evidence and omitting any
alternative discussion. For instance, Cohn Shaw has commented that:
The Peacock committee was a travesty of an inquiry which dealt with considerable
questions without any public debate."8
The combination of the inquiry's narrow remit, the government's choice of
committee personnel, Peacock's action as chair and the general distrust between the
Thatcher government and the broadcasting community led to the belief that the
government would be provided with the ammunition it needed to introduce advertising
on the BBC:
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"The fundamental problem for the Professor is not how to draw the future lines of
British broadcasting, but how to make Mrs Thatcher's lobby dream of a Corporation
studded with commercial breaks come true. The starting point, as so often in the past,
is something the Prime Minister wants."9
However, the report which emerged (as I will illustrate in chapter four)
presented the policy-makers with a market-liberal critique of the whole of British
broadcasting (the 'Comfortable Duopoly') and suggested extensive reforms for the
commercial, as well as public, sector. Thus one must discuss why a 'private report"°
located around a specific economic concern broadened its scope and proceeded to lay
the foundations for a debate which was questioned the basic tenets of public service
broadcasting."
Therefore, this chapter will be about the intellectual and political contexts
surrounding the establishment of the Peacock committee. The intellectual context
flows from the general concept of deregulation in chapter one. In this chapter I will be
building on that material by specifically considering the application of market-liberal
ideas towards broadcasting in the eighties. Whilst, the political context builds on the
material regarding state-broadcasting relations which was introduced in chapter two.
The aim of this chapter is to explore how these two contexts fused in the mid-eighties
to provide the ideological context in which the Peacock committee was set to work.
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3:1. THE INTELLECTUAL CONTEXT: THE LIBERTARIAN APPROACH
TOWARD BROADCASTING
The libertarian interpretation of broadcasting originated from the
market-liberal/utilitarian conception of society as a competitive market. In this
construct no 'fixed' societal order exists. Instead society is composed of interactive
and independent individuals. Thus "the individual is the axiom, the society the
derivative".' 2
 Following upon this logic, the individual is regarded as the principal
source of economic activity through his/her enterprise. Therefore individual economic
liberalization is equated with societal benefit. As Dyson illustrates:
Social welfare will be maximised by the private pursuit of individual preferences as
supported by pro-competition policies and the minimum of public regulation. "'
By extension, state powers have to be limited so that individual
enterprise may be fully realized. For example, government policies can only be
justified if their sum benefit outweighs their costs to the individual. The notion that
political or societal elites can act in their own interests for the greater good is
rejected, as it is understood as qualifying the individual's freedom. This contrasts with
other philosophies which perceive society as embodying "some other or higher force
or purpose than simply welfare, however, broadly interpreted, of the individuals who
comprise society. "'i' Within this conception, social communication should satisfy
individual preferences, rather than attempt to act as an unprovable public service
good. As long as the public service tenets do not impinge upon the individual's right
to choose, they remain acceptable. However, according to libertarians, this had rarely
been the case in British broadcasting.
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It should be noted that whilst this conception underpinned the market-liberal
analysis, this model for broadcasting was often developed by individual actors
working within a market-liberal tradition. This was a broad approach rather than
constituting a particular 'school' of thought.
The first practical attempt to question the public service system from the
utilitarian perspective occurred in the fifties. Sir Robert Fraser, the first
Director-General of the Independent Television Association (ITA), called for a system
which emphasized people 's television in which the key principles would be 'popular
pleasures and interests'. Fraser argued that broadcasting should not be controlled by
rigid institutions broadcasting a mix of morally, enlightening programmes. Instead, he
contended it should be lightly regulated and composed of private contractors, and that
programming should be determined by popular choice rather than any form of
imposed will. Fraser's plans went unrealized as the ITV system "remained caught
between a traditional conception of public service broadcasting and a newer
commercial outlook ... (which meant it) ... could never give a coherent form to its in-
built dilemmas."5
In the main, the market model remained confined to market-liberal economic
forums, notably the Institute of Economic Affairs (lEA). This thinking was influenced
by the economist R.H. Coase who had written British Broadcasting: A study in
monopoly, as well as a number/articles in Economica throughout 1947 and 194816.
1"-
Whilst Coase's examination of the public monopoly did not conclude for or against
monopolization, it provided an implicit critique of the peculiar circumstances
155
surrounding the eariy development of broadcasting:
"The influence of the political parties, the Press, the Post office and the British
Broadcasting Corporation all exerted in favour of a monopoly of broadcasting could
hardly have failed to result in widespread support. Yet it is interesting to observe that
this combination of circumstances was quite accidental. Had the Labour Party been in
power at the time of the formation of the British Broadcasting Corporation; had
independent broadcasting systems not been associated in the minds of the press with
commercial broadcasting and the finance by means of advertisements; had another
department, say the Board of Trade, been responsible for broadcasting policy; had the
views of the first chief executive of the British Broadcasting authority been like those
of the second; with the combination of these circumstance there would be no reason
to suppose that such a formidable body of support for a monopoly of broadcasting
would ever have arisen."'7
In this work, Coase attacked the previously unchallenged Reithian principle that the
BBC should maintain its public corporation status through the 'brute force of
monopoly'. From this perception, regulation in British broadcasting had led to an
inefficient allocation of resources as the key transaction occurred between the viewer
and the broadcaster. Thus, the main objective for broadcasting was maximum
consumer welfare. As programmes constituted leisure or luxury goods, new or
alternative financial methods were necessary and desirable. In contrast to the public
regulated services, it was deemed that successful broadcasting organizations were
those which combined competent commercial acumen with cost-efficient programme-
maldng.'8
This critique provided the basis of the two main market-liberal approaches to
broadcasting. First, they have determined that a form of regulatory capture has
characterized relations in broadcasting. Gordon Hughes and David Vines maintain that
regulation has been underpinned by a number of issues including: what is the
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objective of regulation and what instruments of regulatory control are available to the
regulating authority? 19
 In the ITV sector, they argue that the normative objective of
regulation has been to enforce franchise agreements located around the concept of
quality upon which there can be no defined agreement. 2° In turn, they state:
"The absence of explicit performance criteria not only weakens any monitoring of the
behaviour of franchises but also undermines attempts to make the regulatory authority
more accountable and to assess the merits of alternative systems of regula4ion." 21
This has meant that there has been little attempt to explicitly articulate the
issues and more detrimentally these regulatory conditions, by failing to provide a clear
set of objectives, have been susceptible to clientelism. Hughes and Vines argue that
when a regulatory body takes on the industries' values and assumptions of 'quality'
and 'taste' the "regulators have no option other than to rely upon information supplied
by (the) broadcasting organization which they are responsible for regulating"22.
These arguments have been elaborated upon by other commentators such as
Martin Cave and William Melody, who haLargued that broadcasting's regulatory
agencies have not only been captured but have also actively contributed to the
engineering of broadcasting cartels.1Lcite the case of the Independent Television
Network. As the ITA wanted to impose public service commitments upon ITV, it
allowed a commercial 'carve-up' to occur because the powerful network companies
wished to increase their profits by controlling the network's schedules. As a result,
they not only saved on their production costs but also thwarted the original legislative
intention of commercial competition. 24
 Cento Veljanovski comments:
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the old network was a creation of the peculiar regulatory environment in which
ITV operated. It was essentially a 'cartel-within-a-cartel' backed and enforced by the
IBA which happened to be officially "the broadcaster". No one contractor could shirk,
deflect or renege because the regulator enforced the cartel. "
For lEA members, who had written on broadcasting in the Institute's Hobart
Papers series during the sixties, the lack of real competition between the public and
private broadcasting sectors for funds was untenable. 26
 However, the market analysis
not only acted as a means through which the established arrangements might be
criticized, but further provided a prescription for them
The Hobart Papers are intended to contribute a stream of authoritative, independent
and lucid analyses to the understanding and application of economics to private and
government activity. The characteristic theme has been the optimum use of scarce
resources and the extent to which it can best be achieved in markets within an
appropriate framework of law and institutions or, where markets cannot work, in
other ways. Since in the real world the alternative to the market is the state, and both
are imperfect, the choice between them effectively turns on a judgement of the
comparative consequences of 'market failure' and 'government failure'. "27
Hobart Paper 15 'TV. From Monopoly to Competition' by Wilfred Altman,
Denis Thomas and David Sawers was published to co-incide with the 1962 Pilkington
Report and it was responsive to that debate. It reached a number of conclusions that
would be echoed throughout the eighties. For example, it argued for the introduction
of subscription or Pay-TV programmes, that the BBC should incorporate advertising
and the new techniques should be exploited to increase channels and diminish
government control. 28
 Therefore, it argued for more choice in television through
competition and the implementation of increasingly market-sensitive practices:
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For television the sky should be the only limit. Governments ought to organie as
much competition as can be crammed into the present wavelengths, and welcome any
technical developments in broadcasting or wire that may enlarge the scope for still
more competition in the future."29
Six years later, Sir Sydney Caine wrote Hobart Paper 43 'Paying for TV?'.
This analyzed the British television system's financial structure and concluded by
proposing more direct financial links between the television suppliers and viewers or
consumers. Caine proposed an 'ideal' order in which all television services could be
supplied through pay-television receivers and funded through a combination of
pay-per-view and advertising, thereby abolishing the licence fee. He compared
broadcasting with the press, contending that his recommendations " would do no more
than establish for television a system of financing which has for centuries been
accepted as normal for the press ... (as just as) ... newspapers depend partly on
selling advertising space and partly on selling the papers, programme providers would
depend partly on selling advertising timing and partly on selling viewing time."3°
3:1.1 PETER JAY AND 'ELECTRONIC PUBLISHING'
A significant contribution to the market-liberal approach was made by the
libertarian economist Peter Jay31 . Throughout the seventies Jay had constructed an
integrated thesis on the financial reform of broadcasting and had presented evidence to
the 1977 Annan Committee, which was ignored 32 . In addition, he argued that two
other imperatives heightened the need for reform: the incremental growth of the
broadcasting organizations made them susceptible to state interference and
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technological developments had placed history on the side of the market model.
Jay contended that it was no longer acceptable to judge British broadcasting as
being good through the normal criterion of its ends (programmes), instead it was
necessary to assess the quality of the system by the level of access it afforded to the
individual or consumer to determine what s/he wanted to view or listen. The process,
rather than the product, was what mattered. Therefore, he argued that the new
technologies (cable, satellite) by removing of the limited spectrum provided the means
through which the viewer might fully participate in a form of electronic publishing.
He envisaged that a nationally integrated cable system could be developed
through a mixture of public and private funds. This cable network would be generally
available to the public who would then subscribe to view individual programmes. As a
consequence, a true market-place could exist as the viewer or consumer would call up
the programme by dialling the correct code and paying an appropriate charge in
relation to the programme's popularity or desirability. As Jay had commented in his
1981 MacTaggart lecture at Edinburgh:
"In other words a television set (or radio) will be like a telephone in that the user
selects for himself the connection he wants; and it will be quite immaterial what
connections other users wish for themselves. "
Just as 'electronic publishing' would revolutionize the individual's access to
programmes, it meant that the production and regulation of broadcasting would be
transformed. The broadcasting system would no longer be vertically integrated
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comprising of broadcasting organizations who produced and transmitted programmes.
Instead, the new broadcasting market would enable a greater number of independent
production companies to enter the system. These programme-makers would have the
right to produce whatever they liked for cable in exchange for the payment of a
transmission fee.
The regulators (for example, the BBC Governors and the IBA) would become
an irrelevance as the technological and industrial imperatives which had contributed to
their existence had been overcome. This would be beneficial as regulators had
previously censored the individual's economic and societal rights. Jay contrasted the
state's control over broadcasting against the freedom and liberty of an independent,
printed press. The press had overcome an overbearing state through the introduction
of advertising initiated by the 1861 repeal of the stamp tax or 'Taxes upon
Knowledge'. These set of arguments referred to a belief in what James Curran has
termed the 'heroic struggle for a free press''. This libertarian interpretation of the
history of the press is apparent throughout Jay's work upon the reform of
broadcasting. He commented as far back, as 1970 that:
"Freedom of the printing press is one of our most sacred political liberties. Only the
constraints of the market economy, of the libel law and of changing definitions of
"pornography" are allowed to interfere with what we regard as the basic right to
publish.
Yet, almost equally passionate is our belief that broadcasting must be closely and
minutely controlled, if indeed not exclusively run, by accountable public bodies
operating under the laws and charters which specify their duties in exacting terms. Is
there any good reason why we should be appalled by the idea of maldng the market-
place the arbiter of what should be broadcast as we would be outraged by the thought
of one or two National Publishing Authorities determining what books, magazines and
newspapers should be offered to the public."35
161
In Jay's construct the interventionist regulation of the public service system had no
place in the future of broadcasting:
Quite simply, we are within less than two decades technologically of a world in
which there is no technical pretext for a government-appointed policeman to allocate
the air-waves at all; and therefore, in turn, there will be no technically based grounds
for government or legislative interference in electronic publishing, except insofar as
the general laws of blasphemy, libel etc, which apply to print publishing are applied
to electronic publishing."
In order to create a free broadcasting market-place in which the individual
might exercise not only his/her economic but political freedoms, it would not be
acceptable to merely tamper with the BBC's funding structure. From this perception,
the ITV network also suffered from the ills that had dogged the public broadcaster
monopolization, inefficiency, the stemming of independent producers, a lack of choice
in programming, and finally an overbearing regulatory authority (the IBA).
Essentially, both the public and commercial sectors of the British broadcasting system
were perceived as a Comfortable Duopoly '. In a number of respectJay's vision
concurred with the arguments made by Anthony Smith during the Annan debate.
However, Jay's ideas were drawn upon the market as the provider of economic
pluralism and political liberty. His adherence to the libertarian tradition is clear:
"The thought may have been influenced by my bias against paternalism and
corporatism ... and the general disposition to replace the sovereignty of the consumer
in many walks of life by the fatherly dispositions of the benevolent. "
To this end, Jay introduced the concept of consumer sovereignty to underpin his vision
of a new broadcasting order (italics added):
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The key to it, as in any system of individual consumer sovereignty, is the price
mechanism. If the individual consumer pays, then his preference cannot but dominate
the decisions of producers in conditions of competition. ... Therefore, the highest
priority should be given to introducing a system of direct payment for broadcast
services. "
For Jay, electronic publishing might ensure that the scale and type of
broadcasting service would reflect the needs of the consumer. In meeting this demand,
subscription would demonstrate how resources could be managed for future
investment. Moreover, it would save on advertising costs and overcome the expenses
incurred by collecting the licence fee. Ultimately, this would lead to the reform of a
system which Jay argued had been dominated by political interference, favouritism,
corruption and a metropolitan bias.4°
3:1.3 A CHANGING TECHNOLOGICAL. ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL
CLIMATE
The impact of these commentators, however, remained marginal until the
combination of several factors occurred. First, the endemic benefits of the
market-place were to be enhanced through the new opportunities afforded by
technology. The lEA contributed to the debate by providing an analysis of the
favourable conditions apparent within the cable industry. Cento Veljanovski and
W.D.Bishop considered these implications in 'Cable by Choice; The Economics of a
New Era in Television'. They argued that a pay-cable TV system would act like a
publisher as a private relationship between the subscriber and cable operators existed.
Consequently, these services operated like leisure goods and were free from the
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public interest. Therefore, Veljanovski and Bishop contended that neither the public
provision or regulation of the cable industry would enhance expansion. Instead, they
argued that competitive market practices should be used to provide full scope for
individual initiative and experimentation, and further allowed for flexible responses to
changing demands and pressures. Thus, the pamphlet proposed a number of
recommendations which would minimize the need for regulation and ensure the most
efficient use of resources. These comprised: the devolution of British Telecom and the
deregulation of broadcast TV. In regard to the latter they stated:
"The purpose of a policy of de-regulating broadcast TV is not simply to privatize it
but to ensure that the costs of the current restrictions are justified and that pay-TV
becomes more competitive. 41
A second feature was the increasing economic inequity within the broadcasting
system. The ITV companies continued to earn high incomes in contrast to the BBC.
The licence fee had been undermined by the relative decline in viewers switching over
from black and white to colour television receivers and the government's systematic
cutting of the fee. The inequities in public and commercial broadcasting sector's
finances meant that the BBC was chasing ratings rather than acting as public service
broadcaster.42
The strains of the system became conspicuous in a symptomatic incident. In
February 1984, the comments made during a BBC weekly programme review meeting
were leaked to the Sunday Times, which ran an article entitled 'The BBC at Bay'.
This concerned a summary of a memorandum written by the then Director of
Television programmes Brian Wenham which had raised the concerns arising from a
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discussion about the imported mini-series the 'Thorn Birds'. This document articulated
a deep-seated feeling amongst the BBC's ranks that it was not fulfilling the terms of
its remit due to inadequate state funding and more implicitly the Thatcher
government's political intransigence vis-a-vis the corporation.43
 In regard to such a
malaise Wenham complained:
Government has willed the ends --- that of a four channel TV system, with the IBA
having a monopoly of advertising monies and the BBC having a monopoly of licence
money. But the government has not, however, willed the means, which in my view
means that monies available to each side should be more closely related than they
currently are. If not, what will surely happen will be a drift toward a 3 1/2 or three
channel system, with the effort and the variety simply having been switched from the
public sector to the private."
This leaked document proved to be the catalyst for a debate not only about the
BBC's finances but also concerning its responsibilities as an agency for broadcasting.
In the same Sunday Times article MP Tim Brinton, a former broadcaster and the then
Chairman of the Conservative Party's media committee, argued that the BBC's licence
fee should be reduced from £46 per annum to £30 p.a.. To this end he proposed that
the BBC should concentrate its resources on one channel of extreme excellence,
should separate its TV and radio services, incorporate advertising on the popular
Radios 1 and 2, and finance televised sport through sponsorship.
The BBC replied that such measures would contribute to the production of a
form of 'ghetto television' in which it would be forced to produce high-quality
programmes for the middle classes, whilst the commercial competitors would service
mass needs. The BBC had been at pains to resist such a course of action throughout
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its history, as such a development could undermine its position as a universally
available public service broadcaster funded by a national poll tax. Moreover BBC
officials realized that the corporation could be marginalized and they cited the
example of the small American public service broadcaster.45
The Adam Smith Institute's controversial Omega File added to this debate.
This report was grounded in market-liberal theory and argued that a broadcasting
market could be self-regulated through competition rather than through a system of
political regulation. It developed a highly deregulated and privatized model for the
future of British broadcasting. Its radical recommendations included the following: i)
BBC1 should be funded through advertising, ii) the IBA should be more like the FCC
in its regulatory powers and be more commercially aware and less dogmatic in its
maintenance of public service values, and iii) that BBC TV News should become a
separate body funded by a levy on BBC services and from subscriptions taken by
cable operators. Although this report was unofficial and expressed extreme solutions
to the issues it covered, it articulated arguments which had previously been left
unspoken. Indeed the tone of the report was quite virulent, as Stuart Hood and
Garret O'Leary have commented:
"What is striking is the animosity displayed by the authors of the report towards the
idea of public service broadcasting and the populist scorn with which it is dismissed.
The attack is launched, as we have seen, from a position that uncritically embraces
commercialism and market forces, making numbers the sole criterion of quality. They
resent what they see as the power of an elite which makes the final decisions about
what the public may watch."
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The third feature which contributed to these arguments' achieving a central
position within the debate over the future of broadcasting referred to the changes
within British economic and political consensus. This was inaugurated by the advent
of Thatcherism. When Margaret Thatcher's government entered office in 1979, it
began to enact policies which were conceived from an amalgam of market-liberal
economic theories and libertarian political values. In many respects, Thatcher and
particularly her more ideologically motivated allies (such as Keith Joseph) were
influenced by the libertarianism expressed in F.A. Hayek's The Road to Serfdom48
and the monetarism of Milton Friedman.
In The Road to Serfdom, Hayek had argued that all forms of state socialism
and economic planning inevitably ended in the creation of tyranny. 49 Whilst, Hayek
and Friedman have differences in outlook and opinions (for instance, Hayek claimed
that he was not a monetarist), their work became synthesized under Thatcherism. This
argued for the principle of monetarism through the economic strategies of
privatization and deregulation. In addition, policy cells such as the lEA and the Centre
for Policy Studies propagated such arguments. 'New Right' thinking can be perhaps
best characterised as a distrust of public policy solutions that are not based on market
provisions. Essentially they shared a profound belief in "the superiority of market
solutions to administrative solutions. "50
Throughout the sixties and early seventies these ideologies had been confined
to the periphery of the political debate. However, with the perceived failures of
Keynesian 'Welfare Economics' and the associated critique of an overbearing state,
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these libertarian philosophies began to achieve credence within influential circles of
political power. Their currency in the Conservative Party was exacerbated after the
Heath government's. '
	 ' 4'amous 'U-turn' on economic policy and failure to defeat
corporatism. As Andrew Gamble has noted:
"Liberal political economy became intellectually fashionable again in the 1970s. If
anything its scope and potential were now enhanced, since its adherents were not
afraid to develop it by extending their analysis to the public sector and the problems
of public choice, the activities of politicians and bureaucrats, as well as the traditional
focus on the behaviour of buyers and sellers in the markets. "
These monetarist and libertarian ideas informed the Thatcher government's
general economic policy, most especially in its second and third terms, and extended
into many other areas of concern, for example welfare. This 'new' Conservatism
contrasted strongly with previous Conservative governments whose traditions had been
rooted in paternalism and pragmatism. In economic terms, Conservatives had followed
collectivist economic principles, whilst simultaneously pursuing a defence of private
property without any coherent theory to understand the role and function of private
property in society. 52
 The Thatcher government substantially altered this tradition by
adopting a political philosophy which demonstrated "an unapologetic case for the
virtues of capitalism, individualism, the profit motive and a restatement of the role
and importance of the entrepreneur"53.
In its adoption of these principles, it was able to take the radical and
intellectual high ground and in many respects reshaped the British political agenda,
even bringing into doubt the future existence of socialism. The key tenet of
'Thatcherism' has been described by Veljanovski:
168
• . . that free choice and competition within the rule of law will not only produce an
efficient economy but guarantee better than any other system the greatest liberty for
the individual.
Therefore, the arguments for deregulating the broadcasting industry fell on
fertile ground. Their importance became apparent in the 1982 Hunt report. For Cento
Veljanovski the report marked " a watershed in broadcasting policy" 55 . It marked a
sharp break with the sixty years of government policy which had been designed to
perpetuate the public service system and restrict competition. It argued that cable
television should compete against the BBC and ITV companies. More pertinently, it
developed the concept of light-touch regulation. It maintained that for cable systems
there should be no range and balance in programming requirements, that there should
be no limits on advertising, that 'impartiality' was not required and that there should
be no minimal quota of British material to be aired. The oversight which remained
should be reactive and the minimal regulation of programming was appropriate.
Whilst the Hunt Report disappointed a number of interests, who felt that it had been
too conciliatory to the Home Office, "its recommendations showed that the ground
rules were being modified, (and) that a new attitude to broadcasting was
emerging."56
The resulting 1984 Cable and Telecommunications Act created the
'light-touch' Cable Authority. A number of its recommendations were to contravene
well-established public service principles including universality of service, the
prohibition of direct viewer payment and the concept that no two broadcasting
organizations should compete for the same revenue source. The authority had two
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responsibilities. It granted regional licences to cable operators for a specific time
period (usually fifteen years) and ensured that operators conformed to technical
requisites. It was also responsible for programme supervision and in this respect its
powers were qualified. For example, it could not closely regulate the large volume of
programmes that were being transmitted across the twenty or more cable channels and
it did not have to ensure that cable operators should conform to the tenets of
'informing and educating' as well as 'entertaining'. As the Peacock report would later
comment the authority had " a generalised and reactive role"."
Therefore in the early eighties, the market-liberal approach to broadcasting
gaineJ momentum due to the conjunction of a number of dynamics: the introduction
of the domestically available new media channels had created an opportunity to
question the system; the inability of the broadcasting market to achieve parity between
public and private sectors and the change within the political consensus. Further, the
success of Channel Four had also demonstrated to libertarians and politicians the
possibilitie free-market broadcasting system. Although the channel was regulated by
the IBA and financed by ITV, it was legally bound to commission a large proportion
of programmes from independent producers. However, this compromise between
regulation and the market had left market-liberals simultaneously dissatisfied as it
smacked of collusion and it did not go far enough with market reforms.
From this outlook, a long-term suspicion of the traditional cultural
imperatives and the broadcasting institutions who had acted as a consistent barrier to
individual freedoms remained. In contrast, to the traditional consensus for
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broadcasting policy-maldng which had held that such legislation was designed to foster
a commitment for the "undivided public good", this intellectual focus argued for
individual expression to be mediated through consumer sovereignty, market practices
and deregulation.58
 Moreover, as John Keane has noted, this analysis had taken the
high ground within the area of political philosophy and the media. 59 Keane maintains
that the disparate research practices of political philosophers and medialcultural
commentators, drawn from structuralist, post-structuralist and post-modern
traditions60 , created a situation in which key questions on the relationship between
democratic ideals and the contemporary media were largely ignored. 6' However, the
market-liberalism of Brittan, Jay and Peacock, which would later underpin the
Peacock report, was concerned with linking economic reform with questions of
political liberty. As Keane comments:
N In recent years ... the proponents of 'deregulation' ... have powerfully questioned
the prevailing mix of public and private means of communication operating within the
boundaries of the nation state. Their language has forced a crisis in state-centred
interpretations of the media. Their market-liberalism sends shivers up the spines of
public service broadcasters and state administrators ... Market liberalism has ensured
that public policies concerning the press and especially broadcasting and
telecommunications are shaped increasingly by old-fashioned talk of state censorship,
individual choice, deregulation and market competition. "62
3:2. THE POLITICAL CONTEXT OF THE PEACOCK COMMITFEE
There is an irony, which I will explore throughout my thesis, that the Peacock
report should have responded to the libertarian tradition of political liberty, when it
was set up to respond to the demands of a period of governmental intervention in
broadcasting. Whilst the antecedents of the Peacock report were drawn from this
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libertarian approach to broadcasting, it should be remembered that the immediate
politi'al context may be seen to be characterized by the other main element of
Thatcherism	 authoritarianism.
The most publicly visible feature, and arguably strongest motivating factor,
for the creation( report to discuss the implications of advertising on the BBC was the
evolution of tensions between the Thatcher government and the broadcasting
community. This manifested itself most acutely with the BBC and was invariably
located around the corporation's News and Current Affairs programming. As Philip
Schlesinger comments the political elite's attentions were especially directed at the
BBC due to the corporation's perceived status:
Although ITV has by no means been immune to scrutiny, it has been much less in
the firing line, notably so during the Thatcher years. One reason for this is that within
official circles , and more widely too, the BBC is perceived as owing especial loyalty
to the state. By contrast, the companies regulated by the IBA do not enjoy the BBC's
ambiguous status as an 'organization within the constitution'. In an undeclared internal
war, the BBC has been a prime target for politicians seeking a scapegoat for their lack
of success. it is true that civil libertarian and investigative journalists of both the
establishment and the radical presses have met with official harassment on occasion,
and newspaper editors have been subject to political pressure, but no single media
organization has met with the sustained, hostile attention accorded to the BBC."63
Therefore, the BBC was again faced with the question of assessing how to balance the
national interest against the legal requirements of impartiality over politically sensitive
topics and during periods of crisis.
172
3:2.1 POLITICAL DISPUTES
In particular this paradox focused upon programmes that dealt with the issue
of Northern Ireland. The television coverage of Irish terrorist organi2ations such as
the Provisional IRA and the Irish National Liberation Army (INLA) provoked
outstanding controversy. The latter group had claimed responsibility for the
assassination of Margaret Thatcher's shadow Northern Ireland secretary and close
political ally Airey Neave on the eve of the 1979 General Election. The bombing of
his car caused a political outcry and evoked strong feelings within the ranks of the
Conservative Party. Three months after the Neave's assassination and the election of
the Thatcher government, an edition of the BBC's current affairs programme Tonight
(edited by Roger Bolton) televised an interview with an INLA spokesman
conducted by reporter David Lomax. The programme, in contrast to the later Real
Lives controversy, had been passed by the Director-General of the BBC, Ian
Trethowan. In the subsequent interview the INLA claimed that Neave favoured torture
and extreme repression to deal with terrorism in Northern Ireland. The interview was
followed by a studio discussion chaired by Robin Day (who was later to claim his
remorse in his memoirs The Grand Inquisitor65) between Gerry Pitt, the SDLP MP
and the Unionist MP, the Reverend Robert Bradford.
The programme produced an outraged reaction from the government when
Airey Neave's widow wrote to the Daily Telegraph to voice her disgust. The
programme-makers were attacked as Lady Neave had not received any prior warning
of the programme's content. Margaret Thatcher, in particular, was appalled as Neave
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had engineered her victory within the Tory Party in 1975 and was her strongest
political confidante. As Bolton was later to comment:
Mrs Thatcher found it inexplicable. She asked the Home Office on a visit there
"What are we going to do about the BBC ? She revealed her anger about the interview
in Parliament, " I was appalled it was ever transmitted and I believe it reflects gravely
on the judgement of the BBC and those responsible." She told the Commons that the
Attorney General Sir Michael Havers would consider whether legal action could be
taken against the BBC."
The INLA interview was quickly followed by the political debate which
surrounded a Panorama programme demonstrating the strength of the Provisional IRA
in certain areas of Northern Ireland. The report centred upon an IRA roadblock
operating in the Northern Irish village of Carrickmore. This investigation had been
conducted by the reporters Jeremy Paxman and David Darlow under the auspices of
Roger Bolton (who had become the Editor of Panorama). The programme, which had
remained untransmitted, produced further political outrage and the police seized a
copy of the film under the 'Prevention of Terrorism' Act. The BBC disciplined its
staff and Bolton was sacked, although he was subsequently to be reinstated. The
coupling of the INLA and Carrickmore incident served to instigate a continuous
tension between the Thatcher government and the BBC.67
This accumulation of governmcnt-broadcasting tensions over Northern Ireland
continued after the setting up of the Peacock report. The Peacock inquiry co-incided
with the most famous recent case of political tension between BBC and the state
the Real Lives case in July 1985. This referred to a programme made by the BBC in
its 'Real Lives' series entitled At Edge of Union about Northern Ireland which
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contained interviews with a militant loyalist Gregory Campbell and the alleged IRA
terrorist and Sinn Fein spokesman Martin MacGinness. The programme had been set
up and approved at producer level, and had escaped the notice of the Board of
Management. This meant that the programme appeared in the Radio Times and came
to the attention of the government through the Sunday Times.
The timing of the programme proved to be unfortunate, as Margaret Thatcher
had recently been involved in the All Ireland conference at Hillsborough and had
responded to questions over the televising of terrorism at an American Bar
Association Conference by stating (italics added):" We must try to find ways to starve
the terrorist of the oxygen of publicüy on which they depend." 68
 The Home Secretary
Leon Brittan wrote to the BBC Board of Governors chaired by Stuart Young. Whilst,
he did not employ his veto Brittan emphasised that the programme was against the
national interest. In turn, the board saw the programme and, heavily influenced by
Vice-Chairman William Rees-Mogg, decided to have it withdrawn over the authority
of the BBC management and then Director-General Alasdair Milne. The governors
claimed to constitutionally be the BBC as they were the public trustees. The banning
of the documentary led to an immediate 24-hour strike by the BBC journalists. This
move added to precedent set by Hill during the case of 'Yesterday's Men' in which
the governors intervened over management. However, it also demonstrated the extent
to which the government had exercised political control through the appointment of
the governors.
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The Falklands crisis also presented the BBC with problem of mediating the
national interest with independence. As Michael Leapman comments:
"Mime ... said that the BBC would come under pressure to conform to the national
interest ... The difficulty was to define the national interest. While they should be
careful about military and diplomatic matters, they should report fully the arguments
in Britain over the government's actions. This was part of what provoked the anger of
government supporters over the following month, but they were equally furious about
the coverage given to the Argentineans' view in dispatches from Buenos Aires. "70
Essentially the BBC was in a no-win situation. If it conformed to military and
government censorship (which, by and large, it was forced to do by the suppression of
satellite links and the qualification on the number of broadcast journalists sailing with
the Task Force), it could be accused of bias, suppressing information and acting as the
government's mouthpiece71 . Alternatively, when reporters pursued the long-cherished
principles of impartiality, the BBC had to withstand public criticisms from the
government. A notable example of this problem occurred when Peter Snow, the
presenter of Newsnight, used impartial terms such as 'British Troops' and the 'British'
rather than 'our troops' or 'we' to describe events within the Falidands. The
programme became subject to criticism as it appeared to imply that there were two
sides to the war and that the Argentinean's had a case as well. This was accompanied
by a Panorama documentary which was critical of the Thatcher government's policy
towards the Falkiands. These programmes and their subsequent criticisms led to
Margaret Thatcher declaring in parliament on the 6 May 1982:
" Many people are very concerned indeed that the case for the British forces is not
being put over fully and effectively. I understand that there are times when it seems
that we and the Argentineans are being treated almost as equals and almost on a
neutral basis."72
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The relationship between the Thatcher government and the BBC continued to
proceed in this fashion throughout the mid-eighties.73
 The tensions between the BBC
and the Conservatives continued with the controversy surrounding a 1984 Panorama
programme entitled 'Maggie's Militant Tendency' leading to the BBC paying out
£500, 000 in libel74 , and the reporting of the US's bombing of Libya which led to
then Conservative Party chairman Norman Tebbit setting up an Anti-Tory bias unit.
The BBC Drama department also raised governmental wrath by commissioning and
then scrapping a play about Falkiands by playwright Ian Curteis. Curteis leaked the
decision claiming that the play had been dropped as it showed Margaret Thatcher in a
favourable light. 75
 This row was quickly followed by the press and government
outrage over Alan Bleasdale's drama serial 'The Monocled Mutineer'. The
programme about a World War One deserter had been unwisely publicized as a true
story when it had been littered with historical errors. In this respect, the BBC had
been accused of presenting left-wing fiction as fact. 76
 Further, the BBC was also
subject to the 'Special Branch's' seizure of material during a production of a
programme upon the Zircon Spy satellite by reporter Duncan Campbel1.
Throughout these disputes, Margaret Thatcher and her government felt that
the BBC, as a publicly funded national broadcaster, should be a tool for national
interest, indeed propaganda, instead of holding onto the long-cherished principles of
impartiality. At the most populist end of this approach stood Norman Tebbit, who in
his autobiography 'Upwardly Mobile' indicated the Thatcher government's attitude to
the Falkiands coverage:
177
"The Unctuous "impartiality" of the BBC's editorialising was a source of grief and
anger. Few of us directly concerned will ever forgive the phrase "the British
authorities, if they are to be believed, say ..." or the regular references to British and
Argentinean forces rather than "our forces" and "enemy forces". The elaborate even-
handedness jarred cruelly with those whose lives were at risk, those of us who took
ultimate responsibility for committing our forces, knowing the human costs of what
we had to do, and with the general public. Nor did the excuse that the Overseas
Service broadcasts would lose credibility with their foreign listeners unless the BBC
remained "impartial", hold water because it confused truth with impartiality and
balance.
"It was not impartiality that impelled the Germans to risk punishment by tuning in to
the BBC during the Second World War. For me the British Broadcasting Corporation
might have better called itself the Stateless Persons Broadcasting Corporation for it
certainly did not reflect the mood of the British people who finance it. The wounds
inflicted by the BBC have still not healed."78
Whilst, tension has always surrounded the political relationship between the
BBC and the state (notably under the Wilson government with the removal of the
'War Game' and controversy surrounding the
	 programme which portrayed
Wilson's Shadow Cabinet as 'Yesterday's Men'), governments have rarely criticized
the corporation for the principles of impartiality enshrined within the BBC Charter and
during its news coverage. In fact these qualities had previously been deemed as virtues
by members of the political elite who preferred to extol the BBC's political
independence rather than admit to the close structural and regulatory ties that exist
between it and the state. As Cohn Shaw has commented in an interview conducted for
this thesis:
if the BBC needed to be defended it could turn to '27 Vice-Chancellors, 13
Rear Admirals' etc to send a letter to the 'Times' defending it. I know because I have
done that previously. "
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In the past press secretaries for both of the major political parties, such as Joe
Haines for Wilson, preferred to accuse the BBC of political bias and
misrepresentation. Yet, they were not overtly critical of the time-honoured notions of
impartiality, objectivity and balance. Thus, a distinct change in perceptions by the
Thatcher government over the role of the BBC may be detected, most especially
during periods of crisis. In turn, this led to a virulent critique of the corporation.
Cohn Shaw has noted that throughout the second Thatcher administration (1983-1987)
a" refutation of the BBC (occurred) (which was) accompanied by the assumption that
the BBC was up to no good."8°
3:2.2 ' SYSTEMIC DISLOCATION'
In order to explain, assess and analyze the political tension between the
Thatcher government and the BBC during the early eighties, it will be necessary to
consider what the Thatcher government's responses to broadcasting brought to light.
The relationship between the Conservative government and the broadcasters can
be characterized as one which, at best, exhibited innate distrust and further evidenced
a systematic undercutting of the licence fee. However, the factors contributing to these
visible tensions may be analyzed in several different ways:
Firstly, they may be seen as a continuation of traditional tensions which existed
between broadcasters and the state, which may be implicitly employed to argue that
broadcasting is succeeding in its liberal democratic aim of achieving independence
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from the state. Tensions between state and national broadcaster can be traced back to
the BBC's coverage of the 1926 General Strike and have continued throughout the
years through crises such as Suez in 1956, the War Game in 1967 and the
programme 'Yesterday's Men' in 1971.' Throughout these controversies, the
system's defenders have argued that the BBC was able to retain its independence from
the political elite by resisting threats and pressures. For instance, Reith's stance in the
1926 General Strike meant that the government did not commandeer the BBC (as
Winston Churchill would have liked) and Hugh Gaitskell, as the Labour Opposition
Leader, was allowed to air his criticism of the Suez Crisis in spite of Anthony Eden's
attempts to censure them.
Secondly, it can be argued that the interaction between broadcasters and the
state has been incremental. Therefore, it was indicative of the close ties which were
manufactured informally through legislation, regulation and the perpetuation of
dominant ideological belief (a consensus for parliamentary democracy) which were
combined under the umbrella notion of Public Service broadcasting. Moreover
political crises, in which the national interest is contrasted with political independence,
may also be seen to indicate political acquiescence by broadcasters to the state. For
instance, an alternative reading of the BBC's actions throughout the General Strike has
argued that Reith agreed to exclude the political opposition's leadership from
broadcasts and persuaded the political elite that it would be to their advantage to
pursue a more subtle, less bombastic approach to the issue. For some members of the
Labour Party and the unions the BBC has been redubbed the 'British Falsehood
Corporation'.
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If broadcasting is seen as operating within the hegemony of the state, a
different interpretation of the failings between the Thatcher government and the BBC
becomes evident. As a consequence, the accumulation of tensions between government
and broadcasters may be perceived as being symptomatic of a far wider gulf between
broadcasters and the dominant elements of the political elite, in which through a
mixture of personal political preference and wider design, they misjudged and
misinterpreted the close structural ties that existed. The Thatcher government's use of
overt political intimidation may also be seen to have distinguished it from previous
governmental attempts at political intervention.
At an anecdotal level, it has been claimed that this tension was simply a clash
of personalities. Some broadcasters have argued that Margaret Thatcher was never to
forgive the BBC and ITV for their coverage of her son Mark's disappearance in the
desert! Moreover, leading figures within the BBC have been criticized for their
inability to perceive the issues and their lack of political tact. This feeling was evident
in an interview I conducted with the former IBA Director of Television and secretary
to the BBC Board of Governors Cohn Shaw. He commented that the Chairman of the
Board of Governors Stuart Young was out of his depth. Young's background as a
suburban solicitor had hardly prepared him for the job he was destined to undertake.
He had little experience in supervising such a major societal institution and further
had few links with the broadcasting community. His appointment had followed the
death of the former chairman George Howard and was perhaps most notable as a
reflection of an appointment procedure that was guided overwhelmingly by party
patronage. Young could hardly have been seen as a high-profile choice for such an
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important position.82
Shaw further commented that the Director-General Alasdair Mime was also the
wrong man for the job. Whilst Mime had pursued the classic BBC career path (he
was systematically promoted from novice producer into management hierarchy and
eventually attained the top job within the corporation), his inability to negotiate both
within and outside the corporation has been criticized:
"The problem was that Stuart Young (who was very ill) as Chairman and Alasdair
Mime never really developed the correct relationship. There was a 'tragic
inevitability' when Alasdair began as he was not the right man for the Director-
General's job. Alasdair despised the Board of Governors, although George Howard
(the former Chairman of the Governors) was determined that he should have the job.
Essentially the day he got the job, marked the day he was forced to resign."83
Roger Bolton in his book 'Death on the Rock and other stories' portrays
Mime as a fiery personality who was oversensitive and would not willingly accept
criticism. Bolton recounts a meeting with Milne in which he was invited to air some
of the problems he felt were facing the BBC. When Bolton criticized some of the
programming choices on BBC 1, Mime furiously responded that Bolton had no right to
make such criticisms and took offence. He claimed that he was the central scheduler,
not Bolton. Bolton argues that Milne's personal style of management led to a series of
reactive and irrational decisions.M
In this respect, one has to remain mindful of the personalities involved and
their interpretation of events 85 . Both Shaw and Bolton have respective grudges with
the BBC in terms of their own careers (Shaw probably would have liked the Director-
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General post and Bolton left the Corporation after being dismissed and had constantly
been a thorn in the side of the management 86) and they are evaluating Mime with the
sufficient hindsight of his eventual dismissal. However Bolton's following comments
would seem to contain an element of truth:
"Alasdair did not seem to have a vision of what the Corporation should be, nor the
political skills needed to steer it through particularly troubled waters.
He had the misfortune to work with two weak BBC Chairmen who both died while
in office, and with a Board of Governors which was certainly in tune with much of
the Government's thinking. His predecessor Ian Trethowan, had papered over the
cracks of a widening chasm between the Management and the Governors. Mime could
not do this perhaps no one could.
the DG must be on nodding terms with top people and opinion formers.
Alasdair did not want to socialise. Above all a DG must be able to communicate a
vision of what he wants the BBC to be and clear strategy of how intends to achieve
that."87
However, the tensions which developed between the BBC and the Thatcher
government did not simply result from a clash of ill-matched personalities;they more
fundamentally referred to the alterations which were occurring within the composition
of the political elite. Throughout this period, there was a shift within the balance of
political power that has been commonly characterized as the rise of the 'New Right'.
Whilst, it has been shown that the government's political philosophy was shaped by an
amalgam of Hayek's libertarianism and Friedman's monetarism, the government's
authoritarianism also determined its outlook. Hugo Young in One of Us has detected
how this was manufactured through the government's class composition, political style
and political alliances. 88 Throughout its period in office, the Thatcher government
may be perceived as enhancing the repressive sectors of the state (for example, the
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police) and conducting a reactionary form of policy-making. Its rhetoric was reflective
of a particular strain of petit-bourgeois thought in which this class's morality was
displayed (for instance, Victorian values) and private rather than public goals were
targeted:
"The achievement of ... Thatcherism has been to weld together the instincts of
individual greed and collective self-righteousness into a coherent model of the world,
in which the rhetoric of freedom can co-exist with the reassertion of virtue. Put
crudely, the new authoritarianism allows people to vote in narrow self-interest, but yet
to feel good about doing so."89
This change within the make-up of the political elite occurred as the BBC
leading managers failed to perceive the vehemence of their opposition within policy
forums. In turn, they failed to make allies within these areas of the political elite as
they did not understand that the contours of the political landscape had altered. Cohn
Shaw has commented that:
"Throughout (this) period neither Gecrge Howard, Stuart Young or Alasdair Mime
assigned a role for the BBC in the changing environment. When this occurred it was
five, six or seven years too late. There was no consultation or awareness of the Centre
of Policy studies set up by Keith Joseph in the seventies. As the people involved were
not natural communicators, there was no press or broadcasters in contact with these
figures. Two quite different cultures competed side-by-side;the BBC representative of
an older set of principles and the 'New Right'. The BBC had no allies in the 'New
Right' as there had been no consultation. Previously the radical concerns had been
associated with the left and this perception remained dominant amongst Young and
Milne .....The nature of the political game (had) changed dramatically and the BBC
moved disastrously due to the inability of some to perceive that the rules were altered.
The eighties have been a bad time for the BBC. "9°
Whilst the chief personnel in broadcasting had remained the same throughout
the early to mid-eighties, the background and ideology of leading members of the
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political elite had greatly altered. If one compares the key Thatcherites and members
of the broadcasting community this divergence becomes startlingly conspicuous. For
example, the 'Thatcherite' par excellence Norman Tebbit was drawn from a North
London suburban working-class background, had risen to become an air-line pilot and
had attained a certain perception of society based upon economic mobility within the
private sector. He also exemplified the authoritarian strain in Thatcher's political
orientation in which the political opposition was not so much seen as an opposition as
an enemy to be defeated. 9 ' In contrast, the Director-General Alasdair Mime might be
understood as occupying a position within the traditional liberal intelligentsia through
his university education and his introduction into a public corporation, such as the
BBC, with its defined ethos and attitudes. Whilst this comparison is necessarily
arbitrary it does illustrate the different positions and attitudes which existed between
these two elite societal groupings.
The BBC, moreover, followed the traditional British institutional practices of
incremental alteration and gradualist policy-making. As Tim Madge has argued:
according to some Conservative party ideologues ... the BBC expresses in a form
of living symbolism the possibility of a consensually organix1 society of the kind
they themselves have attempted to erode."
This indicates how the political and broadcasting elites pursued very different
procedures in obtaining objectives. A vital part of the 'Thatcher Revolution' may be
seen to be the fundamental change it offered towards organizational behaviour within
government. Effectively, personal choice and direct decision-making tended to over-
ride the normative consensual diplomacy of the past. The BBC was again slow to
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react to this change, as it was imbued with these traditional institutional conceptions
and practices.
The resulting battle for control over the licence fee and the government's
attempts to use advertising as a political weapon can, on one level, be seen to have
been activated by the inherent political tensions which had been manufactured by the
BBC's formal independence from the state. It demonstrated a divergence amongst elite
societal groups in which wide differences in political perception and the purposes of
mass communication became the norm.
It may have also been perceived as the most extreme example of governmental
interference within broadcasting. The licence fee was not only seen by many
Thatcherites as a retrogressive poll tax which was unpopular and difficult to collect,
but was also understood as a mechanism through which the government might exert its
authority to qualify the power of what it felt had stood as an opposing force. This
would appear evident in the Thatcher government's decision to pursue the Wilson
government's systematic attack on the annual licence fee. In this respect, one might
ascertain that Thatcher's bombastic approach toward the BBC led her and her
ministers to misinterpret the close structural ties that existed between the state and
broadcasters. Previously, these had been manufactured through both formal controls
such as legislation, regulatory bodies and de facto powers such as the appointment
process of the BBC governors. However, political short-termism, motivated by a
desire to neutralize what was perceived as a political enemy, had led the government
into bringing into question the funding of the BBC and inadvertently the very nature
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of the public service broadcasting system.
3:3. THE IDEOLOGICAL CONTEXT OF THE PEACOCK COMMITrEE:
THE CONVERGENCE OF THE LIBERTARIAN APPROACH AND POLITICAL
DYNAMIC TO BROADCASTING
Consequently, with this convergence between the intellectual and political
strands, an ideological context calling for a new model for British broadcasting was
established. This pressed for a system which would have to be responsive to
individual choice and freedom, would discard the normative mechanisms for
broadcasting finance and regulation, and could enable independent producers to
compete in a free market place. Essentially, it was contended that broadcasting should
be provided through competition unless it could be shown that there were compelling
reasons for not doing so. As Veljanovski has commented:
"... if a wider and more varied service is to be provided it is the consumers and the
providers interacting in the market-place who must decide rather than governments
and regulators."93
The response to Jay's arguments within the Peacock Committee was
particularly favourable, in contrast to his submissions to the Annan Committee, due to
the empathy felt by Peacock and most especially Brittan towards the notions that he
propagated. In this respect the committee's balance led it to move away from the
introduction of advertising on the BBC, to using this issue as an entry point into an
investigation which would be more concerned with the broader reform of a future
television industry constructed from the ideology of the free-market:
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those who wish to strike a blow for freedom cannot wait for the ideal inquiry
with ideal terms of reference. They must seize any available opportunity. "
Both Peacock and Brittan, who were subsequently to emerge as the most powerful
grouping within the committee, indicated in their statements to the press that the
narrow economic remit provided the committee with a strong enough base through
which to analyze broadcasting. Brittan, was later to argue, that the speculation
surrounding the setting up of the committee and the subsequent inquiry tended to
neglect several factors:
(we) were inclined towards the market provision of goods and services ... But
market economics is so little understood that it was mistakenly identified outside the
Committee ... with (a) enthusiasm for advertising, (b) support for commercial
pressure groups, and (c) desire to please a Thatcher government. "
The inclusion of Brittan was of particular importance as he had already
developed ideas for broadcasting which were founded upon a strongly held conviction
in market-liberal economic and societal theory. Brittan was cogently to combine the
two strains of the market-liberal economic theory and technology in order to articulate
the increased demand for deregulation. Brittan's post-Peacock article The Myth of the
Spectrum Shortage which appeared in the Financial Times made some of the new
technology's implications clear. He determined that the limitations of the air-wave
spectrum had passed and that there were no technical qualifications for scrambling
transmissions. This he maintained would make pay-per-view channels a desirable and
profitable option as decoding equipment could also be installed relatively cheaply.
Fundamentally, pay-per-view services would provide the viewer with the option to
register his/her intensity of preference by registering the amount s/he was willing to
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pay. In this respect, Brittan's alliance with Peter Jay was to strongly colour his
outlook. Indeed, in conversation with Anthony Smith, he remarked that the whole
process of the Peacock committee and report could be characterized under the term
'Jayism by indefinite postponement'98. In one of Brittan's earliest disclosures to the
press he admitted:
watches far too much television, particularly programmes which feature fellow
economist Peter Jay - who, he believes, should have had his seat on the Peacock
committee. He admires Jay's concept that TV companies should be like publishers,
providing consumers with any kind of programme they care to pay for."
In regard to the usage of Jay, Peacock may be fairly accused of abusing his
right to select expert witnesses. Jay was the only individual asked to provide evidence
and in many respects provided Peacock and Brittan with the information they wanted
to hear. As Alasdair Mime noted with a significant touch of cynicism, Jay was given
pride of place:
After lunch, it was Peter Jay's turn; the only individual invited to speak for himself,
the Peacock guru. Peter set forth, at his usual machine-gun rate of delivery, his
picture of the new world of electronic publishing, where programmes would pour out
of fibre-optic cables in the same way that books had poured of presses in the past.
Sam Brittan smiled like a cheshire cat."
Thus, Jay saw the issue of the introduction of advertising upon the BBC as
deflecting attention way from the truly important concern of 'electronic publishing'.
The debate between advertisers and broadcasters was self-defeating as the BBC and
ITV companies were redundant and retrogressive organi.ations who had no pLe in
the "future wired city, in which choice and market forces would be paramount."10'
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His thesis acted as the foundation upon which Peacock and Brittan could draw the
other members of the committee to the wider series of issues they intended to explore.
These can be delineated as follows; the rise of new technology, the introduction of
new media actors who would benefit from new technologies and new forms of
managing the broadcasting market-place and the evolution of a coherent market-liberal
ideology which could be expressed towards broadcasting. In such a manner, Jay's
submissions proved to be highly influential as they relocated the committee's attention
away from the possibilities of merely tampering with the 'duopoly' by replacing the
licence fee with advertising. Instead, the committee member's focus was drawn
towards an analysis which questioned the fundamental tenets of British broadcasting in
the light of the new media. This was clearly Jay's intention:
Let me start by inviting you to stanc on its head the conventional perception that, in
the universe of electronic publishing, it is the world in which we have been living
which is 'normal' and the world into which we are now beginning to move which is
strange or peculiar. Instead I ask to you to consider the hypothesis that, on the
contrary, it is the world which we have been living, for nearly a century now, which
is artificial and special and that it is the world into which we are moving which will
be properly be regarded as normal and natural."°2
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CONCLUSION
As the material suggests, several factors contributed to the establishment of
the Peacock Committee. There was undoubtedly a political crisis between the
Thatcher government and the BBC throughout the early eighties. This crisis had been
manufactured by the evolution of a political and broadcasting elite that had very little
in common in terms of class background, ideology and institutional practice. It can,
on one level, be seen to be indicative of long-term tension between the broadcaster
remaining independent or acquiescing to the national interest. It may be argued that
the BBC was performing its democratic function and challenging an overbearing
government. However, if the re1ationsiip between state and broadcaster is perceived
as having being mediated through an incremental evolution of minimalist legislation,
regulation, personnel and shared aims, a rather different picture begins to emerge.
The root causes of the tensions between the state and BBC during the early-eighties
may be seen to have emerged from an inability of both parties to understand the
parameters of this relationship. This miscalculation led to the Conservative
government attempting direct forms of intervention when covert pressures could have
been applied. It further made conspicuous the pretence that the broadcasting
institutions could really remain impartial and neutral arbiters during periods of crisis.
In turn, this led to an unprecedented (even compared with the first Wilson
government) and continuous form of hostility from both sides. The Peacock committee
was called, in no small measure, due to the political will of a government who
regarded the BBC as its political opponent rather than a potential political ally.
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This combined with the economic and technological dislocations which were
facing the BBC. Throughout the eariy eighties the terrestrial broadcasting system
exhibited an increasing financial imbalance between the public and commercial sector.
The ITV companies' advertising revenues had led to massive profits which could be
invested into programming, whilst the BBC was having to live within the restricted
budgets of the licence fee which, in real terms, had substantially decreased. This
financial problem led onto a philosophical set of issues for the BBC as the
Corporation, to advance its status and compete with the ITV network, was forced to
divert its resources into popular programming. Essentially, this meant that the public
broadcaster was no longer acting in the interests of 'educating and informing' but was
increasingly conforming to the tenet of 'entertaining'. This produced a moral crisis
within the BBC and further allowed the government to question whether the Reithian
tenets and bureaucracy was outmoded and unsuitable for the contemporary
requirements of British broadcasting.
The third imperative was the new media and communications delivery
methods. Cable and satellite had broken down the technological justifications for the
national broadcaster (the 'Limited Spectrum') and opened up new markets for
independent media suppliers. Further, satellite technology had allowed for cross-
national developments and the ready provision of new technologies would aid the
consumer in expanding his/her diet of programmes. Finally, technological
developments meant that it became more problematic to differentiate broadcasting
from other areas of information technology.
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Therefore, there was a general perception amongst both the government and
broadcasting community that a crisis was occurring. The government was dissatisfied
with the political position of the BBC and distrusted the monopolistic structure of
broadcasting. Meanwhile, the broadcasters felt that they were being constantly forced
to defend themselves against the government's political intransigence and the
respective changes to broadcasting finance which had been inaugurated through a
funding discrepancy and by the new technologies.
There is little doubt that the government intended to reform the BBC's
funding structure through the introduction of advertising to undermine the confidence
of an institution which it identified as a political enemy. The composition of the
committee, the focus of its remit, the length of inquiry and nature of the evidence it
received would all appear to indicate the veracity of this opinion. To many
contemporary observers it appeared that the Peacock Committee was being run by a
chairman who simply would conform to the wishes of Margaret Thatcher. In contrast
to the seventies broadcasting policy cycle, in which the Annan Committee had been
set up as a Royal Commission, Peacock was formally no more than a committee of
inquiry. For example, Cohn Shaw has commented upon the Peacock committee:
"If you compare it with the Annan Committee several points are apparent. From
1974-1977 Annan invited a wide body of evidence --- so much so that it could not be
printed. Peacock did not look at education and there was no attempt to consider
broadcasting as a social phenomenon. It was seen as an economic phenomenon, whilst
this was to some extent a virtue --- it was more of a vice than a virtue. The committee
itself was too small. Annan, for example, had 10-12 members, whilst Peacock had
seven, this meant that there was no proper perspective. It is indicative of the Thatcher
period that the committee of inquiry became devalued as Peacock was erected to
represent market	 103
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However, the Home Secretary Leon Brittan may also be accused of
misjudging the ground-rules of the enquiry process by 'packing' the committee with
market-liberals. Whilst, there appeared to be a superficial accordance between market-
liberal theories towards broadcasting and the introduction of advertising on the BBC,
there were, in fact, many divergencies about the feasibility and philosophical
ramifications of such a course of action. The Peacock report was to respond to a
libertarian approach to broadcasting which had been developed through a number of
key works such as RH. Coase's critique of the BBC, the lEA's Hobart Papers and
Peter Jay's concept 'electronic publishing'. For market-liberals, there had been a long-
term historical cycle of 'missed opportunities' to reform British broadcasting. At a
number of crucial junctures the opportunities for transforming the systemic order had
been apparent and had been rejected in favour of retaining and enhancing the status
quo: during the BBC's transition from private company to public corporation;
throughout the fall-out from the 1949 Beveridge committee's critique of the BBC
when a commercial channel became a reality; throughout the early period of
substantive financial disparity between the BBC and ITV resulting in the Pilkington
report and during the Annan debate when the criticisms of the duopoly and alternative
ideas were posited to foster a more pluralistic form of broadcasting for the fourth
channel (the Open Broadcasting Authority). Previously, technical qualifications,
financial restrictions and consensualism amongst elite groups (although this was not
usually exhibited between the government and the broadcasters) had mitigated the
market. However, in the early to mid-eighties the conditions appeared to make
broadcasting ripe for such a reform. It had become increasingly important due to the
respective changes within broadcasting delivery, the failure to retain financial parity
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between the public and commercial sectors and the change within the political
consensus dictated by the advent of Thatcherism.
Jay's theories for 'Electronic Publishing' both acted as a critique of the
system and also provided the means through which reforms could be negotiated. His
evidence substantially widened the scope of the inquiry. The committee's narrow
remit could be usurped and the commercial, as well as the public sector, was seen to
be ready for change. Jay's role was crucial and highly influential upon Samuel Brittan
in particular. Brittan as market-liberal ideologue was attracted to the notions spelled
out by Jay and could argue for these recommendations in the context of economic and
societal reforms. In particular, this outlook had made a linkage between the economic
reform of broadcasting and greater political liberty. This led to the committee taldng
an unpredicted libertarian approach emerging out of Thatcherite authoritarianism. As
Alan Peacock was later to comment:
The Committee's approach to the financial problems of broadcasting ... came as a
surprise. It was supposed to have been appointed to reach foregone conclusions. This
was not the case. It was widely expected to recommend that the BBC should take
advertising. It did not so recommend. It was believed that the terms of reference
would so confine its activities that it would not be able to consider the wider aspects
of broadcasting resources and how they should be financed. In fact, it offered
revolutionary proposals designed to alter the whole system of broadcasting
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1. Jeremy Tunstall, 'Media Policy Dilemmas and Indecisions', Parliamentary Affairs,
Oxford University Press, Volume 37, No.3, p.315.
2. Ibid., pp.315-316.
3. Ibid., p.315.
4. See The Report of the Committee on Financing the BBC (The Peacock Report),
HMSO, July 1986, p.1. Henceforth, throughout this chapter's references this will be
referred to as the Peacock Report.
5. Peacock had a proven track-record with writings upon the economics of public
finance in areas of social policy and the Arts, as well as serving as the Chief
Economic Advisor and Deputy Secretary at the Department of Trade and Industry
from 1973-1976. Peacock had also made his name as the Vice-Chancellor of Britain's
first 'private' university --- the University of Buckingham. Peacock not only had a
theoretical understanding of the market-place, but was further a disciple of the
principles of free-market thinking and practice. Whilst Peacock was at pains to state
that he considered himself as 'no hired gun', Margaret Thatcher's choice of Peacock
was deemed by many commentators as being controversial. For instance, Peacock had
formerly advocated introduction of an educational voucher scheme and was known as
a passionate supporter of the free market. As Ed Gorman (Broadcast, 5.4.85 p.15)
commented:
"Peacock's appointment has been greeted with dismay by Thatcher's opponents and
by the broadcasting unions. They fear that "given the known views of Professor
Peacock, "the inquiry will be biased in favour of the Government's belief that a
radically altered BBC should be at least partially funded by advertising or
sponsorship."
6.As Michael Leapman (Leapman, The Last Days of the Beeb, Allen and Unwin,
1986 p.95) comments:
"Hetherington ... was appointed to the Peacock Committee ... If he felt wounded by
his treatment at the hands of Mime and the London Mafia, and if he were a vengeful
man, here would be a golden chance of settling the score."
7. The rest of the committee included Judith Chalmers --- television personality and
radio presenter; Jeremy Hardie --- economist, accountant and businessman; Lord
Quinton --- President of Trinity College, Oxford; and Sir Peter Reynolds --- Chairman
of Rank, Hovis McDougall PLC.The inclusion of the television presenter Judith
Chalmers also caused a something of a stir. She was seen to be a lightweight, notably
as she was a co-presenter for the long-running holiday programme 'Wish You Were
Here?' and had been a former co-presenter for the 'Miss World' contest. Chalmers,
whilst being perceived as a hard-working, professional broadcaster, was seen to be
under-qualified and further to have earned her place for her enthusiastic canvassing
for the Conservative Party in North London.Both Lord Quinton and Sir Peter
Reynolds were known Conservative Party
supporters, although Jeremy Hardie (a former SDP candidate) described himself as
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"one of the few remaining Keynesian economists." The trade paper Broadcast
(7.6.85., p.46) summed up the attitude of many observers when it cynically described
the committee's first appearance at a press conference and photo-session:
"Taking a jolly break from their arduous first meeting last week in room 239 of the
"Brown Area" at the Home Office, the Peacock Rubber stamp ... oops, make that
Committee, posed for a rabble of press photographers ... (the) financial journalist Sam
Brittan (relation) ... could be later seen waving an Institute of Economic Affairs
pamphlet, 'Choice by Cable', at Judith Chalmers and saying "I'm looking for things
like this that coincide with my own prejudices.""
Samuel Brittan in his post-Peacock article 'The Fight for Freedom in
Broadcasting', The Political Ouartely, January 1987 identified that after the initial two
stages of this process the internal dynamics within the committee had divided
members into three different groups; i) Peacock and Brittan --- who propagated free-
market economic and philosophical principles within broadcasting; ii) Chalmers and
Hetherington --- who were keen to preserve the achievements of British broadcasting
and were consequently dubious about the merits of the market; and iii) Quinton,
Reynolds and Hardie --- who represented a middle grouping that was neither
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to be re-directed to those smaller ITV companies hit by BBC advertising. Finally
programming for BBC would go out to tender to independents in competition with
offers from the BBC regions.
Meanwhile, Hetherington was telephoned and asked if he would go along with the
"master plan" which had not at that stage even been discussed. It was not until
February that the advertising option was finally dropped."
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CHAPTER FOUR
THE ENOUIRY PHASE PART II: THE PEACOCK REPORT
The Peacock report may be perceived as a libertarian document that
questioned the public service tenets which had governed British broadcasting. Further,
it provided market-liberal recommendations based on Peter Jay's concept of
'electronic publishing". In many respects it reflected the ideological predispositions
of the committee's leading members, notably Peacock and Brittan. As Alan Budd has
commented:
"The Peacock Report broke away completely from the paternalistic, public service
approach of the earlier reports on broadcasting. Its starting point was the sovereignty
of consumer preferences combined with the belief that such preferences are best
served by freely operating competitive markets. That starting point should not have
surprised anyone who was aware of the views of Professor Peacock and Mr. Samuel
Brittan. The possibility that they might be 'captured' by the broadcasters would not
have occurred to anyone who knew them personally."2
So the report marks the point whereby the libertarian arguments, that had
previously remained peripheral to broadcasting and had been confined to policy
forums, were employed to challenge the status quo and lay the foundations for radical
change. The committee intended to set out a coherent blue-print for broadcasting
policy. Professor Peacock argued that these measures must be taken together and not
singled out in isolation. 3
 This contrasted with the government's original aim for the
committee and as Samuel Brittan comments:
"The Committee's work turned out to be half-way between a limited inquiry into
advertising on the BBC and a full Royal Commission on broadcasting .....But those
who wish to strike a blow for freedom cannot wait for the ideal inquiry with the ideal
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terms of reference. They must seize any available opportunity......I like to think that
our Report has a relation to that of a full Royal Commission on Broadcasting, similar
to that of the water colour or drawing, which so often seem more attractive than the
finished painting in oils."
Therefore I intend to consider the Peacock Report's principal arguments. I
will discuss the report's analysis of the licence fee and its possible replacement by
advertising. In the previous chapter, I have demonstrated that this motivation stood
behind the government's decision to set up the committee. Many commentators
believed that Peacock would produce a report that was confined to the narrow terms
of its remit. Indeed, the Peacock debate's focus and the evidence that was submitted
to the committee conformed to this issue. However, its attitude to advertising as an
alternative to the licence fee was far more equivocal than had been predicted. It is my
intention to demonstrate the economic reasons and the ideological factors that
contributed to this outcome.
I will discuss the report's criticisms of public service broadcasting which it
dubbed the comfortable duopoly. The report's ideology was thrown into sharp relief
by its attitude toward the 'comfortable duopoly'. Its critique of the BBC and ITV was
concerned with the efficient deployment of resources. Further, it tied the economic
reform of the system with the political liberalization of the broadcasting institutions.
In particular, it argued that broadcasting's regulatory bodies had been subject to
industrial and political capture.
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I will continue with a detailed analysis of Peacock's proposals for the radical
reform of British broadcasting. I will discuss the report's three-stage plan for the
creation of market-based system which would promote conswner sovereignly. In
particular, my attention will focus upon the eighteen recommendations that comprised
'Stage One'. Raymond Kuhn has suggested that, within Peacock's reforms, three
thematic areas can be identified and may be employed to analyze its
recommendations. 5
 These comprise; alterations to television finances, the introduction
of new technologies for transmission and regulatory reforms. Whilst concurring with
Kuhn's analysis, I intend to re-order this approach by first considering the role of the
new technologies, which I believe were crucial in supporting the report's
recommendations for a deregulated, subscription based system. Fundamentally, the
technological 'push' of the new media provided the committee with a base to develop
its concept of 'consumer sovereignty'. Thus I intend to outline how these thematic
considerations structured the report's approach.
Finally, I shall provide a critique of the report which will consider the
following questions; What were the implications of Peacock's recommendations for
broadcasting ? What type of broadcasting order did the report envisage? What type
of agenda for policy-making did the report set? and What contradictions did it expose
in the Thatcher government's attitude toward broadcasting?
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4:1. THE REPLACEMENT OF THE LICENCE FEE WITH ADVERTISING
Throughout the eighties, the licence fee had been subjected to intense
criticism. The financial relations between the BBC and ITV stood at a point of
potential collapse. A number of developments had demonstrated this fragility. First,
the ITV companies had successfully lobbied for the reform of the levy system in the
mid-seventies so that it was calculated by profits rather than advertising revenue.6
Second, the licence fee had failed to stay on a par with advertising revenues. 7 Third,
the I1'V network pressured legislators for the rights to organize a fourth commercial
channel.8
The system's strains were precipitated by the fruition of the last two
developments during the eighties. The BBC's licence fee revenue was reduced in real
terms by the Conservative government. In 1984 the BBC's income stood at £700
million in contrast to ITV revenues of approximately £1000 million9 --- moreover,
from this budget, the BBC had to find the funds to run four national radio stations.
After a long struggle the fourth channel, which in spite of its minority programming
remit and wider access for independent production, was placed under the jurisdiction
of the IBA and financed by ITV companies. The introduction of Channel Four meant
that ITV rating finally held an edge over the BBC and the corporation's validity as a
national broadcaster was again questioned.
This re-inforced a general feeling in the Conservative Party that the
licence fee was a regressive tax which penalised those who watched the BBC
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occasionally. This attitude was shared by Professor Alan Peacock:
I think the licence (fee) is much more like a poll tax, which isn't very popular in
Scotland at the moment, and it is nowhere related to the amount that individuals use
broadcasting, and certainly not related to the amount that they watch the BBC, which
is of course, the present beneficiary; and of course, it is a highly regressive tax." '°
It was felt that the licence fee was not only unpopular, but that it was also difficult
to collect due to public resistance. In turn, this made it inefficient as valuable
resources were set aside for reminder notices, home visits, detector vans and public
prosecutions.
In response to this political will, the government had commissioned the City
accountants Peat, Marwick and Mitchell to consider the BBC's financial efficiency and
accountability.' 1
 From the fall-out of t:e Peat, Marwick report the government was
faced with three options concerning the BBC's future: that it should continue to
maintain the corporation's broad range of services by increasing the licence fee ; that
the BBC should be devolved, thereby streamlining the corporation so that it could
operate more 'efficiently' under a restricted budget or that for the BBC to continue in
either a traditional or a modified capacity, advertising could be introduced to partially
or totally replace the licence fee.'2
In the event the government decided to pursue the third option to foster
change. The advertising issue would perform the dual function of teaching the BBC a
political lesson and forcing the corporation to reform itself upon business lines.
Further, the government and its supporters hoped it would encourage 'efficiency' and
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reduce institutional waste, thereby making it more accountable to the public.
Similarly, the Peacock report favoured changes to the duopoly's financing as
it argued that to maintain the system of separate funding sources for the BBC and ITV
whilst simultaneously ensuring a parity of resources between the two would force the
licence fee to increase:
"Otherwise ITV would far outstrip the BBC in the amount of money available for
programme making. Given that such a licence fee increases would be politically
unacceptable, the committee concluded that the preservation of the status quo
represented an unstable situation. Alternatives to the licence fee system had to be
considered."'3
However, to the committee, the licence fee's repeal was more problematic. It
resolved that advertising could not simply replace the fee. In drawing this conclusion,
it provided a two-fold argument. First, the report determined that advertising on the
BBC would not be able to generate the required revenue without severely impinging
upon the finances of other broadcasters and areas of the media. It based its analysis
upon the econometric findings that it had received from a number of reports
commissioned from a group of economists including Peter Swann, Martin Cave and
Cento Veljanovski.
In chapter eight, the report considered the likely growth of advertising volume
and revenue, and the probable response from the advertising industry in relation to
additional slots being made available upon the BBC. Then, in chapter nine, it debated
a variety of options for the use of advertising on BBC services. It was found that the
advertising cake was relatively small and that ITV would be detrimentally effected:
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the introduction of significant advertising on BBC television would put some
stations under pressure to cut costs, to change programme policies, or even to merge.
Yorkshire Television, in their evidence, drew attention to the benefits of their local
programming, and suggested that these programmes might come under pressure if
revenues fell. Central Television spoke in the same terms. We recognise this point,
and the dilemma it would create for the regulatory authority."4
Further, it discovered that other groups such as the print media, who received
sixty-three percent of their revenue from advertising, would suffer, most especially
the national press and the general interest magazine market.
Secondly, it commented that advertising was not feasible" while the present
organization and regulation of broadcasting remain in being." IS The introduction of
advertising upon the BBC was impractical as advertising finance would not be used by
channel owners to sell programmes to audiences, rather audiences to advertisers.
Consequently, it maintained that there was no straight alternative between the
licence fee and advertising. Indeed under these conditions, range and quality for the
viewer/consumer would be constrained rather than being enhanced if advertising was
introduced on the BBC:
So long as the present duopoly remains in being and competition is limited to a
fringe of satellite and cable service, the introduction of advertising is likely to reduce
consumer choice and welfare. It could do so both by driving the BBC into a ratings
war and by putting financial pressure on ITV companies, which would make it more
difficult for them to meet IBA requirements. The result could be an inadequate supply
of programmes which many of us watch some of the time and some of us watch most
of the time, but which do not achieve top audience ratings." 16
Further, the licence fee had funded a broadcasting system which, to the committee's
market-liberals, restricted the individual or citizen's pursuit of economic and societal
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freedoms. The report argued that the fee, rather than providing BBC with the capital
to attain constitutional independence, had been employed by governments as a political
weapon to control the corporation's actions. Thus Peacock's attitude to the licence fee
reflected its more general distrust of broadcasting's status quo. Moreover, the fee's
removal was crucially seen as paving the way for more general reforms to the
broadcasting:
"If we had to summarise our conclusion by one slogan (which most of us would not
want to do), it would be direct consumer choice rather than the continuation of the
licence fee." '
4:1.1 THE COMFORTABLE DUOPOLY
For the committee, the introduction of advertising would not dismantle the
'comfortable duopoly'. This controversial motif implied a complacent attitude and a
lack of competition in broadcasting. Although, the report suggested that it had
"neither sought to "get the BBC off the hook" nor to persecute it" ' and had praised
the quality of a number of programmes, it provided an economic critique of the
broadcasting institutions.
Peacock argued that companies within competitive industries have relatively
little control over their product's prices and the varied in-puts of capital, labour and
raw materials which they use to supply their production. Consequently, they cannot
place any restrictions upon entry by themselves or through governmental regulation,
although new entrants may be deterred due to economic conditions. The report
commented:
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Producers will try to increase their market share by "differentiating their product",
ie by competing through service and quality. Broadly speaking, consumer choice
determines the size of the industry in which the number of competing firms is large."
19
Conversely, a duopolistic structure meant that only two roughly equal
companies could supply the product. As these firms are dominant, they would see
competition and consumer choice as being detrimental to their interests. Therefore, the
two sides can reach agreement to control the market by fixing prices and limiting
entry by undercutting the new suppliers. In the latter case, short-term predatory
measures may be introduced. Moreover, these companies by acting as the sole
providers can control the purchase of goods and supplies that they require for
manufacturing their products. Peacock argued that this had occurred in British
broadcasting. Indeed, this arrangement had been praised by politicians and
broadcasters:
"While industrial or commercial duopolies may be regarded with suspicion by
governments worried about their power vis-a-vis consumers the remarkable fact about
British broadcasting is that it has been deliberately created as a duopoly, subject to
extensive regulation, by the government itself." 20
The duopoly had served producer rather than consumer interests. It had
stemmed freedom of entry into programming and therefore failed to represent
minority or alternative voices. Further, it had placed an emphasis upon the
maximization of audiences to protect revenue sources in conjunction with regulation's
control over pricing. Finally, the security of programme funds, along with
interventionist programme regulation, had led to elitist programmes which referred to
producer interests. In turn, this stymied alternative and adventurous programming.
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These factors had exacerbated two consonant features; the producers' energies were
directed at enhancing their reputation amongst their peers and inefficiencies had grown
as there had been little incentive among the suppliers to be cost-conscious
The report focused upon the economic understandings and ideological value-
judgements that had underpinned the system. It questioned the BBC's attitude toward
the Peat, Marwick report. The BBC argued that this had demonstrated corporate
efficiency and used it in its evidence to the committee. Conversely, Peacock
emphasised the other economists who had questioned the BBC and Peat, Marwick's
performance indicators. It also stated that it had received evidence to suggest that the
broadcasting industry was wasteful and overmanned. The costs of BBC and ITV
programmes were compared and contrasted against the cost of independent-producers
which were seen to be cheaper, but just as good.
This led to a description of self-indulgent working practices and an
implicit criticism of broadcasting trade unions. Whilst, the Peacock report was not
overtly accused of 'union-bashing', its description of inefficiency obviously implied a
critique of restrictive practices and overmanning. Moreover, it argued that an arrogant
set of broadcasting institutions had created a 'professionalised' broadcasting
establishment. Essentially, duopolistic arrangements contravened the principles of
market-liberal freedom. As a consequence, the consumer market was unable to
operate. It regarded "the existing order as a system of self-perpetuating privilege
exercised by insiders in their own rather than the public interest." 2 ' It was posited
that broadcasting's financial and structural orientation had promoted a form of
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clientelism within its organizations and regulatory authorities. Peacock argued that if
these developments were allowed to continue, with the introduction of advertising,
that this systemic stasis would be exacerbated:
The BBC's administrative structure seems to generate more than the usual amount of
tension associated with large corporations organised on hierarchical lines. The
unpopularity, whether deserved or not, of the financing mechanism associated with the
BBC and the near-impossibility of the IBA to be seen to be discharging fairly its ward
of franchises are other problems, likely to grow rather than diminish over time." 22
Whilst Channel Four had been fashioned to promote a pluralism of
independent voices and productions, the ability for independent producers to challenge
the established powers was minimal. The report claimed that independents faced a
number of restrictions. First, through the regulations that determined programme
content and secondly through the closed nature of the broadcasting economy:
Regulation of entry into broadcasting is not specifically designed to prevent
competition in the making of programmes but to govern their transmission and to
some extent their content. However, the monopoly of transmission puts the BBC in
particular in the position of deciding unilaterally whether it makes its own
programmes or buys them in. We have received some evidence, not surprisingly from
independent producers, contending that while they were encouraged by the
requirement that Channel 4 should support independent producers, the BBC exercised
a virtual closed shop." 23
Peacock was particularly critical of what it understood to be the political
compliance of the 'comfortable duopoy' to state interests. It posited that the political
position of the broadcasting institution's had evolved, through funding structures,
legislation and regulation, in accordance with state rather than citizen interests. This
remained a dominant theme and informed the report's recommendations.
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Therefore, in many respects Peacock's analysis of the public service system
contrasted with previous governmenta! inquiries that had perceived broadcasting in
societal rather than economic libertarian terms. Whilst the Beveridge and Annan
reports had been critical of the system, they had generally concurred with the public
service principles which had held it in place. For Peacock, the public service was a
closed monopoly that favoured producer interests and excluded the consumer or
citizen's rights. The artificial replication of the market had failed to satisfy the
demands of the viewer and listeners. It contained a vital intellectual flaw
	 that
'quality' programming was subject to the rationale of a broadcasting elite rather than
to public demand. In response to this, the report rejected the notions of cultural
homogeneity, paternalistic regulation and, in the main, the public service. In spite of
the historical changes to the system, the broadcasting institutions were unaccountable
and unrepresentative to the audience who ultimately consumed the product.
Furthermore, through their close ties to state they hindered rather than aided free flow
of political communication, thereby undermining democracy. Therefore, it demanded
the radical reform of broadcasting.:
"The analysis of the "comfortable duopoly" serves the purpose of highlighting the
issues which the Committee must address itself. It makes clear that there is good
reason to question whether a regulated duopoly does promote or could be designed to
promote the welfare of viewers and listeners for whom broadcasting presumably
exists. That being so, there is at least a prima facie case for examining alternative
methods of financing."
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4:2. THE PEACOCK REPORT'S RECOMMENDATIONS FOR BRITISH
BROADCASTING
'Consumer sovereignty' appealed to libertarians, such as Peacock and
Brittan, who believed that broadcasting had qualified the individual's economic and
social liberty. They predicted that broadcast deregulation would mean that the
consumer would at last be able to pick and choose the types of programmes s/he
desired to watch. In this bullish new environment, state regulation would be minimal
and the new broadcasting system would be lean, tough and responsive to consumer
demands. In the market-liberal conception for broadcasting there would be no place
for wasteful public and private monopolization.
To reform British broadcasting, the report drew heavily upon the criticisms
of the duopoly and proposals for reform that had been made by Peter Jay in the
evidence he presented the committee 25. He had recommended a pay per view
subscription service in a deregulated system called "electronic publishing". He argued
that broadcasting had been regulated due to the airwave scarcity. However, the old
arrangement couldjhallenged if a national fibre optic national grid was installed,
either by public or private enterprise, as "there would be scope for an unlimited
number of channels and hence no regulation would be necessary, save that to maintain
standards of taste and decency." 26 Jay envisaged that a multitude of channels could
be supplied by a multitude of independent production companies to provide the
consumer with the widest possible range of choice. Therefore Peacock's central
conclusion was that:
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British broadcasting should move towards a sophisticated market system based on
consumer sovereignty. That is a system which recognises that viewers and listeners
are the best ultimate judges of their own interest, which they can best satisfy if they
have the option of purchasing the broadcasting services they require from as many
alternative sources of supply as possible.....The fundamental aim of broadcasting
should in our view be to enlarge both the freedom of choice of the consumer and the
opportunities available to programme-makers to offer alternative wares to the public.
27
4:2.1 THE THREE STAGES TO 'CONSUMER SOVEREIGNTY'
In order to realise Jay's vision for 'electronic publishing' the report promoted
a three-stage plan. The immediate areas for reform were included in the
recommendations that were designed to be implemented in Stage One which was
subtitled The Preparation for Subscription. As this indicates, the report's principal
recommendations were designed to set the scene for reform by dismantling the
duopoly and introducing the new technologies that would promote the market within
broadcasting:
"The 18 recommendations which we have just put forward are for prompt action and
are designed as a major step forward, this decade, towards our main objective---of
widening consumer choice through the new technologies, with a high content of
knowledge, culture, criticism or experiment." 28
Once the preliminary conditions for change had become manifest, the report
argued for even more extensive chang es to broadcasting within the subsection entitled
Strategic potential. In this stage, subscription would act as the BBC's primary funding
source and there would be a more competitive environment. In the final stage a
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multiplicity of channels would be made available for subscription and a full consumer
market. Throughout these stages, broadcasting would be supervised by a light-touch
regulatory body which the committee called the Public Service Broadcasting Council
(PS BC).
Taken together, the Peacock report's conclusions present a coherent market-
liberal blueprint for the future of broadcasting. It produced the following table to
outline the stages for reform:
Table 3. The Three Stages
STAGE	 LIKELY	 POLICY REGIME
BROADCASTING
DEVELOPMENTS
1	 Satellite and cable	 Indexation of BBC
develop, but moat viewers	 licence fcc.
and listeners continue to
rely en BBC, ITV and independent local
radio.
2	 Proliferation of
	 Subscription replaces main
broadcasting systems, channels and payment
	 part of licence fee
methods
3	 Indefinite numbers of channels.
	 Multiplicity of choice leading to full
Pay-per-view programme or pay-per-channel
	 broadcasting market.
available. Technology reduces cost of
multiplicity of outlets and of charging system.
A Public Service provision will continue
through all three stages
29
4:2.2 THE NEW MEDIA
The new media proved to be a key force in focusing the report's analysis.
Whilst, the traditional arrangements had been criticized, these criticisms had been
previously deflected. The vertically integrated public service system, combining
production with transmission, was justified as it was the most efficient way to
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organize a vital national resource due to the 'limited spectrum' of airwaves. It would
stem the possible disruption of the narrow band of channels from a multitude of
suppliers. However, with the removal of this technological barrier this argument was
undermined and a wide number of competitive, independent broadcasters could utilize
the new media. This played an important role in the Peter Jay's thinking:
the technology of broadcasting (had) ... made it necessary to determine centrally
who could broadcast on what wavelength and when, and made it impossible to
monitor consumption in a way that wçuld enable variable prices to be charged to each
consumer for each act of consumption.... Technology has now liberated us from that
box, though only if we make the deliberate choice to be liberated and to spend the
money necessary to create the physical apparatus if variable charging per unit
(differentiating according to which units the consumer chooses) is to be possible."3°
Peacock envisaged that the more television channels, the more broadcasting would be
characterised by more competition for audiences and revenues. Moreover, it argued
that in a multi-channel future, programme content regulations over and above the
general law of land would be unnecessary and undesirable. 3 ' In contrast to the Annan
report, which had paid scant attention to these advances, Peacock provided a pro-
active interpretation of the new media:
The first 50 years of broadcasting saw only one major technical innovation which
affected the central structure of broadcasting, admittedly one which transformed
broadcasting, the arrival of television .. By contrast, the past five years have seen
several technical developments which are likely to lead to a significant re-evaluation
of existing attitudes to broadcasting."32
The new communication delivery systems of cable and satellite were of chief
importance. Whilst these technologies had previously existed, the most crucial
distinction was their potential availability for cheap, domestic use. 33 Two types of
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satellite broadcasting were available: low-powered satellite services and Direct
Broadcasting by Satellite (DBS). The latter held out more revolutionary possibilities
for the broadcaster as it could produce signals to be directly received on reasonably
small domestic dishes. The reality of satellite broadcasting was still some way off (it
would only be practically realized in 1988 with the launching of Rupert Murdoch's
'Sky Television'), however the possiblities of using a satellite that was positioned in a
geo-stationary orbit could instantly minimize the progress made in terrestrial and cable
broadcasting. Satellites would produce a sufficiently large signal which, in turn, could
be transmitted over an entire continent and without the physical problems imposed by
a complex infrastructure of transmitters or buried cable.
The new technologies held the key for change as they provided the foundation
for reform. Thus, the report optimistically predicted that new opportunities would be
fostered by cable and satellite. It argued that any attempt to stem these opportunities
should be understood as being regressive, technically unfeasible and highly
problematic for those who opposed reform
the growth in satellite broadcasting ... may make it possible, at a modest cost,
for viewers to receive programmes from many countries, each with different views on
how broadcasting is to be regulated and financed. To place obstacles in the way of
each viewers' access to international trade, in the light of some aim of broadcasting
which requires strict national regulation of access to programmes, would simply not
work. Governments would find that, like King Canute, they could not control the
waves."
This technological 'push' is apparent within a number of Peacock's recommendations
for a fibre-optic cable network and, to a lesser extent, DBS:
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The first recommendation referred to the adaption of all television receivers so
that encryption might occur, thereby enabling subscription based services to become a
reality. It stated that all new television sets should by the earliest possible stage
include a pen-television socket (an input and output socket for base-band audio and
visual signals) and associated equipment that could be employed to decode encrypted
signals. Therefore, the aerial would receive the signal, and the base-band signals
would be extracted and made available in the socket. Essentially, the scrambled signal
could be decoded by the socket if the viewer/consumer had subscribed for the
available services. This, it should be stressed, was a general requirement and would
not require the viewer/consumer to invest in expensive decoding equipment in addition
to the television receiver as this circuitry was incorporated into the set.
Concurrent with these changes in reception, it was predicted that a
national grid of fibre-optic cable technology could become a reality by the end of
century. Each house in the country could be connected to create a free broadcasting
market. It was argued that, through cable and to a lesser extent satellite, a wide
number of channels could be made available in manner that was analogous to
removing a book or a magazine off a shelf. Thus, if the fibre-optic network signals
were scrambled through encryption, the viewer/consumer could pay to have the signal
decoded at his/her own discretion. As the report commented in its description of Jay's
notion of 'electronic publishing':
"In other words, a television set (or radio) would be like a telephone in that the user
would select for himself the connection he wanted. The number of "channels" would
become, if not infinite, at least indefinitely large---certainly as large as the number of
receivers."
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Therefore, the report recommended that 'National telecommunication systems
(eg. British Telecom, Mercury and any subsequent entrants) should be permitted to act
as common carriers with a view to the provision of a full range of services, including
delivery of television programmes '36• This measure would circumvent the possible
impasse that could exist if the entertainment-led evolution of cable continued.
Throughout the early eighties the cable industry had been evolved in an ad-hoc
fashion in which it had been conditional upon the cable operators to finance new cable
links and negotiate with local councils. Peacock argued that the common carrier grid
might be made available by using the telecommunications companies (British Telecom,
Mercury) lines and then having the cable companies apply for the franchises from the
Cable Authority. This, it was felt, would allow for expansion and investment. Peacock
commented:
"We feel this arrangement will make investment in cable operations considerably
more attractive since at the moment the reservation in investment is due to the high
capital cost of laying the cable and the length of time before a return in investment is
seen. With a common carrier network the cable would already be installed, the initial
investment could be much smaller and the company could expect to see a return on
investment much faster. Common carrier charges would be regulated on a public
utility basis, perhaps by OFTEL.
Further, to enhance the market-place and allow for a plurality of independent
voices the report argued that DBS franchises should be put out to competitive tender
and that there should be no restrictions upon the non-British EEC Cable operators.
For Peacock, then, the new technologies provided both the necessity and the
framework for change within British broadcasting. There was an implicit belief that
fibre-optic cable and satellite would encourage market-style conditions in broadcasting
to operate in the near future.38
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4:2.3 THE REFORM OF BROADCASTING FINANCE
Whilst, the new media had broken down the constraints that had previously
qualified radical change to the system and had provided a technological 'push' to alter
the structure of broadcasting's organization, to realize this change the committee felt
that a significant number of financial reforms were required. In this respect, the
committee outlined a number of differnt recommendations to intensify competition
within terrestrial broadcasting. To this end,the report was guided by the principles of
creating a market-led broadcasting system. This aim underpinned its discussion of the
different financial alternatives which were both reviewed and then systematically
disregarded.
For instance, the report rejected advertising and sponsorship, as they did not
provide the effective means for reforming the broadcasting market-place. The
committee preferred to employ Jay's recommendations as they were not only its
ultimate goal, but provided a series of pragmatic steps that could be followed to make
these notions a reality. This led to Peacock recommending the following measures:
First, the licence fee was to be index-linked with the Retail Price Index (RPI).
This meant that the licence fee, instead of being set annually at the discretion of the
Home Office, would be set in relation to British trade figures. It was argued that this
would stabilise the BBC's income and it was chosen over the indexation to average
earnings and to the corporation's own pay cost levels. This measure had several aims:
it would foster efficiency within the BBC as it would have to spend its annual income
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more carefully and would have to fulfil core rather than marginal activities; it would
insulate the BBC from the political interference that had been manufactured by the
government's control over the licence fee and it would lead to the eventual phasing
'4-
outhe licence fee as the BBC's funding mechanism by replacing it with subscription.
The committee also recommended that the BBC should collect the fee rather than the
Home Office.
Secondly, (in a majority decision) that there should be a franchise auction for
Independent Television contractors. 39
 It argued that competitive tendering would stem
the favouritism that had been previously exercised by the IBA during franchise
awarding. In the 1981 franchise round, even George Thomson (the incoming IBA
Chairman) has claimed 'There must be a better way'40. As Asa Briggs and Joanne
Spicer have illustrated that this franchise round may be accused of exhibiting
clientelism between the larger companies and the IBA, a clandestine regulatory
operation and being unrepresentative of smaller franchisees 41 . According to the
report, the franchises had been effectively carved up by the large franchise-holders
and the IBA had been subject to 'regulatory capture'. 42
 The report argued for the
minimum of regulatory controls within the auctioning process. It stated that the IBA
would only be expected to enforce basic limits on quality, range and scheduling. Once
the bidders had satisfied these rulings, the regional franchises would be awarded to the
highest bidder. If a franchise was not won by the highest bidder, the IBA would be
required to give a detailed, public explanation for its decisions. To supplement this
idea there would be a rolling annual review of franchisees to enforce programming
requirements and competition.43
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Thirdly, the report recommended a forty-percent quota for independently
produced programmes on the BBC and ITV channels over the next ten years. This
would encourage British production companies that were neither holders of an ITV
franchise nor were fully or partially-owned by the BBC, IBA or any foreign or
international franchise holder. It would by-pass the duopolistic barriers upon entry and
allow for the introduction of new actors and different voices through the mechanisms
of competition. To enforce choice, Peacock argued that legal protections should be
adopted to stop the smaller units merging into conglomerate independent
companies.
Fourthly, the report stated that Channel Four should sell its own advertising
rune.45 It argued that this would allow for an autonomous Channel Four which would
no longer be subservient to the IBA. Instead it would prove to be a complementary
service as it stood outside of the jurisdiction of the Authority. Further it felt that
other financial reforms could be inaugurated through the introduction of car radio
licences and the privatisation of BBC's national Radio 1 and
	 Moreover, the
report argued for the removal of all legal restrictions for pay-per-view and pay-per-
channel services upon terrestrial broadcasting.48
The overall design of these financial reforms emphasised the introduction of
competitive market practices into terrestrial broadcasting as a precursor for more
extensive financial alterations to the broadcasting market. The report suggested that its
first set of recommendations would allow for the gradual realisation of subscription
based services both in terrestrial and non-terrestrial areas of broadcasting. Eventually,
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the BBC could be solely funded by subscription and the report commented:
(subscription is thus regarded) as a way in which all broadcasting organizations,
including the BBC, can sell their services to the public. We do not see it as simply an
alternative way of collecting the licence fee. "
For Peacock, the benefits of these financial reforms were three-fold. Firstly,
they would promote efficiency within a broadcasting system that had been wasteful
and overmanned. Secondly, they provided the framework through which a truly 'free'
broadcasting market could service consumer preferences. Thirdly, they fundamentally
challenged the normative relations between broadcasters and the state. It was this
promotion of citizen's rights through economic change that provided Peacock with its
modus operandi and in particular shaped iattitudes towards the regulation of
broadcasting.
4:2.3 THE DEREGULATION OF BRITISH BROADCASTING
The report had concluded that regulatory authorities, most especially the IBA
5
had been subject to a form of 'regulatory capture'. To reiterate, it attack comprised:
an inefficient allocation of funds through regulation; an overbearing role in the
supervision of programming and a loyalty towards the broadcasting profession rather
than to the public that regulators were designed to represent. The BBC Board of
Governors was ill-equipped to deal with the corporation's labyrinth bureaucracy and
the IBA had tended to support the dominant ITV companies during the various
franchise rounds.
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Ultimately, however, its critique of regulation concerned the political position
of broadcasting. In contrast to the pluralist model for broadcasting, in which the BBC
and ITV companies occupy an indepeiident position in the British polity although they
are subject to the Crown and Parliament, ° that has been promoted by legislators,
previous committees and the broadcasting community itself, the market-liberals drew a
rather different interpretation.
The report was highly critical of what it perceived as the political compliance
of the broadcasting institutions involved within the duopolistic arrangements that had
existed. The licence fee, for instance, was an economic qualification upon the
broadcasters that was employed by the state as a control mechanism. This conclusion
contrasted with the traditional construct that the fee ensured that the BBC could retain
it constitutional autonomy and formal independence from the state. Whilst the report
had made its market-liberal credentials apparent in its approach to the licence fee, it
was in the wider area of broadcasting regulation that Peacock pursued its most radical
approach and outlined it most controversial set of recommendations.
Crucially, it was argued that the broadcasting structures circumscribed the
individual's freedom of expression. Collins, Garnham and Locksley have
demonstrated how a number of the Peacock report's ideas within broadcasting
conformed to a set of libertarian/utilitarian principles 51 . They compared a series of
Samuel Brittan's writings in the Financial Times about the Peacock recommendations
with his other works. First, they note that Brittan compared the haves and have nots
in broadcasting to other areas of the economy in which he delineated " a dual
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economy of insiders with well-paid secure jobs and outsiders who drift between ill
paid labour and the dole" 52 . Second, they commented thaommittee's description of
a complacent broadcasting clique, populated by a bureaucratic apparitchnik,
conformed to what Brittan referred to as the global " corrupting effect of interest
group pressures on moral legitimacy, practical effectiveness and ultimately the very
stability and sustainability of liberal democracy."
Therefore, for Peacock and most especially Brittan, any form of authority that
qualified the individual's economic freedom through the circumscription of individual
actions and clientelism was seen to stem the citizen's freedoms and was a
retrogressive force that had to be reformed. This was clearly the report's conclusion
for the public service system:
"There are also weaknesses of the Public Service system. Despite the investment of
both the BBC and ITV sectors in sophisticated market research, there is an absence of
true consumer sovereignty and of market signals, which only direct payment by
viewers and listeners could establish. Because of its dependence on public finance and
regulation, the system is vulnerable to political pressure, and vulnerable to trade
union and specific interest groups."TM
The report felt that there had been an underlying collusion between the state
and broadcasting which had been manufactured through the establishment of a nexus
of entwining, heavily regulated bureaucratic institutions. Samuel Brittan, in particular,
has presented commentators with a clandestine and conspiratorial interpretation of the
traditional control structures that have been employed in British broadcasting:
It is precisely because we are not dealing with baked beans or package holidays but
with the communication of ideas, and the dissemination and analysis of news and
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artistic endeavour, that freedom of entry by producers and freedom of choice by
consumers to the maximum feasible extent are so vital. There is no need to enter into
a metaphysical debate whether the consumer is the best judge of artistic quality or the
best judge of which programmes will benefit him, or his capacity for citizenship. The
point is that no one person or group, or committee, or 'establishment' can be trusted
to make a superior choice."
The political implications of this on the role of the BBC Board of Governors
and the IBA were a profound concern for the committee. Samuel Brittan has
commented upon the peculiar relationship between regulation and state control within
broadcasting claiming that 'pre-publication regulators acted as censors'. Brittan's
attitude can be detected in the following piece:
Much worse than the method of finance of the BBC --- which may be a regrettable
necessity for the time being --- is the general assumption that broadcasting unlike the
Press and the theatre, needs to be regulated ie. censored. Cries of censorship are
usually confined to particular programmes which displease the Government. But the
whole process of the IBA, both its continual vetting of schedules and programmes and
its long-term power to withdraw franchises from contracts that displease, amounts to
censorship."
Thus, the Peacock report argued that systematic censorship had occurred as
the regulators vetted programmes and placed financial constraints on broadcasting. In
turn, this excluded many of the alternative voices that might be included in a market-
based system. In the future, regulation would have to be light-touch and broadcasting
should only be subject to general legal requirements. This is reflective of Peacock and
Brittans' conviction that the market will prove to be the best regulator by enforcing
the citizen's economic emancipation:
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as regulation is phased out the normal laws of the land relating to obscenity,
defamation, blasphemy, sedition and other similar matters should be extended to
cover the broadcasting media and any present exemptions should be removed." "
Peacock not only intended to maximise the consumer's right to exercise
economic freedom, but moreover conceived that this would act as a major reform of
the citizen's societal freedoms. This libertarian value judgement stands at the heart of
the Peacock Report. Brittan has analyzed this part of the report in the following self-
congratulatory manner:
Even left-wing critics such as Richard Hoggart and Philip Whitehead said that
Peacock had gone far further in opposition to censorship than any previous committee.
It was the linkage of the Report with the long tradition of Western writing (from
Milton to Mill and beyond) in favour of freedom of expression that gave me more
pleasure than anything else."5
The notion is reiterated in the report's conclusions where
Peacock pronounces upon the importance of US Constitution's First Amendment
the citizen's right to freedom of speech --- and continues upon this line by referring to
the reforms that have been accorded to the British press. It comments upon the
Parliament's 1694 abolition of pre-publication censorship which, according to the
Whig historian Macaulay, acted as greater contribution to civilisation and liberty than
either the Magna Carta or the American Constitution's Bill of Rights. The time for
change in broadcasting has arrived:
550. Hitherto it has been very hard either to avoid prepublication censorship in
broadcasting, or apply the spirit of the First Amendment, because of the spectrum
scarcity and the difficulties of charging viewers and listeners directly. Intervention and
regulation have been required not only to secure public service broadcasting in our
own sense of the term, but even to simulate the effects of a functioning consumer
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market.
"551. Technological developments hold the promise, however, of liberation from
these constraints. There is at least a chance of creating a genuine consumer market in
broadcasting combined with a continuation of public service, in the positive sense of
secure funding of programmes of a demanding or innovative kind. "
The Peacock committee promoted the concept of a 'free broadcasting' system
that would be analogous to what they perceived to be a 'free press' in Britain. The
press, it claimed, operated freely without any intervening form of state regulation
through the economic emancipation of advertising. Similarly, broadcasting should only
be expected to conform to the laws that related to the print media and legal
requirements concerning any defamation of character, obscenity, blasphemy and
sedition, thereby ensuring that free speech would not undermine such freedoms as the
right to privacy. Peacock argued that this would stem what he perceived to be as pre-
publication censorship and programme vetting.
Consequently, only a minimal form of broadcasting regulation was justifiable
for Peacock. The report proposed that a 'light-touch' regulator entitled the Public
Service Broadcasting Council (PSBC) should be established and financed by the
broadcasters themselves. 60 Peacock felt that its definition of public service ( for
instance, a multitude of choice promoting range, diversity and innovation) might have
to be protected, thereby avoiding any form of marginalisation of independent
programme-makers. 6' Thus, the council's remit would retain a public service
element.
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However it would be structureçl to operate like the 'Arts Council'. 62
 The
financing of the arts has been drawn from a variety of private funding sources and
public grants. 63
 The Arts Council's role was to filter this capital and allocate it to the
appropriate bodies such as theatres and orchestras. The report envisaged that the
PSBC could similarly determine the allocation of such external funds in appropriate
proportions to the respective station owners or programme-makers who had applied
for bids. Fundamentally, the PSBC was designed as an administrator that would
merely channel resources to the broadcasters. It had no direct input in protecting
consumer rights which would be enhanced by incorporating regulatory requirements
into a more general series of statutes. However, it may be seen as something of an
anomaly within the report's libertarian recommendations. Surprisingly, Peacock had
advocated, in a watered down form, the very type of regulator that it was supposed to
be against. The Arts Council, in action, had proved to be every bit as susceptible to
clientelism, political pressure and favouritism as both the BBC governors or the IBA.
Taken together, Peacock felt that its provisions for deregulation would mean
that:
"broadcasting had come of age ... prepublication censorship, whether of printed
material, plays, films, broadcasting or any other creative activities or expressions of
opinion, has no place in a free society and we would advise Government and
Parliament to embark forthwith on a phased programme for ending it." 65
235
4:3. A CRITIOUE OF THE PEACOCK REPORT
To many within broadcasting, the committee's rejection of advertising on the
BBC appeared to be the key feature of the report. This certainly was a general feeling
amongst broadcasters who responded to 'Recommendation 2: BBC television should
not be obliged to finance its operations by advertising while the present organisation
and regulation of broadcasting remain in being' 66 with a sigh of relief. Certainly
contemporary newspapers and broadcasting journals contributed to the impression that
this was the report's primary conclusion 67• Such a response was hardly surprising as
Peacock had been called by a government who desired to alter the BBC's funding
structure. Further, the terms of debate and the evidence that the committee received
were focused around this issue. 68 As Alasdair Milne, the BBC Director General, was
later to comment:
"The general consensus seemed to be that we had been lucky that Peacock did not
advocate the introduction of advertising to the BBC. The Prime Minister had wished
it, after all. My understanding is that the Committee recognised very early on that it
was not an option." 69
It would appear from the evidence that Peacock and Brittan's own attitude
towards the possible economic effects of the introduction of advertising upon the BBC
was far more equivocal than Milne's memoirs might suggest. Brittan still maintains
that the report could find neither for or against advertising, although I would suggest
that this conclusion cannot be drawn from the report itself. 7° However, the BBC
tried hard to conceal its euphoria. It congratulated itself on its lobbying campaign and
one BBC executive famously claimed:" We have won the short-term recommendations
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and the long-term never tends to happen anyway" 71 . Alasdair Mime welcomed the
committee's rejection and stated that advertising had been advocated by a 'minority'
of supporters.
This 'minority' included Margaret Thatcher and many within the circles of
political power and influence. For Thatcher and the proponents of change the report
had failed to place advertising upon the BBC. 73 They distrusted the bureaucratic
nature of the corporation in which there was " a hierarchy, but no chain of command;
countless rules, but no discipline; executives galore but no leaders" (Paul Johnson).74
Further, this institutional stasis had been transferred to the commercial sector as ITV,
whilst competing with the BBC for audiences, did not compete for revenue and
through its monopoly over advertising space could maintain excessive profits.
Concurrent with this analysis, was the government's paranoia over a perceived leftist
bias within broadcasting. This was noted by Nigel Lawson in his memoirs:
Margaret was deeply concerned at actual and potential bias on television,
especially in news programmes, and with the prospect of moral degradation. I had
great deal more sympathy with her concern than I had with the sort of remedies she
sought. It is a fact of life that bright young people on the left tend to seek and get jobs
in broadcasting and journalism, just as those on the right tend to choose the City."75
As a consequence, the government's immediate response was characterized by
tentativeness and disappointment. The retention of the licence fee was criticized as it
was not only an unpopular and costly tax to implement, but further because the
government felt that the broadcasting institutions were now impervious to reform.
Indeed, if anything Peacock had conspired to make matters worse as the licence fee
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would be linked to the RPI, thereby undermining the government's bargaining
ability. 76
 A number of Conservative MPs argued that Peacock's econometric analysis
was mistaken and argued for the expansionist possibilities of the advertising
market.7
The technological feasibility of some of the report's measures was also
brought into doubt. In particular, the recommendation to create a national fibre-optic
grid was seen to be impractical as it violated, both legally and ideologically, the
Department of Trade and Industry's (DTI) previous privatization of telecoms. The
DTI felt that Peacock had not fully investigated this proposal and had been
significantly influenced by British Telecom who could set out the pace of installation
and the costs of rental space. This did not accord with the department's aim to open
up the telecoms market. After the privatization of British Telecom, the department
hoped to fully deregulate telecoms an use market provisions which were incompatible
with the report's recommendation as BT would given a monopolistic hold over the
installation of cable lines.78
Peacock had consequently failed to please its political masters. For the
broadcasters, the series of reforms suggested by Peacock was perceived as part of the
government's sustained attack upon the broadcasting institutions, in particular the
BBC. ITV, who had hardly been the subject of the report, were similarly outraged by
the proposal to franchise its regional areas through competitive tendering. This
response was understandable when one considers the political context for the genesis
of the report. Throughout the mid-eighties, as I have demonstrated in chapter three,
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tensions between the government and the BBC ran high.
Therefore in such a climate of anxiety, suspicion and mistrust Peacock, with
its radical agenda and far-reaching questioning of broadcasting from a market-liberal
perspective, was treated with a degree of contempt by many leading broadcasters and
commentators. They saw it as a deliberate attempt to undermine the traditional
broadcasting regimes for good:
"It would be naive not to see the connections between the radical critique of the
broadcasting (institutions) made by Peacock and the current connected Tory campaign
about the political bias speculated by Norman Tebbit. The long-term logic of Peacock
entails the thorough marginalisation of any public service commitment in British
broadcasting."79
An examination of a number of the report's recommendations would appear to
support their arguments, most especially in relation to the broadcasting economy and
the very concept of public service broadcasting. The broadcasters argued that the
report had rigidly applied market principles to broadcasting and did not really
appreciate the industry's financial structure. 8° Professor Andrew Ehrenberg of the
London Business School maintained that internal competition existed, at a producer
level, for funds, airtime, audiences, viewer appreciation and critical renown. 8 ' The
success of the system, however, depended upon assured sources of funding, drawn
respectively from the licence fee and advertising. Peacock's reforms may be seen as
attacking the financial structure which had underpinned the system.82
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The BBC disagreed with the recommendation of index-linking the licence fee
to the Retail Price Index (RPI). This would destabilize the corporation's finances and
then Director-General Alasdair Mime argued would undercut the true inflation rate
which Peat, Marwick and Mitchell recognised as standing at approximately seven to
eight percent. 83 This would again hinder rather than help the BBC's mission to act as
a national broadcaster which would provide public service broadcasting.
Unsurprisingly, Mime also believed that the BBC should keep hold of Radio One and
Two. 84
The ITV companies dismissed the recommendation which proposed to put
their franchises out to competitive tender. David Plowright, then Chairman of
Granada and the Independent Television Companies Association (ITCA) and John
Whitney, then Director of the IBA, argued that broadcasting was not simply a
commodity in which minimal financial requirements were appropriate. 85 The most
telling criticism of the franchise auction, however, was made within the report itself
by the dissenting members:
"Three of us (JC, JH, AH) do not recommend this system, certainly as long as the
duopoly lasts. First, it would be very hard for the IBA to choose between a cash bid
and a bid which offered less money but a better chance of high quality public service
broadcasting. The present system of allocating the franchises had been much criticised
as being arbitrary and unpredictable. The proposed system would reinforce these
criticisms. Second, we do not think that the public service undertakings given by
bidders can be made sufficiently precise to be legally enforceable; and if it is the IBA,
not the courts who decide when there has been a breach, that again will give rise to
concern about natural justice and arbitrary decisions. Third, a system of competitive
tenders is designed to reduce profits. It therefore makes it more likely that companies
through bad luck or bad management, will make losses or poor profits. The examples
of TV-am and the many ILR stations show how hard it is in practice for the IBA to
enforce standards. "86
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This demonstrated the legal problems which would face the commercial regulator and
further worked against Peacock's idea to dismantle the clientelism which had
characterized the system. The decision would be again taken by a regulatory body
composed of the 'great and the good' who might act in the interests of the industry
rather than the public. Moreover, the closed nature of the decision-making process
was not really questioned, as the IBA would only have to explain whid not chcv
the highest bidder.
Channel Four chairman Edmund Dell questioned the report's conclusion that
the station should sell its own advertising, whilst attempting to retain its distinctive
remit. This, it was felt, would place the channel into a near impossible position of
attempting to please advertisers, whilst catering for specialist or minority
audiences. 88
 Further, it was argued that the quota would undermine regional
productions, create union problems, stem training and could subsume creative and
scheduling issues. 89
 The effect of the change in/system's production base was felt to
be devastating:
It would transform the BBC and ITV from all-purpose broadcasters to the limited
and restricted role of broadcast carriers, from ... major programme producers to that
of programme transmitters ... Remove or enfeeble these two essential pillars of our
public service broadcasting and the entire edifice will come tumbling down. "°
Therefore the broadcasters were not only concerned about the specific
implications of the report, but also with the possible ramifications of the concepts
which had underpinned Peacock's approach toward broadcasting. They felt that
Peacock amounted to a sustained attack upon the system's cherished principles, would
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beleaguer their financial status and open the market-place to media magnates such as
Rupert Murdoch. The BBC argued that these changes would subvert its 'mixed
programming' strategies and might ghettoize the corporation as subscription could lead
to a situation in which the national, public broadcaster would have to paid for whilst
the advertising supported channels would remain free. 9 ' The whole concept of the
BBC as a national, public service broadcaster was then seen to be at risk. This would
lower standards as the ITV companies would simply pursue the largest audiences with
the minimum financial risks in order to please their shareholders and advertisers.
Therefore, the public service criteria would diminish as entertainment programming
would take precedence over educating and informing. Finally, Peacock's advocacy of
subscription television might undermine the traditions of programme diversity and
universality of service. The tenet of universality had been deemed to be a vital pre-
requisite of broad rather than narrowcasting. The Peacock committee, however, did
not view this feature as a qualification upon their critique of the 'comfortable
duopoly'. Through their reforms the committee posited that a fairer market-based
alternative to universality would become manifest. As Samuel Brittan later
commented:
the price of unanimous endorsement by the Committee of stages two and three
was a statement that the whole population should receive at least four mainstream
television channels, even if this required public intervention or subsidy (699). But we
also said:" It is not realistic to expect that every novel or experimental service be
made available in the most isolated patch of the country"; and we cited the BBC's
1986 Annual report, showing that it took sixty-five new transmitting stations to raise
the coverage of BBC1 from 99.0 to 99.1 percent of the population."
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The broadcasters' attacked the report, upon economic and philosophical
grounds, arguing that "the whole plan of dismantling the present system in order to
create a new public service broadcasting corporation is unwittingly destructive."
Indeed, Peacock's central tenets of greater freedom for independent productions,
mediated through a quota system, and subscription-based system stressed that
broadcasting as an economic commodity rather than as a socio-political entity. This
was particularly evident in its attack on the public service philosophy
The committee had produced a report which responded to the main policy
issues in broadcasting --- social, political, economic and technical --- in a far more
removed manner than the previous investigations into broadcasting such as Pilkington
and Annan. As a Peacock supporter Alan Day commented:
"Its approach .....is that of a serious study of a complicated and changing set of
considerations using the methods of the social sciences, rather than an extended,
amiable and worthy essay reflecting the intelligent musings of a group of the Great
and Good."
It challenged the traditional assumptions that had been employed by other committees
of inquiry. The public service system was no longer seen as a being beneficial to the
public, which consisted of consumers. Their interests had been neglected and the
broadcasting institution's had a stranglehold on the system's points of entry. The
report provides an interpretation of broadcasting community that suffered from the ills
of monopolisation. The bureaucracy was seen to be impenetrable, complacent and
wasteful in its use of resources. Further, clientelism existed between the broadcasting
institution's and the state, and the citizen's access to the flow of free information had
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been sacrificed. The 'comfortable duopoly' existed for the pleasure of its inhabitants
and the state.
In turn, such fundamental changes served to question the historical evolution
and current political role for broadcasting within Britain. Peacock re-examined the
regulations, laws, financial and ideological presumptions that had shaped broadcasting
and found them to be subject to overbearing state control. For the consumer/citizen to
fully enjoy 'freedom' within broadcasting it was necessary that the regulatory tiers and
funding mechanisms, which had served to perpetuate state interests rather than
actively resist them, should be dismantled. The report attempted to reconceive the
political role for broadcasting in order that it might fulfil a 'free' role in British
society. This, Peacock argued, already existed within the print media whereby the
market proved to be chief mechanism for regulation. Consequently, the report wished
to reform both the formal and informal control mechanisms that existed over
broadcasting.
The traditional tenets and authorities had failed on several accounts. First,
they were outmoded by the introduction of the new media. Peacock predicted that
national forms of regulatory control over broadcasting would become increasingly
anachronistic in an environment which was dominated by Pan-European initiatives and
new forms of delivery that undermined the traditional justification of the 'limited
spectrum'. Secondly, for Peacock the zurrent set of arrangement contained a series of
intellectual, ideological and structural flaws which combined to stem the consumer and
the citizen's freedoms.
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The committee intended to demystify the British broadcasting system so that it
would (become) no more special than publishing became once the world was used
to living with the printed press." 95 The mystification of broadcasting had evolved due
to the Reithian tenets that had dominated the traditional institutions, the legal and
regulatory regimes that supervised the industry and further because of the state's
overbearing interventionary role within it. This had meant that broadcasting was
commonly understood in a manner that served the status-quo . The emphasis within
broadcasting had been placed upon what could not be done, rather than upon what was
possible. Peacock's solution to this problem was to breakdown the privileged
broadcasting blocs, open up the traditional institutions to outside entrants and to make
broadcasting more responsive to consumer needs.
This meant that there should be extensive reform of the 'comfortable duopoly'
and a reinterpretation of what was meant by Public Service broadcasting. Therefore,
within the text of the Peacock report there are not only recommendations for
reforming the economic organization of British broadcasting, but there are also a
considerable number of criticisms and challenges to the essential value judgements that
had underpinned broadcasting. The Peacock report posited that only a minimal form
of public service was required. It felt that the market might provide an abundant
variety of programmes and stated that:
"The best operational definition of public service is simply any modification of purely
commercial provision resulting from public policy."
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A competitive, libertarian ethos would be introduced into broadcasting and
was to be further promoted by a market based system founded upon the introduction
of the new media. The new means for delivery could provide the viewer/consumer
with a wealth of choice and programming. Consequently Peacock posited that if such
an opportunity for change was to be fulfilled it would be necessary to radica}form
the structures of broadcasting. The ultimate goal for the committee may be summed
up as follows --- the creation of an environment in which the viewer/consumer could
assert his/her citizen rights within broadcasting through the operation of a market
based system that was reflective and responsive to his/her preferences. The Peacock
report was designed with this objective in mind and provided a number of reforms
through which such a strategy might be pursued. These reforms was coherently
packaged and the report stressed that they could not be taken out of context and
pursued in isolation. It was posited that such a piece-meal approach would be
ineffectual and the thrust for change would be ameliorated.
This outlook explains why the report did not recommend the privatization of the BBC.
Brittan has commented:
Some critics asked why we had not recommended privatizing the BBC. The reason
for not doing so in stage one is clear enough. Under the present broadcasting system,
privatization of the BBC would not introduce any extra element of competition.
Moreover, so long as direct charging of viewers and listeners is impossible and the
BBC is tax-financed, a privatized body would be responsible neither to the market nor
to Parliament and would thus have arbitrary and unacceptable power. This matters far
more to broadcasting than it does for gas or telephones (which has been privatized as
semi-monopolies)."
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CONCLUSION
"After more than a year of deliberations the Peacock report arrived to a chorus of
anger and derision from broadcasters, unions and MPs."98
The Peacock report had failed to please a wide number of interests
because it had rejected the introduction of advertising upon the BBC and had preferred
to outline a set of market-liberal reforms for the future of broadcasting. For different
reasons, there was little receptiveness for Peacock from the broadcasting community
and the political elite immediately after its publication. Throughout the general reports
of the time, the feeling appeared to be that it would be dismissed. It had satisfied few
interests and engendered extreme hostility elsewhere. From all quarters, the report
was interpreted as a failure either being castigated as being too radical or not
satisfying the government's interests in broadcasting enough.
The committee had hoped to set the agenda for radical change in broadcasting
policy-making. The attractiveness of the report for those who were directly involved
was dependent upon how these parties identified that their interests had been catered
for. The traditional broadcasting institutions, especially the BBC, were pleased with
the reports micro findings --- that the BBC would not be forced to take aboard
advertising and their would be no immediate competition for the same revenues.
However, they were obviously a lot less happy when they considered the macro
implications of the report. They disliked being described as the 'comfortable duopoly'
and treated the notion of a Public Service Broadcasting Council with contempt.
Moreover, the ITV contractors were horrified at the idea of having their franchises
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put out to competitive tendering.
The political opposition also mobilised against the report. The leaders of the
ACT!' and BETA argued that many of the measures were unfeasible and would also
result in the loss of revenue and jobs. The then Shadow Home Secretary Gerald
Kaufman was predictably blunt when he castigated the report as ' a jumble of evasive
verbiage ... (whose) proper place (was in) the wastepaper basket." "
Peacock only gained support from market-libertarians who welcomed the
report as "one of the great liberal documents of the age." In its more commercial
concerns it also received support from Independent producers and production
companies who welcomed the recommendation to liberalize the broadcasting market-
place by placing a forty-percent programming quota upon the terrestrial channels.10'
The Conservative government's attitude to the report was far more equivocal than
supporters of market-liberalism might have expected or desired. As Raymond Snoddy
reported:
"The Home Office analysis given to Hurd said the report lacked intellectual
coherence, and you know something has gone seriously wrong when senior officials
use such uncomplimentary language about more than a year's work by a distinguished
batch of professor and economists."°
Further, the then Home Secretary Douglas Hurd was heard to have made his
displeasure with the report behind the scenes. Samuel Brittan provides the anecdote
that Hurd compared Peacock unfavourably with Annan at a senior Conservative
wives' lunch on the date of the report's publication'°3. Even before Douglas Hurd
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had introduced the report in Parliament, the Home Office had moved to reduce its
impact and credibility.' 04
 The report was accompanied by dismissive policy
statements and was selectively leaked through the compliant Lobby'° 5, who inferred
that it had been subject to a number of fundamental disagreements amongst several
members of the committee (principally between Peacock and Brittan on one side, and
Hethrington and Chalmers on the other)'° 6 and that it had been unfavourably
received by the Prime Minister and the rest of the cabinet.' 07 In a contemporary
article, Alan Peacock commented:
"There had been a set of unfortunate leaks, unfortunate because they took particular
recommendations, such as the rejection of advertising out of context. The press were
unanimous in their view that members of the Cabinet were reacting most unfavourably
to what they had been told about the Report's contents. Our child would be strangled
at birth."04
This action was re-inforced by Hurd's presentation of the report in the House
of Commons. Whilst Hurd diplomatically welcomed the long-term validity of
Peacock's approach, he dismissed many of the short-term proposals.'° 9 For example,
Hurd vaguely promised that there would be a careful consideration of independent
quotas."° In effect, it was argued that Peacock had failed to please its political
masters and they had decided to consign it to the 'dustbin of history" 1 . The
Spectator sarcastically observed:
(Douglas Hurd) ... with a most elegant flick of the instep ... despatched Professor
Peacock's report to the long grass; ' a stimulating and challenging report' ... 'fits in
well with our general philosophy' ... 'presents regulations not sacrosanct'
'constructive debate
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There was a feeling that the department had been caught out by the report.
Douglas Hurd had suffered from the legacy of his predecessor Leon Brittan who had
"misread the message (and had) set up a committee who genuinely believed in the
reality, rather than the rhetoric of the free-market." 3
 However, even Leon Brittan
(who had been responsible for the partisan stacking of the committee) would have
been astonished by the nature and extent of the report's scope. After all, the Home
Office had initiated the committee with a clear instruction --- to consider the
implications of introducing advertising upon the BBC. Instead it had been presented
with a document which had, akin to a Royal Commission, significantly questioned the
tenets underpinning the whole of the British broadcasting system. Clearly, the
department's expectations had been exceeded and its unease can be measured by the
reticence it displayed upon receiving the report.
Peacock had displeased the government through its arguments against
regulation and censorship. The mass media, and broadcasting in particular, had often
been cited by the government as creating a moral laxity through a disproportionate
amount of representations of sex and violence. 4 In particular, these voices had
called for greater regulation and censorship within the area of public morals. The
Cabinet quickly dismissed the arguments for a removal of interventionist regulation
over what was shown, believing it to be instrumental in promoting pornography,
obscenity and violence. The Home Secretary Douglas Hurd quickly demonstrated the
government's attitude:
Our present arrangements reflect the view that the peculiarly intrusive nature of
broadcasting and in particular television, continue to require special regulatory
arrangements.
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However as Samuel Brittan comments, the purpose of Peacock's
libertarianism stood at odds with this interpretation of its meaning:
"MPs who identify freedom of speech and of artistic expression with soft porn
are merely revealing something about themselves. Recent examples of broadcasting
suppression include discussion of Count Tolstoy's book on British involvement in the
forced repatriation of anti-Communist Russians and Yugosla ys, and a critical
programme on the role of the IBA. Earlier on Churchill's warning on the dangers of
Hitler were kept off the air to please the party Whips. Every single one of the Home
Secretary's arguments on the supposed need to censor broadcasting because of its
intrusiveness was heard after the invention of printing, which was just as provocative
in its day. Freedom of speech was one of the four freedoms of the Atlantic Charter;
and those who want to suppress it, on whatever pretext, are traitors to the Western
heritage."116
As Brittan's comments signify, this issue referred to a more deep-rooted concern, as
the removal, partial or otherwise, of the regulating agencies responsible for
supervising broadcasting brought into question the issue of state control within
broadcasting. The report, whilst expounding the construct of a free broadcasting
market without censorship, had revealed a major dichotomy in the Thatcherite
thinking towards broadcasting. Whilst Thatcherites were, in principle, in favour of
deregulation, competition and consumer choice, they were even more suspicious than
paternalistic 'One Nation' Tories of proposals which enabled the individual to watch
and listen as they preferred, subject to only the laws of libel, taste and decency. As
Samuel Brittan commented:
"They (Thatcherites) espouse the market system but dislike the libertarian value
judgements involved in its operation, value judgements which underlie the Peacock
Report."117
It is ironical that Peacock, which was called by the Thatcher government as
political weapon to enforce compliance from the broadcasting community, served to
251
expose the contradiction within Thatcherite policy toward broadcasting and made
conspicuous the control mechanisms that had been employed by the state in relation to
broadcasting." 8
 It was Professor Peacock and Samuel Brittan's intention to reform
the agenda for broadcasting by making conspicuous the mechanisms that had been
employed to structure the British broadcasting system. Peacock may be criticized upon
several fronts (ie. its innate belief in the market as proper regulator, its ability or
inability to understand how the broadcasting economy works, its interpretation of
public service broadcasting and the historical development of a free press or its direct
linkage between economic performance and societal freedoms), however it did expose
and question the flaws and contradictions between a broadcasting system that claimed
to be established in terms of constitutional independence and one which, in reality,
allowed for a considerable amount of collusion between the state and broadcasters.
Whilst many commentator have argued that Peacock was primarily important for
setting the debate in financial terms, I would argue that its true significance was
located around these factors." 9
 Peacock asked essential questions about the political
position of British broadcasting in a liberal-democratic nation. The conclusions it
reached challenged the normative values and, inspite of government intransigence and
deflection, refused to be easily dismissed. This was realised by the chairman himself
when he predicted immediately after the report's publication that:
My conviction is that the report cannot be shelved, in the sense that the issues go
far beyond the immediate interests of this government."20
Clearly the Peacock report would have major implications for the ensuing
broadcasting debate and the round of policy that followed its publication as it
challenged the traditional conventions and structures that had been employed to
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propagate broadcasting in Britain. As Cento Veljanovski, a leading supporter and
Lto
economist for the Peacock commented:
"the framework developed by Peacock and the issues that it drew attention to
essentially fundamental questions about the nature and purpose of broadcasting in a
free society --- required all to reconsider the basis of broadcasting policy."2'
Therefore it remained to be seen whether the policy-cycle inaugurated by the Peacock
Report would produce the complete agenda for change the committee desired, as the
government would have to attempt to reconcile two apparently irreconcilable facets
state intervention and deregulation) in order to create a coherent policy for change.
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install an extensive fibre-optic grid in the process of modernizing copper wiring of
household phones. But as this prospect receded, so too did the dream of a perfect
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CHAPTER FIVE: THE POLITICAL PHASE OF THE POLICY CYCLE: FROM
THE 1986 PEACOCK REPORT TO THE 1990 BROADCASTING ACT
This chapter will examine the political phase of Jeremy Tunstall's
broadcasting policy-cycle model.' As I have shown, Tunstall defined the policy-cycle
as: an enquiry phase --- ending with a report suggesting various recommendations; a
political phase --- concluding with legislation which may concur with the report but
often stresses different themes, and an operational phase --- culminating in the
legislation's implementation 2 He comments upon the political phase:
The report goes to the relevant government minister and department. A White Paper
may follow, then a bill and, after the usual debates, a law is finally enacted. The act
may reflect only quite a small part of the public committee's recommendations, and
even these may be adopted in altered form."3
For my purposes this phase may be demarcated from the Peacock report's publication
in July 1986 to the Broadcasting bill's enactment in November 1990.
In many respects, the 1990 Broadcasting Act was reflective of the preceding
period of political intervention which can be characterized by its short-term
reactiveness. While the BBC had been subjected to governmental antagonism during
the early eighties, the immediate focus of wrath was the 1988 Thames documentary
'Death on the Rock'. The resulting political storm, co-inciding with the government's
aim to reform what it perceived as a monopolistic and unaccountable broadcasting
system, served to focus its attention on Independent Television (ITV). Consequently,
the legislation compounded one of the policy cycle's central ironies as ITV found
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itself being reformed whilst the BBC and the new media remained relatively
untouched.4
The 1986 Peacock report provided a market-liberal critique of British
broadcasting and may be understood as having defined a framework through which the
Thatcher government could reform broadcasting. Peacock widened the debate from the
re-organization of the BBC to the whole of British broadcasting. It criticized the
system as being publicly unaccountable because it was duopolistic and subject to state
pressure. It argued that through economic deregulation individual choice, expression
and political accountability would be realized. 5
 To this end, the report's critique may
be employed to consider the nature of the legislative period. The Peacock report set
the agenda for the subsequent broadcasting debate. As Steven Barnett has commented:
in debates and at conferences the report was cited as an example of the free-
market approach towards broadcasting. It set an important precedent and the
framework for the debate which was, not so much about the PSB, as how can we
place broadcasting into the mode of the consumer."6
However, the problem with this broadcasting policy is to determine where
the ideology ended and the politicking began. To what extent was Peacock a half-
constructed vehicle on which Thatcherites might impose recommendations designed to
alter terrestrial broadcasting ? Was an attempt made to inter-relate the concept of
consumer sovereignty with any practical policy-making? Did the political phase
indicate a coherent effort by the government to employ Peacock's recommendations
and was an alternative conceptual framework to the common notion of public service
broadcasting realized ?
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This was a confused policy-making phase in which suggestions were
considered, only to be dropped in order to be re-considered again. The Home
Secretary Douglas Hurd, after "kicking (Peacock) into the long-grass" 7, went on to
state that "nothing is certain" and that the licence fee might come under renewed
speculation. 8 The immediately negative reaction to the Peacock report proved too
premature as throughout the following years it achieve a qualified acceptance and a
number of its recommendations attained favour within the political elite's thinking. As
Raymond Snoddy noted "ideas once seen as outrageously radical (became) almost
common place" 9. Yet, it should be remembered that the government's decision-
maldng was marked by indecision, hesitancy, uncertainty and inconsistency during the
early post-Peacock phase)°
In retrospect, the political phase resulted in the significant reform of ITV,
with the BBC being largely left alone." It is therefore necessary to analyze how such
recommendations emerged in such a confused climate. Throughout this chapter, I
intend to discuss the broadcasting debate's development. I will consider the
government's reaction to the Peacock report and provide an analysis of the policy's
evolution.
I will discuss the debate's political emphasis to determine whether
ideological coherence or political realism affected the resulting policy. Further, the
chapter will question the extent to which this policy referred to issues of political
control and ask whether the government attempted to define a concept of broadcasting
within the 1990 Act. I then intend to evaluate the substance of the 1988 White Paper
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'Broadcasting in the '90s: Competition, Choice and Quality' and the 1990
Broadcasting Act. In order to determine the government's response through the
official documents, I propose to provide a thematic breakdown based upon the
following areas: new media, finance, and regulation.
Therefore, this will be a study of policy-making which is concerned with the
imperatives that governed and channelled the Thatcher government's approach to
broadcasting policy. In particular, it will discuss the issues raised by the third
Thatcher government's policy-management and ideological viewpoint.
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5:1. THE POLITICAL PHASE: THE POLITICAL ELITE'S RESPONSE TO THE
PEACOCK REPORT
Whilst the Peacock report's focus was on the BBC, its recommendations
extended to all areas of terrestrial broadcasting as they included significant financial
and regulatory recommendations for the ITV sector as well as the BBC. In this
respect, it is noticeable that the subsequent post-Peacock debate and the locus of the
policy should have centred upon ITV rather than BBC.
Clearly, Peacock's wider approach contributed to this shift. As Peacock had
found against the introduction of advertising on the BBC, the dynamic towards re-
organizing the corporation through legislation tended to be stymied. The reform of the
BBC was also stemmed by the findings against the incorporation of subscription in the
report Subscription Television.' 2 Moreover, the government's relations with the
BBC, which had reached their nadir with the successive crises of 'Real Lives' in 1985
and the Special Branch's seizure of the 'Zircon Spy Satellite' tapes in early 1987,
were to change during the political phase due to the politicization of the appointment
process and the corporation's increasingly cautious approach to political controversies.
Consequently, the government accepted Peacock's recommendation that the BBC's
licence fee should be set in relation to the Retail Price Index (RPI) from January 1st
1988, but preferred to leave the corporation largely alone.
To some extent, the shift from BBC to ITV may well have occurred due to
the inevitable policy-making drift and as the commercial broadcaster was a more
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expedient option for reform. Moreover, when the government's initial disappointment
with the report had diminished, it was left to mount a response. In the aftermath of its
immediate reaction, it began to perceive that elements within the report provided a
framework through which reform could be developed.
In this respect, it may be noted that the Peacock report appealed to a number
of different constituencies by off-balancing established practices in an unexpected
manner and gave the free-market libertarians a head start both philosophically and for
the purposes of lobbying. On one level, it was seized upon by market-liberal think-
tanks such as the Institute of Economic Affairs (TEA) and the Centre for Policy
Studies. On another level, it provided ammunition for News International and its
apologists.' 3
 The close proximity of these organizations to the government obviously
strengthened its acceptance of a number of the Peacock recommendations.
For the government, the report's notion of 'consumer sovereignty' facilitated
its belief that rather than being a 'grand architect' for policy, the doctrine allowed it
to be an 'enabler' in promoting more competitive practices and opening up the market
to new entrants.'4 This attitude was reflective of the government's general concern to
encourage openings at the point of consumption rather than protecting producer
interests.
However, from the evidence, it would also appear that this change responded
to the contemporary nature of the political elite. The broadcasting policy network was
shaped through the Prime Minister, the cabinet's dynamics and the infiltration into the
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political elite of a business class during this period of the Thatcher government.
Margaret Thatcher occupied a dominant position within the cabinet, most
especially after her 1987 electoral victory, which proved to be important in the
development of this policy.' 5
 Simon James described her as a protagonist Prime
Minister whose influence was reflective of her overall power in government.' 6 So
whilst her thinking may have been personally motivated, it was also crucial in
channelling arguments and selecting certain policy objectives.
Thatcher's personal interest and influence in broadcasting policy can be
detected as she was chairperson of the cabinet broadcasting sub-committee. In this
respect, there is more than a degree of truth that her approach was dictated by her
own personal whims as much as following any prescribed ideology or policy
procedure.' 7
 As Nigel Lawson, somewhat sarcastically , noted in hindsight:
Broadcasting was a subject on which Margaret held a great many firm views and
prejudices, which she would air at some length, irrespective of whether this had any
bearing on the Committee's pressing need to reach decisions on a number of complex
and critical issues."8
Moreover, access to the Prime Minister was built up through political
allegiance, shared conceptions and personal rapport. A close ally to Margaret
Thatcher was Lord Young, the Secretary of State for the Department of Trade and
Industry (DTI). He stood as one of the leading examples of the infiltration of a
business class within senior political appointments. He remained a businessman
brought in to organize policy, rather than acting as a politician who was brought in to
supervise business.'9
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Young's relations with Thatcher and the DTI's aim of opening up
broadcasting to competition were to prove vital in shaping the course of the
legislation. Throughout the early period of the political phase the DTI contested with
the Home Office for sovereignty over broadcasting. Both departments reflected
different interests and were responding to alternative policy and ideological agendas.
The Home Office, responsible for broadcasting since 1974, preferred to perceive
broadcasting as a public good and was motivated by issues of social and political
control. Its ministers, Secretary of State Douglas Hurd and Timothy Renton, were
also drawn from the Conservative Party's more traditional echelons and were
consummate professional politicians.
Alternatively, the DTI saw itself at the vanguard of the Thatcher reform
movement The department had been actively involved in the mass privatization and
de-nationalization of industries in the name of competition. As it was responsible for
the licensing of broadcasting technology, it argued that the new media provided more
competitive opportunities. Therefore, broadcasting should be seen as an economic
activity and the DTI considered radical solutions such as privatizing the airwaves,
BBC2 and Channel Four in order to provide for increased independent access to the
broadcasting market. 2° The difference in approach was noted by the Economist:
A few months ago a Home Office man was arguing about broadcasting policy with
a man from the Department of Trade and Industry. 'Are you sure you have the
interests of the consumer at heart?' asked the Home Office man, believing this to be
the yardstick by which government policy should be judged. The DTI man reassured
him. Only after five minutes did the two realise they were talking at cross-purposes:
for the Home Office, the consumer was the viewer; for the DTI, the advertiser. Such
is the government's dilemma over the deregulation of television. Will the winners
from this autumn's white paper be the watchers of television or those who advertise
on it?"2'
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This business ethos was enhanced by Young's appointment of other businessmen such
as Sir Jeffrey Sterling, Chairman of the P&O shipping group, to act as advisors.22
Moreover, Young's ambitions meant that the DTI was a predator during the late
eighties. Therefore, the department devoted a significant amount of attention to an
issue which had previously been marginal.
Although the departments' aims were resolved at a meeting at Silchester,
this fight for control marked the stage between the report to the White Paper. In
several respects the White Paper was a compromise between the Home Office's half-
hearted back-tracking and the DTI's desire for greater liberalization, privatization and
competition. The joins, however, were conspicuous. For instance, the compromise
over Channel Four, which remained a public service broadcaster, whilst having to sell
its advertising in competition with a more commercial ITV sector was reached due to
the different departmental aims. 24 As 'teven Barnett comments:
The 1988 White Paper was a result of a bitter feud between the DTI and the Home
Office. ... The White Paper is full of contradictions between the liberal establishment
versus the Thatcherite business ethos. There have been stories within the departments
that Lord Young, then Secretary to the DTI, had the ear of Margaret Thatcher and
that Hurd, whose interest in broadcasting within the Home Office was minimal, was
fighting a rearguard battle.
"The shift back to the Home Office coincided with the removal of Lord Young. The
Dl'!, under Young, received patronage from Margaret Thatcher and had a massive
public profile. It stood in the vanguard of the philosophical shift marked by
Thatcherism. In its departmental briefs it was looking to be the lead department
related to broadcasting. When Young lost favour, the impetus left the Dl'!. "25
The policy process was thus fought between two departments who laid different
emphases upon broadcasting. It appears, however, that both departments, along with
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the Chancellor of the Exchequer Nigel Lawson, were keen to proceed with the
franchise auction.26
The reform of the terrestrial broadcasting system was further enhanced by the
government's desire to encourage the free development of the new media channels.
The technological push provided the government with the political weaponry to attack
what they perceived as the vested interests of the terrestrial broadcasting system. As
Roger Bolton has commented:
In the past, there has been government antagonism. However, there was very little
governments could do to change broadcasting. The technological change of satellite
became the vehicle for change."27
Since the early eighties, the government had been keen to liberalize the
communications systems. 28
 As the new technologies had broken down the 'limited
spectrum' of airwaves, they enabled the government to actively reconsider the
purposes of traditional broadcasting practices. In particular, the government and the
DTI hoped that British Satellite Broadcasting (BSB) would succeed as a commercial
enterprise. The government had anticipated that BSB would be the sole satellite
broadcaster.29
However, this liberalization of the new media served inadvertently to aid
Rupert Murdoch's 'News International' group. Murdoch, who had failed to gain the
IBA regulated satellite channels in the 1986 satellite franchise round30, had
experimented with satellite broadcasting throughout the early eighties with Sky
Channel. 3 ' He had clear ambitions and whilst the government and the DTI hoped to
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create competition in the first instance, its hands-off approach would eventually allow
Murdoch to gain a foothold. Once this had occurred he was to benefit from the
political patronage of Margaret Thatcher that he had developed. It has been suggested
that the government's unwillingness to deal with the low or medium powered satellite
services was motivated by her close personal relationship with the News International
owner.32
 Greg Dyke, former Chief Executive of London Weekend Television,
commented:
A major factor of the 1990 Broadcasting Act was the leeway they (the government)
gave to Murdoch because he was their friend. This was purely patronage. When I
complained about Murdoch's control I was told under no circumstances are we
interested in doing anything. 'He won us the election'."33
The government's patronage of Rupert Murdoch was to remain apparent
throughout the political phase. The regulatory issues, which in part were placed under
pressure due to the inevitable drive of technology, were given little prominence in
satellite broadcasting which was left to be developed by the market. In this respect, it
could be suggested with the benefit of hindsight that Murdoch was indirectly aided as
ITV could, in the future, stand in direct competition with his subscription based
services. Moreover, the government's failure to provide any cogent response to
satellite broadcasting was eventually to allow Murdoch to circumvent monopoly
restrictions and gain sole control of these channels.35
The Thatcher government's response to the Peacock report was thus indicative
of its leading members' aims, circles of influence, departmental positions, responses
to new technologies and clientelist patterns. It hoped to open up broadcasting to
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competition. In regard to this approach, Margaret Thatcher was particularly caught by
the Peacock report's recommendation to auction the ITV company franchises as she
was distrustful of the ITV system feeling that it was inefficient, union-dominated,
overmanned and monopolistic.36
5:1.1 THE COMMERCIAL LIBERALIZATION OF ITV
The franchise auction had been a side-issue for Peacock and was, to some
extent, mitigated as only four committee members (Peacock, Brittan, Quinton,
Reynolds) had sanctioned this proposal. 37 However, for the Thatcher government it
would open ITV up to competitive practices and make it accountable to advertisers
and customers. 3 The government was keen to challenge the large companies'
protectionism in which market rigging and limited entry were the norm. It felt that the
ITV cartel was anachronistic in a broadcasting environment which, through the new
technologies, could stem the traditional monopolization.39
Moreover, as Peacock had indicated, reform would provide greater
opportunities for independent production companies to enter a previously closed
system. Additionally, the government's desire for competition within the commercial
sector drew it to endorse the report's recommendation that Channel Four should sell
its own advertising revenue in compettion with ITV. In respect to these beliefs, the
government was strongly influenced by the advertising lobby.
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The Peacock report's criticism of a 'comfortable duopoly' was particularly
pertinent to the advertisers. They wished to dismantle the ITV monopoly over
advertising space as they felt they had been hostages to ITV's fortunes. The lack of
competition for funds between the BBC, financed by the licence fee, and ITV, through
advertising, had stood at the heart of the public service system sustained by arguments
for quality programming, competition for audiences and political independence.
Further, the IBA had stringently controlled the amount of advertising and the prices
for it. In practice, however for the advertisers, these arrangements had allowed the
ITV companies to charge exorbitant r.tes for peak-time advertising and through their
monopoly indulge in unaccountable programming, institutional and financial
practices.4°
The advertisers felt that as ITV was the recipient of a third of their annual
expenditure, they had a right to intervene in the schedule. 4 ' They resented their
inability to target audiences, believing that the ITV companies had remained
arrogantly dismissive of their needs and that the IBA's demands for public service
broadcasting had exacerbated this situation. Moreover, they had heard stories about
inefficiencies, some true, others apocryphal, such as camera crews waiting until three
minutes past six to claim overtime for two days. 42 These union practices had
emerged out of agreements negotiated by the ITV companies whose excessive
profitability had promoted a wasteful use of resources. In effect, the advertisers felt
they were footing the bill for these practices. As Timothy Renton has commented:
The big companies who used television advertising a lot, such as the car dealers, car
producers, Unilever, the detergent manufacturers, were at the time furious - there is
no other word for it - at the ITV monopoly on television advertising. They were
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desperate to see competition in this field, and they were all for Channel 4 selling its
own advertising. Up until the Act, Channel 4 advertising was entirely sold through
and by the Channel 3 companies. They were also very keen to get Channel 5
started. W43
Previously, Saatchi and Saatchi, the advertising company employed by the
Conservative party during general elections, had been influential in pressing for
Peacock's investigation of advertising on the BBC. Whilst the report dismissed
advertising and favoured the licence fce, its recommendations enabled the advertisers
to turn their attention to 1TV. Therefore, they hoped that a market-based system
would enhance competition by reducing advertising space rates and by lessening the
ITV companies' excessive profits. The changes to Channel Four's financial base
would also decrease costs.
In turn, the commercial sector represented to the government a throw-back to
the monopolistic, corporatist and collectivist traditions which it had sought to remove
from the British economy. As Nicholas Garnham has commented:
(The government's) proposals ... are underpinned by the more general view which
motivates the New Model Army of Thatcherism, that Britain has failed and that this
failure is due above all to the corporatist practices of the British elite and especially to
the propagation of anti-entrepreneurial cultural values by the British intelligentsia.
Within this analysis public service breadcasting, one of the characteristic and supreme
creations of that class has itself to be tarred with the brush of failure. "
In many respects, the closed-shop union practices had been allowed to develop due to
the change from a levy upon revenues to profits in the late sixties. Whilst this
measure was designed to stem excessive profitability, in practice it had led to
companies circumventing the levy by re-investing money back into programming and
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labour. The companies claimed that the financial system enhanced creativity and
experimentation as sufficient revenue was available for alternative programming.47
However, the government perceived that ITV was no different from any other
economic sector and should operate upon the business principles it had instilled
through the introduction of privatizatic n and deregulation. Further, the Treasury
argued that the levy had meant that the ITV companies had effectively evaded their
financial responsibility.48
The government remained suspicious of the commercial sector's clandestine
nature. In particular, it believed that the IBA, rather than acting in the public interest,
had shown itself to be subject to 'capture' by the companies it was meant to regulate.
This, it was argued, had been exhibited by the IBA's failure to stem the contractor's
regional monopoly over advertising revenues and during the 1981 franchise round.49
This franchise round had been seen as a 'carve-up' for the major licensees and many
observers had been mystified by the IBA's decision to replace the established
'Southern Television' with TVS and 'Westward' with TSW in the South East and
South West regions respectively. 50 These decisions had been made at the IBA's
discretion and could not be overturned through judicial review. 5 ' The closed and
private nature of this form of decision-maldng was perceived as being unaccountable
and reprehensible. As Andrew Davidson has shown:
"Thatcher herself asked the outgoing IBA chairman Lady Plowden why Southern had
failed. 'I can't possibly tell you that' replied Plowden."52
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The Thatcher government's annoyance was further raised when Michael
Green's Canton Communications group attempted to take-over Thames in 1985.
Green, who had made his fortunes on the industry's technical side, had negotiated
with Thames's owners Thorn and the IBA to take-over the London weekday provider.
At the eleventh hour, after an agreement had been reached with both the parent
company and the regulator, the Thames Chief Executive Richard Dunn, upon learning
about the deal, lobbied the IBA Director John Whitney imploring him to refuse it. He
argued that Green was a business-man who would transform the broadcaster into a
publishing-house, would contravene the IBA's programming code and the ITV
network's traditions. Dunn's arguments fell upon fertile ground and the IBA declared
that the take-over should be stopped. This angered Green, media magnates such as
Robert Maxwell and the City.
The refusal of Green, who had forged close links within the business class
who were populating senior positions in the government, acted as catalyst for the
emergence of underlying resentments. Green exerted and would continue to hold onto
a degree of political influence during the lobbying process, not least as he was the ex-
husband of DTI Secretary Lord Young's cousin. 53 Thus ITV became subject to
accusations of cartelism and it appeared that a distinction existed between broadcasting
'insiders' and outsiders.M To the government, the IBA had again acted in a high-
handed and unaccountable manner. This form of establishment patronage contrasted
with the Thatcher government's publicly propagated views which had sought to stem
such practices. 55
 Although Green's position vis-'a-vis ministers and the cabinet would
seem to imply that the government remained oblivious to any criticisms of clientelism
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itself, and his favoured position served to demonstrate the extent to which the
- 'Thitcherite entrepreneur' had become an icon of the late eighties.
Therefore, in this respect, the commercial liberalization of ITV and the
removal of the interventionist IBA was desirable for Thatcher and advocates of
competition. This attitude was evident at a famous Cabinet broadcasting seminar held
on the 21st September 1987 on commercial broadcasting which was attended by
Professor Alan Peacock, BBC, IBA and ITV broadcasting chiefs, when Margaret
Thatcher infamously dubbed ITV as 'tne last bastion of restrictive practices's.
This meeting was once again illustrative of the (in this specific case, almost
farcical57) break-down between political and broadcasting elites. At the seminar, a
number of the ITV company chiefs presented papers and contributed to an open
session. 58 During this meeting, in her capacity as chairperson, Thatcher demonstrated
her annoyance that ITV could continue to act in a monopolistic and unaccountable
manner. 59 She also made it clear that she wanted greater competition within the
system, despite the broadcasters who argued that broadcasting was a cultural industry
in which 'quality' could not be measured through finance but through programme
output. In regard to the varying imperatives which drove the franchise auction, the
Home Office Minister in charge of the policy Timothy Renton commented:
"The aim of the auction, or competitive tender as it was more euphemistically called,
was quite simple. It would provide annual additional revenue to the Treasury ... it
was also to enable new bidders and entrants to come openly in a transparent process
that had not existed in 1980/81. New bidders had to come openly in the field and into
the winning process. The magic circle had to be opened up."6°
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5:1.2 INTERVENTION. CENSORSHIP AND CONTROL
Against this, Thatcher indicated at the meeting a repressive, interventionist
strand, which on one level was located around the issue of the representation of sex
and violence on television. In the summer of 1987, a survivalist, gunman Michael
Ryan had committed a massacre in the Berkshire town of Hungerford before shooting
himself. Ryan had been impressed by a number of films, including Sylvester
Stallone's 'Rambo' movies, which had included a high degree of violent action. These
films were available on rented video cassettes and the government articulated popular
fears over their mass dissemination. However, possibly for political convenience, it
mixed up violent videos with the generally available broadcast programmes.
It was also concerned by an invasion from skies as foreign pornography,
licensed by more liberal European states, could penetrate the British broadcasting
market. After the broadcasting seminar, Thatcher advocated that greater censorship
was required to restrict violence and pornography. 6 ' Additionally, she argued that
fines should be imposed on advertisers who attached themselves to 'offensive'
programming. 62
 This overtly, interventionist policy culminated in the Home Office's
proposed statutory censor, the Broadcasting Standards Council (BSC) being set up in
1988.63
So whilst the government advocated a liberalization of broadcast financing, it
simultaneously decreed an increased amount of regulatory intervention within
programming. Deregulators were weakened by this major contradiction at the heart of
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the Thatcherite reform agenda. While on one hand the Prime Minister was
ideologically committed to liberalizing the market, she feared the consequences of a
libertarian approach. Therefore, the policy which emerged was not only reflective of a
fight between reformers and traditionalists, but also referred to the central paradox
between a free economy and strong state which underpinned the political project
which has been commonly identified as 'Thatchensm'. Andrew Gamble identified this
as follows:
"The state is to be simultaneously rolled back and rolled forward. Non-interventionist
and decentralized in some areas, the state is to be highly interventionist and
centralied in others. The New Right can appear by turns libertarian and authoritarian,
populist and elitist. This ambiguity is not an accident. It derives from the fact that the
New Right has two major strands; a liberal tendency which argues the case for a
freer, more open and more competitive economy, and a conservative tendency which
is more interested in restoring social 2nd political authority throughout the society.
What makes matters more confusing is that not only do those within the New Right
regard the importance of these tendencies differently, but those who have written on
the New Right often concentrate upon one of them to the exclusion of the other. "
This confusion may explain why the government shifted its attention
away from the BBC to the ITV network. If the government had attempted to liberalize
the BBC it might have discovered, much like Tony Benn in the 1960s, 65that a whole
tier of protective, constitutional measures would have to be dismantled. The close
proximity of the governors to the corporation (legally they are the BBç) could have
possibly led to a break-down of the normative, interventionist regulatory patterns.
This distinction may have been exacerbated by political perceptions. For the
political elite the BBC remained a national instrument for broadcasting . The BBC
had traditionally been the focus of government concerns over broadcasting, whilst ITV
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had not been subject to such a concentration of attention (although ironically, as I
shall demonstrate later, the Thatcher government's determination to reform ITV was
reinforced by the controversy surrounding the Thames Television documentary 'Death
on the Rock'). In contrast, the more detached public regulation of the IBA and
privately funded nature of ITV provided greater opportunities for a more
straightforward commercial reform through changing the financial base, without the
attendant complexities of dismantling a publicly funded quasi-state institution. Further,
whilst the commercial system had evolved, through finance, legal rulings, regulators
and ideological conviction, to eventually complement rather than compete with the
BBC, it had initially been conceived by Selwyn Lloyd as a channel founded upon
private enterprise. 67
 Indeed Robert Fraser, the first ITA Director-General, had
argued that it should operate upon the principles of Benthamite utilitarianism.
Consequently, Margaret Thatcher and her supporters sought immediate
practical solutions for competition within a spec jfic part of broadcasting from the
Peacock report, rather than employing it as a market-liberal blue-print to radically
restructure the industry. Their response was deliberately selective, preferring to pick
recommendations which conformed to their general purposes rather than considering
the whole report, in spite of its authors' warnings. 69 On one level, for Thatcher and
a number of her colleagues, broadcasting was not distinguishable from any other
business. In this respect, the government's response fitted into the part of Peter Jay's
thesis which equated broadcasting with publishing.70
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However, whilst the system could be liberalized, it could only be liberalized
up to a point. This was justified by the government through its concerns to protect
societal values by intervening in programming. This form of intervention diverged
from the Peacock report's avowed aim to withdraw overbearing regulation or what it
deemed as censorship. Moreover, as the dichotomy between libertarianism and
authoritarianism became conspicuous, it was felt by both industry insiders and
observers that a hidden agenda existed in which the policy was designed to reduce the
broadcasting institution's political potency. 7' In particular, the Thatcher government
fundamentally disagreed with the purpose of political reporting, most especially during
crises. The government felt it was the broadcasters' duty to promote the national
interest, in contrast to the broadcast journalists' belief that they should act as impartial
brokers of information within the dominant political system. As Towyn Mason has
commented:
The policy occurred in an intensely political period. The government had an
ideological view of the world and a reformist view. Many within the BBC believe that
two agendas existed. There was the ostensible agenda regarding policy including
Peacock, the White Paper, the Bill and the Act. There was also the undeclared
agenda. This is a belief amongst many, although I would qualify it by saying that it is
subject to prejudice and is based upon conviction rather than analytical judgement.
However, many see that Thatcher, Kenneth Clarke and Norman Tebbit etc shared an
attitude to broadcasting, that the BBC and ITV --- the broadcasters --- were too
powerful and, as they were unelected, irresponsible."72
This factor was visible due to the government's record of rather crude
attempts to intervene within broadcasting. The trend of poor government-BBC
relations, which I have identified in Chapter three, intensified in the mid-eighties with
the aforementioned 'Real Lives' case, the reporting of the US bombing raid on Libya
and the seizure of the programme tapes on the Zircon Spy satellite.
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The 'Real Lives' dispute demonstrated the nadir of political relations between
the government and the BBC. The disparate position of the government and the
journalists over accountability had promoted the disagreement. In the aftermath to the
controversy, through a mix of political appointments and the governors' usurpation of
the management, the BBC began, in the words of Margaret Thatcher to 'put its house
in order'.73
The early death of BBC chairman Stuart Young in 1986 (brother
of DTI Secretary Lord Young) enabled the government to appoint a non-partisan
political ally Marmaduke Hussey. The government's nomination of BBC governors
became an increasingly important political weapon to hold over the corporation.
Although Hussey held no publicly stated political beliefs and was seen to be a
compromise candidate in October l983, he had close ties with the political elite and
with Rupert Murdoch. He had also been perceived by many as a 'hatchet man' who
had closed down The Times for a year due to a union dispute. His appointment led to
the dismissal of Director-General Alasdair Mime who was replaced by Michael
Checkland, the Deputy Director-General with an accountancy background. Whilst
Mime had acted as an 'Editor in Chief', Checkland was more concerned with
deploying resources efficiently and distanced himself from the controversial areas of
News and Current affairs. This responsibility was covered by former London
Weekend Television (LWT) Director of Programmes John Birt who was recruited as
Deputy DG.
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Birt had co-authored a series of articles entitled the 'Bias against
understanding' with his 'Weekend World' presenter Peter Jay in the Sunday Times in
1975. They argued that news was largely reactive and for broadcast journalism to
become analytical it was necessary to centralize the command structure, by creating
specialist journalists and emphazing key stories rather than a broad approach.
Therefore, Birt set about realizing his theories by amalgamating the 'News and
Current Affairs' departments.
His approach, however, had a political purpose by re-inforcing the 'referral'
system through such a centralization. As the producers would have to refer their items
to their seniors, power would be exercised at a commissioning or editorial level as
potentially controversial items could be rooted out. Consequently, the self-regulation
system would be enhanced.75
As the BBC shied away from political controversy, the political elite's
attention was drawn towards ITV. The government's wrath was channelled by the
Thames Television documentary 'Death on the Rock'. In contrast to government
statements, this programme cited eye-witness evidence that the security forces had
enacted a shoot-to-kill policy against three IRA suspects in Gibraltar. It created a
long-running controversy and led to the government attacking ITV through Rupert
Murdoch's Sunday Times.76
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The fall-out from the programme exposed a vast gulf between the political
elite and the IBA, who in its capacity of broadcaster was legally responsible for airing
the programme. Before the documentary was shown a dialogue occurred between then
Foreign Secretary Sir Geoffrey Howe and the then Chairman of the IBA Lord
Thomson. Howe had asked the IBA to withdraw the programme claiming that:
"The dangers are clear, and so is the resulting responsibility laid upon the media.
The dangers are more in the case of the television medium because the interviewing of
witnesses is presented in a much more direct way than in the written press. There
must be a serious risk of contaminating the evidence by establishing potential
witnesses in advance of the hearing in public positions with all the attended pressures
which that produces."77
In response, Lord Thomson replied:
I am sorry that you and I, from our different standpoints, should have come
to different conclusions about the Thames programme ... However I believe
that the decision I made for the ISA ... to allow the broadcast to
go ahead was the right one in all circumstances."78
This exchange was not only indicative of two legal viewpoints, it also
demonstrated that two very different types of culture existed without any common
ground to reach agreement. The IBA's. response in defending and airing the
programme, whilst being valid in protecting investigative journalism, was
demonstrative of an old organization's inability to perceive how far the political
mainstream had altered. A number of contemporary newspapers called this 'political
suicide' as the government threatened to dismantle the IBA.
The distrust that had grown between the BBC and the government was
transferred to ITV. ITV was not only seen as ignoring the demands of the advertisers,
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but as being unaccountable to its political masters. This, combined with the arguments
that ITV should be commercialized as it was monopolistic and anti-competitive,
served to reinforce the government's desire to introduce legislation to reform ITV's
financial and regulatory arrangements. As Roger Bolton has commented:
"The market-libertarian ideology fitted into a general disdain for broadcasting. This
was set off by the 'Tonight' programme, which I produced, about the assassination of
Airey Neeve with the interview of a spokesman for the responsible terrorist
organization, the INLA. This compounded a sense of antagonism toward broadcasting
and coincided with the belief that broadcasting was overmanned and was no different
from any other form of industry."79
Therefore, the Thatcher government's policy response toward broadcasting
was motivated by political calculation, underpinned by a desire to establish a
broadcasting system which conformed to its perception of the national interest, as well
as any desire to liberalize the market. However, this political motivation highlighted
the contradiction between the market and liberty in the Thatcher government's attitude
toward broadcasting. If deregulation was taken to its logical extreme, it would mean
that the government would have to curb it own powers over broadcasting. 8° In
contrast, the government had been motivated by its inherent political distrust of
broadcasters and desire to control the flow of political information. This paradox
faced a government which was apparently committed to the market, but was fearful of
the consequences of this approach. Irç'iically, the government's paranoia over
broadcasting which had contributed to the legislation proved to be as important in its
rejection of a number of Peacock's concerns over political liberty. In its use of the
report's recommendations the government was conditioned by its attitude to the
broadcasting system, its deregulatory fervour and its concern to retain political
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control.
Thus, at the heart of its broadcasting policy the true nature of the Thatcherite
political programme revealed itself. A distinct tension emerged between the theoretical
grounding of 'Thatcherism', pitched in Hayek's arguments for limiting state
intervention and developing the market as the most effective provider of resources,
and the government's commitment to ncreasing state powers over law and order,
censorship and the flow of information. Consequently, throughout the course of the
Thatcher government pressure arose between market-liberal purists and political
practitioners who supported a market economy whilst wishing to retain, if not extend,
the state's political power.
With regard to the Thatcher government's response to political liberty, Samuel
Brittan has provided a trenchant market-liberal analysis of what he distinguishes
between right-wing authoritarianism and the market. He defines Thatcher's approach
as The New Spartanism founded upon the principles of:
1. A hawkish or super-patriotic attitude to foreign and military affairs.
2. An opposition to social permissiveness and a desire to return to 'traditional
values'.
3. Hostility to government economic intervention, often partial and inconsistent, but
going beyond that of previous ... Conservative governments. N81
Instead of seeing the market as an activator for individual political liberty, the New
Spartan support of the market economy sought the government to direct the national
effort through taxes, subsidies or bans. From this perspective, the imposition of
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qualified but strong state measures, would allow market forces to efficiently deploy
socially beneficial resources throughout the rest of the economy.82
Therefore, the Thatcher government's often articulated, philosophy
contrasted with the development of broadcasting policy partly because of this
underlying distinction between the tenets of market-liberalism and what Brittan has
termed New Sparranism. Although, Margaret Thatcher had declared upon entering
office that SI Economics is the method ... The aim is to change the soul" 83 , her
government's attitude was conditioned by the aim to employ market strategies within
the context of enhanced state power.
In the past, the broadcasting system whilst apparently independent had been
subject to tacit state control through regulation and mutual conceptions between the
political and broadcasting elite. However, the Thatcher government's paranoid
concern over controlling political communications and its innate distrust of a semi-
nationalized industry had led it to push for financial change. In the wake of Peacock,
the substantive reform of the public or commercial system could mean extensive
changes in the mechanisms through which overt or covert political pressure might be
applied toward the broadcasters. This realization was exacerbated by the Thatcher
government's overwhelming desire to repress any elements of political opposition it
found within mainstream broadcasting.
Consequently, its attitude toward the introduction of market reforms diverged
from the Peacock report's market-liberalism. The report had linked consumer
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sovereignty to individual political liberty. Instead, the Thatcher government preferred
to employ Peacock's market recommendations for broadcasting within a context which
allowed for a " strong central state, with the intermediate institutions of civil society
being abolished, privatized, replaced cr at least modified. " In light of this, the
commercialization of ITV's regulatory, financial and programming practices was not
only an expedient response to the report which would please its allies within
advertising and media entrepreneurs such as Green and Murdoch, but centrally
conformed to the demands of a government which had generally pursued:
a revival of a nineteenth century 'contractual' model of social policy, (in which)
the government would cease to provide social goods, even at an arms length, and limit
itself to defining and defending individual rights vis- 'a-vis their provision. This is why
the search for appropriate forms of regulation (became) so important. By playing
down its role as provider in this way, government (could) present itself as libertarian,
even though it may be acting in increasingly aggressive and even authoritarian ways
in its supervision of the providing bodies."85
This approach can be evidenced in the 1988 White Paper Broadcasting in the
'90s:Competition, Choice and Qualily This was the first policy document to turn
attention away from the BBC, which was considered the cornerstone of public service
broadcasting86 , to the commercial sector. It included recommendations to auction
ITV regional franchises, force Channel Four to sell its own advertising and re-regulate
ITV under the auspices of the Independent Television Commission (ITC). The White
Paper also sanctioned a twenty-five percent quota for independent productions on the
terrestrial channels, looser ownership controls and the proliferation of the private
expansion of the cable and satellite channels. These principal proposals were designed
to open up the broadcasting market and were couched in the terminology of economic
liberalization:
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IS The Government places the viewer and listener at the centre of broadcasting policy.
Because of technological, international and other developments, change is inevitable.
It is also desirable: only through change will the individual be able to exercise the
much wider choice which will soon bc come possible. The Government's aim is to
open the doors so that individuals can choose for themselves from a much wider range
of programmes and types of broadcasting ... The government believes that, with the
right enabling framework, a more open and competitive broadcasting market can be
attained without detriment to programme standards and quality."87
However, the White Paper's proposed consumer choice carried a rider ---" In
this as in other fields consumers will rightly insist on safeguards which will protect
them and their families from shoddy wares and exploitation." 88 The document
subsequently proposed the retention and extension of interventionist regulation within
programming. For example, it enhanced the powers of the Broadcasting Standards
Council, provided the ITC with sanctions over programming content, increased
consumer protection obligations on taste, decency and balance and removed
broadcasting's exemption from obscenity legislation.
The White Paper marked the point in the policy process in which
the commercialization of the system overtook the dynamic for deregulation. It was the
government's most extreme statement for economic change. However, simultaneously
through the re-regulation of the system the state's political controls were retained, if
not extended. Therefore, the government whilst favouring the market in a number of
areas, wished to maintain a form of central control. This may have been incoherent in
terms of Thatcherism, but it made perfect sense in the light of New Spartanism.
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5:2. FROM THE WHITE PAPER TC THE 1990 ACT
With ITV's commercialization set in place within the policy, the final
shaping of the Broadcasting Act occurred between 1988 and 1990 under the
jurisdiction of Home Office ministers Timothy Renton and David Mellor. Mellor
replaced Renton after he became Chief Whip due to the cabinet reshuffle hastened by
Nigel Lawson's resignation in 1989. In particular, Mellor was assigned to oversee the
legislation through from Bill to Act. The DTI's role had diminished partly due to the
expedience of placing a Bill through Parliament and because of Young's reduced
power within cabinet. The Home Office's jurisdiction was also symbolic of changes
within the government's political complexion with the general erosion of Margaret
Thatcher's power. The change in political fashions meant that there was less political
capital in attacking the broadcasters as the legislation revealed alternative policy
agendas and as the general political climate imperceptibly altered.
Although, the political will for commercialization remained a potent force,
this latter part of the political phase was characterized by political compromise and
bargaining. The White Paper marked the zenith of government hostility towards the
British broadcasting system. The debate which ensued between its publication and the
Bill's enactment was notable for the manner in which controversial amendments were
reduced in their impact and the way that political and broadcasting actors
maneouvered to produce an act which attempted to reconcile deregulatory
prescriptions with consensual pragmatism.
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In part, this situation was aided by the role of the political actors involved;
Timothy Renton and, particularly, his successor David Mellor. They belonged to the
Conservative party's more patrician elements and their political philosophy diverged
from Thatcherism. Renton was concerned with providing a practical outcome to the
broadcasting policy which reflected the political interests and made concessions to the
ITV companies. In this respect, Renton attempted to provide a compromise path
between the traditions of the system and the commercial demands made by his
political superiors, notably Margaret Thatcher herself. 89
 One example of this change
referred to the issue of networking (in which the major ITV companies contributed to
the national network in order to enhance their profits by increasing productions, whilst
the smaller companies could broadcast popular programmes therefore sustaining
profits by pleasing advertisers). In 1988, Margaret Thatcher had made it clear that she
would not entertain any prescribed networking agreements. 9° However, as Renton
has commented:
in the event Section 39 of the Act made it a legal requirement for ITV to
continue with networking arrangements, instead of the ITV companies' voluntarily
forming a networking arrangement because this was important for them for economic
and competitive reasons. There is ... . statutory framework ... which ... does not
sound like light regulation or 'light touch'. ... On the other hand, the establishment of
the network centre, where decisions are taken as to what is to be shown or
commissioned for the network, independent from the individual ITV companies, is
giving both the smaller companies and the independent producers the opportunity for
far better access."9'
Similarly, Mellor preferred practical solutions which were suited to
the traditional imperatives of consensus and negotiation rather than ideological dogma.
However Mellor, in contrast even to Renton (who had been drawn from the traditional
political elite background of Eton and Oxbridge) had more populist convictions, and
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through the government's respective policy failures on poii tax and Lawson's
resignation was allowed a degree of freedom in his interpretation of the policy which
had not been accorded to his predecessor. Whilst, two elements of the White paper
remained set --- the franchise auction and the reduction of ITV's control over ITN
the unwavering imperative to commercialize the system expressed by Thatcher,
Lawson and Young had been undermined.
He was therefore far more acquiescent to the well-organized rear-guard
lobbying conducted by the ITV broadcasting programme-maker's lobby 'The
Campaign for Quality Television' which was established in 1988 by 'World in Action'
producer Simon Prebble, led by former Granada producer Simon Albury and backed
by the ITV Association and IBA. 93
 In particular, throughout the Bill's committee
stage the Campaign made significant in-roads into the legislative process. As Andrew
Davidson has commented:
There ... (was) ... an extraordinary courtship between producers, performers and
minister that underscored key changes in the broadcasting legislation."
Indeed, it may/suggested that the programme-makers proved far more adept than the
ITV company executives in gaining access to Mellor. 95 This appears to have been
due to the high-profile nature of its membership (which included the television
producer Albury and well-known television comedians such as Rowan Atkinson,
Michael Palm, Terry Jones and John Cleese 96), Albury's organizational abilities, its
access to the print and broadcasting media and Mellor's personal and political
predisposition toward the industry. The Campaign consequently actively lobbied
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the Minister of State to reform the prospective franchise auction. This was established
in a meeting between Mellor, Albury, Prebble, Atkinson, Jones and programme-
makers Angela Graham, Paul Hayman and Claudia Mime at the Home Office in
December 1989.98 As Albury commented upon Mellor:
He (Mellor) does have an enthusiasm for discussion and an old-style Tory
commitment to constructive dialogue."
In this respect, the Campaign argued that the legislation should include effective
guarantees over the range and quality of programmes, for a quality hurdle for
franchises and an exceptional circumstances proviso.'
Alongside the producers and performers' lobby (and with no little tension)
stood the ITV Association led by the Thames Television Chairman Richard Dunn.'°'
The company chiefs were galvanised into action after the White Paper had
recommended that the franchises should be auctioned and the competitive tender
proved to be the focus of the public debate. The ITV Association, through its financial
power and its leading position in ITV, contributed to the debate arguing that the
franchise auction was intellectually unacceptable.'°2 Dunn, in particular, was seen to
co-ordinate the lobby, attempt to woo MPs and make himself available to the
media.'°3
 However, it should be noted that the ITV Association's success was
mitigated due to the tensions between the ITV companies that had always existed
based on regional identity, different perceptions of need and conflicts of interest.104
Further, Mellor's relationship with the Association was conditioned by the political
elite's belief that it had acted as a cartel for the interests of insiders.'05
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Finally and crucially, the appontment of George Russell as IBA Chairman
meant that the regulatory body played an important role in developing ITV's
arguments. Russell had declared the need for a 'quality hurdle' for the franchise
auction immediately after he had taken the post and had stated that if no concession
were made he would resign) He successfully argued that a two-stage process
should be employed in which the quality of the programme and financial plan would
be judged before the competitive tender. Russell and others argued that the winning
bidders of the franchise auction should not have to pay their money in a lump sum at
the start but could pay through instalment during the lifetime of the franchise.'°7
 In
many respects these victories were reflective of the status given by Mellor toward
Russell:
the importance which Mellor plaes on Russell's judgement is reassuring: the
clear message on open issues is that if Russell says he needs further change, he is
very likely to get it."°8
Through the producer's lobby 'The Campaign For Quality Television', the
IBA and, to a lesser extent, the ITV Association, the ITV sector demonstrated that it
had become more aware of the political ground-rules in contrast to the period of
tension surrounding 'Death on the Rock'. Whilst, ITV's attitude had previously been
to dismiss competition as being entirely inappropriate to a cultural industry, it
understood that its arguments would have to be stronger and more realistic. For the
broadcasting establishment within ITV such as David Plowright and Richard Dunn,
the recommendations had appeared to be so self-evidently wrong that they had been
unable to marshall arguments effectively. Although this remained a problem as their
general arguments about the delicate balance of the broadcasting equation were
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ignored, they were able to influence the government's thinking in relation to parts of
the franchise auction (such as re-inforcing the quality hurdle and the inclusion of an
exceptional circumstances clause) and regulation. As a contemporary report observed:
"The Government now appears to be finding common ground with the IBA, and it
may decide after all that the highest bid is not the best criterion for winning a Channel
3 licence."09
Therefore, in contrast to the pre-White Paper debate, a convergence of styles
and cultures characterized this period of the political phase. The 1989 Broadcasting
Bill was reformed as compromise tended to dictate the transformation of political
ideas into statute law. Thus, Renton aid, most especially, Mellor found themselves
negotiating a delicate balance between the commercial reforms demanded by their
political masters, whilst bearing in mind the need to retain some form of political
control through the regulator, and their own (admittedly differing) determination to
respond to the interests of the broadcasters. They struck the balance between
deregulation, commercialization and tradition by compromising upon the key measures
whilst arguing for greater general commercial reform.
In a number of ways, the Act's terminology demonstrates how Mellor, during
the committee stages, resolved these conflicting imperatives. Whilst a number of
abstract terms such as 'high quality' and 'diversity' have remained, other phrases
traditionally associated with broadcasting legislation were absent."° The Act made
no reference to the key public service tenet of 'educating, informing and
entertaining'." This point was made apparent during the Bill's committee stage when
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Robert MacLenan, Liberal Democratic spokesman for broadcasting noted:
Clause 2 is an important statement of the functions and duties of the ITC ... The
Clause is all the more remarkable, however, for what it does not say. It demonstrates
no concept of public trusteeship for the dissemination of television. "112
Mellor's response, whilst rebuffing MacLenan and attempting to hasten the
review process, is indicative of the overall conclusions which finally underpinned the
legislation:
We could spend all the time that is available to the Committee debating this
amendment, but I want to make it cle'r in, I hope, a reasonably sensible and
disciplined time, the point is that a matter of principle is involved. We might as well
recognise it. We do not think that the services to be regulated by the ITC need, in the
main, to be governed by the public service remit as it has been commonly
understood."'13
Therefore, with this aim in mind, the principal recommendations were
directed towards ITV's regulation, network arrangements and finances in order to
open the market whilst maintaining a degree of intervention and protection.
Consequently, the ITV companies could be protected by a quality hurdle and the
exceptional circumstances clause within the franchise auction. Similarly the ITC's
power extended beyond that of a licensor. Whilst, a more qualified competition would
exist in ITV, the public service would'be maintained by the BBC and the requirements
placed upon Channel Four.
The convenient terminology of this organizational framework was 'quality '.
The government's construct of 'quality' referred to 'quality of choice'. Throughout the
debate following the White Paper Timothy Renton stressed that greater competition
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would lead to wider choice and enhance "their (the viewers') ability to choose for
themselves a viewing and listening menu of greater overall quality in relation to their
individual curiosity, tastes and interests." 114 This abstract concept was employed to
legitimize policies and to provide a degree of credibility. However, it was a broad
construct which could also accommodate a number of different ideas for broadcasting.
As Renton has later commented:
Re-reading the notes I kept during the months that we prepared the Broadcasting Act
I see constant reference in them to the difficulty of ensuring that British television did
not, in quality terms, go down the tube in the same manner as American. I remember,
like so many others visiting New York and the horror of flicking from one channel to
another and finding nothing but quiz shows, sex, old soap and even older films. It was
because of this insistence on quality combined with diversity that despite opposition in
the highest places we maintained a special remit of Channel 4 and a minimum level of
support for that channel at 12 per cent of their advertising revenue from the ITV
companies."5
The passage from White Paper, to Bill, to Act marked a period of
compromise in which commercialization was, to a degree, tempered. This political
bargaining demonstrated how the legislation had emerged through the traditional
British policy process in which political will and pragmatism were equally strong
imperatives as ideology. As Maggie Brown commented, the Third Reading
Parliamentary debate over the Broadcasting Act was notable for its lack of bitterness,
consensualism and remarkable ease as
The much amended Broadcasting Bill now passing to the House of Lords before
Royal Assent in the autumn has emerged as a powerful blend of pragmatism and
grand design, a very British piece of legislation, with its right-wing free-market edges
largely knocked off.
"The easy passage has come about because David Mellor, the Home Office minister
responsible for broadcasting, drew the sting through the months of courteous debate
within committee. Mr Mellor has played the role of flexible friend: what started out
as one of the most controversial Bills has won grudging acceptance. There have been
some 800 amendments. The Bill caught the tide of ebbing Thatcherism."6
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In turn, this produced an Act which attempted to resolve the balance between
deregulation, commercialization and the public service, but resulted in an ill-defined
piece of legislation which contrasted with the Peacock report's coherent market-
liberalism. As Sue Elliott has stated:
"The 1990 Broadcasting Act was a r2gbag of different ideas and ideologies which in
part related to Peacock, the industry, the Number Ten policy office etc.. Whilst all
legislation is imperfect and subject to political pressures, it has produced a
number of inconsistencies and genuine problems.""7
3. THE INCOHERENCE OF POLICY: THE 1986 PEACOCK REPORT. THE 1988
WHITE PAPER AND THE 1990 BROADCASTING ACT
The following table outlines the confused impact of broadcasting deregulation:
Table 4: The main recommendations of the political phase
Reconunendation 	 The 1986 Peacock Report 	 The 1988 White Paper
	 The 1990 Broadcasting Act
The licence fee	 The licence fee to be pegged to 	 The pegging of the licence fee to
the Retail Price Index (RPI) by
	 the RPI was noted. The BBC was
the 1st April 19118 and collecttd
	 acknowledged as the 'cornerstone
______________________ by the BBC itself,	 of British Broadcasting '.	 _____________________________
ITV franchises	 The competitive tendering of the 	 A competitive tender for
	 A two-stage franchise auction
regional ITV franchises, 	 franchises in which the bid plus a
	 including a 'quality' hurdle. The
prolita levy is paid annually to the
	 applicant provided programme and
exchequer. The applicant was 	 business plans, with a sealed bid
required to pass a quality	 based on advertising revenue to.'
threshold which would satisfy
	 the next 10 yeara.The highest bid
'consumer protection' targets. 	 could only be considered on
positive programme requirements 	 passing the quality hurdle,
and ownership rulings,
	 otherwise it would be rejected. An
'Exceptional Circumstances' clause
would favour companies with an
outstanding record. The annually
payable bid combined a fixed
percentage of the net advertising
with index-linked sum for the
franchise. The latter provided the
competitive constituent as rival
companies would bid against each
other. The winner had to produce
'quality' and 'regional'
programmes.
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Channel Pour's funding	 Channel Four should sell its own	 Channel Four to sell its own	 Channel Four to continue as an
and programme output. 	 advertising in competition with	 advertising, whilst simultaneously 	 innovative broadcaster whilst
ITV and would no longer be	 remaining an innovative	 selling its own advertising in
funded through the ITV	 broadcaster. A minimum level of	 competition with flV. A levy
companies' subscriptions,	 income to be drawn from the ITV 	 drawn from the ITV companies.
competitive tender and levy
_______________________ ______________________________ proceeds
	 _______________________________
Independent Producers	 The introduction of a 40% quota	 It was noted that Peacock's initial	 The maintenance of the 25% quota
for original programmes	 40% quota had been reduced to	 on BBC and ITV channels.
commissioned from independent	 25% of the IIBC's and TV's
producers upon the BBC and 1TV	 output by the end of 1992.
_______________________ channels over a ten year period. 	 ______________________________ _______________________________
The New Media	 All television receivers should
	 A rejection of pen-television	 The Independent Televiaioa
and subscription based 	 incorporate a pen-television 	 sockets and of the national fibre- 	 Commission (ITC) became
services,	 socket allowing for
	 optic cable grid. The expansion of 	 responsible for licensing cable,
subscnption.The inatallation by	 cable was left to the Cable 	 domestic and non-domestic satellite
British Telecom of a national
	 Authority and the operators 	 services The Cable Authority was
fibre-optic grid for cable services,	 themselves. Similarly low or 	 abolished.
medium powered satellite services
were left to the market. Some
_________________________ _________________________________ content_regulations_were_included __________________________________
Regulation	 The replacement of the traditional	 The Independent Broadcasting 	 A corporate ITC as a regutaJor
regulators with a 'light touch'	 Authority (IBA) to be replaced by 	 rather than a broadcaszer.It is
omni-competent Public Service
	 a Radio Authority and the
	 empowered to enact both positive
Broadcasting Council (PBSC)	 Independent Television	 and negative licensing functions in
Conunission(ITC), a light-touch 	 regard to ownership, programming,
licensing body responsible for 	 advertising and sponsorship. It no
supervising company licences,	 longer has pro-viewing powers,
advertising and maintaining levels 	 whilst programming and scheduling
of decency. Transmission	 powers were passed to the ITV
services to be pnvatiz.ed. The 	 Association and Network Centre.
legitimisation of the Broadcasting 	 Further, it is no longer legally
Standards Council (BSC). 	 responsible for reprcacnting the
ITV cranpaniea in courts of
law,Thc ITC was made responsible
for the supervision of the franchise
auction. Commercial television's
transmission services were
privatiz.ed and taken over by
National Trsnsccmmunicatiocss Lid.
Radio services have been hived otT
to the Radio Authority. Measures
concerning the BSC and the
Broadcasting Complaints
Commission (8CC).
The Peacock report had placed ' the new media at the heart of its
recommendations.
The multiplicity of channels would introduce alternative forms of funding, institutional
and regulatory structures into British broadcasting. Throughout the political phase the
new media became a marginal factor. The government ' s inability or unwillingness to
deal with it was apparent throughout the White Paper. For instance, instead of
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diverting public resources into a national cable network for free-market enterprise, the
issue was considered to be impractical.
With regard to the new media, the 1990 Broadcasting Act is notable for its
omissions rather than for its recommendations. Its provisions were restricted to the
regulation and licensing of cable and satellite services. 118
 As the legislation was
conceived in national terms, the supra-national concerns of ownership, programme
content and regulation raised by satellite services were ignored." 9
 Implicitly, the
new media have been left to the market-place and the legislation attempted to be non-
interventionist.
This was partly reflective of the government's difficulty in legislating for
channels which circumvented national borders and the European Commission's
decision in 1986 to distinguish between television and telecommunications channels.
This standardization and distinction by the European Commission of television and
telecommunication satellites meant that satellite operators could exploit cheaper
technology and were not liable to any national regulations. This policy was evolved
simply in terms of national statecraft rather than attempting to take into account the
international complexities that DBS raised and was outdated by the enactment of the
Bill.
However, it also demonstrated •in inconsistency which referred both to short-
termism and political reality.' 20
 Primarily, the government's attitude reflected its
desire to use the new media as a weapon to reform the traditional terrestrial
broadcasting organizations and enhance potential alterations in the British media's
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ownership. Further, its attempts to create a number of cross-media ownership rulings
were hastily conceived and had little political backing. This attitude was expressed in
the White Paper when it commented:
With the greater choice and variety that lies ahead, the Government is determined
that ownership in the independent sector should be, and remain, widely spread. The
existing controls on takeovers will be removed ... The Government proposes to make
the greatest possible use of subordinate legislation for such rules in order to ensure
maximum flexibility in catering quickly for changing circumstance."2'
With regard to broadcasting's inance the government's response was largely
focused on ITV. The White Paper and the Act turned attention away from Peacock's
wholesale recommendations for subscription to specific commercial reforms. The
former cited the government commissioned 1987 report Subscription Television
written by Charles Jonscher which had recommended against subscription for the
BBC.' The policy-makers preferred to perceive subscription in terms of its impact
upon the present broadcasting institutions, rather than attempting to employ Peacock's
concept of a subscription system which would provide the flaure mechanism to
organire broadcasting.'23
Similarly, whilst Peacock's four financial recommendations --- the ITV
franchise auction, Channel Four selling its advertising air-time, the independent
production quota and the setting of the licence fee to the RPI (alongside the
introduction of a fifth commercial channel' 24)--- were all accepted, they were
conceived in a micro rather than a macro context. For example, the competitive
tender for franchises had been a secondary issue within the report. In contrast, this
proposal stood at the core of the White Paper and the Act.'
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The government's acceptance of these reforms had several purposes.
They would allow for ITV's advertising monopoly to be dismantled, thereby reducing
advertising slot costs. This, the White Paper argued, would mean greater public
accountability by enhancing competition and ending the financial disparity between
BBC and ITV.' 26
 In turn, the 1990 Broadcasting Act's most radical
recommendations were saved for ITV's and Channel Four's financial structure. For
instance, the 'franchise auction' meant that the winning licensees' bids were annually
payable to the Exchequer. Therefore significant revenues were to removed from
broadcasting, thereby reducing resources. This had drastic implications for the
companies' returns and meant that programming costs and labour would have to be
streamlined to maintain profitability. This commercialization extended to Channel
Four which was simultaneously required to act as a public service broadcaster whilst
competing against ITV by selling its own advertising.
These recommendations were significantly modified to include a 'quality
hurdle' and an 'exceptional circumstances clause' (as they became subject to the
intense pressure of the ITV lobby' 27). Further Channel Four lobbied successfully to
have fourteen percent of its advertising revenues underpinned by the ITV
network.' 28
 However, these proposals demonstrated the Thatcher government's desire
to make the ITV network operate in a more commercial and 'efficient' mode.
Consequently, Peacock's notion of consumer sovereignty became a convenient
political metaphor for the government rather than something it actively pursued. The
legislation marked the introduction of commercial 'laissez-faire' practices over the
principles of market-liberalism.
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The most extreme confusion occurred when the policy attempted to tackle
the broadcasting regulators. Although the terminology of individual choice, range and
variety was employed, the White Paper and the Act marked the transition from
deregulation to re-regulation.' 29 Instead of the Peacock report's minimal regulation,
the legislation transformed the IBA in'o the Independent Television Commission (ITC)
which was responsible for the licensing of all commercial broadcasting services
including cable and satellite.'30
In some respects, the ITC's powers were circumscribed. The post-1993 JTC
could not intervene in the network's scheduling or demand educational or
informational programming. Instead, a vague clause impelled it to protect a wide
range of national services.' 3 ' The legal change from being a broadcasting authority
to a licensing commission created a post-hoc regulator, without pre-viewing powers,
which could only defend or impose sanctions on a programme after it had been
transmitted.' 32
 This also meant that it would no longer act as a legal buffer between
ITV companies and complainants over controversial programmes.'33
Against this, the 'light-touch' regulator was given interventionist
programming and financial powers. The ITC could employ its licensing powers
negatively to press for the appropriate scheduling and production of 'quality'
programmes. Therefore, as the ITC has the legal power to sanction or revoke a
franchise-holder, a degree of intervention is inevitable. These measures were designed
to promote the continuity of a public service element within the ITV system and were
reflective of the sector's lobbying, the greater amount of ministerial acquiescence and
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the overall change in political complexion by the late eighties.
However, network managing and scheduling power has been transferred to the
ITV Association (composed of the ITV companies). Programme commissioning has
also become the ITV Network Centre's responsibility. As Clare Muiholland, the ITC
Director of Programmes, has stated:
To a considerable extent the system will be one of self-regulation by the licensees
within a clear framework of obligations and codes of practice. The ITC will need to
have an effective information system to allow it to take prompt action when problems
arise. For their part the licensees will have to have their own internal procedures to
ensure that they meet the requirements and standards of their licence. It will be for the
licensees, for example, to make proper arrangements for the handling of complaints
from the public about programmes, scheduling, advertising and technical operation
standards. " '
This removal of responsibilities was pursued to dismantle a perceived
form of 'regulatory capture'. The IBA had been criticised for acting in the interests of
a cartel of the largest network contributors (Thames, London Weekend Television,
Granada, Central and Yorkshire). Yet, the Act replaced one form of central control
with another as the ITV Association, dominated by the major companies and
advertising interests, took over the commissioning process. The legislation did not
break-down networking power; rather it concentrated monopoly power over
regionalism.
The Act compounded an irony of the eighties legislative process, in
which a policy designed to encourage deregulation has produced more regulatory
bodies than before --- the BBC Governors, the ITC, the Broadcasting Standards
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Council (BSC) and the Radio Authority, alongside the consumer body the
Broadcasting Complaints Commission (BCC). Most notably, intervention was
enhanced through the BSC which was created to respond to the portrayal of sex and
violence on television.' 35
 The government had appointed Lord Rees Mogg to chair
the BSC in an attempt to sleight the broadcasters as he had been the BBC Board of
Governors' Vice-Chairman during the 'Real Lives' incident.' It was pitched that
(although these claims were exaggerated) the BSC might well take over from the
IBA.' 37
 However, the White Paper recuced the council's power by defining it as a
consumer complaints body without pre-viewing powers.' 38
 Despite its impotence,
this 'sex and violence' council conflicted with the Peacock report's notion of liberty
and may be seen to exemplify the repressive strain of Thatcherite politics.
The 1990 Act indicated an attempt to resolve the inherent ideological and
political tensions between market freedoms and the traditional forms of British
broadcasting's financial organi2ation and regulation. It signified a mediation between
political aims, social control and the broadcasters' interests. In some respects, its
recommendations were reflective of an alternative approach to broadcasting in which
the issues of 'choice' and 'competition' came before 'quality'. However, in contrast to
the Peacock report's market-liberal thinking, whereby a reconception of 'public
service' had been defined by concentrating on the relationship between the consumer
and the availability of 'public service' programmes, the policy-makers focused their
attention solely upon reforming the terrestrial broadcasting institutions.
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Thus, the 1990 Act may be seen as containing elements of continuity, change
and contradiction. Its purpose was to create a 'light-touch' regulator to supervise the
ITV network and to radically shake-up ITV through the competitive tendering of
franchises. This, it was hoped would satisfy the broadcasters who demanded some
element of continuity, the government ideologues pressurising for commercial reform
and the political interests of the state.
The legal reality has been rather different. The legislation made the ITC both
an interventionist and 'light-touch' regulator, it centralized the network arrangements
and the recommendations governing the 'franchise auction' were less market-driven
than might at first have been expected. Moreover, it is worth noting the physical size
of the Act which is reflective of a general truism about deregulation --- that it takes
several times the amount of effort to define deregulation in order for it to work. The
Act contains two-hundred and four sections compared to the 1981 Act's sixty-
five.'39
 Consequently, an incoherent, prescriptive Act emerged in which the conflicting
imperatives of accountability and liberalization became confused with normative
methods of control, political will and attempts to commercialize the system.'4°
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CONCLUSION
The political phase indicated the drift from the Peacock report's coherent
market-liberal ideology to a compromised and confused piece of legislation. It
demonstrated how the practicalities of the policy-making process comprising political
will, departmental jurisdiction, and negotiation with the broadcasters were equally, if
not more, important determinants than ideology in the eventual shaping of the Act.
Whilst the Peacock report was largely the work of market-liberals, the political phase
was dominated by a complicated series of overt and covert political motivations and
economic considerations. These include dissensions amongst the competing policy
networks comprising departments of state, advisors and politicians, the Prime
Minister and the Cabinet.
The government's political will was significantly influenced by the efforts of
the advertising lobby and the monopolism which pervaded the industry. The
advertisers, who had the ear of the Prime Minister through agencies such as Saatchi
and Saatchi (who had organised the Conservative Election campaigns in 1979, 1983
and 1987), felt that their interests had been undercut due to ITV's monopoly over
advertising slots. Effectively, they argued ITV could charge exorbitant prices and its
schedule did not account for advertising interests. The government's contempt was
exacerbated as it disliked the excessive profits which were being made by the ITV
companies, through their monopoly of advertising revenues. Moreover the levy was
essentially a taxation on profits which could be circumvented by re-investing revenues
back into production costs and labour agreements. It also felt that a form of cartelism
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had emerged in which there were industry insiders and outsiders. This had been
evidenced by the IBA's vetoing of Canton's attempt to buy Thames in 1986.
Whilst ITV went against the apparent aims of Thatcher's belief in competition
and efficiency, the principal motivation was political. After 'Real Lives' the BBC had
'put its house in order' and made overt noises about becoming more efficient, whilst
simultaneously seeking to limit the amount of political controversy. ITV, however,
found itself at the centre of a high-level political storm after 'Death on the Rock'. The
government's approach was deliberately heavy-handed and oppressive. The IBA's
reluctance to bow to political pressure clearly contributed to its own demise and
channelled the government's desire to reform a clearly monopolistic system.
The period was also characterized by a complicated development within the
legislative process as extensive lobbying occurred between those who wished to enter
the system and had been previously constrained, notably Michael Green's 'Canton',
and ITV backed lobbyists such as the 'Campaign for Quality in Broadcasting' who
pressured the government to compromise over key proposals. The change in the
government's political composition fui ther contributed to this process. Whilst, the first
half of the political phase was reflective of the institutional power of Margaret
Thatcher and her allies, the post-White Paper period was marked by a partial return to
a more consensual and pragmatic forn) of policy-making. In this respect, the
broadcasting policy process is reflective, in common with many other areas of British
policy, of a political fudge in which the acquiescence of a number of competing
interests overrides a coherent agenda for reform.
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However, British broadcasting policy may be differentiated from the general
policy compromises as it stood at the cusp of the Thatcherite desire to deregulate the
commercial sectors of the economy, whilst attempting greater state intervention in
regard to individual rights and civil liberties. This dichotomy operated upon two
levels; i) a highly articulated concern over the potential programming output with the
liberalization of the broadcasting market-place and ii) a more covert desire to retain, if
not enhance, governmental controls oer the flow of political communication. As a
consequence, the policy-making process is indicative of a central contradiction
between market freedoms, often referring more to short-term political will than to any
attempt to actually convert economic theories into concrete policies, and the strain of
repressive political control which Margaret Thatcher's government actively engaged in
vis-'a-vis broadcasting. This manufactured itself on a number of occasions --- the
'Real Lives' affair, 'Death on the Rock', Special Branch's seizure of the 'Zircon Spy
Satellite tapes' and the Douglas Hurd's blanket broadcasting ban on Sinn Fein.
Further, as the government considered the market-liberal ideas of
Peacock, Brittan, Jay or Veljanovski, it made conspicuous the control mechanisms
which had been established throughout broadcasting's history through incremental
understandings, self-censorship, institutional development, governing ideologies and
regulatory practice. In effect, the government, whilst being publicly accused by
broadcasters as perceiving it as 'no more than a can of beans' discovered that
broadcasting was indeed a socio-economic-political practice which had been
conditioned by political, national and cultural understandings. Previously, clearly
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identified parameters had been established in which broadcasting could exert its formal
independence. This was not a conscious practice, but had been aided by common
assumptions, backgrounds and interpretations of political liberty between the political
and broadcasting elites.
However, with the rather crude, overt methods employed by the government
and a political style augmented by vocal attacks and aggression, these normative
processes came increasingly under pressure. In turn, the Thatcher government found
itself in a rather more complicated position than it had anticipated as it desired market
reform but feared the political consequences of opening up the airwaves to a form a
riotous pluralism.
The White Paper and the Act signified an attempt to streamline the legislation
between deregulation, political control and tradition. However the joins remained
conspicuous. For instance, the ITC is meant to be a 'light-touch' regulator with
licensing responsibilities, yet, inspite of the removal of pre-viewing powers, the ITC
has a number of interventionary powers within programming as licences can be
withdrawn in this respect. Therefore, the government preferred to use the Peacock
report's recommendations selectively as they would force broadcasting to become
more market-driven, whilst simultaneously retaining political control over the system.
Moreover, the accompanying financial turmoil of the franchise auction could indirectly
temper the broadcasters' desire to enter into political controversies as they were in a
constant state of financial vulnerability. The ITC's legal status may be seen as further
evidence of a more hidden handed sense of control:
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the IBA was the legal broadcaster, it acted as a buffer between broadcasters and
(,political) pressures. Now that broadcasters will be legally responsible the companies
will have to cope with these pressures and a form of self-censorship could occur.
(The companies) are now legally responsible for the editorial content. The former
system had been their insurance to produce controversial programmes." 141
In purely political terms, the government's actions made sense as they meant that
political control could be maintained alongside increased commercialization. In
contrast to Peacock's long-term agenda for change, the government was therefore
substantially motivated by short-term political gain.
This policy did not indicate any overall coherent vision for broadcasting.
Instead, the process exhibited the government's preference for the expedience of
commercialization over ideology. To this end, commercialization became an end
rather than a means to an end. This proved to be a politically convenient option as it
satisfied the government ideologues by providing them with the political weaponry to
reform a perceived enemy. However, this usage of competitive practices also
demonstrated the political nature of a government which saw the market as acting as
the most efficient provider of resources rather than as a liberalizing force. In many
ways this harks back to the Conservatives' 1987 Election Manifesto pledge:
We shall follow a policy of more competition, variety and innovation in our
domestic networks and encourage the export of British programmes to international
audiences and markets. The development of the broadcasting industry will be allowed
to occur, wherever possible, commercially" 142
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Therefore in the New Spartanism of the Thatcherite government, state intervention
could be advanced with greater commercialization in spite of the fundamental
contradiction between libertarianism and authoritarianism it revealed. The
contradiction between free-market choice, both in economic and political libertarian
terms, as presented by broadcasting deregulation and the government's desire to
restrict the flow of political communication is summed up by Samuel Brittan:
"The selective way in which the Government picked up specific proposals from the
Report, while failing to accept its basic import, was unpromising. To the extent that
the Government endorsed some Peacock recommendations it is the letter that was
accepted, and the spirit that was rejected."'43
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CHAPTER SIX: THE COMMERCIALIZATION OF BROADCASTING
The third (part of the policy cycle) is the operational phase, which puts the
legislation into effect. In practice, the legislation has said very little about what a new
TV channel, for example, will carry; not only a programming policy and the crucial
financial details still need to be decided, but many institutional/organizational details
have to be worked out from scratch because they were little considered in the several
previous years of 'debate'. SI'
It is the purpose of this, and the following, chapter to determine how the
policies, which were arrived at through a legislative process characterised by
mediation, negotiation, compromise and ideological incoherence, have been
implemented during the early stages of the operational phase. To investigate this
procedure I have organized my analysis into the following thematic terms; a
discussion of the reform of the broadcasting industry's financial structure and an
assessment of 'light touch' regulation.
This chapter will analyze, explain and assess how the legislation has
affected broadcasting's financial structure. Tom Nossiter has argued that British
broadcasting had been previously characterised by three major tenets ---centralization,
control and circumscribed competition. 2
 Through these terms he refers to a nationally
scheduled and universally networked broadcasting system (despite the in-built
regionalism of the ITV network), supervision by hands-on regulatory bodies and
duopolistic competition which "is at once both keen (for professional reputation) and
circumscribed (to the extent that sources of revenue are distinct)." 3 The 1990
Broadcasting Act has contributed to a climate of greater competitive fluidity within the
broadcasting market-place by attempting to dismantle these three key principles. In
1988, the BBC had its licence fee pegged to the Retail Price Index (RPI) and due to
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the 1990 legislation both the BBC and ITV companies have been required to
incorporate a twenty-five percent quota of independent productions. 4 The ITV
network has also been subject to a franchise auction and Channel Four began to sell
its own advertising airtime in 1993. Further, the private expansion of satellite and
cable channels was enhanced by the removal of legal rules, through minimal financial
regulation and lax rulings on cross-ow.iership.6
Therefore, it may appear, with the respective changes inaugurated by the Act,
that in the area of broadcasting finance, the reality has started to conform with the
1986 Peacock report's envisaged form of economic competitiveness. 7
 However, it
should be remembered that a distinction exists between these financial alterations and
the report's recommendations for the significant political reform of the system
fostered by economic change. Whilst, the legislation was motivated by a variety of
political pressures, it has ended up as an effective means to commercialize the semi-
public service ITV and Channel Four system. The ITV companies have been forced to
maximize audiences for greater advertising revenues and have had their finances
squeezed as they will have to pay an annual levy to the Treasury calculated from the
size of the tender and a percentage of their profits. 8 Moreover, they predict that they
will be competing for viewers against the subscription based satellite channels whose
audience share will dramatically increase by the end of the 1990s. This chapter will
therefore consider how the conditions of the commercial broadcasting market have
developed in respect to the legislation and how the ITV network has responded.
Moreover this commercialization process has had an indirect effect on the BBC as:
British broadcasting has a delicate balance and that if you change one element in it
you affect the others."9
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The BBC occupies a peculiar position within the policy-making cycle under
investigation in my thesis. Whilst, tensions between the BBC and the Thatcher
government led to the creation of the Peacock report, throughout the course of the
post-Peacock legislative process the C( rporation was largely left alone and the
government's focus (and its hostility) was transferred to the commercial sector.'° The
resulting 1988 White Paper and the 1990 Act did not produce any formal, legal
changes to the corporation itself. Indeed the White Paper, which was received with
outrage from the rest of the broadcasting community, acknowledged the government's
acceptance of the BBC as the national Public Service broadcaster stating that it "is
still, and will remain for the foreseeable future, the cornerstone of British
broadcasting." The 1990 legislation contains no reference to the BBC beyond
requiring it to air independent productions for 25% of its output.' 2 However, the
BBC has been forced to respond to the commercialized broadcasting environment in
which it has to operate, most especially due to the imperative of Charter renewal.
Therefore significant internal financial alterations have occurred in a more covert,
defacto manner. The BBC has been subjected to a number of forces which I intend to
delineate.
This chapter will consider the nature of broadcasting's financial system during
the early period of the operational phase. It will outline the trends which have started
to emerge throughout this period and will discuss the extent to which the system may
be characterised by change or continuity in respect to broadcasting's principal actors
and the strategies which have governed their actions. Further, it will address whether
the financial reform of the system may be equated with greater political compliance or
liberty.
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6:1. THE COMMERCIALIZATION OF BRITISH BROADCASTING
For the Peacock Report the sinultaneous expansion of channels provided for
by the new distribution technologies and the dismantling of the comfortable duopoly
would allow for a greater number of players within broadcasting. It envisaged a
broadcasting market composed of small scale independent production companies.
These would be reflective of greater plurality in the system as they would be
representative of different, political voices and would be lightly regulated. However,
in the subsequent political phase of the policy process, the concept of a free market of
providers was effectively replaced by a political commitment to commercialize ITV,
while the new media were left to be privately expanded. This led to a number of
Peacock's recommendations being abandoned or having less effect than the committee
had anticipated.
The Peacock report also envisaged that the BBC would be substantially
reformed as an institution as its licence fee funding would be systematically reduced
and finally withdrawn. However, as I have shown, the BBC proved too resilient and
continued to operate as the public service broadcaster throughout the late eighties and
early nineties. It remained assured of its position, whilst other sectors were questioned
and altered. In particular, the principal changes to the players in broadcasting,
resulting from the fall out of the commercial and legislative developments, have
affected the satellite sector with the creation of B-Sky-B and ITV. Therefore, how has
the commercialization process affected the balance of forces in these areas of British
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broadcasting ?
6:1.1 THE BSB-SKY 'MERGER'
Peacock envisaged that the creation of a publicly, invested national cable grid
would facilitate market conditions in British broadcasting. In the event, this proposal
was dismissed by the DTI and cable, which attracted such attention during the early-
to-mid-eighties, proved to be something of a disappointment as a mass delivery
service. In contrast to any national development, cable was only promoted at a local
level and it was the responsibility of the cable operators to negotiate with local
authorities or boroughs in laying the cable itself. This has lead to anomalies as
residents living in the same Street which is serviced in adjoining boroughs may or may
not find that they have been cabled.' 3
 Moreover, the costs of laying the lines has
made it unfeasible to service rural areas. Finally, the entertainment led development
of cable was struck a decisive blow when Nigel Lawson removed the favourable
taxation on cable operators in his 1985 budget.'4 Therefore, throughout the latter half
of the eighties the picture for cable became confused as it was left to the private
market.
The Conservative government' minimalist new media policy similarly left the
development of Direct Broadcasting by Satellite (DBS) channels to the market-place.
The DTI had backed the private development of the satellite channels and had hoped
that British Satellite Broadcasting (BSB), who had won the IBA regulated DBS
franchise in 1986, would succeed in creating revenue both in terms of dish sales and
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subscription.' 5
 However, the unforeseen technological development of domestic
equipment to receive signals from the medium powered Astra satellite, the
introduction of Rupert Murdoch's Sky Television as a competitor broadcasting from
Luxembourg, a general recession, poor management and the crippling costs of the D-
MAC system led to the company being described as "one of the great commercial
disasters in British history, and certai, ly in the history of the British media" I6
BSB's financial problems finally led its shareholders, without the knowledge of the
company's management, to negotiate a merger with Murdoch and the creation of B-
Sky-B. '
The most popular account of the merger, propagated by Peter Chippindale
and Suzanne Franks' in their detailed, journalistic book Dished: The Rise and Fall of
British Satellite Broadcasting', has tended to focus upon the two different management
strategies that were pursued by the respective organizations. ' Chippindale and
Franks compare BSB's proI(y spending against Rupert Murdoch's leanly funded
Sky TV. BSB's management failings were legion and the company was extravagantly
run with debts that eventually totalled £ 1 billion.' 9
 Although it has been admitted
that BSB had to cope with the expensive and untried D-Mac technology, the company
was commonly portrayed as being ineffective and inefficient.20 For example, it was
housed in an inappropriate complex entitled the Marco-Polo building in Battersea.
Further Chippindale and Franks note that there were overpaid officials, employees
with high expense accounts, strategic errors such as the overbidding for Hollywood
films and the appointment of inappropriate personnel including the Chief-Executive
Anthony Simonds-Gooding. 2 ' Sirnonds-Gooding has been subject to a vast amount of
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criticism:
BSB's cumulative losses had amounted to over £1 billion by the time shareholders
decided to merge with Rupert Murdoch's Sky Television. But it wasn't the
shareholders --- including Pearson, Reed, Granada, and the French company,
Chargeurs --- who took most of the flak for the monumental corporate catastrophe.
Critics in the press and industry were , and still are convinced that the management
botched it from the start. In management the buck stops with the chief executive.
Simonds-Gooding was a marked man." 22
Finally, the BSB management fatally underestimated the strength and resolve of
the opposition.
Conversely, Rupert Murdoch has been perceived as achieving the
correct balance between financing, programming and most crucially timing. Murdoch
offset the enormous expenses incurred by satellite by using restrictive budgets for Sky
TV. He did this by; employing as few staff as possible, keeping this staff non-
unionised, locating the company in cheap premises in Isleworth, cost cutting when
necessary, importing and producing cheap programmes and using the cheaper Astra
satellite technology. 23 Moreover he appointed Australian television executives with
proven track-records and fearsome reputations.24 Most importantly, Murdoch was
able to establish Sky and make it operational some eighteen months before the
competition and consequently develop an audience through dish sales. In this
respect he was able to make a deal with Amstrad tycoon Alan Sugar who had a
reputation for the manufacture of cheap electronic goods.26
From this position the eventual merger between the companies was a case of
one company failing and another succeeding. Whilst this managerial failure analysis is
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useful and has dominated popular thinking, it only elliptically refers to other equally
important factors that also combined to produce this situation. It does not attempt to
place the merger within the wider pol i cy, legal and regulatory context that has
accompanied the technological development of the new media. The general
broadcasting policy dilemma between a maintenance of state intervention and the
imperatives of market-forces was particularly focused upon satellite broadcasting. The
inability of politicians, policy-makers, regulators and media actors to reconcile these
two contradictory objectives in a satisfactory manner contributed to the creation of a
situation in which the merger was not only feasible but became the only financially
expedient option.
BSB was massively disadvantaged as it was saddled with the high-powered D-
Mac franchise which forced it to invest in the new High-Definition technology? The
extraordinary costs of DBS, most especially on the D-Mac services, meant that
shareholders had become nervous and even Murdoch's News International
conglomerate suffered. 28 This was allied to the general grip of an unforeseen
recession that contributed to the generally low sales of satellite receivers and the
problems of overcoming the likely public resistance to investing High Definition
Television (HDTV) receivers. 29 Similarly, BSB was regulated by the IBA and its
remit forced it to occupy a semi-public service role. 3° Moreover, it had been
initially conceived as the sole satellite broadcaster and as such had been protected by
national rules. 3 ' However as Steven Barnett, Media Consultant for the Henley Centre
of Forecasting, comments:
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Pitched unexpectedly into a satellite battle, (it) found itself saddled with an untried
and complicated transmission system which became an unwelcome millstone. Devised
to be nurtured in a satellite television monopoly, it was not appropriate in a fight for
survival."32
In such a situation the opportunities for a new satellite broadcasting venture,
which employed restrictively expensive technology, to challenge the dominance of the
traditional terrestrial broadcasters would appear to have been minimal, even if it had
remained the sole monopoly. BSB's problems were compounded as it was placed in a
falsely competitive situation. 33 This occurred with the launch of Sky in 1988 on the
cheaper, inferior Astra PAL satellite. Further, the IBA was unable to control this
channel, as it was not legally bound to conform to the regulator's rules, public service
norms or any particular set of technical or working practices. The government, which
had been partially caught out and was already pre-disposed to Murdoch, argued
that it could not intervene as Astra was a non-domestic satellite channel. 35 In reality,
the two companies were under a totally different set of rules. This discrepancy was
not lost on BSB:
As it staggered on the air, BSB campaigned hard to pressure the government to
bring Sky under the regulations of the pending Broadcasting Bill. ... The
legislation did not include broadcasts from medium-power satellites such as Astra.
BSB pushed hard to have this loophole closed. But the government, anxious not to
damage Murdoch, asserted that since Sky came from a Luxembourg satellite, using
frequencies not allocated by the British government, and a technology which could
provide essentially unlimited channels, it was not subject to the spectrum scarcity
argument which had required the previous restrictions. This was obviously not so, if
only Sky's headquarters and studios were in Britain. As BSB pointed out, public
policy was constantly challenged by new technology; legislation had to be changed to
preserve the long-established principles limiting cross-media interests."36
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Whilst, the government had publicly declared that the satellite channels would
encourage competition within broadcasting and remained unaware of the negotiations
between BSB and Sky, it had effectively allowed for the monopolization of these
channels by the merger of BSB and Sky in November 1990 and the creation of Rupert
Murdoch's B-Sky-B. The merger between BSB and Sky only really existed at the level
of ownership. 37 Although BSB's backcrs retained influence as shareholders, it should
be remembered that Murdoch became the majority shareholder. Further, at the
management and production level the situation most resembled a 'take-over'. Almost
all of the BSB's key management personnel were removed and the majority of the
BSB staff were promptly djsmjssed. 38 Moreover all of the company's operations
were relocated to Sky's base at Isleworth and any form of unionisation was dispensed
with.
The ramifications of this merger for the British broadcasting economy are
only beginning to make themselves apparent. They include: the failure of a nationally
co-ordinated satellite broadcasting monopoly on the allocated D-Mac Direct
Broadcasting by Satellite (DBS) television channels with the collapse of BSB; the
concentration of cross-media ownership in Britain in the hands of Rupert Murdoch's
News International PLC; the failure of national legal rulings to stem such a form of
concentration; an unregulated private satellite broadcasting monopoly in the shape of
British-Sky-Broadcasting (B-Sky-B) on the inferior PAL Astra telecommunications
satellite channels and a major set-back (if not the demise) for the highly touted D-Mac
DBS technology with major implications for the manufacturers of the High Definition
by Television (HDTV) receiver units. Sky's access to the market through subscription
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will undoubtedly impact upon the rest of the commercial broadcasting sector.
Moreover, it is reflective of general internationalizing of media ownership as the top
five European media companies (Finnivest, Bertelsmann, News International, Hachette
and Havas) have all invested in either terrestrial, cable or satellite channels throughout
the eighties. This has meant they have been able to diversify from their traditional
bases of the press, publishing and advertising39:
"For many of these companies ... (multi-media concerns) ... television has been a
secondary rather than primary interest: of the largest players most bought their way
into television later rather than developing their other media interests from a television
base."4°
The merger has enabled a monopoly satellite broadcasting service to emerge.
This broadcaster is not subject to any national legal or regulatory rulings in relation to
programme output and cross-ownership rules. The principles of B-Sky-B have been
blatantly commercial and it has a determined aim to increase its audience share by
employing populist programming through gaining exclusive rights to American
imports, Hollywood films and sport. The commercialization process within satellite
broadcasting, in the main, has been directed through the market rather than the direct
provisions of the 1990 Act. However, it was clear throughout the political
development of the policy, that the Thatcher government was closely allied to Rupert
Murdoch and directed its attention away from intervention within this sector.
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6:1.2 THE ITV FRANCHISE AUCTIQN
Conversely, the changes wc4 have affected ITV have been drawn directly out
of the Broadcasting Act 1990. At the end of the political phase, a common feeling
existed within ITV that the 1990 Act had proved to be the best of 'bad job'. 4 ' The
most destructive elements of a franchise auction had been displaced by a number of
compromise measures which could still potentially damage the system. Moreover, the
ITC, the ITV Association and the pressure group the Campaign for Quality
Broadcasting felt they had been successful in preserving key features within the
system and stemming outright commercialism. 42 Subsequently, the ITC had to
interpret the legislation, set out the guidelines for the possible applicants and supervise
the competitive tendering for franchises.
On the 15th February 1991 the ITC issued prospective bidders with an
Invitation to Apply for Regional Chan,,el 3 Licences by the 15th May 199	 This
document outlined the ITC's interpretation of legislative measures governing the
franchise auction. The applicants were required to submit a programme plan and
business plan (based upon the prospective advertising within the region) as well as a
sealed bid. These plans were then subjected to the quality threshold. 45 If the
application was deemed to be untenable by the regulator's criteria, it would fail. Only
after the application had passed this stage could the size of the bid be considered. This
process took five months and the ITC's deliberations were made available to the
potential franchisees on the 16th October 1991.46 They were as follows:
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Table 5. The Franchise winners
AREA
LONDON WEEKDAY
LONDON WEEKEND
BREAKFAST TV
MIDLANDS
YORKSHIRE
NORTH WEST
NORTH EAST
BORDERS
SCOTLAND CENTRAL
NORTH OF SCOTLAND
NORTHERN IRELAND
WALES AND WEST
SOUTH WEST
SOUTH AND SOUTH
EAST
EAST OF ENGLAND
CHANNEL ISLANDS
WINNER
CARLTON TV
LONDON WEEKEND
SUNRISE
CENTRAL TV
YORKSHIRE TV
GRANADA TV
TYNE TEES
BORDER
SCOTTISH TV
GRAMPIAN
ULSTER TV
HTV
WESTCOUNTRY TV
MERIDIAN
ANGLIA TV
CHANNEL TV
BID
£43. 17m p.a.
£7.585m p.a.
£34.61m p.a.
£2000 p.a.
£37.7m p.a.
£9m p.a.
£15.057m p.a.
£52, 000 p.a.
£2000 p.a.
£720, 000 p.a.
£1.027m p.a.
£20.53m p.a.
£7.815m p.a.
£36.523m p.a.
£17.804 m
£1000 p.a
In the event the ITC decided to avoid any invocation of the 'Exceptional
Circumstance's Clause' preferring to rule out potential bidders under the quality
barrier or due to the highest bid. 48 Such a ruling clearly provided the Commission
with the possibility of being subject to Judicial Review and therefore it decided to
avoid it altogether.49 This meant that potential rivals to established companies such as
Granada's opponent North-West Television were ruled out in terms of the quality of
their programming and business plans rather than the size of their bid. In this respect,
Granada had successfully gambled 
onAmaller 
bid than their opponents.5°
The procedure produced several notable victims. They included Thames
Television, who held the most-prized London weekday contract and was the largest
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network contributor. Thames passed the quality threshold but was out-bid by
Michael Green's Canton. Thames had been seen as the most vulnerable franchise as it
had attracted the strongest rivals (led by Green and Richard Branson respectively) and
due to its parent company Thorn's financial instability. 52 It also meant that Green
had finally fulfilled his wish to own an ITV franchise after he had attempted to buy
Thames in 1986 but had been stopped by the IBA. 53 Conspiracy theorists also argued
that Thames lost its franchise due to its production of the infamous television
documentary 'Death on the Rock' which had attracted so much governmental wrath in
1988 and had clearly strengthened Margaret Thatcher's resolve to reform the
commercial system.TM
Two smaller companies, the trubled Television South (TVS) and Television
Southwest (TSW), lost their franchises to Meridian Television and WestCountry
Television respectively as they were deemed to have overbid in relation to the
potential advertising revenue for their regions. 55 Again, these areas had attracted
outstanding interest as they had been rich providers of advertising revenue. The
heaviest irony was the defeat of the Thatcherite flagship TV-AM led by Bruce
Gyngell, who had defeated the broadcasting unions in a year-long dispute in 1988, by
Good Morning Television (GMTV). 56 This led to the bizarre spectacle of a
spectacular volte-face by the ex-Prime Minister herself, when Gyngell famously read
out a private letter to the press:
I am only too painfully aware that I was responsible for the legislation. ... When I
see some of the other licences have been awarded I am mystjfied that you did not
receive yours and heart-broken. You of all people have done so much for the whole of
television --- there seems to be no attention to that."
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Of the four companies, only Thames continues to play a role in the new
system as a considerably slimmed down production company responsible for popular
series such as 'Minder' and 'The Bill'. Thames has also negotiated with the BBC to
make its considerable programme library available for the satellite station 'UK Gold'.
Many within the industry felt that the ITC, led by Chairman George Russell,
had managed to act as effectively as possible. 59 It was argued that the Commission
had skilfully stemmed the flow of revenue going directly to the Exchequer's coffers
by effectively employing the 'quality threshold' and by penalising companies who
drastically overbid such as TVS and TSW.6° Conversely, it may also be stated that
the Commission let through too many high bidders who may face increasing problems
associated with the current recession within advertising and the potential growth of
subscription in the following years.6'
The auction also provided the ITV companies and their rivals with an almost
impossible task as they had effectively to gamble their futures upon advertising
revenue projections over the following ten years. The companies could make educated
guesses by considering the nature of opposition and the current relative size of the
advertising within the region. However a number of imponderables existed such as the
possible future effects of the recession upon advertising budgets and the predicted
increase in subscription services within the new media channels.
Inspite of these variables and inconsistencies, by October 1991 the players and
the rules of the game within both the subscription funded satellite sector and the
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advertising based ITV network had been established. Certain actors had been lost,
whilst new actors (most notably Michael Green's Carlton Communications) had been
established in the ITV sector.
6:2. THE EMERGING BROADCASTING ECOLOGY
Consequently, either through direct policy or through the more hidden-handed
imperatives of political clientelism and business failure, the duopolistic system has
been broken down. In the wake of these reforms, three main categories of actors have
emerged; a satellite monopoly; a more commercially dominated ITV sector and the
public service broadcaster represented in part by Channel Four and mainly by the
BBC. As Steven Barnett commented:
Recently, David Mellor said to Barry Cox that the PSB will survive. Cox said, that
you're destroying the tradition of the PSB. Mellor responded that only Channel 3 will
have to go down the path of commercialism, and the BBC and Channel Four will
remain. ITV will do what it wants. W'iat is forgotten, is the need for a sense of
balance in the broadcasting ecology."62
Therefore, it is my purpose to consider what trends have emerged in respect to the
broadcasting ecology by discussing how the 1990 Act's commercialization of services
has affected the organizational processes through which British broadcasting has
developed during a formative period. In this respect, I will be concerned with both
macro developments within the ITV sector as new companies, relationships,
commissioning processes and practices emerged and micro developments in the
production base of the BBC, most especially with the initiative of Producer Choice.
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Before any detailed discussion of the changes starting to affect the duopoly, it
will be necessary to briefly comment n B-Sky-B. Throughout the first three years of
its existence B-Sky-B ran at a tremendous loss and Murdoch's News International
empire has demonstrated signs of being overstretched. Murdoch had to sell a
considerable number of his magazine titles and his international interests nearly
collapsed as his debts mounted. 63 However, a small profit has been made recently
and B-Sky-B's monopoly means that it will be able to increasingly challenge the
terrestrial broadcasters. It may well become a more important player as the situation
in broadcasting throughout the nineties becomes more volatile after the ITV franchise
auction winners take their place and have to contribute their annual payments to the
Treasury. Further, the renewal of the BBC Charter and the possibility of the
Corporation being once again faced by the spectre of taking in advertising may also
mean that a maturing satellite monopoly may well have an influential role to play in
the shaping of the broadcasting system. A great deal of this speculation depends upon
how the satellite market develops and the extent to which the public will take-up these
new channels. Moreover it is unclear what delivery system will present B-Sky-B with
its greatest access to the public as urban areas are steadily being cabled and B-Sky-B
has been shown via this technology, in tandem with the mass manufacturing of
satellite dishes. However, in its favour the de-listing of national sporting events and its
ability to show recently released cinema features has meant that B-Sky-B has started to
bid exclusively for popular programmes and attract audiences through these
incentives.
B-Sky-B's financial strategy has been built upon winning a critical mass of
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subscribers, retaining the audience's loyalty and increasing the subscriptions from
existing owners incrementally on an annual basis. Harold Lind has compared this
strategy with the unsuccessful attempt by the French channel La Cinq which attempted
to increase its share of the audience by investing in the dead-labour expenditure of
dish sales. 65 This led to the financial ruin of the company. He argues that B-Sky-B
will follow the example of the other French new media station Canal Plus.M Instead
of attempting to penetrate the audience, Canal Plus preferred to rely on the vast
profits drawn from subscription. 67 This was why the decision was taken by B-Sky-B
to make dish owners pay an additional £5.99 a month for the Sports channel from
September 1992.68 As Steven Barnett, commented in an interview conducted for this
thesis:
The subscription market only needs a total of 15-20% of the audience and a regular
monthly fee from each dish owner of £25-30. Subscription television achieves a
critical mass, at which point it becomes incredibly profitable. (In this respect)
revenues can be increased without increasing cost-base. People will be willing to pay
for sports and movie channels, and for channels which have sole rights. Multi-channel
television will only be taken up in a few households, as the general public is not all
that interested in television. However, through subscription huge profits can be made
and these channels can buy rights to increasingly expensive sports and movies. "
6:2.1 A BREAKING DOWN OF TH VERTICALLY INTEGRATED
BROADCASTING SYSTEM: THE COMMERCIALIZATION OF ITV
As a consequence of the legislation and the franchise auction, the ITV
network has been subject to massive incremental re-organization. The process of a
partial competitive tendering for regional franchises left areas of the ITV system in
disarray as some companies successfuity gambled upon small bids, whilst others were
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forced to heighten the stakes against what they perceived as dangerous competitors.
This resulted in a haphazard series of financial alterations as some franchises were
desired because of their ability to attract advertising and others were left
unchallenged. The auction destabilised commercial broadcasting finances.
The ITV network's response to this cycle of events has been to harden its
competitive outlook. The restructuring of the network schedule has been interpreted
by the companies as mechanism for centralizing control. This has been apparent
within the ITV's reading of the ITC's networking documents. 7° Through these
arrangements a number of features have become conspicuous. Firstly, the already
minimal regional autonomy within the ITV network has been sacrificed as alternative
central control structures have been enhanced. For instance, all licensees are required
to sit on the ITV Association Council which is responsible for determining overall
policy. 7 ' Secondly, there has been the creation of the ITV Network Centre
management headed by Andrew Quinn, former Chief Executive of Granada and now
Chief ITV Scheduler, and Marcus Plantin, former LWT director of programmes.72
This is responsible for the commissioning and scheduling of all programmes upon the
commercial channel. Formally, both independents and franchise-holders will have
equal access to this body. In practice it would appear to be a mechanism through
which de facto power might be wielded by the largest companies (Granada, London
Weekend, Central, Carlton) and will be re4 nforced in order to increase their profits
in the new climate. 73 As the emphasis will be upon retaining and increasing profits,
it would appear unlikely that the Network Centre will attempt to commission from
new, untried talent and would be inclined to secure ratings winners.
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As the scheduling power has been passed on from the regulator to the
companies' central organization, which has fewer public service requirements placed
upon it by the Act, the new network management has made it clear that it will pursue
aggressive strategies in order to increase audiences and attract advertisers. 74 There
have been a number of indications of this new perspective. The ITV network has
informed advertisers that it will be able to exploit its newly found freedoms. On the
30th September 1992, Quinn and Plantin stated their intentions to one thousand top
advertisers. 75 Their ideas comprised of extending the runs of popular dramas,
revamping the news and increasing the number of comedies and sports programmes:
Advertisers were told that ITV would place more emphasis on "proven audience
winners"; would target programmes more carefully at suitable audiences and require
programmes to attract high ratings if they are to keep peak slots. "This is the
beginning of ITV marketing itself properly, " Mr Quinn said. "It means a closer
relationship with advertisers and stronger branding and marketing of ITV."76
Their analysis had obvious ramifications for ITV's news organisation,
Independent Television News (ITN), and for current affairs programmes which are
expensive and do not provide large audiences. These programmes will not be given
the same status as before and increased pressure will be placed upon re-scheduling the
news so that audiences will be maximized to attract advertisers. One previously
sacrosanct scheduling area had been religious broadcasting. In the past, all the
regional broadcasters had to schedule religious programmes in 'God-slot' between six
and seven o'clock on a Sunday evening. This had been a constant source of
resentment for a number of the companies and the advertisers who felt that they had
both lost a vast sum of potential revenue. Under the new system ITV's religious
programme Highway was replaced with The Family Action Movie.
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Another clear demonstration of this new attitude referred to the Independent
television programming rights and repeat sales for the next fifteen years. In this
respect, the companies have colluded by stemming any sales of their repeat
programmes to other British broadcasting organizations, notably B-Sky-B which runs a
'Comedy Channel' consisting of repeated situation comedies. There remains
considerable amount of bad feeling between the commercial and satellite broadcasting
sectors which may be summed up by Greg Dyke's statement on the publication of
these agreements:
"We are very anxious to avoid having our own programmes played back against us,
as happened to the major American networks."78
These structural and procedural changes have been accompanied by the
development of new company business plans and attitudes within the commercial
sector. The new franchisees, in particular Carlton TV, are imbued with a different
raison d'etre from their predecessors. First, they are broadcasting publishers rather
than programme-makers and inevitably have a different outlook in terms of resource
management. Canton's main concern is to commission programmes rather than
provide a whole schedule of self-produced shows. This fits into the ethos of Michael
Green who made his fortune in the television facilities market and has branched out
intO broadcasting production as part of a wider corporate strategy. 79
 It also
demonstrates the impact of the twenty-five percent independent production quota upon
the companies' thinking and the break-down of a vertically integrated system.
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Secondly, their choice of personnel is indicative of wider changes within the
commercial sector's ethos. Canton's Director of Programming Paul Jackson belongs
to a different generation of broadcaster who holds no loyalty to ITV traditions.
Jackson has often publicly argued for an increase in popular productions, the
rescheduling of current affairs programming and a more commercial outlook.80
Similarly, another power player, former London Weekend (LWT) Chief Executive
and ITV Association Chairman Greg Dyke belongs to this new generation
broadcasters. Thus, the system's established broadcasting elite, represented by
individuals such as the ousted Chief Executive of Granada David Plowright, may be
seen to be in a state of relative decline.8'
Moreover due to the conditions of the auction, the successful ITV companies
are having to divert sizeable resources into the Exchequer and have therefore been
subject to cost-cutting. A large amount of the companies's annual revenue is to be
taken directly out of the system which sees an annual percentage of profits, depending
upon the respective size of the regional advertising, plus the auction bids going into
the Treasury's coffers. For example, the London Weekday provider Canton will have
to pay out an estimated £67 million per annum.82
This has led to all franchisees streamlining their internal organisations and
cutting staffing levels. This has gone hand-in-hand with changing industrial
arrangements and the collapse of trade union power. The broadcasting industry has
been substantially altered by the increase in independent producers and independent
facilities companies. Thus, the compa-'ies have begun to centralize their production
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bases into metropolitan areas to reduce costs. Further, the 1990 Act allowed the
companies to reduce their staffing levels as there was no recommendation for
franchise-holders to retain an in-house production base. 83 As former LWT Chief
Executive Greg Dyke has commented:
"The biggest change and the reason that most ITV have been able to survive the
recession as well as they have, ... has been the collapse of the trade union movement
and therefore the enormous loss of jobs and the restructuring of the industry. Now
that was partly brought about by the a'iction itself. The threat of the auction meant
that you had to go into the auction as efficient as anyone going against you. We are
now down 650 staff and we started off at 1400 four years ago. That has freed up
television in some ways with the end c,f the old union restrictive practices."
Broadcasting, as with other industries, has been subject to the general decline in
union power and, in particular, the dispute at TV-AM which acted as a test-case and
resulted in the removal of large number of the technicians. 85 This has meant that
broadcasting labour has increasingly been subjected to restrictions within its
contractual tenure, the decline of union power, a large number of redundancies and
greater casualization of working practices. Market forces, which have been employed
to restructure broadcasting, are dictating the labour market. As Tony Lennon,
President of BECTU, comments:
"Whether the broadcasting bill was framed with this in mind, it has certainly
achieved the desired results (whereby) an industry that was once dominated by the
union closed shop is now characterized by almost a majority of people in (the
independent sector) working on a casi'al basis."6
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This pressure has been exacerbated by the new franchise-holders, such as
Canton, who run their companies more 'efficiently' by employing fewer staff,
contracting out to independent producers and making fewer network programmes. The
following table taken from Broadcast indicates the reduction in staff created by the
introduction of the new franchise-holders compared to their predecessors:
Table 6. ITV Staff Numbers
STAFF NUMBERS
October 1991
Thames	 1400
TVS
	
800
TV-am	 399
TSW	 293
Total
	
2892
January 1993
Carlton	 360
Meridian	 322
GMTV/Visnews	 190
Westcountry	 112
Total
	
984 87
Consequently, the ITV system has been subject to extensive change due to the
legislation and it has responded in kind. The Franchise Auction has meant that I1'V
has become more commercial and is now responding directly to the wishes of the
advertisers. There has been a loosening of ITC's regulatory controls in relation to the
financial organisation of ITV and comDetition will inevitably increase as the demand
will be to maximise their audience share, thereby enhancing advertising revenue, in
order to survive in a tougher market-place. The companies also argue that their
audience share will decrease as subscrption based services gain a stronger foothold
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and are determined to augment their profits in the short-term. In addition, they face
competition from Channel Four which has been legislated to sell its own advertising.
However, due to the special needs of C4 the companies are required to contribute to a
seventeen percent of revenues safety net to protect the channel. 88
 This has led to the
ironic situation in which the companies have been forced to finance a direct
competitor.
After 1994, the ITV regions will also be legally subject to the possibility of
takeover bids. 89
 The companies who overbid for their regions, such as Yorkshire and
Tyne Tees, have proved to be casualties and their future over the following years may
prove to be precarious. 90
 The potential exists for increasing amount of corporate
power within the ITV system. For example, Michael Green's Canton already has
sizeable stakes in several of the regional franchise-holders and may be in a position to
expand his media empire. However, c"ie to the ownership rulings another danger
comes from abroad as national take-overs are restricted but international ones will be
allowed. Therefore, global media conglomerates, including Silvio Berlusconi's
Finnivest could be allowed to gain entry into ITV.
Simultaneously, there has been a loosening of the interventionist regulation
that demanded that the ITV companies were responsible for conforming to the tenets
of Public Service Broadcasting. Clearly the Public Service concept will be contested
within the more commercial environment which has begun to emerge within ITV as a
result of the franchise auction. The ITC has fewer interventionist powers and may be
increasingly constrained to the role of a licensing body.9' The companies are
351
principally concerned with maximisin their profits in order to pay their assigned
annual rate into the Exchequer and to gear themselves up for the potential increase in
subscription. This commercialization appears to have provided the foundation for
greater corporate power within ITV by enhancing centralisation and the potential for
greater monopolisation.
Thus, the ITV sector has in many ways become more accountable to
advertisers, media conglomerates and the City. Whilst, the Independent Production
companies do have greater access to air-time, the franchise auction has not in anyway
set out the framework for greater freedom of entry for new broadcasters or alternative
voices, rather it has indicated that ITV is exhibiting a transition from one form of
monopolistic control to another form of cartelism.
6:2.2 THE BREAKING DOWN OF THE VERTICALLY INTEGRATED SYSTEM
IN THE PUBLIC SERVICE SECTOR: THE EFFECT OF COMMERCIALIZATION
ON THE BBC
In this commercial environment, the BBC may be seen as facing a number of
problems. Principally, its funding, through the licence fee remains a vexed issue due
to its supposed unpopularity amongst the population, its reduction in real terms and
the ideological mandates it places upon the BBC as the public broadcaster.
On the one hand, John Reith's arguments for public service broadcasting were
sustained by the licence fee. Effectively it provided the BBC with the resources to
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fulfil its remit as an educative, regional and world body, as well as an entertainment
broadcaster. The BBC's attitude has remained that the licence fee remains the most
effective funding method. 92
 Towyn Mason, Deputy Secretary of the BBC, argues that
"in terms of value for money, the licence fee should be compared with satellite
subscription ... (it) is the cheapest way of funding." 93
 Against this, the BBC
governors and management remain mindful that they are operating in a post-
Thatcherite environment in which competitive economic policies are still being
pursued by the Major government. Concurrently, the corporation, along with ITV, is
losing its air-waves monopoly because of the increase in new media channels.
The strains on the BBC have increased as it has been required to maintain its
public service duties against a backdrop of economic and technological change. By the
end of the decade, it predicted a reduction in its audience share to approximately 25 %
as subscription services proliferate. Therefore, the traditional justification for the
licence fee, founded upon the universality of programme services and audience use, is
likely to become problematic. The BBC's position within the increasingly commercial
broadcasting environment and the imç rative of the 1996 BBC Charter renewal has
led the corporation's governors and managements to follow a number of proposals.
Therefore, the BBC began to promote a series of institutional reforms and
programming strategies which will enable it to become a specialized 'public service
broadcaster'. Further, to demonstrate to the government that it is pursuing radical
policies to promote efficiency the BBC has responded by reforming its internal
financial organization --- the resource management strategy entitled Producer Choice.
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Throughout this transitional period tensions within the BBC have emerged (not
least due to the policy clash between outgoing Director-General Michael Checkland
and his successor John Birt) as the institution is inexorably tied to the British public
through its image, internal conception, finance and position within the political arena.
It is therefore necessary to investigate this strategy, determining its origins and
understand why it has been chosen. A study of this financial reform reveals that the•
ramifications of altering an institution of the BBC's size and status within broadcasting
and British society are immense.
6:2.3 PRODUCER CHOICE
From April 1st 1993, BBC producers were required to choose between tenders
from BBC resource departments and from external independent facilities houses.
Previously, programme budgets were determined in relation to resources rather than
in 'real money'. The producer would be informed that s/he could have 'x' amount of
man-hours for shooting and post-production time. The system was based upon
direction rather than money. This has been replaced by a reform which can show the
amount of money that has been invested in a programme. In addition, the programme-
makers will have to break even and have cost targets placed upon them. Effectively
the BBC has switched from a command economy, in which the licence fee money
entered the corporation to be divested from the centre to each resource department, to
a public service free-market, in which centrally allocated money is directed to the
main areas of the BBC's programming output such as BBC1, BBC2 and BBC radio.
The following diagram indicates the flow of resources:
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'Producer Choice' means that the money, previously held in the resources
section, has been re-directed to the programming areas. The channel controllers will
receive an annual budget to determine the funding for the main eleven programming
areas (for instance, sport, drama, light entertainment). These sums are to be agreed
upon, through negotiation between the channel controllers and the heads of
departments, eighteen months in advance of the programming year.
Throughout this period the channel controllers will decide on the type of
programming they require, commission the programmes from the departments and
will allot the programming and departmental budgets. For instance, the Head of
Drama could be given £200 million pounds to develop and produce the number of
hours of programmes which have been specified by the channel controller.
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Next in the chain of command are the heads of department. They are
responsible for assigning budgets for each individual programme. These budgets are to
be given to the producers in real cash figures rather than shooting periods or post-
production facility hours. The producer can compare and contrast BBC resources, in
terms of prices and quality, against those within the external market (although
independent producers are restricted to using outside facilities houses). In such a
fashion, s/he will determine whether the programme may be made by BBC or
independent crews providing that the head of department approves.
A form of competitive tendering exists in which production houses may trade
with the producer by demonstrating their work and providing desirable costs. There
are three forms of draft contracts for the producer; an internal contract, an external
contract and a free-lance contract. The first part of the contract outlines general
conditions, whilst part two specifies the responsibilities between programme-maker
and contractor in terms of scope, deadlines and standards. This latter part also
indicates how the contractor should be paid. In theory, the producer will be in an
autonomous position to determine the trade-off between programme's budget and
artistic qualities.95
However, the producers' freedoms are qualified as they must remain
within the budgets as the department will be constituted as a business unit. This
business unit is required to break even, otherwise, as the 'Producer Choice'
documentation ominously comments (italics added):
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If a business unit fails to break even, a managerial assessment will be necessary.
The aim will be to analyze the cause of the problem and to tackle it. Break-even
would be expected the following year."
Therefore, the producer is under pressure to bring the programme in on
budget as any overspending will result in cuts elsewhere in the department.
These changes have been contingent upon the semi-privatization of BBC
resources facilities. These departments have calculated their prices in regard to the
external facilities and offer to sell their resources to the individual producer. To this
end, they have been set up as mini-businesses and are expected to conform to the
same break-even targets. They are also subject to overheads including property and
capital charges.
The three tenets of 'Producer Choice' are described in the internal
documentation as organizational decentralization, financial transparency allowing for
external comparisons and operational reform enabling a mixed economy (based upon
in-house and external activities) to support the corporation's public service purposes.
As a form of resource management, 'Producer Choice' may be compared to the
changes which have occurred within education and the National Health Service. As
Jonathan Rooper commented:
" You can give a simple answer how its going to work, it's going to be an internal
market. Theoretically, efficient resources get used and inefficient resources don't get
used. It will mean that the BBC will have fewer of its own resources and buys in
more.
357
6:2.4 THE ORIGINS AND INSTITUTIONAL SIGNIFICANCE OF PRODUCER
CHOICE
The origins of 'Producer Choice' lie in a number of financial initiatives,
alterations in managerial organization and shifts within corporate ideology that have
developed throughout the BBC during the mid-to-late-eighties. First, through an inter-
related mixture of economic instability and political necessity, the BBC has started to
conform to the external pressures of the broadcasting market-place. Secondly, the
BBC has been subject to fundamental transformations within its managerial structure
and personnel.
Due to the licence fee's reduction and the decline in new colour licence fee
holders, which had previously insulated the broadcasting economy, the BBC has faced
severe financial pressures since the early eighties. However, the catalyst for the
desired efficiency drive, resulting in 'Producer Choice' proved to be two-fold --- the
introduction of a 25% quota for Independent programmes and the 1996 Charter
debate.
The 1990 Act ensured that the BBC would be forced to incorporate
independent programmes. The BBC management took this as a sign to alter the
internal organisation arguing that cuts would have to occur. This argument has a
degree of truth, yet it has been met with the criticism that the 25% figure is
misleading as qualifications exist. For instance, the quota's calculation does not take
into account the output of major departments such as 'News and Current Affairs' or
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repeats. The BBC has been able to remove a sizable number of broadcasting hours
from this equation.
The renewal of the Royal Charter and the management's desire to retain the
licence fee as the BBC's principal funding source has defined corporate thinking. The
BBC argues that as it is a distinctive public service broadcaster, advertising,
subscription and sponsorship remain unviable due to market failures and ethical
considerations. From this position, the BBC conducted a major review of resources
through the establishment of fifteen Task Forces in 1991. Their reports were sent to
an overall steering committee who assessed the BBC's viability as follows; function,
speciality, preservation and civilised behaviour. This steering committee was
responsible for arriving at the 'Producer Choice' policy from these and other internal
reports.
The willingness of the BBC's management to conform to the new financial
imperatives is significant. If their attitudes are compared to the actions of their
predecessors, a marked divergence is apparent. The Reithian tradition, in spite of
developments such as 'professionalism', had previously imbued the thinking of
management and governors. The traditional perception remained that the BBC was " a
jolly fine show".' This resulted in a situation in which public service functions
have occupied the rationale of decision-makers over the profit motive. The BBC's
finances were organized through direction rather than business practice.
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Conversely, the 1996 Charter renewal was taken as a sign to pursue major
economic and structural reforms within the BBC. Towyn Mason summed up the
present thinking when he stated:
"There is no conflict in principle between using efficient market strategies for
efficiency and providing the best use of the licence fee. The economic pressures have
increased and the BBC needs to respond."10'
In several respects, the policy choices represented by 'Producer Choice'
betray the working methods of its creators and indicate the significance of their
appointments within an altered set of internal power relations. On the management
side, the two key actors were the outgoing Director General Michael Checkland and
his successor (previously Deputy Director-General) John Birt.
Checkland's accountancy background directed his approach and he made it
clear that he wanted a smaller BBC".'°2
 Checkland's background within the BBC
as an accountant rather than a programme-maker (he was promoted from Senior
Assistant in the Cost Department to Director of Resources, Television in 1982 before
reaching the top management posts) was according to Philip Schlesinger:
(symbolic of) a new phase of corporate development. In common with other media
organizations having to devise strategies to deal with the current transformations of
the global communications market, the BBC needs to elaborate a new combination of
cultural purpose and economic entrepreneurship."°3
However, Checkland remained resolutely a 'BBC' man. He was criticized as a
'money man', yet rose within the corporation through the traditional pattern of
internal promotion and patronage. This dictated his approach and also contributed to
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the severe internal crisis which affected the BBC management during the last year of
his reign.
John Birt has employed a seemingly 'logical' strategic form of thinking
throughout his years in broadcasting. A key factor to Birt's managerial style, or
'Birtism', has been his diligent and painstaldng meticulousness in identifying a
problem, analyzing its causes and determining conclusions based on his own particular
form of reasoning.'
In contrast to Checkland, Birt was an outsider to the BBC. He failed to gain
entrance as a BBC trainee and began his broadcasting career at Granada, eventually
rising to London Weekend Television (LWT) Director of Programmes. His senior
appointment at the BBC in 1987 went against the corporation's tradition. Historically,
all chief executives had risen through the ranks. Birt was, and has remained,
resolutely an outsider, who was rooted in ITV conventions and was brought into
temper the 'News' and 'Current Affairs' department.
'Birtism' has been criticized by those within the organization. In the 'News
and Current Affairs Directorate' he tightened the control mechanism of 'referring up'.
It has been noted that Birt has a messianic style of reasoning and has used his position
to insulate himself from any criticisms. Birt is seen to have a clear mission for the
BBC and to have attained the power to realize his aims. In turn, this form of control
has had implications for the corporation's overall managerial structure through a
selective appointment process and a greater centralization in the 'Corporate Affairs'
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division in which the policy and planning offices have assumed an ever-increasing
importance.
In their responses, Checkland and Birt employed the techniques which have,
accompanied them throughout their respective careers. They considered a variety of
solutions ( for example, the Task Force reports and the Resources Review) through
which to resolve and pursue the strategy of 'Producer Choice'.
Thus, within the internal summary for the policy headed 'Value for Money'
they identified the problems comprising financial qualifications, the possibilities of
political intransigence from a new government and a new governmental department
responsible for broadcasting headed by a traditional 'One-Nation' Tory Peter Brooke
'°, and fundamental structural alterations in the broadcasting market-place. It
comments:
The underlying policy aim is to make the BBC's Value for Money evident and
demonstrable - prior to the main public debate on the renewal of the BBC's Charter.
"The BBC wishes the public debate about its future role to concentrate on its
programme purposes ... there will be a real, and important debate about the
distinctive public purposes which the BBC should pursue; and about the range and
volume of the different programme services.
Producer Choice, on the other hand, is about the means of realising public service
broadcasting purposes, and this distinction between means and ends is important in the
BBC's relationship with its public."
According to this mechanistic logic it would appear the 'Producer Choice' is but
one part of the larger jigsaw of this approach to managing the BBC.
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Therefore the BBC management's 'new realism' has been influenced by the
composition of its chief personnel. A key factor within this process was the selection
of Marmaduke Hussey as the Chairman of the Board of Governors. Hussey's
appointment was undoubtedly political and was indicative of the Thatcher
government's usage of the patronage process. 107
Hussey reorganized the relationship between the governors and the
management. His appointment occurred in the aftermath of 'Real Lives' --- the nadir
of governmental-BBC relations. In response to Margaret Thatcher's aim that the 'BBC
should put its house in order', Hussey pursued an interventionist form of managerial
control. His first major action was to sack the then Director-General Alasdair Mime.
This served to cement his position as Milne proved to be the last example of the
authoritarian 'Reithian' manager. Checkland, to his own chagrin, never achieved the
control over the board that other Director-Generals, notably Hugh Greene, had
enjoyed.
The source of power within the BBC has been divested in the Board of
Governors and, most especially the chair (and to a lesser extent vice-chair), in terms
of overall strategy and policy. Hussey has remained an interventionist manager with a
distinct vision of how the BBC should be run.
Therefore, the strategy of 'Producer Choice' arose as a number of the
normative dynamics have been undermined. The changes within managerial attitudes
are reflective of influential structural alterations within the institution, of the
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governmental and internal appointment processes, and fundamental shifts in the
negotiation of power relationships between board and management.
6:2.5 PRODUCER CHOICE AND MANAGERIAL DIVISION
The evolution of 'Producer Choice' has occurred within a context of
managerial confusion and acrimony. The reasons behind these problems are not so
much rooted in the reform itself, but are to be found in the overall conclusions and
the pace involved in the application of this policy. They are indicative of a breakdown
in the managerial structure as the trends within the circles of influence have hardened.
Whilst Birt has been popularly ascribed with the development of 'Producer
Choice', there is some doubt over who is exactly responsible for the genesis of this
policy. Undoubtedly, Birt has made a significant contribution towards the policy by
decisively channelling the project and increasing its pace. It was his difference in the
reform's emphasis and speed, against Checkland, which proved to be indicative of a
severe breakdown within the management and the enhancement of a process which
may be described as the 'Birtian revolution'.'09
This further manufactured itself as a profound disagreement over the wider
changes, of which 'Producer Choice' was a part, heralded for the BBC as a
broadcaster."° Whilst Checkland publicly supported the proposed financial and
programming changes, he privately differed with Birt not only over the pace of these
alterations, but also in their intent. Checkland believed that the BBC should have
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remained a broad based public service broadcaster providing a wide number of
services including popular entertainment against Birt's notion of a specialized public
broadcaster providing distinctive programming against the market.
Since Checkland's departure, the BBC's future has been clearer. Birt's vision
was defined in Extending Choice and comprised; i) news and information across a
wide number of national outlets, ii) the evolution of British based culture and
entertainment, iii) the maintenance of the Corporation's educational output and iv) the
interchange of ideas between Britain and abroad.' 1 ' Within this remit, the report
made it clear that the BBC will have to "limit and define" its specific public service
role and indicated that it should be a 'distinct' public service broadcaster offering high
quality programmes in each programming genre. There is an obvious compromise
clause, that one might speculate is the work of Checkland, which states:
"To go down (the) route (of specialization) ... would be to force publicly funded
broadcasting in Britain into the kind of "cultural ghetto" approach which has so
weakened the broadcasting system in the United States, Australia and elsewhere."112
Conversely, Birt's approach is apparent in a key sentence, which sets the tone more
clearly. The report states:
"The BBC will need to withdraw from areas in which it is no longer able or needed
to make an original contribution."3
In terms of power relations, Birt was allied to Hussey in his championing of
'Producer Choice' and his view of a specialized public service broadcaster. Hussey,
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alongside Birt, has been described as a man with a 'Thatcherite vision' who is
determined to fashion the BBC into the likeness of private business enterprise."4
These problems in developing policy were heightened by Hussey's insistence
to appoint Birt as designate Director-General without interviewing any other
candidates. His appointment, with Checkland remaining the official DG for a year to
appease some board members, created an interregnum period in which a power
struggle occurred. The result has been that the charter renewal strategy was contested
by two director-generals, with distinctly different views of the future. Birt was clearly
in the ascendency as his plans were finally accepted by the governors and conformed
to Hussey's wishes. Indeed, some less charitable accounts suggested that Hussey
created a managerial power vacuum so that he could assume the chief executive
role."5
 However, this period of corporate development has left the BBC staff fearing
that irreconcilable splits will mark the outcome of any form of policy."6
Checkland's beleaguered position as a 'lame-duck' Director-General" 7 was
accompanied by the emergence of a number of distinct groups within the management.
Checkland retained the sympathy of an 'old guard' who had risen through the
corporation and owed their loyalty towards it. The pre-eminence of this section of the
broadcasting elite, however, was challenged by Birt's use of the appointment system
to sustain his position and to insulate himself from direct criticism. In programming
areas, in particular 'News and Current Affairs', Birt's allies have gained a secure
foothold such as Glywyn Benson (the Editor of 'Panorama') and Samir Shah.
Further, the Producer Choice initiative was headed by Birt's ally Michael Starks."8
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As a coda, it should be noted that there was a certain irony in Checkland's
position. Checkland, who broke the mould by appointing the outsider Birt and a
number of other outsiders in key posts, ended up in a beleaguered position. As Tony
Lennon comments:
(Checkland) has been hoist by his own petard. ... Checkland now finds that (his
position has been undermined) as an old BBC man, as 'one of the chaps', (as he is)
surrounded by all these new people who have no loyalty to the organization and who
are actually in the majority when it comes to circles of influence. So (he) ****ed it up
by his own progressive strategy in my view!"9
6:2.6 THE IMPLICATIONS OF PRODUCER CHOICE
'Producer Choice' is reflective of a particular managerial response to the
perceived problems facing the BBC. It was designed to justify, through the
implementation of market style practices, the public funding of the licence fee.
Therefore, the policy has both an economic and political set of ramifications.
It represents a fundamental change within the corporation's financial structure
which has implications for programme-making, staffing and public service
broadcasting during the nineties. This vision can be drawn from Birt's foreword to the
internal 'Producer Choice' documentation:
"The BBC's core underlying values - its commitment to high quality programmes; to
craft excellence; to training and to other good employer practice remain unchanged.
Producer Choice will create increased opportunities for initiative, matched by
greater responsibilities; and it will reduce administrative costs and structures.
As a result a higher proportion of the licence fee will be spent on programmes.
There will be all-round benefit - for our viewers and listeners as well as for our
programme	 120
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Superficially, according to these lines, 'Producer Choice' will be a strategic
change to the working relations that already exist. Birt is careful to employ a patrician
tone which stresses that the BBC will maintain its traditional programme quality. The
logic would seemingly indicate that this financial reform will provide the framework
through which future funding battles could be fought.
The reality is not that simple. 'Producer Choice' is not just a form of resource
management, and, even if it was, could not be conceived as a rejigging of the figures.
The BBC's financial reform cannot be viewed in isolation, as the implications of such
a change are vast and may not only impinge upon the production process but could
also encompass institutional re-orientation within the BBC. Therefore, the policy has
been designed to substantively alter the corporation's ethos. The aims of the 'Producer
Choice' are made explicit by Birt:
"We are introducing new ways of working - and striving for a more streamlined
BBC, offering increased value for money. The period up to April 1993 - and
probably the year beyond - will be a challenge for us all. I am confident that we can
make a success of it - that the outcome will be a leaner, more devolved BBC.
"... So the innovation currently taking place goes much wider than the new Producer
Choice relationship between programme-makers and production resources. The BBC
as a whole is undergoing a transformation, carrying further processes initiated in the
late 1980s."'2'
The broadcasting unions argue that this will produce fundamental changes to
the characteristics of the BBC labour force. They maintain that it has placed
impossible responsibilities upon the resources sections by transforming them into
business units. In theory, these units are required to compete with outside production
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houses. In practice, there are a number of hidden factors which could undermine their
competitiveness. The resources sections will have a number of dead labour costs
placed on them such as accommodation rents and equipment hire. Further, they have
to prove that they can continue to break-even to BBC accountants and develop a
business plan that illustrates that they conform to market principles. BECTU maintains
that the only way that the resources sections will be able to conform to these rulings is
by squeezing labour and estimate that six thousand jobs may be under threat.'
Therefore, the labour force may become massively casualized throughout the
whole of broadcasting, creating a cheaper labour pool for the independent sector. This
could possibly spiral as independent facilities could place pressure upon the already
beleaguered BBC resource areas by under-cutting their labour costs. This development
may be exacerbated as producers have to balance their corporate loyalty against the
realities of programming costs. Many other commentators feel that the BBC's craft-
base will be systematically undermined as full-time workers, whose talents are only
employed on particular productions (such as special effects), cannot be justified under
'Producer Choice's business criterion. From this perspective, it would appear that the
future viability of the resources section is in doubt.
There are also ramifications for the BBC as a public service broadcaster.
Birt's philosophy appears to be that the BBC is a broadcaster radiating public service
programmes, rather than being in itself a public service broadcasting institution. This
marks a sea-change in corporate thinking and parallels the 1986 Peacock report's
concept of public service broadcasting being measured in the programming output,
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instead of being vested within the corporation's aims, values and management.'"
In a political sense, 'Producer Choice' has been developed to placate
government and stem intervention. The BBC management has interpreted the charter
debate as a period in which it can show its efficiency in order to retain an increasingly
pressurised licence fee:
First, the BBC can demonstrate to politicians the costs of an individual
programme. Previously, this had been a problem, as programmes were made using
'in-house' resources and within overall programming budgets, leaving the BBC
vulnerable to criticisms aimed at its extravagance. Secondly, it enables the corporation
to argue that, through the competitive use of public funds, it is accountable to its
audience. To this end, it is as important for the BBC to be seen to be acting as
actually implementing such a policy.'24
'Producer Choice' represents an axiomatic change within the financial
structuring of the BBC which has fundamental implications for programme-making,
staffing and, more crucially, the role of public broadcasting during the nineties.
The strategy has emerged out of a series of managerial changes, policy responses and
alterations within the dynamics of corporate power. The BBC has become dominated
by political interest through the legacy of Thatcherism as the principal actors (Birt,
Hussey, Barnett) owed their positions directly or indirectly to the former government.
It is also indicated the extent to which these reforms were developed in a climate of
clandestine managerial secrecy. This policy-making process has become dictated by a
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cabal of like-minded managers and governors who believe that market-led strategies
will appease the political elite. Their policies have been dictated by particular
approaches to the broadcasting market and an understanding that the BBC should
adapt in a specific, commercial manner to build up new allies.
6:3. COMPETITION BETWEEN SATELLITE. COMMERCIAL AND PUBLIC
TERRESTRIAL CHANNELS: THE 1992 FOOTBALL DEAL
An early indication of the possible direction of broadcasting finance in the
nineties occurred on the 18th May 1992 when it was announced that a deal had been
negotiated between the Football Association (FA) and a consortium consisting of the
BBC and B-Sky-B to televise the new FA Premier League. The five-year deal for
£304 million proved to be one of the most expensive within the history of televised
sport. It was also one of the most controversial contracts in the history of the game
and broadcasting. The B-Sky-B/BBC deal had usurped the apparently agreed figure of
£200 million between the ITV network and the Premier League. It was surrounded by
accusations from the chief ITV negotiator Greg Dyke that he had been betrayed by the
Premier League Chief Executive Rick Parry, that the ITV network had been snubbed
and that underhand procedures between B-Sky-B and the football league chairmen had
been pursued:
the controversy over British sport's biggest television deal continued last night
with ITV demanding to know how details of it's last minute bid were leaked to B-Sky-
B, enabling the satellite broadcaster to trump it, why they were not allowed to make
a counter offer, and why they were not given the opportunity to make a formal
presentation. '.125
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The background to the deal is indicative of a byzantine process in which a
number of conflicts and contradictions abound. It represented a victory for B-Sky-B
Chief Executive Sam Chishoim, who had presented the FA with a lucrative package
that could secure the future of the satellite station. It also appeared that Greg Dyke
had been forced, to paraphrase that old sporting metaphor, to snatch defeat from the
jaws of victory ! Dyke had apparently been confident that ITV's increased bid would
ensure the continuous live coverage of football upon the terrestrial channel. However
during a last minute round of bloodletting, he was to discover that ITV's offer had
been undermined and that the FA was advising the clubs to accept the B-Sky-B deal.
The deal appeared to be symptomatic of the increased convergence of capital
within the football industry.' 26 For instance, a key player during these negotiations
was Alan Sugar who had an apparent conflict of interest. Sugar was not only the
financial power behind Tottenham Hotspur plc but was also the electronics
entrepreneur who owned the Astra satellite dish manufacturer Amstrad.IV
Consequently, he was heavily criticised by ITV for his scheming (a charge he claimed
he would take legal action to repudiate) and received prominent coverage within the
press:
A bitter row over the contract broke out on Thursday when it was revealed that
Alan Sugar, chairman of Tottenham Hotspur plc and Amstrad, the princifl4( makers of
satellite dishes for B-Sky-B, spoke to B-Sky-B about a late bid submitted oy ITV to
league. The satellite company promptly trumped ITV's offer to win. Mr Sugar said B-
Sky-B knew of the ITV bid before he telephoned them."28
The ITV companies promptly pursued the FA through the courts. They
claimed a breach of contract and argued that Rupert Murdoch should be taken to the
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'Monopolies and Merger's Commission'. However, ITV failed to win an injunction
which might freeze the deal. Moreover, PA chairman Rick Parry remained
unrepentant. He informed the High Court that even if ITV could submit an increased
offer it would have to compensate the Premier League for the lost revenue from pay-
per-view subscriptions that had been incorporated into the B-Sky-B contract.' 29 After
this inevitable public spectacle, the controversy waned and the deal between the PA,
B-Sky-B and the BBC remained intact.
The deal meant the live Premier League football matches could only be
viewed through subscription' 30 . The contract also reflected and cemented a series of
major changes in broadcasting's financial relations. First, it demonstrated how sport
has increasingly become the forum for competition within broadcasting. The football
deal followed on from the controversy over the cricket World Cup when B-Sky-B
refused to provide the terrestrial channels with any pictures of the event. In addition,
there are a number of clear economic imperatives governing the satellite broadcaster's
logic. Sports programming has remained relatively cheap in terms of rights and
production costs. To programme an hour's worth of sport currently stands at a figure
of approximately £30, 000.131 Moreover, crews rarely have to be transported abroad
and the event's predictability means that costly production delays can be avoided.
Sporting occasions are clearly time-tabled throughout the year and generate a
substantial amount of free publicity through the press.' 32 Televised sport has also
traditionally generated large viewing figures. Throughout the year key sporting events
including the FA Cup Final, Wimbledon and the Grand National attract mass
audiences.' 33 The repeal of these occasions 'listed sport's events in the 1990 Act has
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also encouraged this development. '
The deal was reflective of B-Sky-B's commercial ethos and its strategy for
future development. It demonstrated that B-Sky-B's principal aim was to maximize its
profits and to pursue the most commercial course it could. It was popularly reported
as being illustrative of new approaches within broadcasting deal-making. These cut-
throat strategies were previously in evidence during the infamous merger between Sky
and BSB, and have been exercised throughout Rupert Murdoch's period as a press
magnate. Such a 'wheeler-dealing' style of management appears to be personified by
B-Sky-B Chief Executive Sam Chisholm. The newspaper and trade journals were
resplendent with footballi ng similes:
"For Chishoim, it is a double victory. Not only will dish sales be boosted but it has
dealt a blow to ITV's image as a brand leader in commercial television. This bolsters
his ambition to take commercial television's throne, currently occupied by ITV centre-
forward Dyke."35
Thus, on one level, the channel has been understood to have benefitted from its ability
to undermine the ITV companies, its leadership in football coverage and the prowess
of its corporate affairs.
The deal has also made conspicuous the financial strategy that the company
intends to employ in order to become a recognisable power. Instead of attempting to
pursue an increased number of dish sales, which could prove to be a problematic
fiscal vortex, greater focus has been placed upon increasing the level of subscription
from existing dish owners. Moreover as Harold Lind comments:
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"The expenditure of hundreds of millions of pounds for the rights to show leading
soccer matches for the next five years would make no economic sense for B-Sky-B
unless matches are put out in encrypted form on a premium channel. However many
dishes might be sold by a " free 1' football channel, the total potential market will
remain only a fraction of what ITV could offer the advertiser ... by showing the
football from the start on a subscription channel, the number of extra sales required to
make massive payments economically may well be achievable."36
For ITV the deal was reflective of its attempt to adjust itself into a more
commercial environment. ITV's negotiating team was led by the Greg Dyke, former
Head of Sport and Chief Executive at LWT. Dyke has been one of the most
outspoken spokesmen for advocating greater commercial change within the
system.' 37 For Dyke and ITV the failure to make a deal with the FA provided a major
strategic blow as the exclusive rights to Sunday afternoon football would have
significantly increased advertising revenues and enhanced the view that ITV was the
market-leader in the provider of national sport.
In particular, the football deal represents an example, amongst many, by the
BBC to attempt to adapt to the commercialism which has started to characterise the
relations in the rest of British broadcasting. There was a degree of indignation that the
Public Service broadcaster should have entered into an alliance with a competitor
whose majority owner, Rupert Murdoch, has been perceived as standing for a
commercially driven ethos which is diametrically opposed to the BBC's Reithian
principles. For some commentators, the BBC had entered into a 'Faustian' contract
with Murdoch:
When Auntie takes tea these days, she sups with the devil. Or at least it seems that
when the BBC announces a new deal in association with News International, whose
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Sky TV is the antithesis of public service broadcasting. ... Rupert Murdoch is not, by
any stretch of the imagination, on the side of the angels."38
However, the deal had many attractions for the BBC as it enabled it to
provide national coverage of the national game. The corporation had been starved of
all league football due to the 1988 ITV contract with the Football League for £44
million. The BBC was left to pick up the FA Cup, which proved a successful venture,
but was left feeling that it had been out priced and manoeuvred by ITV.'39
Previously, the BBC had been proud of its sports coverage and it felt that its former
leadership was being undermined. Indeed, traditionally BBC sports coverage had been
more prestigious combining technical expertise, sporting contacts, greater resources,
long-term exclusive contracts and sense of national duty.' 4° Garry Whannel
comments:
When ITV was launched in 1955, one major advantage the BBC had was its high
level of cultural prestige. In its tradition of broadcasting major sport events, it had
turned these events into national occasions in a new sense. The Boat Race, the Grand
National, The Cup Final and the Derby had become shared national rituals, extended
by broadcasting to a much wider public. The BBC was therefore a central part of the
apparent importance of these events."4'
Therefore as Steven Barnett has noted the absence of league football:
from BBC screens could not be shrugged off as a minor irritation. While ITV's
first season of exclusive coverage (1988-89) produced the most sensational climax in
the first division's history (Liverpool 0, Arsenal 2), the BBC could not even offer a
few consolation pictures. Its annual sport centre-piece, Sport's Personality of the Year,
was reduced to a single dismissive sentence to acknowledge the league championship
winners before moving swiftly on."42
The B-Sky-B deal could stem Corporate impotence and re-establish the BBC's image
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as the chief sports channel. Therefore, in some respects, it could be argued the BBC
entered into the deal so it could take revenge upon Greg Dyke's previous negotiation
for all league soccer games. Indeed Jonathan Rooper (Head of the BBC Secretariat)
commented that this went back to an earlier 'Snatch of the Day':
ITV make a lot of noise about it now, but you must remember that it was Michael
Grade, when he was at LWT, who really opened this whole thing up on football. And
ITV people forget that ITV has been keeping 'Match of the Day' off television for
four or five years now. s1143
The deal, however, was not simply pursued in terms of revenge. The
competitive broadcasting environment had affected thinking within the BBC. At a high
level, it saw the ITV network as its chief rival in the short-term due to competition
for viewing figures and audience share. From this perspective, the deal had a market
logic for the BBC. The BBC managed to attain the sole rights for covering Premier
League football upon terrestrial television by investing a far smaller amount of capital
than could have been imagined in a direct head-to-head competition for rights with
ITV. It could not have marshalled up or justified the resources against the bid for
£200 million offered by the ITV network. This meant that the BBC has effectively
regained an extremely popular programme --- 'Match of the Day' --- at a nominal fee.
Whilst B-Sky-B has the rights to live games, the potential viewing share for edited
highlights upon terrestrial television remained desirable. At the moment, and perhaps
for the foreseeable future, the terrestrial audience for broadcasting continues to be the
largest in British broadcasting. This means ITV's rating will be reduced and the BBC
will gain in the short-term.
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Finally, the deal indicated the willingness of the BBC management to
accommodate the satellite broadcaster. The governors and management believed that it
would be better to treat B-Sky-B as an ally rather than an enemy. Some commentators
have cited BBC Chairman Marmaduke Hussey's role and his possible conflict of
interest as a former director of The Times owned by Rupert Murdoch's 'News
International"'. In this respect, the evidence whilst strong has not been entirely
damning. The BBC's own comments upon its role probably summarize its position
most accurately. Jonathan Rooper felt that the deal is indicative of a future trend in
which alliances will develop between different sets of broadcasting actors:
Once you have competitive tenders, you can't complain if people behave
competitively."45
Consequently, the deal was reflective of relationship which had formed in the business
environment of News International (Hussey and Murdoch), the dismantling of the
duopoly and the accompanying changes to the ideologies within broadcasting. It went
against the cultural traditions of history of televized sport and the British broadcasting
system.' There will be a more flexible broadcasting market-place in which it will
be necessary to oblige the increasingly powerful satellite monopoly.' 47 This was
indicative of the BBC's understanding of its position within the broadcasting market
which was made clear in the 1992 Extending Choice document:
"It is clear, therefore, that the broadcasting market of the 1990s will continue - and
probably accelerate - the transformation of supply and demand that began in the
1980s. New technology and regulatory changes will further expand the number of
channels available to viewers and listeners. Commercial priorities and objectives will
become increasingly prominent in the broadcasting market-place."48
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Fundamentally, the deal was reflective of and has further contributed to
structural alterations within the broadcasting industry. It demonstrated how the
legislation had contributed to the commercialization of broadcasting's finances. The
traditional norms of the broadcasting environment have been substantially altered. In
this respect, it would appear that the comfortable duopoly, which Peacock had argued
had rigged the market-place, has started to be dismantled. Therefore, it could, to
some extent, be posited that a more competitive market has been realised.
Broadcasting finances are more fluid and the public, commercial and satellite sectors
are responding to this imperative. Effectively, new deals and linkages have begun to
arise in a more fluid, commercial environment.
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CONCLUSION
Throughout the first two years of the Act's implementation a number of
significant developments have occurred. As satellite technology opened up the
broadcasting market, it attracted Rupert Murdoch to seek an entry into British
broadcasting throughout the eighties. Murdoch's eventual monopolistic position within
this area resulted as much from the failure of the government, partiy through accident
and partly through design, to place effective cross-ownership regulations upon his
media position as the more obvious failure of BSB. In effect, an inequitable situation
emerged in which BSB was placed under national regulations and was saddled with
the expensive D-MAC technology whilst Sky could circumvent national regulations by
employing the Luxembourg based Astra Satellite, which was considerably cheaper to
broadcast from.
The 'merger' and subsequent creation of a monopolistic satellite broadcaster,
B-Sky-B, indicates that a subscription based system will become increasingly
influential throughout the following decade. B-Sky-B has no satellite broadcasting rival
and, from its position of dominance, appears to be increasingly able to compete
directly with the ITV companies as evidenced by the deal for the coverage of the
Premier League. As subscription increases (either through dish sales or the more
probable strategy of building up critical mass of subscribers and then increasing
charges for various 'exclusive packages'), both the ITV network and the BBC will
have to respond to the new environment.
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In respect to the ITV network, the 1990 Act has already forced the
commercial sector to considerably re-think its purpose by restructuring the companies'
finances through a franchise auction, forcing these companies to pay an annual sum to
the Treasury, competing with Channel Four for advertising whilst impelling the
companies to contribute to a safety net should the channel's finances be adversely
effected, re-organizing the network commissioning and scheduling process and largely
removing any public service regulation over the programme output. The response by
the ITV companies has been to commercialize their operations, centralize their
organizational structure, streamline the labour force and become increasingly
advertising led in programme output and network scheduling. It remains to be seen
whether the twenty-five percent quota for independent producers will provide greater
access for new talent or if the Network Centre commissions largely from independent
production companies composed of tried and tested broadcasters. As Greg Dyke
comments (italics added):
"The system must be fair and be seen to be fair. It must also be effective. ... We
want the best most cost, effective commercial schedule to compete in the new era of
television. n149
Further, the desire for ensuring profitability in a climate of uncertainty created
by the possible growth of subscription and the recession's effect on the amount of
advertising revenue available would seem to indicate that the ITV companies will
pursue strategies to protect their interests by producing popular programming. This
may well affect the production, corn missioning and scheduling of 'News and Current
Affairs' documentaries. The more commercial climate calls for a maximization of
audiences, however, the scheduling barrier of the 'News at Ten' and the peak time
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scheduling of documentary programmes such as 'World in Action' would appear to
stand in the way of this imperative. Clearly, there will be an increasing pressure by
the 1TV Association to force the Network Centre to replace these programmes with
ones which attract large audiences. This may lead to greater number of consumer
affairs programmes such as Central's Cook Report, or abandoning of investigative
journalism as it is costly, attracts smaller audiences and may force the companies into
expensive legal battles.' 5° John Fairley, programme controller at Yorkshire
Television anticipated:
" The amount and placing of current affairs shows in the peak-time schedule will be
the main change post-1993 ... One half-hour show perhaps, but it won't be at 8:30
like This Week or World in Action."5'
The ITV companies have also to fend off possible hostile take-over bids by
foreign broadcasting organizations after the moratorium on foreign take-overs is lifted
in 1994. The companies are in an invidious position as they have been, until the
November 1993 amendments by Peter Brooke, legally forbidden from attempting to
take-over one another whilst being subject to possible outside takeovers. Further, even
the largest companies (Granada, Canton, LWT, Central, Yorkshire) are minor players
on the international scene. This could lead to a situation in which the ownership of
ITV will refer to a more general trend in which national broadcasting systems are
being seen as part of wider international media conglomerates as cross-ownership
increasingly becomes the norm.
The BBC's response to the changes within broadcasting finance demonstrates
how a more hidden handed process can accompany policy outputs. The 1990 Act did
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not directly affect the BBC, however its measures have indirectly altered the
development of the corporation. Throughout this period, the BBC has attempted to
show that it will use the licence fee in a cost-effective and efficient manner. It has
also defined itself as a 'specialized' public service broadcaster. These internal policy-
making shifts and decision-making processes have arisen partly from the corporation's
need to respond to the market conditions, the upcoming renewal of the Charter and
more crucially due to the BBC's management's interpretation of this development.
Through the Thatcher government's use of political patronage and appointment and
the subsequent tension between old-style and new style leadership personified, to some
extent, by the departure of Checkland and the promotion of Birt, a number of palpable
changes have emerged in the BBC management's outlook.
This leads to a central question; has the financial reform of broadcasting
actually promoted a greater degree of political autonomy for the broadcasting
institutions or hastened a larger of amount of political complicirness ? The ITV
companies, due to financial necessity and legal changes, have clearly decided to
concentrate on providing entertainment led programmes. The companies are also wary
to involve themselves in political controversies such as 'Death on the Rock' due to the
expensive court costs of defending such a programme as they will no longer be
cushioned by the ITC. As Cohn Shaw comments:
To make controversial programmes you need two things --- brass and courage.
Thames had a large amount of money and spent over three-quarter of a million pounds
setting up the Windlesham-Rampton report to justify the programme. The new system
puts both finances and courage in some jeopardy. Whether boardrooms will be as
courageous remains to be seen but the prospects are not as hopeful as they were ten
years ago."52
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Alternatively, the BBC has attempted to out-think government by employing
new methods of resource allocation which will appeal to the political elite. The drive
for 'Producer Choice' did not emerge from the Major government but emerged from
the governors and BBC management. This is a potentially dangerous course to follow
as it contingent upon the ministers, involved in supervising broadcasting, personal and
political characteristics.
Further, it may be argued that state power has grown in a de facto manner as
the BBC management, rather than resisting alternative forms of resource management,
have placed themselves into further difficulties by exacerbating the political weapon of
broadcasting finance. As the BBC's reasoning has become conditional upon the licence
fee, the fee has become an end rather than a means to an end. In turn, this has meant
that those who hold control over the finances may effectively dictate the broadcaster's
actions.
In effect, these strategies, and the thinking that has guided them, have
generated a greater amount of political compliance rather than weakening these ties.
The BBC's senior management have often referred to public accountability in
demonstrating that the licence fee is being efficiently utilised. Yet, throughout
'Producer Choice's' formative development stage, there has been little public debate
and it would appear that the term 'public' has become synonymous with the political
elite. This trend may well be heightened as broadcasting finance becomes less assured
and the Charter debate continues, as the BBC management may be less prepared to
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promote any form of political controversy.
'Producer Choice' could prove to be an effective method to vet programmes.
It sets up a procedure in which the finance is divested through the commissioning
process. If a programme proves to be potentially controversial it may be dropped
during the negotiation period. Moreover, as this key phase occurs eighteen months
before the programme is shown any flexibility and responsiveness to public issues may
diminish. In this final respect, 'Producer Choice' can be perceived as an effective
control mechanism.
More crucially, as the BBC occupies a unique socio-economic political
position within the British polity, being an 'institution within the constitution"53,
any series of pecuniary changes clearly have important ramifications for the
Corporation's political as well as fiscal purposes. Finally, the media attention upon the
BBC indicated that 'Producer Choice' was conceived and initiated without any actual
'public' debate and that the governors, in particular the Chairman Marmaduke
Hussey, preferred to ignore the issue of accountability rather than countenance it. As
Steven Barnett anticipates there will be:
A greater commercialization process. Advertising, as a result of government policy,
has greater leverage. Obvious things such as fewer current affairs programmes, a
tabloidization of the culture which is already starting and a more rapid
Americanization as imports will increase as they are cheap, although they do not
attract higher audiences.
Within Television, and radio, this commercialization will restrict choice instead of
increase diversity. Moreover the amount of money will not increase, instead they will
be the same amount of money being used to fund more hours as multi-channels lasting
for longer hours increase. The equation means that the money will be more thinly
spread and the equation will not allow for quality.
"There has been a substitution of commercial power for state power. State power has
been displaced by the big corporations. The BBC in respect to state influence won't
change."'54
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CHAPTER SEVEN: CHANGE OR CONTINUITY ? THE EARLY OPERATIONAL
EXPERIENCE OF BROADCASTING'S REGULATORS
In this chapter I intend to consider how British broadcasting's regulatory
bodies have been affected by the legislation. In one of a series of ironies surrounding
the 1990 Act's attempt to deregulate the system, a greater number of regulatory
bodies have been established. These comprise; the BBC Board of Governors, the
Independent Television Commission (ITC), the Broadcasting Standards Council
(BSC), the Broadcasting Complaints Commission (BCC) and the Radio Authority.
Although the BCC had been created under the 1981 Broadcasting Act and the BSC
had been established as a non-statutory body pending the ratification of the 1990 Act,
this arrangement of regulatory actors contrasted with a situation in which the BBC
Governors and the IBA acted as broadcasting's major supervisors.
In response to this regulatory development a degree of consensus exists
between commentators, regulators and broadcasters: the deregulatory theories related
to broadcasting throughout the post-Peacock policy cycle have not been directly
realised through the policy process. Moreover, it has also been suggested that
throughout the early operational phase more hidden imperatives (for instance, the
reliance upon normative procedures and practices or the indecision and confusion
instigated by structural, constitutional or institutional ambiguity) may become
apparent.
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Therefore, in order to test the veracity of this analysis, it will be necessary to
outline the responsibilities of these traditional, altered and new regulatory bodies.
Further, I shall discuss the balance of power between the bodies which has begun to
emerge in the wake of the act. In order to pursue these aims this chapter will both
consider regulation in a macro sense by defining the role and position of the actors
and in a micro sense by providing a case study of the reformed commercial regulatory
authority the Independent Television Commission (ITC), which from the 1st January
1991 replaced its predecessor the Independent Broadcasting Authority (IBA) and the
Cable Authority.1
There are several reasons to focus attention upon the commission. First, the
ITC has been the regulatory body which has been most affected by the 1990
Broadcasting Act. As the Act attempted to commercialize the Independent Television
system, it subsequently altered the position of the commercial sector's regulatory
supervision and institutions. 2 Second, as the ITC has become an omni-competent
authority, the scope of its regulatory supervision has been substantially widened from
terrestrial services to all non-public television broadcasts including Oracle teletext,
cable and domestic satellite services. 3 Third, the ITC during the first year of its
operations had to supervise the most controversial legislative provision --- the
franchise auction for the ITV regions --- and thus stood at the centre of a high-profile
and problematic debate.4
Therefore, this chapter will consider the early operational phase of broadcast
regulation to determine the extent to which continuity or change has characterized this
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period. 5 It is my intention to analyze the constitutional position of these regulatory
actors, their functions, composition, working practices and the criticisms they have
received. In particular, I will focus upon the ITC by considering how it has been
legally reformed by the 1990 Broadcasting Act and how it has interpreted its role
during the first two years of its operations. I will therefore provide an institutional and
behavig( al analysis of the ITC. Further, I shall detail the ITC's role and actions
throughout the 1991 round of franchise auctions. I will then determine whether the
regulation of the commercial sector has been dominated by coherence or
contradiction. Inevitably my conclusions will have, to some extent, be speculative as I
will be looking at a period of transition. Consequently this chapter is designed to
analyze how broadcasting policy has been realised throughout this embryonic period
for 'light-touch' regulation and it will attempt to account for the distortions that any
form of analysis will make conspicuous during this transitory period.
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7:1. THE POST-1990 ACT REGULATORY ENVIRONMENT: TRADITIONAL.
NEW AND REFORMED ACTORS
One of the central themes of the Peacock report was the deregulation of the
broadcasting system. The report argued that the regulatory bodies had been subject to
regulatory capture, operating in the interest of the broadcasters rather than the public.
This had occurred in three main areas; regulation and control of entry, regulation and
control of pricing and regulation over output. 6 Controls over entry and pricing had
stymied competition by making it almost impossible for independent programme-
makers to gain access to the airwaves. 7 Essentially, these measures had preserved the
vertically-integrated, broadcasting duopoly.
Moreover, it was contended that interventionist regulatory bodies had acted as
pre-publication censors who qualified the individual's choice over programming in a
high-handed manner. 8 In turn, programme regulations meant that the full range of
political views were qualified. The regulatory bodies have also been subject to covert
political control as they were composed by the 'great and the good', who were
appointed directly by the government, and manned by bureaucrats whose values were
governed by the status quo. 9 Although, the report recommended that some protection
to the public service system could be afforded by the introduction of a Public Service
Broadcasting Council (PSBC), it ultimately proposed the removal of the traditional
regulatory actors and commented that broadcasting should only be subject to the
general laws of the land governing taste, decency, libel and obscenity)0
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In contrast to the report's libertarianism, the political phase of this
broadcasting policy-cycle also evidenced Thatcherite authoritarianism. Most overtly,
Margaret Thatcher and her supporters were concerned with the representation of sex
and violence on television. Their fears were provoked by the Hungerford massacre
and they called for greater intervention over programming output. This dynamic
expressed itself in a tangible sense with the creation of the Broadcasting Standards
Council (BSC) in 1988. The functions of this council were muddied by a process of
political and media exaggeration. Moreover, the threat of the BSC, during a period of
extreme political tension between the government and the IBA, led to reports of the
demise of IBA and its replacement by the BSC. This leads to a more covert
explanation for the government's desire to retain interventionist regulation over
programming as the Peacock report's libertarianism stood in marked contrast to the
Thatcherites' will to increase their powers over political programmes. As Anthony
Smith has commented:
"What we saw during the post-Peacock legislative round was the slow collapse of
Thatcherism as a reforming force. It was eroded not because it had run out of steam
but because it simply does not fit the requirements of broadcasting - and by
requirements I mean the things which society requires of broadcasting. The fact is that
we all want radio and television to be regulated, including, at the end of the day, the
deregulators themselves; we all want to have some kind of stake or say in the great
machinery of influence over otkI".ime and our lives."
Consequently, the resulting recommendations of the 1990 Act were reflective
of this contradiction between libertarianism and authoritarianism. The IBA was to be
replaced by the Independent Television Commission (ITC), which was principally a
licensing body in 1988 White Paper, although throughout the bargaining process from
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Bill to Act its powers over programme output were increased. Alongside the ITC
stood the Radio Authority which was similarly 'light-touch' in intent. Against this, the
BSC's interventionist functions, codes and working practices were legitimized and the
powers of the consumer body, the Broadcasting Complaints Commission (BCC) were
re-iterated in the Act.
With regard to the Broadcasting Complaints Commission, the 1990 Act
retained its state funding and its status as a corporate body composed of members,
including a chairman and deputy, appointed by the Home Secretary.' 2 Its functions
were limited to the consideration and adjudication of an individual's complaints
concerning unfair treatment and unwarranted infringements on privacy.' 3 To make a
complaint either the affected person or someone acting on his/her behalf could contact
the BCC who would decide whether it would investigate the case.' 4 If the claim was
upheld, the broadcasters would be required to publicly acknowledge the commission's
decision. 15 Essentially, the BCC was legally defined as a post-hoc regulator which
was concerned with the representation of private individuals by the broadcasters in
order to provide redress if abuses occurred.
Further, although it did not bear any mention in the Act, the other established
regulatory actor --- BBC Board of Governors has emerged out of this period of the
policy cycle unscathed. The governors have retained their position as public trustees,
formally responsible for ensuring that the corporation remains accountable to the
public. Throughout the BBC's successive charters their official powers have been
incrementally defined as details over renumeration, regional governorships and
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patterns of meetings were made conspicuous'6.
Therefore, ironically a policy-cycle pitched upon the principles of deregulation
has resulted in a larger number of regulatory players by retaining the BCC and the
BBC Governors, by introducing the BSC and by dividing the IBA into the ITC and
the Radio Authority. In this section, it is my purpose to outline the formal powers and
constitutional position of the BSC and the ITC.
7:1.1 THE NEW BROADCASTING REGULATOR: THE FUNCTIONS OF THE
BROADCASTING STANDARDS COUNCIL
The authoritarian, short-term and reactive nature of the Thatcher
government's broadcasting policy may be seen to have been exemplified by the
creation of the Broadcasting Standards Council (BSC). It emerged to deal with a
perceived need to provide stronger regulatory intervention over programme output,
most especially with regard to representations of sex and violence. However, in spite
of popular reports and the first chairman William Rees Mogg's professed desire to
have pre-viewing powers, the BSC surfaced as a non-statutory body, and later as a
statutory body in the Act, with the responsibility to define a code, few real powers
and a rather ill-defined role.
Institutionally, the BSC was a corporate body composed of a chairman, deputy
and board members. For day-to-day a 4Iairs, the BSC was to be serviced by a small
managerial department led by a Director.' 7 The body was to be funded directly
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through taxation and was therefore responsible for providing an annual report and
statement of its accounts.' 8 The major legislative function for the BSC, in fact
carried out by 1989, was the preparation of a code of practice.' 9 This was to be
drawn up in consultation with the broadcasters, other regulatory bodies and
appropriate members of the public. 20 Once the code has been set out, the BSC would
meet in order to report on the portrayal of sex and violence and to establish standards
of taste and decency. 2 ' Consequently, the BSC was not only responsible for
sanctioning programmes but had a prescriptive role in providing analysis by
researching of the audiences' responses to such programming.
However, its main task was to determine whether it should uphold complaints
made about representations of sex and violence. In order to make a complaint, a
member of the public or a representative body was required to detail the name, date
and time of the broadcast within two months of the programme's transmission. If
the complaint was being raised about an advertisement then the time period was cut to
three weeks. The Council was required to consider the complaint unless: it was
outside of its remit, dealt with matters taking place in court, was part of a legal action
or was deemed to be frivolous and inappropriate. If the complaint was to be
considered then the BSC would review a copy of the programme and possibly provide
a hearing with the complainant and broadcaster. In order to make its findings known,
it would either enforce the broadcaster to carry an announcement of its ruling or
disseminate the information through the press.24
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Therefore, the legislation confirmed that the BSC would be a post-hoc body
which could determine the merits or deficiencies of a programme once it had been
transmitted. This contrasted with the uriginal argument for an interventionist sex and
violence council and demonstrated how the BSC had been increasingly marginalized
during the policy process. In reality, the 1990 Act created a body which actually had
few real powers to sanction broadcasters over their output and left those responsible
for its running to find it a role to play. Moreover, with the general internationalization
of broadcasting through both domestic and non-domestic satellite broadcast
transmissions and reception equipment, the national regulation provided by the BSC
was to be increasingly anachronistic as foreign channels transmitting violent material
or pornographic programming could b'amed into Britain. 25
 However, the BSC could
not properly review or sanction the production of this material due its foreign legal
status. Consequently, the Home Office's non-statutory directives and the 1990 Act
which ensured that maintenance of the BSC ended up pleasing neither those who
advocated greater censorship such as Mary Whitehouse, the leader of the National
Viewers and Listener's Organization, or the other broadcasting regulators and
broadcasters who saw it as an unnecessary addition.
7:1.2 THE REVISED BROADCASTING REGULATOR: THE FUNCTIONS OF
THE ITC AS DEFINED BY THE 1990 BROADCASTING ACT
The 1990 Act divorced the regulation of commercial radio with television by
creating the Independent Television Commission (ITC) and Radio Authority. The
latter was made responsible for licensing the local commercial radio stations, for
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supervising a national music commercial radio station and to review these
arrangements through administering a reallocation of local franchises.26
To delineate the commission's legal functions a comparative analysis between
the ITC and the IBA's legal remit (as defined by the first Thatcherite broadcasting
legislation	 the 1981 Broadcasting Act) may be employed. To this end, it would
appear that several criteria may be used to emphasize both similarities and differences:
The first criterion refers to the ITC's institutional status and legal definition.
In the 1981 Act the IBA was defined as a corporate body consisting of a Chairman,
Deputy Chairman and Board of Governors.V The members of the board were to be
appointed by the Home Secretary and internal issues were largely left to the discretion
of the board and management. 28 Schedule I of the 1990 Act continued this tradition
by recommending that the ITC should operate as a corporate authority and set out the
guidelines for the appointment, scale and tenure of the board which continued to be
selected by the Home Secretary. 29
 It has also required the commission to provide an
annual report and set of accounts, whilst allowing financial and employee
appointments to be left to the judgement of the ITC.3°
Whilst a formal, institutional continuity has remained the ITC's supervisory
focus and legal status differs from its predecessor. In contrast to the IBA which was
responsible for all of terrestrial, commercial programming on television and radio, the
ITC is only required to supervise television. However, the ITC's focus was broadened
as it became responsible for licensing all cable and domestic satellite broadcasts as it
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replaced the Cable Authority. 3 ' The 1981 Act defined the IBA as national provider
for television and radio broadcasts both in relation to transmission (for example, the
installation of transmitters in outlying or poorly populated areas) and programming.32
In the latter respect, the IBA was to act as interventionist regulator to ensure that the
public service tenets of 'educating, informing and entertaining' were adhered to by the
ITV companies. 33 Conversely, the 1990 Act merely empowered the ITC to enact
both positive and negative regulations in respect to the ITV companies' ownership,
programming and advertising/sponsorship as a licensor. In subsection 2.2 (a) the
Commission's responsibility to licence services was defined accordingly:
" (i) to ensure a wider range of such services are available throughout the United
Kingdom, and
(ii) to ensure fair and effective competition in the provision of such services
connected with them."35
Sections three to six of the Act detailed the terms and provisions of the
licences and the ITC's role in granting them. 36 In order to grant a licence the
commission has to be convinced of the candidate's financial, legal and
programming/scheduling suitability. 37 Moreover, the licencesee has to act in
accordance to the directives laid out in renewable codes written by the commission
and if the contractor fails to do so the licence may be subject to sanctions or in the
last resort revoked.
In subsection 2.2 (b) programme standards were to be maintained in a
manner which they (the ITC) consider it best calculated to ensure the provision of
such services which (taken as a whole) are of high quality and offer a wide range of
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programmes calculated to appeal to a variety of tastes and interests" 39 . Sections six
to seven of the act include provisions which allow the commission to supervise
transmitted programmes in order to ensure taste and decency, accurate and impartial
news coverage, care in the presentation of religious subjects and most controversially
that 'due impartiality' is seen to have occurred. 4° This last clause stood as an
anachronism, in terms of 'light-touch' regulation, as it required the ITC to intervene
in order to make certain that perceived political bias should be offset by another
programme to redress the balance from the opposite political perspective. 4' To
monitor programmes and provide the criterion for broadcasters the commission was
required to draw up a programme code, which would be regularly reviewed, to make
certain that these imperatives were realised and most especially to define a practical
interpretation for 'due impartiality' •42 Moreover, provision 6(4) provided the ITC
with a negative programming role:
Without prejudice to the generality of subsection (I), the Commission shall do all
they can to secure that there are excluded from programmes included in a licensed
service all expression of the views and opinions of the person providing services on
matters (other than the provision of programme services) which are political or
industrial controversy or relate to current public policy."43
Clare Mulholland, ITC Director of Programmes, has termed sections six and
seven consumer protection requirements. She argues that the Act also enables the
commission to ensure that the licensees conform to positive and programme-related
guidelines.45
 The former derive from section sixteen of the act and are also covered
in the recommendations covering the Channel 3 licence, particularly in the Act's
annex. They comprise high quality and diversity; specific allocation of time to non-
regional and regional broadcasts; and minimum percentages upon original or
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commissioned programming. 47 The latter category includes networking arrangements,
training, equal opportunities, provision for the disabled, a national television archive,
regional facilities and staff, audience research, Party Political Broadcasts, Government
directions and complaints procedures.48
However, as the ITC became a licensor the implications of what it could not
do were as important as its formal powers. For instance, the post-1993 ITC has no
formal remit in the process of network scheduling and will not be able demand that
the network provides peak-time educational or information programming. Instead of
these distinct public services directives, it.rsponsibilities were replaced by a vague
clause which recommends that it should make sure that a wide range of services are
provided on a national level.49
The legal change from broadcasting authority to licensing commission
meant that the body was to become a post-hoc regulator which might only defend or
impose sanctions upon broadcasters after a programme has been transmitted. 5° As
provision 11(3) illustrated the ITC has no previewing powers:
"Nothing in this part shall be construed as requiring the Commission, in the
discharge of their duties under this Part as respects licensed services and the
programmes included in them, to view such programmes in advance of their being
included in such services."5'
As the companies will no longer have to submit their programmes to the regulators
before they are aired, a tier of regulation is to be effectively dispensed with. In this
respect the legislation appears to intend to dismantle an informal brokerage of power
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between the regulators and broadcasters that previously existed during the preview
stage. 52 This transformation in editorial control may also demonstrates a broader
shift in the ITC's interventionist role in programming. Instead of assessing the impact
of a programme in the wider context of channel's output, the ITC will judge the
programme's merits or deficiencies (for instance, aesthetic or ideological) in
isolation.53
Second, this legal change in institutional emphasis between the IBA and the
ITC has been exacerbated by several other factors. The 1990 Act privatised ITV's
transmission services. Previously, the IBA had been responsible for the transmission
of programmes. On January 1st 1991, a private company, the 'National
Transcommunications Ltd', was founded from the fall-out of the IBA Engineering
Department. TM Thus, at one stroke, the ITC's staffing levels were vastly reduced.
Whilst the IBA was responsible for two television channels, the ITC is an
omnicompetent authority which is responsible for supervising a far wider range of
delivery systems. The ITC has subsumed the Cable Authority and also monitors
domestic satellite services. 35 Additionally it has been required to regulate the
proposed new terrestrial channel --- Channel Five --- and has legal duties to supervise
local services delivered via cable or 'micro-wave' technology. 56 The ITC's position
as a regulator has become more problematic due to the Act's legitimization of several
competing authorities. 57 Moreover as Cento Veljanovski has commented:
the ITC will have the Office of Fair Trading breathing down its neck. The
Broadcasting Act gives the OFT the 'whip hand' in satisfying itself that the proposed
network and the way it operates permit competition in the supply of network
programmes. "58
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Finally, and most revealingly, the Act's terminology may be understood as
being indicative of a determined attempt to alter the commercial regulator's focus and
institutional development when compared to the 1981 Act. Whilst abstract terms such
as 'high quality' and 'diversity' remained, other common phrases associated with
broadcasting legislation are absent. 59 For example, the Act makes no reference to the
public service tenets of 'educating, informing and entertaining'.60
A superficial glance of the Act, in relation to the ITC, might appear to
vindicate the argument that(mact of deregulation was severely qualified throughout
the policy-making process and that any formal change has been negligible. The ITC
remained a public body with interventionist regulatory power over the companies
licenses and, to some extent, over programming. The ITC, whilst being a licensor,
may appear to be far more than that in certain respects. For example, it is still
responsible for measuring the franchisee's performance in relation to finance and
programming. This means that a degree of intervention is inevitable as it has the
power to either sanction or revoke a franchise-holder if the ownership conditions are
abused or programme standards decline.
Further, there is some credence in the belief that the ITC may continue as a
public service regulator, most especially in its legal remit to maintain and oversee a
wide variety of high quality programmes. Indeed, in having to determine 'due
impartiality' it may be argued that a far more overt form of state control could be
mediated through the authority than had been apparent within the previous system.
Clare Mulholland has gone as far to state:
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The Broadcasting Act as it emerged is however, very far from a recipe for
deregulation, at least as far as programme content is concerned. There are more
specific agreements in certain areas than in any previous legislation. What is more,
the ITC is required to impose sanctions -any licensee who breeches the codes."6'
However such a reading of the legislation can be criticised as being myopic as
it is only partially correct i iPnalysis and tends to neglect other implications within
the legislation or ignore particular legislative provisions altogether. The ITC has
remained a public body with a number of hands-on regulatory powers which may
demonstrate that its jurisdiction extends beyond an organization that is commonly
understood as being merely a licensing body. Yet, the 1990 Broadcasting Act intended
to re-orientate the ITC's supervisory focus by making it perform regulatory functions
in accordance with a revised set of objectives which appear to emphasize a less
interventionist and a more detached role for the body. In turn, this might appear to be
an attempt to reform the commercial regulator's institutional characteristics.
Throughout the sections of the Act which dealt with the ITC there was an
attempt to fuse together the two dominant strands of thought that have defined the
political phase of the policy-making cycle --- deregulatory ideologies with more
traditional public service precepts. This means that the scope and focus of the ITC has
become subtly, but substantially, reconceived. Whilst it became a public body which
retains regulatory powers as a licensor, it was also a far more detached body that has
fewer interventionary powers. Consequently this has created a compromised and
paradoxical legal situation where a supposedly light-touch licensing commission has
been defined by a far more prescriptive set of rules (for example, the 1990
Broadcasting Act contains seventy-one rulings concerning the ITC compared to the
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forty-five rules which governed the IBA in the 1981 Act 62). This means that the Act
has developed the formal guidelines for a far more mechanistic commission in an
increasingly 'transparent' regulatory order whilst simultaneously leaving a substantial
number of the clauses open to doubt and ambiguity. As David Glencross, the ITC's
Chief Executive, has noted:
"What we have is a curious combination of a lighter-touch regime and the imposition
of more specific regulations on broadcasting than the old legislation. s'63
7:2. THE CRITICISMS OF THE POST-1990 REGULATORY SYSTEM: A
CONSTITUTIONAL CRISIS
Therefore, the legislation has created a more complicated regulatory
environment containing a larger number of competing authorities. Although, the Act
legally defined each of these bodies, it may be suggested that their constitutional
position has become more ambiguous. Principally, a number of regulators may be
seen to have duplicate functions and confusion has arisen from the public,
broadcasters and regulators themselves concerning who has jurisdiction over the
content of programme output. In particular, these criticisms have been directed at the
Broadcasting Standards Council.
First, the public's understanding of BSC and the BCC has been problematic.
Their awareness of both authorities has remained minimal in spite of the legal
requirement for these bodies to advertise their activities. In part, this has been due to
their failure to properly publicize themselves. Consequently, the public has been at a
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loss to distinguish between the BCC and the BSC. This problem may be identified by
figures released by the BSC itself:
Breakdown of 262 Complaints:
Table 7. Breakdown of 262 Complaints.
No. of complaints
Published Findings of Complaints
	 48 (22 programmes/advertise I
ments)
Complaints under consideration 	 43
Inappropriate to pursue 	 22
Outside BSC remit or Complaints of a General Nature 149
However it may also be suggested that the distinction between one body which
attempts to provide legal redress for the individual and one which outlines controls
over sex and decency has not been effectively made. Moreover, a number of
broadcasters and regulators have called for the merger of the two bodies which they
see as effectively covering similar ground. As John Willis comments:
In this Alice in Wonderland world of regulation, the Broadcasting Standards Council
is the Mad Hatter to the BCC's March Hare. ... The increased efficiency created by
reducing the number of quangos by one could be used to create a properly funded
independent Ombudsman body which, unlike the BCC, would offer enough credibility
for both broadcaster and complainant."65
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The second major confusion has occurred within the broadcasting environment
itself. The broadcasters have complained that the BSC has created a number of
general problems for programme makers. They have argued that the balance between
protecting individual viewers and wider public right to know has been overwhelmed in
favour of the former as the BSC must consider an individual complaint even if
millions of viewers have enjoyed the programme. However, broadcasters'
criticisms have been particularly aimed at the regulatory confusion that the BSC has
inspired between itself, the BBC Board of Governors and the ITC in relation to
programming. They are principally unclear on the jurisdiction of each authority. As
Caroline Thomson has commented:
There is the possibility of regulator chasing regulator. For example, Channel Four
may accord to all the codes of the ITC and the licence but not fulfil the criteria of the
BSC. There is the possibility of chaos and it is a problem for the ITC as much as
ours. They may set out a prescriptive code of customs and practices only to be
second-guessed by someone else. Additionally, who should we obey ? It is very
difficult to know which rules operate under some circumstances."67
Further, the procedural relationship between the BSC upholding a complaint and its
effect on the thinking of the BBC Board of Governors and the ITC has proved to be
far from clear. Essentially, broadcasting remains subject to the possibility of clashes
between these different bodies who have djfferent remUs and are responsive to
d?fferent constituencies. Therefore, the future for the regulation of broadcasting
appears to be increasingly problematic. As Sue Elliott comments:
It is a confusing situation and the body (BSC) is dealing with complaints, at a cost
of £1 million per annum from the Home Office, which the IBA previously dealt with
at a low level of staff. It has a narrow remit and Cohn Shaw (the Director) is
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searching around for it to have a role to play.
I don't think that a coherent, regulatory environment can exist when there are
five separate regulators."68
7:2.1 A CRITIOUE OF THE TRADITIONAL. NEW AND REFORMED
REGULATORY ACTORS
This confusion in the balance of forces has been both reflective of and
influential to the changes which have occurred at a micro level within broadcast
regulation. Clearly, as these alterations have started to affect the inter-relationships
between the regulators, subsequent internal reforms have occurred within their
organizational development and supervisory focus. Further, as different factors have
altered the broadcast economy, the regulators have had to adapt to the new conditions
and demands. Finally, as I have shown the regulatory bodies, most especially the
ITC, have been reorganized through the legislation.
In this respect, the regulatory authorities have been subject to criticisms at
institutional, organizational or ideological levels. Increasingly, the BBC Board of
Governors has been criticized due to the political complexion of its composition, its
patronage from the Home Office, the interventionist nature off i stance over the BBC
management, the power located in the chair and its lack of accountability to the
public. In regard to the Board's accountability, many have argued that the governors,
in spite of their formal commitment for greater openness, have continued to engage in
a secretive form of decision-making which suits their own purposes rather than
operating as public trustees.
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To a lesser extent, these criticisms have also been levelled at the Broadcasting
Standards Council and Broadcasting Complaints Commission. These bodies have
similarly been composed of the 'great and the good', have been accused of pursuing
secretive working practices and making arbitrary decisions. In particular, the BSC
attracted criticisms due to the appointment of William Rees Mogg as its first
chairman, although the introduction of the experienced broadcasting regulator Cohn
Shaw as Director was seen to have offset this decision. However, the hostility toward
the BSC has remained as it has been argued that it is largely self-serving, responsible
for the expenditure of £1 million per annum and has failed to be truly representative
of the public. This has led to Cohn Shaw himself proposing a new regulatory structure
for governing broadcasting:
"The appointment of the governors for the BBC and the IBA, most especially the
BBC, has been highly politicized. What is needed is an alternative body that acts
within the public interest and is against government involvement. This would possibly
be an independent body dealing with the philosophical issues of broadcasting. Annan
suggested a Broadcasting Foundation to represent the viewer or 'consumer', although
I dislike that term, who's voice has not been previously heard. This audience has not
previously had a fair crack of the whip. Whilst there have been advisory committees,
these do not acknowledge the mass (the Cs, Ds, Es) but were composed of the middle
class. There have been four bodies of worthy citizens, but no common understanding.
Effectively the mass has been disenfranchised."69
However, whilst these actors have been challenged over their composition and
the representative nature and also find themselves in a broadcasting environment with
different imperatives and rules, they have not been subject to the focus of the
legislation in the same manner as the ITC. Further, throughout the transitional period
between 1990 to 1992 the ITC engaged in a voluminous amount of work in order to
adapt to the new legislation, streamline its bureaucracy and to develop its activities as
a licensor rather than broadcaster. Principally, it was responsible for supervising the
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1991 I1'V franchise auction. Therefore the ITC, throughout this period, has acted as a
key case study which may provide a number of clues over the future direction of
broadcast regulation in the 1990s.
7:3. THE EVOLVING CHARACTERISTICS OF THE EMBRYONIC ITC
In respect to the ITC, a number of arguments have either claimed that the ITC
will become an JBA mark-iwo or that significant shifts in the institution's emphasis
had fundamentally altered its position. In this respect, it has been possible to detect
several shades of opinion. For example Anthony Smith has commented:
What has emerged is not the free-wheeling public body imposing a number of
requirements on each supplying company, if necessary through the courts, but a public
institution, the ITC, watched over by the Broadcasting Standards Council with the
help of the Complaints Commission. The ITC still looks to many people the spitten
image of its progenitor, the IBA." 70
In Smith's more benevolent vision (for the regulator at least) the old and new
regulatory actors have been engaged in evolving a framework for a revised, but not
thoroughly reformed regulatory order. From this perspective, institutional reform has
been qualified by the legislation itself. Instead of setting the foundations for a number
of authorities which were designed to enact more commercial principles, the
compromises which have characterised the post-Peacock debate have meant that "the
supporters of high public service requirements in commercial television (have)
gradually won back the ground inch by inch and (have) left the new Independent
Television Commission with a much higher level of regulatory authority than the
doctrinaire deregulators had desired or envisaged" 71 . Moreover, inspite of any formal
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legal, constitutional or institutional reforms, however mitigated or complete, it was
posited that the public service traditions would be maintained as the regulators would
continue to follow the traditional ideologies and working practices.
Others, including broadcasting actors such as former London Weekend
Television (LWT) Chief Executive Greg Dyke and Channel Four's Head of Corporate
Affairs Caroline Thomson, have emphasised that these structural, constitutional and
institutional issues will foment a more deep-seated alteration of the evolving
regulatory regime. It is argued that by changing the general and specific day-to-day
functions of the regulators and by transforming the IBA, the legal broadcaster of ITV
programmes, into the ITC, a licensing body, that different values, conceptions and
working practices will become manifest. 73 As the system has been designed to
become more transparent, regulators may be governed through an increasingly
prescriptive set of legal rules. If its functions become more tightly defined, the ITC's
scope could be limited and its attention may be directed toward commercial
considerations rather than attempting to adhere to the traditional public service
commitments.74
Thus, to determine the veracity of these arguments and to fully appreciate
the developing nature of the reformed commission it will be necessary to consider
how the ITC began to operate during a major transitional period between 1990-1992.
Throughout this rather confusing phase, the commission was subject to both the 1981
and 1990 Broadcasting Act. From January 1st 1993 onwards, the ITC was required to
conform to the 1990 Act in full. Consequently, in this section I will consider how the
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ITC started to implement the legislation in respect to its institutional organization and
to determine the behavio rial characteristics which became apparent as it started to
interpret its revised supervisory focus. Following itinception, John Howkins predicted
that two options existed for the ITC as it defined its role:
One is to supervise the contract procedures and then to become a sort of 'referee' of
the contractors waving flags if they break the rules. The other is to push forward the
job of public service and continue to shape and guide the industry."75
7:3.1 AN INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS OF THE ITC
In applying an institutional/nianagerial analysis on the ITC it would ostensibly
appear that throughout its first year of existence that very little change occurred.
Undoubtedly the shedding of radio and transmission services has meant that there has
been a certain number of structural alterations. This was not lost upon the
broadcasting union BETA (later BECTU) who had to renegotiate its membership's
working conditions as they became subject to private sector arrangements.76
However, one princi'9 I theme during the early stages of transition was continuity. As
John Dugdale commented:
"The name has changed but many aspects of the old organisation remain intact. The
ITC has the same telephone number as the IBA, and occupies the same Brompton
Road building in SW3 opposite Harrods."
Such a verdict may be substantiated when certain factors are taken into
consideration:
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First, the commission continued to be funded through the same method. The
IBA's income was composed from a levy paid by all the Independent contractors. This
meant that it was a statutory authority which, in principle, was indirectly financed
through advertising revenues. This method of payment, whilst being superficially
transformed, remains in existence and the ITV companies contribute fees which have
been calculated on a sliding scale from the smallest contractor to the largest
franchise-holder. 78
 Moreover, due to the increased workload inaugurated by the
franchise auction the ITC's costs have increased rather than declined. For instance, in
1991 it was estimated that the ITC will absorb some £19 million of its £21 million
income upon broadcast regulation. 79
 However, this was followed in 1992 with a
decrease in the ITC's required income with the reduction duties and the streamlining
of the organization.80
Secondly, the ITC Board remained intact from the IBA. Indeed the first board
was formulated as a Shadow ITC for that very purpose. The board continued to be
composed from a standard assortment of the 'great and good' who have traditionally
occupied such positions. Invariably the Home Office has selected individuals from the
following backgrounds; business, public service or academia. All these individuals
have been usually drawn from the upper to upper middle-classes and have usually
been educated at the 'Oxbridge' colleges. Therefore the board not only includes the
Chairman George Russell from business, but also comprises of Eton educated Jocelyn
Stevens as his deputy and the Earl of Dalkeith as a board member.8'
Thirdly, the appointment of George Russell was seen to be significant as it
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demonstrated that a figure who was respected both in the business and broadcasting
communities would be in charge of running the commission. In his capacity as
chairman, he continued to employ and appoint key personnel with a strong
background in broadcasting regulation. Throughout the first year of its operations, the
ITC retained nearly all the IBA's bureaucratic staff. There were four hundred and
thirty people placed in regulatory, administrative and support positions, with an
additional number of research and development staff. The ITC was divided into
several divisions comprising; programming, advertising and sponsorship, cable and
satellite, engineering, finance, secretariat, licensing, public affairs, administration and
national and regional offices. 82 As Raymond Snoddy commented that this had been a
deliberate and conscious policy:
There had been fears of significant redundancies at the IBA when it is to be replaced
with the new body ... Mr. George Russell, the Chairman of the IBA who will also
chair the ITC, has been arguing the need for continuity."83
Thus, the ITC's senior management has included Claire Muiholland, the
former IBA deputy director of programming, who was promoted to the post of
Director of Programming and Donald Horn (the Administrative Controller) who had
been with the authority since l965." Most importantly, David Glencross, who had
been with the IBA since 1970 and was the former Director of Programming, was
appointed ITC Chief Executive. His selection was of particular significance as it
indicated that there was an acceptance within the ITC's governing circles that an 'in
house' regulator, rather than a businessman, was required to manage the supervision
of commercial broadcasting. 85
 As Richard Brooks comments:
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"Up to six months ago the odds were on bringing in an outsider, possibly a
businessman. After all, if the IBA was going to be killed off and replaced by a
non-interventionist body, the ITC, surely it needed a newcomer, someone who
unsullied by the bureaucratic trappings of the IBA? ... The reality is that, so far at
least, the leopard has shown it can change its spots, with the IBA coping better in the
real world of television deregulation than most thought."86
Therefore, throughout this formative period, at least, the ITC retained its
predecessor's hierarchical and managerial structure. It continued to be governed by a
part-time board and run on a day-to-day level by a professional regulatory staff.
Moreover, until the summer of 1993 (past the cut-off date for this thesis) the
commission was based in the same national and regional headquarters. 87 The national
base in Brompton Road had been dubbed by critics and industry wags as 'Brompton
Towers' to emphasize the IBA's impenetrable bureaucracy which had been seen as
largely autonomous and oblivious to outside requirements. 88 Consequently, this
physical manifestation of the regime may also be seen to have played a contributory
role in the evolution of the reformed body. This maintenance of institutional funding,
personnel and structure has been understood by some to show that the IBA's
organizational framework and prevailing ideologies will be perpetuated in the
reformed ITC. As Michael Kavanagh has observed internal appointees will have a
vital role" ... in determining (if) any radical departure (will occur) from the existing
IBA 'culture' .. . (and) opponents of the (old) IBA broadcasting regime fear that the
new lighter ITC ... will emerge merely as an IBA Mark II" 89• Brenda Maddox
concurred arguing that the appointment process "links the old ITV with the new
the very bridge the Government was trying to blow up."9°
Whilst this evidence would have appeared to stress that continuity could define
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the ITC's institutional characteristics, this assessment is problematic due to a number
of distortions during the ITC's first year. As the ITC remained a proto-IBA until 1993
and was subjected to both the 1981 and 1990 Broadcasting Acts, it retained its status
and role as the legal broadcaster. Further, the commission needed to retain its staff to
supervise the franchise auction. After that period the ITC's duties may be seen to have
been cut by a third (with the divorcing of radio and transmission services) as it moved
to fulfil its licensing role. 9 ' In 1991, Caroline Thomson predicted that:
"The ITC will change. It is currently in a hybrid stage, the personnel has remained
the same as it is supervising the franchise auction. I think change will become more
apparent afterwards when quite a lot of the functions will drop off and the staff will
be thinned out."
This analysis was borne out by subsequent events. In 1992, the ITC
announced that it was moving one hundred of its staff to smaller premises at 33 Foley
Street, London and a number of its London based staff would be re-located to a new
base at Kings Worthy near Winchester by June 1993. Throughout, the second half
of 1991, the management board started its investigation into the ITC's staffing and
structuring for the post-1992 era.
Change may also be inaugurated by the politicization of the bo4rd members.
Whilst, Russell's pragmatism has been admired, it should be noted that the deputy-
chair Jocelyn Steven's had a reputation of being a close Thatcherite ally. 95 His
ideology may well contribute to the ITC's outlook. Further, in his capacity as
chairman at Marleys, Russell was responsible for approving £10,000 into
Conservative Party funds. 96 As John Dugdale commented:
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Superficially, the quango's composition is consistent with standard practice. But if
data not disclosed in the officially supplied biographies is teased out, it is clear that
the commission breaks with the convention in having a definite political complexion.
Although the imbalance has been reduced by the resignation of Lord Chalfont, no
attempt has been made to offset the bias in the usual tokenistic way of appointing a
safe trade unionist. The ITC conforms not to the familiar pattern of Butskellite
committee chemistry, but to that of the Thatcher era."97
Therefore any discussion of how the reformed ITC will carry out both general
and specific day-to-day operations needs to take into account these factors. Clearly, an
institutional analysis reflects both elements of continuity in the choice of key
personnel, management hierarchy and to a lesser degree, a publicly articulated
commitment to the public service. To some extent, institutional reform was also
hidden by the workload of the franchise auction. However, the ITC has been forced to
slim down, has developed different working practices and has been subjected to
Thatcherite patronage in the choice of the board, inspite of Russell's undeniable
pragmatism. An institutional analysis, however, needs to be supplemented by a
discussion of how the ITC has begun to interpret its role in the wider context of the
broadcasting environment through its behavioi rial responses and self perceptions.
7:3.2 HOW HAS THE COMMISSION INTERPRETED ITS RESPONSIBILITIES
DURING THE TRANSITIONAL PHASE?
The 1990 Act forced the ITC to interpret its role both within the general (for
example, how does it perceive itself within the political and broadcasting
environment?) and specific realm (for example, what ideas have determined its
relationship with the ITV companies?).
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Throughout the debate that marked its demise, the IBA continually stressed
that it played a vital and pro-active interventionist role in supervising the commercial
sector.98 This interpretation of its responsibilities was heavily influenced by the
precedents of public service broadcasting and working practices to justify the supposed
advantages of continuity with adaptability. Essentially the IBA remained fixed within a
mind-set that dismissed 'change-for-change's sake' and emphasised the success of the
system. This can be summed up by the chairman of the IBA Lord Thomson:
"The risk this time is that the non-BBC side of broadcasting might be left to a simple
licensing framework on the lines of the American FCC rather than a framework that
is concerned about standards, or even that the ITV should be deliberately relieved of
its obligations to produce the rich variety of programmes which goes by the name of
public service broadcasting."
As it has previously been shown, this defensive posture demonstrated that there were
a number of misconceptions about the dominant characteristics of the contemporary
political elite and served to undermine the Authority's credibility rather than enhance
it.
When George Russell succeeded Lord Thomson as Chairman of the
IBA/Shadow ITC Chairman he preferred to make more conciliatory gestures that
would produce a convergence of aims amongst broadcasters and politicians)°° In
taldng such an approach Russell was able to place the emphasis upon merging the
concept of public service regulation with a series of more pragmatic business-style
notions. He did not castigate the White Paper, Bill and Act as being an irrelevance,
but decided that it was necessary to incorporate a number of the policy's market-led
recommendations into his overall vision of the public service:
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At the IBA, Russell has never made the mistake of criticising the Government's
plans wholesale. He has not joined those who say that the Bill is unnecessary."10'
Instead of attempting to forestall the impact of the legislation through a
critique of the principles involved, Russell took a practical stance which resulted in
the ITC trying to realise a more achievable set of objectives. Therefore he has
demonstrated a preference for concentrating upon what he and the commission's
management believed to be realistic goals by focusing upon the key prescriptions
within the White Paper and Broadcasting Bill. This would change the role of the
regulator as Georgina Henry commented:
As the shape of the new ITC becomes clearly defined, Russell disputes the
suggestion that it will end up looking like the old IBA. No one wants that. The crucial
difference is the shift of publishing responsibilities from the Authority on to the
companies, the ITC will be a post-transmission regulator not a pre-transmission
censor."°2
Throughout the broadcasting debate, Russell remained firm upon the key
principles and flexible upon the need for change. In his first press statement, he
announced he would resign if the government did not acquiesce over the quality
hurdle for the ITV regional franchises.'° 3 At a formal level, it would appear that
the ITC has conformed to the general principles of the 1989 Coopers and Lybrand
consultancy report entitled the Regulato,y Functions of an Independent Television
Commission.'°4 This examined a number of the proposals in the White Paper and
considered how arrangements could be conducted over: appeals against ITC decisions,
the economic regulation of advertising and the enforcement of fair competition. 105 It
analyzed the role of the regulator and argued that (italics added):
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A pro-active strategy requires the regulator to develop his own priorities in the
allocation of limited regulatory resources, rather than be complaints-driven. This
involves consideration of the agency's scope to determine policy and develop a
comprehensive enforcement strategy rather than to proceed in a case by case
incremental manner.""
Moreover, it was argued that a flexible approach would be required to ensure that
there should be a maintenance of quality, diversity and information. Such an
interpretation refers more to normative daily practices than to any set of formal
guidelines:
Firstly, the ITC will need to be pro-active in enforcing positive programme
requirements, since the absence of complaints will not necessarily mean that all is
well. In other words, the ITC will have to decide on the priorities for regulation
and not develop policy in a piece-meal fashion ... Secondly, there needs to be a
flexibility in the interpretation of the positive programming requirements to allow
licences to adapt to changing market conditions. Thirdly, the enforcement of positive
programme will not relate to "one-off" events. Instead it will depend on performance
over a period of time and over a range of programmes.1' 107
Consequently, Russell has tried to evolve an institutional and ideological
framework through which the ITC's managerial staff could interpret the commission's
role in terms of what was possible in the contemporary context instead of being reliant
on old arguments that recycled the benefits of the previous regime. This idea has
permeated through the commission to define the ITC's formal interpretation of its
near-future modus operandi, most especially in relation to its supervisory functions
relating to programme-makers. The commission's board and management has argued
that quality productions can only be provided if the correct structure is established and
directed by the ITC. This will be required to create the right balance between public
service and market-led influences. In order to maintain the resulting equation the ITC
will have to continue to be vigilant. This has also had a political purpose by enabling
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the JTC, in turn, to negotiate from a position of comparative strength with the
Government to reform or revise specific measures rather than general principles:
Russell believes the Government will, in the end, be content to settle the broad
principles and leave him to get on with the definition." '°
These principles may be seen to have underpinned the ITC's approach to its
renewable programme, advertising and sponsorship codes. These were legally required
by the Broadcasting Act 1990.109 The programme code was prescriptive in a
negative sense as it determined that the ITC should monitor the licensee's compliance
to the rulings and to investigate complaints once programmes had been transmitted.
Therefore, the licensee was responsible for upholding a number of
If these measures were ignored the license could be sanctioned
through fines or ultimately revoked. 111 The code was divided into twelve sections,
which reflected specific sections of the Act, comprising: taste and decency, privacy,
impartiality, political broadcasting, terrorism and crime, legal matters, images of very
brief duration, game shows, charities, religion, other programme matters and public
communication."2 It was, if anything, more elaborate than any of the previous IBA
guidelines. For instance, the taste and decency rules formalized the common
understandings over the nine o'clock threshold in respect to representations of sex and
violence and bad language." 3 Additionally, the ITC's philosophy has been to make
a comparative weakness into a comparative strength. This may be detected in an
interview with George Russell:
Despite the ITC being designed as a fully regulatory body Russell believes it can
still influence the broadcasting environment of the future by being a 'progressive
regulator'. Settling contracts by which a holder has to agree to provide 'x' amount of
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hours of a particular type of programming represents for Russell, a "progressive
situation" where we can soon say 'you're not doing it, what are you going to do about
it ?1Mh14
In January 1991 the ITC introduced new advertising and sponsorship codes.
These not only referred to the Broadcasting Act 1990, but also to the European
Directive on Television." 5
 The ITC's interpretation of the law again to was promote
an arms-length relationship between it and the advertisers and sponsors." 6
 In
contrast to the IBA, the ITC would not routinely prevet advertising proposal and
scripts117. Its role was to ensure that ITV companies kept to their obligation to
provide material which complied to the code, although it would respond to request
over how the code should be interpreted. 18 The ITC would continue to monitor,
where necessary intervene and sanction if the code was not adhered to." 9 The
sponsorship codes were designed to give greater scope for programme sponsors.'2°
Previously, this had been restricted by statutory provision.' 2 ' The code allowed all
programmes, barring news and current affairs, to take on sponsorship unless conflicts
of interest might exist between the sponsor and programme over editorial needs (for
instance, consumer advice programmes).' 22 Further, the code forbid product
placement, any sponsor influence over content and scheduling, and on terrestrial
channels, the duration of the sponsor credits.'23
However, whilst it might appear that Russell has attempted to mould the ITC
in his own image (for example pragmatic, business-like, less ideological and adaptable
to an ever-changing political and broadcasting environment) there are certain
difficulties in becoming too reliant upon this perception. It must be asked whether the
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confident predictions made by Russell in public statements and speeches are matched
by such confidence in the commission itself? Here the picture has proved to be far
more ambiguous as a number of problems are perceived to remain.
First, there has been a feeling that the ITC, as it has a far wider number of
services under its jurisdiction, cannot be anything more than a shallow regulator as it
does not have sufficient staff to cope with all the terrestrial, cable and satellite
services under its control.' 24 Second, the alterations in regulatory focus and structure
are perceived as having detrimental implications for the future of the ITC as a public
body upholding the values of 'educating, informing and entertaining'.' The
removal of the forum for negotiation between regulators and broadcasters, which has
accompanied the commission's change in status from broadcaster to regulator, has
similarly been understood to be retrogressive.' 26 As Sue Elliott has commented in
conversation:
In the future the ITC will have no pre-transmission role as it will no longer be the
broadcaster but the regulator. It may apply sanctions after a programme is shown.
This post-hoc way of regulation, I believe is ineffectual and boring.
I am pessimistic both in a personal and professional sense. In the IBA my role was
to preview programmes and negotiate with makers ... This will be dispensed with due
to our non-involvement in previewing. This will mean that if mistakes are made the
broadcasters will be legally responsible."
Third, inspite of the aim to create a system of regulation that can take into account a
wider set of imperatives, ITC programming staff believe that legal and institutional
changes will result "in (a) new regime (which) is far more 'mechanistic' ... (where)
issues (will be) judged in isolation and this will allow for far less flexibility."28
433
These perceptions are indicative of a maintenance of the institutional self-
doubt that characterised operations within the IBA throughout the late-eighties and
further demonstrate that a significant amount of the 'cultural baggage' drawn from its
predecessor has governed thinking in the commission. Although there has been a
formal attempt to incorporate market prescriptions within the new definition of public
service, traditional concepts have remained influential. As Sue Elliott further reveals:
I prefer to think of the viewer as viewer rather than consumer. In a purely economic
and crude sense the competitive situation may produce a more direct relationship
between consumer and producer. This is a narrow economic relationship rather than a
political relationship. I am pessimistic in a professional, personal and wider sense of
viewer accountability. This is, after all, a cultural product --- not a can of beans
which can play a significant part in the cultural life and in order to do so requires a
central procedure and established structure. In the future, as the funding becomes
more segmented the proper functions of broadcasting will be more complicated and
difficult to fulfil." 129
Consequently, as with the institutional analysis of the ITC, any discussion of
the commission's behaviour is circumscribed by the vagaries of speculation. It is
correct to state that throughout the first two years of its operations, that the ITC
retained control over the specifics and minutiae of commercial broadcasting by
continuing to operate under the 1981 Act's provisions. Therefore, positive programme
requirements remained a realistic objective and it is possible to conclude that even
with the changes apparent in the 1990 'Act that this precedent will result in the ITC
occupying a more interventionist position.
However, as Sue Elliott has suggested more fundamental changes may occur
once the ITC is is transformed from being a broadcaster into a regulator at the end of
1992. At this stage, an institutional and behavio rial analysis can only reveal a limited
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amount of information and may direct attention at certain evolving characteristics. It is
apparent from this material that a synthesis has started to occur between the legislation
and those who have to interpret it resulting in a series of traditional, revised and
reformed imperatives. Yet, it is difficult from this evidence to determine with any
precision where the emphasis will lie as internal and external factors (for example,
governmental changes and the collapse of dominant ideologies) may pressurize policy-
makers and regulators to reconceive their interpretations.
However, it may be argued that a number of cases have shown the possible
qualifications for the ITC which may exist over the following years. These problems
have, to an extent, made themselves apparent during the first two years of the ITC's
existence most especially with regard to the commission's inability to regulate the
satellite broadcasting sector and to intervene within the ITV schedule.
7:3.3 EARLY EXAMPLES OF THE LIMITATIONS OF THE ITC'S ROLE
Throughout the following decade, it has been predicted by many broadcaster
commentators that the ITC's position will become more untenable as its power has
been diminished through the legislation and the nature of the commercial broadcasting
market will alter. In respect to this argument, it may be suggested that the ITC will
have problems licensing an ITV system which is governed by increasingly major
players such as Carlton and Granada. These actors have diversified their economic
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power from the manufacture of communications hardware and catering respectively
and are looking to accumulate monopolistic ownership throughout the ITV system.
Moreover, with the re-structuring of the ITV regional franchises and the overbidding
which occurred, alongside the possible relaxation of ownership rules, it may also be
seen that the I1'V environment will force complicated mergers to take-place. Further,
it has been intimated that the ITC's broadening regulatory focus, comprising not only
of all terrestrial but all domestic satellite and cable broadcasts, may also demonstrate
the inadequate powers of a national regulator over an international market. Finally,
whilst the ITC has the negative power to sanction broadcasters over the schedules, it
has been argued that these controls will be legally problematic and difficult to
administer. Throughout the first two years of its operations, a number of these
concerns have begun to make themselves conspicuous.
The IBA/Shadow ITC faced an early test concerning its ability to intervene
over satellite broadcasting when it was announced that national satellite broadcaster,
BSB, had merged with Rupert Murdoch's Sky Television in November 1990. George
Russell and David Glencross's anger had been raised as the IBA/ITC was not
contacted by the BSB shareholders to be informed of the negotiation that was
occurring between them and Murdoch:' 3° Subsequently, the regulatory body argued
that its contract with BSB had been breached as the BSB shareholders had no rights to
effectively dispose of the IBA regulated DBS channels. Glencross commented:
It is one thing for the BSB shareholders to conclude that they can no longer support
the losses that are being incurred. It is quite another for them to imagine they can
transfer or share the contract with whoever they choose. The DBS contract is not
theirs to dispose of. It is the IBA's decision."'3'
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Moreover, the tough stance was enhanced by the decision to give careful consideration
of any application from B-Sky-B for a non-domestic satellite licence. However, in the
long-term the IBA/ITC was powerless to intervene as it had no legal jurisdiction over
the merged companies or the Astra Telecommunication satellite airwaves that were
employed by the new organization. As Peter Goodwin commented:
"The problem with the IBA's decision to terminate the DBS contract only after a
transitional period is that after that period B-Sky-B does not have any reason to be
interested in the DBS franchise. B-Sky-B has made it clear from the start its intention
to concentrate solely on Astra."32
In the event, the IBA/ITC retracted by allowing B-Sky-B to transmit its programmes
on the licensed non-domestic satellite airwaves, thereby deciding that the practicalities
of the 'merger' outweighed the protection of its regulatory status over
broadcasting.' 33
 Therefore, despite the initial show of strength by the
Authority/Commission, in reality, due to its limitations to intervene, pragmatism and
the general lack of political will exhibited by the government, it found itself to be
largely impotent and being forced to ratify a decision made between Murdoch and the
BSB shareholders.
Further restrictions have become apparent over the ITC's regulation of ITV
scheduling practices. Whilst George Russell has declared that the ITC may be able to
take an interventionist role in programme scheduling, in reality its position has proved
to be qualified. Essentially, the Broadcasting Act 1990 placed scheduling power into
the hands of the ITV companies through the establishment of the ITV Network
Centre. This body is responsible for both commissioning and scheduling programmes.
Further, due to the financial changes which have affected the companies and the fewer
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public service commitments, they are keen to increase advertising revenue by
scheduling more popular programmes. In this respect, the ITC's role has proven to be
reactive rather than pro-active. Clare Mulholland has summed up the 'arms-length'
relationship between the licensor and licensees which has emerged from the
legislation:
"To a considerable extent the system will be one of self-regulation by the licensees
within a clear framework of obligations and codes of practice. The ITC will need to
have an effective information system to allow it to take prompt action when problems
arise. For their part the licensees will have their own internal procedures to ensure
that they meet the requirements and standards of their licence. It will be for the
licensees, for example, to make proper arrangements for the handling of complaints
from the public about programmes, scheduling, advertising and technical operations
standards."'
Although the ITC has argued that it can remain a 'progressive regulator'
which will be able to intervene within the schedule by settling franchisee's contracts
and demanding certain types of 'quality' programmes, the ITV companies have taken
a very different approach. They contend that the ITC has no pre-viewing powers and
may find that its legal power will prove to be circumscribed. The battle-lines are
beginning to be drawn between the older conceptions of the regulator and the new
commercial imperatives that are governing managerial tiers within the companies. As
Greg Dyke has commented:
N They (the ITC) are trying to be the old IBA by another name. Thy won't sustain
that because they will bust up with one of us and we will take themTcourt. There will
be terrible bust ups. They keep saying things like they can influencwhere pieces are
scheduled tonight, we send them legal advice and say we can schedule where we like.
They think they have a 'quality' schedule list and they have some influence in it; they
haven't at all and I've got the legal advice to prove it to them.
They will become like an American regulator. They'll add up columns and they'll
add up numbers."35
438
One example of this development has been the concern over religious
broadcasting. For many years, the ITV companies had been obliged by the IBA's
regulations to schedule religious programmes early on a Sunday evening. This
undoubtedly has an impact upon advertising revenue, but had previously been
mandatory. During 1992, the ITC received 1,460 letters concerning ITV's intention to
move the religious programme, Highway, from this slot.' 36 However as David
Glencross admitted:
As a result of the Broadcasting Act 1990, the ITC no longer has powers to mandate
that a particular religious programme is shown at a specific time, so the matters one
between viewers and the ITV companies."37
Therefore, throughout this transitional period the ITC has faced several
challenges to institutional status and its jurisdiction over broadcasting. Inspite, of the
formal declarations and policies pursued by George Russell which stress continuity,
incremental change and a pro-active role for the ITC, the commission has been
plagued by self-doubt and has faced several challenges to its authority. Although, the
ITC is officially a light-touch regulator, its role has become increasingly problematic
as it has been forced to interpret the legislation and to respond to a disparate
broadcasting environment in which new actors from other areas of the media economy
have become dominant, most especially Rupert Murdoch, and ITV, due to the
franchise auction, has become more commercially motivated. Clearly, from this
evidence the ITC's response has been shaped as much from its own predecessor as
from the legislation. However, this material still fails to fully demonstrate the
practices the ITC will engage after 1992.
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7:4. AN ANALYSIS OF THE ITC'S EVOLVING WORKING OPERATIONS: THE
COMMISSION'S ROLE DURING THE CHANNEL 3 FRANCHISE AUCTION
The most instructive method which has remained open to the reviewer in
determining possible patterns for the future is to consider how the ITC coped with the
supervision of the controversial ITV Franchise Auction. This dominated its attention
during the first year of it operations. Consequently, such an analysis will define the
ITC's principal working practices and may suggest how the commission will continue
to make its decisions. There is a further advantage in detailing these practices as a
direct comparison can be made between the ITC and it predecessor the IBA, as the
latter was similarly responsible (albeit under a substantially different circumstances)
for the re-allocation of ITV franchises in 1981.
7:4.1 THE 1981 FRANCHISE ROUND: HOW DID THE IBA CONDUCT ITS
AFFAIRS?
In order to understand the IBA's motivations in 1981, it is first necessary to
consider the evolution of the legal and industrial context in which the Authority was
situated. As I have previously argued in my historical chapter, the British broadcasting
system whilst outwardly exhibiting the features of a dual system based upon a mixed
economy of public and private finance, developed in an incremental fashion in which
the public and private sectors represented two sides of the same order. The system
had been contained by the state as statutory regulatory bodies required governmental
backing both in institutional and ideological terms in order to attain legitimacy. This
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form of governmental support has neither been formerly achieved through legislation
or by heavy-handed state intervention. Instead it has been subtly realised through
concepts such as 'impartiality' and 'public service' which have combined to created
of a culture of shared aims and mutual understandings between broadcasters and
politicians. Within this space, the broadcasting regulators have had a fair degree of
autonomy which was, in turn, defined by an understanding of what could or could not
be achieved. This has created a specific set of working arrangements in which de-
facto or informal practices were covertly pursued as the norm.
Kenneth Dyson has argued that as a consequence British broadcasting
regulation has enabled certain key players to attain privileges as they were seen to be
representative of sectional interests, whilst simultaneously being consonant with a
particular perception of the 'public interest'.' 38 He maintains that two tendencies
have typified the regulatory process: that regulatory capture has occurred as those
who were to be regulated have determined how regulators have conducted their affairs
and there has been an orchestration of interests structured in a neo-corporatist
manner.' 39 He has defined this as Private Interest Government and states that five key
features have become conspicuous:
1. Regulation was based on 'minimalist' legislation, with governments
displaying reticence about the very idea of 'broadcasting policy'.
2. In their relations with broadcasting governments showed a preference for
invisible or indirect action.
3. The regulatory process involved a pronounced secretiveness, privacy,
informality and exclusiveness, with a narrow range of privileged participants
and little concern about public accountability.
4. The regulators represented 'establishment politics' (or) 'the great and the
good'. Regulation depended on trust in them to define and safeguard the
'national interest' in broadcasting and took on a strong component of moral
suasion.
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5. The regulations exercised self-restraint, so that in practice the reality of
regulation was shaped by broadcasting professionals.'4°
The 1981 round of ITV franchise re-negotiations and the IBA's role
throughout this process would appear to vindicate Dyson's arguments. The 1980
Broadcasting Act was ratified during the Thatcher government's first term and
belonged to the traditions of consensual broadcasting policy where minimal
governmental requirements remained the norm. Although the 1980 Act demonstrated a
degree of tightening the system up in relation to public accountability and by
increasing the number of rules, as Dyson has noted the "law provided a framework,
rather than a blueprint." 4 ' The legislation was minimalistic and empowered the IBA
to act in an unilateral manner as it could decide on the ITV company franchises for a
maximum of eight years.
The IBA's interpretation of the Act led it to review the ITV franchises
throughout 1980 to 1981. The IBA Chairman Lady Plowden, along with the board,
was largely responsible for setting out the procedure and determining the decisions
which were made. In many respec' both the IBA's review of the franchises and the
conclusions it came to were subjected to extensive disapproval . Asa Briggs and
Joanne Spicer have outlined seven major criticisms.
First, the ITV companies felt that the process had a detrimental effect on their
programming as management was forced to focus on the franchise round and the
companies diverted resources away from their output. This the companies, and to a
lesser extent the new IBA chairman Lord Thomson, had argued led to a decline in
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programme standards.' 42 The second criticism concerned the inequity of a process in
which a number of companies faced no competition whatsoever, whilst others which
were vulnerable from all sides ended up losing their franchise despite the relative
merits of their programming. As Briggs and Spicer comment:
"There seems to be something inherently unjust about a system where there was no
evening out of bids, particularly since, during the franchise-allotting processes,
'weaknesses of incumbent companies' which were challenged might have been
exposed by contenders in whom the Authority itself was soon to show no
confidence."'43
The IBA was also accused of thinking about their decisions as a 'package' concerning
the economics and politics of the whole of the ITV system, rather than thinking about
the effect on the individual programme contractors. This led to many arguing that the
system was unjust as strategic sacrifices were made to preserve the overall order. In
particular, the replacement of Southern Television with Television South (TVS) was
cited as evidence of this form of thinking. Further, this was little or no unaminity
over whether the system was actually any better or worse off after these changes. '
Another issue concerned the role of the Authority and its inability to relate
programming with finance either in consideration with individual companies or the
overall structure of the system.' 45
 Essentially, the IBA was perceived as being
composed of amateurs, of being out of touch whilst still attempting to be
interventionist. The ITV professionals understandably felt that the IBA, a lay body,
did not have a consistent understanding of the system. Moreover, the legislation had
allowed these individuals to make judgements which affected the companies'
profits. '
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The fifth criticism concerned the Act itself. The legislation had been too
vague on the relationship between the IBA's monitoring functions and iallocating
function. This had led to confusions and a spectacular voile-face by the Authority.'47
For instance, in 1974 the IBA had written to the chairman of Southern Television
praising the company's programming and technical output. In 1980 to 1981, Southern
Television had lost its franchise. For all practical purposes, Southern Television's
performance had improved in these five years. Therefore, whilst the IBA claimed to
find the company programme output as 'bland, it appeared that the IBA had not used
the monitoring reports that it was meant to keep.'48
A sixth criticism referred to the failure of any form of actual public
debate.'49 The public had little or no chance to comment on the process whilst it
was occurring or once the decisions had been made. Public meetings seldom focused
on key issues concerning ownership, holding companies, diversification or regional
share-ownership.' 5° Financial issues were either treated naively or were ignored.
Finally, the procedure was seen to be inappropriate and poorly organized. The
companies losing their franchises were not given appropriate warning and anomalies
existed as some companies were either required to give detailed explanations in their
interviews with the IBA, whilst otherswere barely questioned. Most especially,
decisions were seen to have been made in a high-handed manner. Lady Plowden's
response to these criticisms also did not help when she stated that "it would be
destructive to have hearings in public because you can ask in private questio'1?you
can't ask in public." 5 ' As Briggs and Spicer have commented the lasting impression
was that:
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No changes were made (and) ... the general discussion ... was less comprehensive
and probing --- than the previous dialogue between the companies and the Authority
or public discussion outside Parliament."'52
In performing its legal duties, the IBA may be seen to have employed
normative practices which were founded upon the characteristics of secrecy and
invisibility. There was little room for public control or accountability as the Authority
preferred to negotiate with a limited number of participants who were deemed to be
influential due to their professional status. Moreover, establishment politics came to
the fore as the IBA decided to incrementally alter the commercial system so that
public service prescriptions would remain fundamental. An elaborate and complex
process was used so that the wider systematic benefits were encouraged and that any
change in one area needed to take into account the overall balance of the system.
Finally the patronage of the major Independent Companies can be perceived
as being influential. It is a truism to note that the more important large companies
(Thames, London Weekend, Granada) remained unaffected and retained monopolistic
control in organizing the network and smaller companies such as Southern Television
lost their contracts. Dyson has identified this latter tendency as being
neo-corporatist' 53 and this led to many criticisms:
The Times ... spoke of the Authority as a 'lay body' (which was) allowed "to
choose the companies permitted to operate an absolute monopoly in a field which has
in the past made fortunes for some of those who coin the IBA's approval". The
professionalism of independent television lay in the companies, not at Brompton
Road."
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7:4.2. THE ITC'S SUPERVISION OF THE 1991 FRANCHISE AUCTION
In contrast to the 1981 Franchise round which had been widely condemned,
the government had intended that the 990 Act would make the system more
transparent and accountable by opening it up to the market-place through an auction,
inspite of the quality guarantees, and effectively dispensing with a level of complacent
bureaucracy.
However, through the policy process and the bargaining which had occurred,
it has also been suggested that the legislation was inappropriate and forced the ITC's
hand in its decision-making. Many within the industry felt that the ITC, led by
Chairman George Russell, had managed to act as effectively as possible. It was
argued that the commission had skilfuly stemmed the flow of revenue going directly
to the Exchequer's coffers by employing the 'quality threshold' and by penalising
companies who drastically overbid such as TVS and TSW.' 55
 Peter Goodwin has
suggested that the ITC document Invitation to Apply for Regional Channel 3 Licences
by defining programming strands and sub strands (for instance, news, religion, and
childrens) and the threat of the 'Exceptional Circumstances' clause enabled the
commission to ensure that programmequality was to some extent maintained.'56
Conversely, it may also be stated that it let through too many high bidders who may
face increasing problems associated with the current recession within advertising and
the potential growth of subscription in the following years.'57
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Whilst, several points of view have been expressed in respect to how the
ITC's decisions affected the industry, less has been said about whether the
commission's interpretation of the franchise auction rules was any better or worse than
what occurred in 1981. However, a number of clear features were detectable within
its approach to the competitive tender. These factors hardly conformed with the
Government's stated aim of making the ITV sector more accountable to the public by
employing commercial measures to free the system. Instead, they demonstrate the
persistence of Dyson's analysis claiming that the broadcast regulation has been fixed
within the Private Interest Government approach.
The first and most obvious factor was the lack of any actual public debate.
The ITC made no attempt to hold any public meetings during the franchise auction
process. This was left to the British Film Institute (BFI) who staged a number of
regional public meetings to provide the forum for debate. These debates were
predominantly populated by interested parties and received little or no publicity. This
meant that the most drastic upheaval to the commercial system since its invention was
largely ignored by the public who remained ill-informed about the potential changes
that were being discussed. George Russell's comments sound suspiciously similar to
those made by Lady Plowden ten years earlier:
"The methodology of trying to see who is good, bad, indifferent; the financial
analysis, no public meetings, no beauty parades, the formal requests for further
information in writing and getting a considered reply back - this is a process I would
stand by totally."158
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Second, far from being the straightforward auction that the government had
originally envisaged, the process became a massively complicated and bureaucratic
undertaking which involved several hundred man hours and took nearly ten months to
complete. In interpreting the rules, the ITC produced the Invitation to Apply for
Regional Channel 3 Licences. This seventy-five page document was sent out on the
15th February 1991 and contained over two hundred sections outlining how a bid
should be made.'59 These comprised licensing requirements, the franchise
procedure, the quality threshold and the general arrangements of the future
network.' 6° As George Russell has commented:
"The Government did not lay down the mechanism of the methodology, we did."'6'
This meant that the workload was divided amongst a number of working
parties who first looked at the programming 'quality' of the application and then were
drawn together to consider Section C - the business plan. These teams had no prior
knowledge of the size of the bids and consequently employed the normative criteria
associated with the traditions of ITV rather than respond to the commercial imperative
of the competitive tender. Thus, inspite of the ITC's altered legal remit in granting
franchises under the terms of the Act as a licensor, the commission still retained its
predecessor's institutional and ideological outlook in assessing the applicant's merits
or deficiencies. The ITC remained strongly interventionist as programme content,
regional appropriateness and business plans were all considered in detail. In particular,
this analysis may be seen to have underpinned the commission's notion of 'quality'
broadcasting when it dealt with the first part of the application. As Sue Elliott
448
comments:
"There is no definition of quality. ... However, the only workable way of dealing
with the issue is to equate it, to some extent, with diversity and range which are parts
of the conception. Therefore, the 'quality threshold' was based in relation to the
existing ITV service. Using the present service as a benchmark, licensees may at least
(be judged) on a package which concurs to eighty percent of such output."62
Fourthly, the ITC did not even out the results of the bidding process. The
contradictions within the system were legion as Central and Scottish Television found
themselves freed from competition, whilst the London weekday contractor Thames, in
spite of it status as a largest contributor to the network, lost its franchise to Canton.
In this respect, it could be argued that the ITC's approach contrasted with the IBA's
attempt to provide a 'package' for the overall system in 1981. The process forced the
ITC to consider each region in isolation. As George Russell has commented:
It is also wise for you to remember, because I kept telling people at the time, that it
was genuinely 15 or 16 different races, the threshold for each and the size of Becher's
Brook for each being different."63
However, whilst the government had envisaged this would increase competitiveness
only areas of potential profitability received a significant challenge from the new
companies. Moreover, it may be argued that the ITC's decision to remove Thames
was governed by political realities and it was sacrWced for the general good of the
ITV system. In this respect, the major players, such as Granada, remained secure and
a degree of regulatory capture still characterized the relationship between the ITC and
ITV companies. Further, this decision may be also be seen to demonstrate the
persistence of establishment politics within broadcast regulation.
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Finally, the decision-making process remained resolutely secretive both to the
companies who won or lost the auction and to the public. It was a clandestine affair.
Its outcome did not have to be publicly defended by the commission and certainly a
number of the decisions appeared somewhat arbitrary, most especially it should be
noted with the removal of TV-AM. In this respect, the ITC remained fixed in the
tradition of its predecessor, the IBA, which was heavily criticised for its arbitrary
approach during the 1981 Franchise round when companies such as Southern
Television were dropped for no publicly stated reason. The former Chairman of the
IBA, Lord Thomson of Montieth, famously remarked about the IBA's 1981 decisions
that 'There must be a better way))M
However, the 1991 franchise auction certainly did not prove to be an any
more open or democratic procedure as neither the public or the losing franchisees
were provided with a full explanation of the commission's decisions. George Russell
has argued that the losing companies (Thames, TV AM, TVS, TSW) were all
informed under the 1990 Act rules why they had been removed. However, Russell
admits this explanation was only partial:
All they got on 16 October was a simple faxed letter saying that you failed quality
or in some cases failed on finance. In the meetings later we were able to say, you
failed quality under section 2a, but passed under c, d, e, f or whatever. We formally
told them the bits they had failed under. That was not what they all wanted but that
was what we were prepared to give, because that was what we felt proper under the
Act."65
The 1TC's refusal to explain its reasoning led to one of the losing companies TSW,
chaired by Harry Turner, taking the commission to the courts to overturn the
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decision. 1 The company claimed that its business plan had been unfairly assessed
and it unanimously rejected the notion that the commission had been mislead by a
staff assessment paper.' 67 In the event, the Court of Appeal, in a decision of two to
one, decided to reject TSW's claim that the ITC had acted inappropriately. The
process of judicial review proved to be long, costly (over £500, 000 in court costs)
and ultimately fruitless for the deposed company, however the ITC was forced to
provide information declaring the reasons which had governed the judgements it had
made. 168
Therefore, a comparative analysis between the IBA's actions during the 1981
franchise roundand the ITC's decisions in 1991 demonstrate a continuity in its use of
the methodology and the outcome. Whilst, the rules and circumstances had greatly
altered throughout the decade, the ITC still exhibited the features, outlook and
ideology of its predecessor.
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CONCLUSION
This chapter has demonstrated that the regulatory arrangements within British
broadcasting have become increasingly complicated. The legislation set in place
reformed and new bodies alongside traditional regulators. This has meant that
regulatory organizations have started to clash over jurisdiction and that incoherence
has characterized their operations. This incoherence has appeared on several levels.
First, the public's perceptions of these authorities has been unclear as evidenced by
the general inability to distinguish between the BSC and the BCC. Secondly, the
regulatory authorities and the broadcasters have largely failed to reach agreement on
accepted areas of jurisdiction and procedure. Therefore, rather than deregulation, a
process of re-regulation has occurred throughout the post-1990 period. This has been
marked by a painful and contradictory transition period which will apparently take a
number of years to resolve.
A concurrent development has been the change in the broadcasting
environment and the need of the regulatory bodies to adapt to this reformed milieu. In
particular, the 1990 Act has commercialized the ITV system and has promoted
alternative constituencies of power. Iniurn, the ideologies expressed by ITV
companies' management have challenged the traditional arrangements. Further, the
increasing penetration of the subscription based satellite broadcaster, B-Sky-B, has
exposed the shortcomings of legislative process which identified broadcasting as a
national, rather than international, phenomenon. This has meant that the legislation
governing broadcast regulation may be seen to be inappropriate and short-sighted.
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Ultimately, national regulators have proved powerless in attempting to control the
efforts of diversified, international conglomerates such as Murdoch's News
International.
The case study of the ITC has demonstrated how te one, major broadcasting
#% LI
regulator has attempted to cope in this reformei Throughout this study it has been
possible to identify three main trends 	 continuity, adaptation and change:
First, in terms of the ITC's legal framework a complex situation has emerged
that reflects the incredible (even for British legislation) swings and balances that have
influenced broadcasting policy-inaking. The minirnalistic broadcasting policy that had
previously provided a framework for regulation has been replaced by a far more
detailed form of law which in attempting to propagate deregulation has resulted in a
compromise between a number of competing theories and pressures. Consequently,
the ITC has retained some of the interventionist powers of its predecessor, the IBA,
most especially over the licensing of the franchisees. However, in respect to the ITV
companies' programme output the ITC can only ensure that a degree of balance and
quality occurs across the schedule. To this end, I believe, the legislation has proved to
be deeply flawed as it has tried to please all interests whilst eventually satisfying none.
Second, it is far from clear, from an institutional or behavio rial analysis, if
the ITC can or will deliberately circumvent the legislation or will be enforced to
follow provisions to the letter of the law. It is possible to argue that continuity will
occur as the ITC has used traditional organizational and working practices. However,
453
the adaptability that George Russell has tried to incorporate into the commission's
principles cannot be underestimated. Within the ITC itself the realisation has emerged
that things can never be quite the same. The professional staff have been streamlined,
the commission was re-locating and the functions of the regulators have been altered.
Moreover, they understand that technological and market alterations will force new
philosophies to come into play. However, the institutional self-perceptions would seem
to imply that throughout the institution's embryonic period the ITC's philosophies
remain muddled and unclear. Further, the ITC has appeared to feel that it still may
retain a positive control over the ITV system through its ability to sanction or revoke
licences. This interpretation of its role has been challenged by the broadcasters who
claim that the ITC no longer has the legal power or institutional might to intervene
over the schedule. As Steven Barnett comments:
"The ITC will be retrospective and it will be almost impossible for certain
commitments to be maintained. It won't be the filter through which programmes are
appreciated. It is much more difficult to regulate retrospectively. The procedure is
much more slow. It is difficult to tell how effective or ineffective the new system will
be, but experience appears to indicate that the ITC will have its work cut out and will
be stretched to the limit."69
Throughout the 1991 franchise auction the problems of maintaining the
traditions of the system, alongside the 'ITC's attempts to adapt to the new commercial
realities became conspicuous. In the event, the ITC understood that its role was to act
in the interest of the overall system by stemming the flow of money to the treasury,
enforcing a procedure which stressed the quality of the bid and making a number of
tactical sacrifices to please its political masters. The ITC's actions also served to
expose the argument that the legislation had opened up the decision-making processes
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and had made the system more transparent. A comparative analysis between the IBA
reallocation of franchises in 1981 and the 1991 demonstrates the similarities rather
than the differences in both bodies procedures and their allocation of licences.
As I have previously mentioned, several shades of opinion exist on the future
development of of British broadcasting regulation. Anthony Smith has argued that the
system has essentially remained intact although a number of superficial alterations
have occurred. In regard to the ITC, this argument may be substantiated if the
institution, the personnel and the commission's formal interpretation of role are taken
into account. These would seem to indicate that the ITC will not become a light-touch
regulator. From this perspective, Smith argues that integration and coherence will be
achieved as normative ideologies and working practices will be pursued.
An alternative perspective may be drawn from conversations with broadcasting
professionals such as Caroline Thomson and Greg Dyke or regulators such as Sue
Elliott. They argue that whilst the specifics of the 1990 Broadcasting Act would
appear to stress the perpetuation of public service conceptions, in a wider sense
different philosophies located around market-led prescriptions are apparent. In turn,
they argue that the legislation in attempting to create a situation for deregulation has
produced a far more formalised order which will result in an incremental change in
the manner in which regulators will function. As Thomson has commented:
"It is a case study of how a traditional old system based on consensus and the ability
to muddle through has been replaced by a transparent (market-led) system where
everything has to be done by the rules. The rules have to be more detailed as they are
related to legal obligations."70
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Both of these arguments are conditioned by the values of Public Service
Broadcasting to a greater or lesser degree. In the former, the advocates of public
service have won and these conceptions have proved to be impervious to the intrusion
of deregulatory concepts. In the latter, the scenario is less clear-cut as the traditional
concepts have been seen to have been undermined by new or different imperatives.
These judgements are based upon subjective criteria and should be understood as
such. In attempting to apply a more objective assessment upon the material it is clear
that factors supporting either case have become apparent and thus tend to
simultaneously support and contradict these perceptions. The reality has proved to be
far more complicated than there simply being a situation of continuity or change.
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CONCLUSION
The aim of this thesis has been to assess, analyze and explain the evolution of
British broadcasting policy throughout the mid-to-late eighties and to consider the
early developments within British policy outputs in relation to the commercialization
of broadcasting finance and regulation. It was my purpose to carry out an
investigation which would test, through a number of criteria, the nature and extent of
deregulation within broadcasting. In this respect, I have analyzed the historical
development and organization of the British broadcasting system, the development of
deregulatory theories as articulated by the Peacock Report, the political will and
culture in which the policy was developed, the nature, scope and orientation of the
legislation itself and the implementation of this policy.
To this end, the central conclusion of my work has been that broadcasting has
evidenced an on-going transition between a regulated public duopoly founded upon the
tenets of 'Public Service Broadcasting' (PSB) into a system in which public and
private funding has been channelled into increasingly commercial practices. This is an
incremental process in which certain characteristics are starting to become apparent as
the British broadcasting system currently exhibits elements of continuity, revision and
outright reform.
The broadcasting institutions continue to exist in a modified form and formally
the system remains committed to the public service ideal, although this has been
pitched as being predominantly the concern of the BBC and Channel Four. Through
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the franchise auction and the considerable sums of money that have left the companies
to go directly to the Exchequer, the ITV sector is becoming increasingly commercial
in terms of its organizational structure, constituent power blocs, labour practices and
programme output. The ITC, inspite of retaining semi-interventionist powers within
the role of broadcasting, appears to be more and more involved in thorny licensing
issues in respect to the regional franchises.
A significant alteration has begun to show itself at an ideological level
within the broadcasting elite as the terms of the debate have been set by the market,
as commercial practices are being more consciously pursued. Further, a new
generation of broadcasting managers, as signified by individuals such as BBC
Director-General John Birt, Carlton chairman Michael Green and former London
Weekend Television (LWT) Chief Executive Greg Dyke, have ascended into the
major positions of power and influence. In many ways, these changes have been
imperceptible and were afforded through the legislation, institutional practices and
reformed ideologies. Therefore, the effect of the Peacock Report within this context
has been crucial in certain areas, incremental in others and marginal elsewhere.
In this respect, the deregulation of broadcasting which was advocated
by Peacock and intellectuals such as Samuel Brittan and Peter Jay, has been subsumed
by a process that may be best described as re-regulation. The Peacock Report and
Brittan, in particular, throughout his writings on broadcasting, made the link between
economic reform and political liberty.' The argument was drawn from an innate
belief of the self-regulating capacity of the market and a critique of the duopoly which
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contravened consumer welfare. Further, the citizen's rights had been ameliorated by
the traditional monopolistic system which was covertly subjected to state intervention
through regulation. Brittan saw 'regulation-as-censorship' and the report made several
references to MacCaulay's history of a free press, liberated by the Star Chamber
repeals and the economic emancipation of advertising. This aspect of Peacock's
critique remained unique, but was quickly dismissed by Douglas Hurd who reasserted
the government's wish to retain interventionary supervision over programme output.2
However, the subsequent course of the legislative process was marked by a
precarious balancing act between state intervention and the Thatcher government's
well-articulated belief that it stood in the vanguard for opening up the market for
competition through free-market practices such as deregulation. The government's
response was influenced by the strain of repressive controls over the broadcast media
that it had virulently practised throughout the early-to-mid-eighties culminating the
'Real Lives' and 'Death on the Rock' debacles and the multi-farious forces, such as
the advertising lobby, who lined up on either side of the debate.
The Peacock Report's political libertarianism was undermined throughout the
policy-making process and the subsequent implementation of the legislation.
Ironically, the economic reform of the system and the increased access for
Independent producers has given rise to a significantly stronger set of state controls.
This was due to the government's mixed motivations as its attempt to dismantle the
broadcasting system was strongly directed by its desire to quell what it perceived as a
dangerous political foe. As a consequence, an invidious pattern of de facto state power
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has started to emerge as broadcasting finds itself governed by the volatility of the
market. This has become apparent in a number of ways either through the legal
changes affecting ITV as the ITC is no longer the official broadcaster and cannot
protect the companies by representing them in court, through the politicization of the
senior appointment process, thereby inducing a greater complicity between the
political and the broadcasting elite, and finally through the implementation of
broadcasting policies determined in relation to the immediate political environment.
However, in one noticeable respect, Peacock's aim for public service
broadcasting has become manifest. This has been the concern with the public service
being endemic in the prograinniing ends rather than in the institutional values and
organization. 3 To some extent, Peacock's notion of public service being provided by
the market-place has been borne out, albeit not necessarily in the form outlined in the
report.
This has been overtly apparent in the commercial changes instigated by the
1990 Act which have affected ITV, as the companies have been subject to a franchise
auction (in which significant revenues were taken out of the system) and have had to
dramatically rationalise their operations. In the ITV sector many of the normative
understanding, rules and indeed regulations have been dismantled.
Similarly, the BBC's internal market reform of 'Producer Choice' is intended
to employ market strategies in order to increase creativity at the programming ends
whilst simultaneously demonstrating the efficient use of public resources. The sea-
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change in the BBC's management's attitudes has been promoted through the patronage
appointment system indulged in by the corporation, the twenty-five percent quota and
the institution's attempts to second guess the government.
It should be noted that these developments have, in many respects, occurred
through incremental re-conceptions, inspired (or not, depending on your political
persuasion) by the constant legislative, political and financial pressures which have
faced broadcasting, rather than following any type of prescribed pattern laid down by
the Peacock Report. The legislative cycle (in common with many others) resulting in
the 1990 Act has been messy, contradictory and incoherent. Issues have been raised,
only to be rejected and the whole policy has been subject to many false dawns. In
particular, the pace of the new technological developments have tended to outstrip
policy-making and forecasters. Ironically, these caveats and possible cul-de-sacs
appear to be the one consistency in the whole process under investigation within my
thesis. This also appears to be one of the trends that has marked the early and
continuing implementation of this policy. Therefore, this development sheds light
upon the following issues:
Firstly, the imperatives and dynamics which have shaped the policy-making
process. Throughout the immediate post-Peacock policy-making period there was a
battle for supremacy between the Home Office and the Department of Trade and
Industry (DTI) over the control of broadcasting. 4 Both departments held different
interests in regard to broadcasting and were responding to alternative policy and
ideological agendas. The Home Office preferred to perceive broadcasting in the
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normative terms arguing for the maintenance of public service as a public good for a
limited resource (although broadcasting was increasingly being subjected to
technological reform allowing for an expansion of the airwaves) and was further
motivated by the issues of social and political control. The Home Office ministers,
Secretary of State Douglas Hurd and 	 Timothy Renton, were also drawn from the
more traditional echelons of the Conservative party and were consummate professional
politicians.
Alternatively, the DTI perceived itself at the vanguard of the Thatcher reform
movement and was responsible for the technological licensing of broadcasting. The
Department had been actively involved in the mass privatization and de-nationalization
of industries in the name of competition. As technology provided more competitive
opportunities, the DTI argued that broadcasting should be seen as an economic activity
and was keen to consider radical solutions such as privatizing the airwaves, BBC2 and
Channel Four in order to provide the appropriate conditions for increased independent
access to the broadcasting market. Moreover, the DTI acted in a predatory manner
during the mid-eighties as it was led by the extremely ambitious Lord Young
throughout 1987-1990. Young was a strong political ally of the Prime Minister and
owed his appointment to his business background. Therefore, the department devoted
a significant amount of attention and time to an issue which had previously been
marginal.
This fight for control within the political organization of policy marked the
stage between Report to White Paper. In several respects the 1988 White Paper is
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indicative of a compromise between the backtracking Home Office, who were fighting
a half-hearted rear-guard action, and the DTI which desired greater liberalization,
privatization and competition. The compromise over Channel Four, which remains a
legally innovative broadcaster, whilst having to sell its advertising in direct
competition to a more commercial ITV sector was reached due to the different
departmental initiatives. It appears, however, that both departments, along with the
then Chancellor of the Exchequer Nigel Lawson, were keen to initiate Peacock's
majority decision of the franchise auction.5
A second, related issue was the strength of political will over formal economic
theories such as deregulation. A tension existed between radical think-tanks, the
Peacock Committee, politicians, policy-makers and broadcasters between regarding
broadcasting as simply an economic practice and understanding it as a socio-political
practice which had wider implications for society. At the most extreme end of market
reform stood think-tanks such as 'the Adam Smith Institute' or 'The Institute of
Economic Affairs'. 6
 Peacock provided a market-liberal blue-print which retained a
minimal form of regulatory practice such as a 'Public Service Broadcasting Council'.7
Against this, the government was motivated by a desire to introduce commercial
practices and privatization within the industry, but distrusted the full implications of
economic deregulation as it desired to retain forms of covert control over broadcasting
which had been manufactured through regulatory actors such as the BBC Governors,
the IBA and financial practices such as the licence fee and the levy system.8
The government's political will was significantly influenced by the efforts of
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the advertising lobby and the monopolism which pervaded the industry. The
advertisers, who had the ear of the Prime Minister through agencies such as Saatchi
and Saatchi (who had organized the Conservative Election campaigns in 1979, 1983
and 1987), felt that their interests had been undercut due to ITV's monopoly over
advertising slots. Effectively, they argued ITV could charge exorbitant prices and its
schedule did not account for advertising interests.9
1TV's monopoly raised government contempt elsewhere. In particular, the
Thatcher government disliked the extensive profits which were being made by the ITV
companies, through their monopoly of advertising revenues and the Treasury's
inability to effectively tax them through the levy system. The levy was essentially a
taxation on profits which could be circumvented by re-investing surplus capital back
into the companies through costly productions and labour agreements. It also felt that
a form of cartelism had emerged in which there were industry insiders and outsiders.
This was most famously evidenced by the IBA's vetoing of Canton's attempt to buy
Thames in 1986.10
Thirdly, the government's ability to actually alter the system was afforded by
the communications revolution and the ability to manufacture cheap domestic cable
and satellite receivers. The government's concern, within this area of broadcasting,
appeared to be exclusively located around the ability to direct it as a political threat
against the established broadcasting organizations and their practices. 1 ' Therefore,
the policy-making was cursory as there was no attempt to analyze its supra-national
implications. Further, it demonstrated a form of political clientelism in its dealings
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with Rupert Murdoch's 'News International' group who held a considerable interest in
satellite broadcasting.' 2 The government's refusal to intervene and allow the market
to regulate the new media served to lay the foundations for the monopolistic control
which currently exists after the 'merger' between Sky and BSB.
Finally, any attempt to dismantle the broadcasting system clearly demonstrates
the nature and pressures of state-broadcasting relations within the British polity. The
deregulatory agenda set by Peacock not only exhibited confusion at the level of
political organization and will, but illustrated the dichotomy between the proposed
liberalization and the political control which had underpinned the system from its birth
in the early twenties.
Effectively, the development of British broadcasting had been conditional
upon the ideological, if not overt political support, of the political elite. Public service
broadcasting was more than a technical or resource issue, but referred to an ethic of
broadcasting and a commitment to apparent political independence, fomented through
the broadcasting institutions constitutional and financial organization. The relationship
between broadcaster and state has always been more complicated as outright
independence has been lessened by the imperatives of legislation, reports, regulation,
finance and covert intervention.
The early eighties proved to be a particular tense period for these relations as
the broadcasting and political elites fell out and failed to find any common ground in
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terms of background, outlook or experience. Margaret Thatcher's ascendancy was
accompanied by a number of ideologues situated in very different locales, who had
previously been marginal in the political scene. The market-liberals of the Institute of
Economic Affairs or the Adam Smith Institute provided the movement with its
intellectual base, whilst politicians such as Keith Joseph built up links with the
followers of Hayek and Friedman. These changes within the composition of the
political elite were not actively followed by broadcasters, who found themselves to be
increasingly anachronistic within this environment. 13
This dissolution was hastened by the broadcaster's approaches to sensitive
political issues such as Northern Ireland or the Falklands, and cumulative series of
disputes confirmed the ever-widening gulf. These demonstrated a diverging approach,
between broadcasters and the government, over what constituted the national interest
and what constituted political independence. Further, the Thatcher government's
aggressive political style added to their all or nothing reading of the relations with the
broadcasters. Whilst, poor relations had marked the Wilson government's relationship
with the BBC, culminating with the appointment of Charles Hill as the Chairman of
the Governors, the retiring of Hugh Green and 'Yesterday Men', his press secretary
Joe Haines had accused the BBC of political bias for the Conservatives.' 4 In marked
contrast, the leading Thatcherite Norman Tebbit accused the corporation, after the
Falkiands War, of being governed by a 'unctuous impartiality'.' 5 Moreover, whilst
political disputes had marked the terrain previously, significant sections of the political
elite supported the concept of public service broadcasting and impartiality. During the
Thatcher period, this basic support eroded and the broadcasters found themselves in
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an isolated position.'6
This misreading of British state-broadcasting relations by both sides produced
a situation in which short-term solutions were sought. This led to an incoherent form
of legislation which was reflective of a policy-making process riddled with
contradictions, partly of the government's own making which demonstrated the more
hidden-hand of political control. The policy-making may be seen to be 'stop-start'.
Initially, the BBC was the object governmental reforms due the poor relations between
the Corporation and Thatcherites which had reached a nadir with the 'Real Lives'
controversy. However, the government's focus shifted toward the commercial sector
as the companies made excessive profits which they had re-directed back into
production as they were levied, operated in a highly monopolistic fashion in which
competition was stemmed as market entry was limited, were subject to extreme
unionization through restrictive union agreements and were regulated by the IBA
which may have appeared to have been 'captured' by the interests it was supposed to
protect the public from.
Whilst ITV clearly went against the apparent aims of Thatcher's beliefs of
competition and efficiency, the principal motivation was political. After 'Real Lives'
the BBC had 'put its house in order' with the appointment of a Conservative ally
Marmaduke Hussey as Chairman of the Board of Governors and the dismissal of
Alasdair Milne as Director-General.' 7 The BBC also made overt noises about
becoming more efficient, whilst simultaneously seeking to limit the amount of political
controversy.'8 ITV, however, found itself at the centre of a high-level political storm
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with the airing of Thames TV documentary 'Death on the Rock'. The government's
approach was deliberately heavy-handed and oppressive. The IBA's reluctance to bow
to political pressure clearly contributed to its own demise and channelled the
government's desire to reform a clearly monopolistic system. The period was also
characterized by a complicated development within the legislative process. For
instance, extensive lobbying occurred between those who wished to enter the system
and had been previously constrained, notably Michael Green's 'Carlton', and ITV
backed lobbies such as the 'Campaign for Quality in Broadcasting' which received a
high-profile due the figures involved within them, who notably also proved to be
successful in winning a franchise ('Meridian'))9
As a consequence, the policy-making process is indicative of a central
contradiction between market freedoms, often referring more to short-term political
will than to any attempt to actually convert economic theories into concrete policies,
and a strain of repressive political control which Margaret Thatcher's government
actively engaged in vis-a-vis broadcasting. This manufactured itself on a number of
occasions --- the 'Real Lives' affair, 'Death on the Rock', Special Branch's seizure of
the 'Zircon Spy Satellite tapes' and the Douglas Hurd's blanket broadcasting ban on
Sinn Fein. Further, as the government considered the market-liberals ideas of
Peacock, Brittan, Jay or Veljanovski, it made conspicuous the control mechanisms
which had been established throughout broadcasting's history through incremental
understandings, self-censorship, institutional development, governing ideologies and
regulatory practice.
479
In effect, the government, whilst being publicly accused by broadcasters as
perceiving it as 'no more than a can of beans' discovered that broadcasting was indeed
a socio-economic-political practice which had been conditioned by political, national
and cultural understandings. 2° Previously, clearly identified parameters had been
established in which broadcasting could exert its formal independence. This was not a
conscious practice, but had been aided by common assumptions, backgrounds and
interpretations of political liberty between the political and broadcasting elites.
However, with the rather crude, overt methods employed by the government
and a political style augmented by vocal attacks and aggression, these normative
processes came increasingly under pressure. In turn, the Thatcher government found
itself in a rather more complicated position than it had anticipated as it desired market
reform but feared the political consequences of opening up the airwaves to a form a
riotous pluralism. The publicly available policy documents --- the White Paper and the
Act --- signify aattempt to streamline these issues, however the joins are conspicuous.
The Independent Television Commission (ITC), for instance, is meant to be a 'light-
touch' regulator with licensing responsibilities, however, inspite of the removal of
pre-viewing powers, the ITC has a number of interventionary powers within
programming as licences can be withdrawn in this respect.2'
In many ways, the attempted reform of broadcasting stands at the cusp of
Thatcherite reforms to the general British economy. It provides a micro-cosmic
example of the political orientation of Margaret Thatcher's government both in terms
of the mechanisms of hands-on policy-making and ideology. Broadcasting, like many
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other industries, was seen by Thatcherites to exhibit the tendencies of monopolization;
bureaucracy, favouritism, regulatory capture, closed entry to alternative providers,
closed shop unionization, inefficiency and a wasteful allocation of resources. In turn,
these criticisms were exacerbated by the break-down of relations between the
government and broadcaster as, akin with other sectors of the economy, old
conceptions clashed with the new ideologies being expressed by the government.
However, the broadcasting industry, unlike a public utility like Gas or Water, could
not be simply sold off or be perceived as merely as an economic entity. This was due
to the state's interests in protecting the flow of information in the prescribed manner.
The more the government attempted to alter broadcasting, the more apparent it
became the government interests could actually be undermined.
The full ramifications of the policy implementation process are only beginning
to make themselves clear. This period has exhibited patterns of normative thinking
(for example, the issue of quality) against the new value judgements of
commercialization and the market.
The new media has allowed for the speculation of media conglomerates across
Europe (Bertelsmann, Hachette etc) and Britain has proved to be no exception. The
failure of British Satellite Broadcasting and the ascendancy of Rupert Murdoch's Sky
Television, later B-Sky-B (which was a merger only at board level), has produced a
situation in which a broadcasting monopoly dominates the satellite channels.22
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This strongly contrasts with Peacock and the market-liberals assertion that
'Electronic Publishing' could provide the foundation for a pluralistic pattern of
independent productions in terms of access and programming. 23 Further, BSB was
not only a financial calamity in the soft-ware end of the market, but undermined the
efforts of manufacturers like Phillips to market High Definition Television (HDTV)
through the expensive Mac system that the broadcasters was legally required to
emp1oy.' Murdoch, preferred to employ the cheaper Astra Telecommunications PAL
based system which did not require any change within television receivers.2
The merger of Sky and BSB was also a conspicuous policy failure. Whilst,
BSB had been assured of a monopolistic position for three years on the British DBS
frequencies, along with the protection from the DTI, the government miscalculated the
developments within technology and did not take into account the 1986 European
Broadcasting Corn mission decision distinguishing between telecommunications and
television satellites. 26 This meant that domestically marketable satellite dishes could
be manufactured by Alan Sugar's Amstrad company at low prices. It also
demonstrated the extent to which satellite broadcasting had acted a convenient
metaphor upon which to reform terrestrial broadcasting. Ultimately, the technological
revolution enabled the government to question the validity of the BBC's monopoly of
the licence fee and the ITV network's monopoly over advertising revenue.
Moreover, the merger illustrates the clientelism which existed between the
Thatcher government and Rupert Murdoch's 'News International'. This close political
alliance meant that there was no attempt to take Murdoch to the Monopolies and
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Merger Board, inspite of his significant stake within the British Press. Alongside
this clientelism, it must be also asked what could any national government or
regulatory body (then the IBA) actually do about an international media conglomerate
who had by-passed national ownership, regulatory and programming rulings by
broadcasting out of Britain to a satellite which beamed back to Luxembourg and then
back to Britain. Whilst, the 1990 Act mentions the regulation of non-domestic satellite
services, there are few formal powers that can actually be invoked. 28 Therefore, the
B-Sky-B situation demonstrates the extent to which this legislation was conceived in
nation state terms and its inability to actually cope with the internationalization of the
broadcasting market as global broadcasting empires increasingly dominate and
organize the industry.
Presently, B-Sky-B remains a relatively marginal broadcaster in terms of
audience penetration, although with the film channels and the 1992 deal to televise the
FA Premier League subscription could increase. The take-up of subscription may
prove to be conditional upon the recession and whether exclusive rights, in particular
to sports events, can be established. The Football deal for £304 million over the next
five years was highly visible, but neither audiences, dish sales nor the more likely
strategy of creating critical mass of subscription appear to be gaining a secure
foothold. 29 However, with greater cable penetration in urban areas (where satellite
channels are broadcast upon local cable stations) and alternative, cheaper receivers
this situation may significantly alter. The advent of subscription based services throws
into relief some of very principles on which broadcasting has been developed in
Britain. Clearly, with audiences having to pay for new reception equipment and
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channels, above and beyond the mandatory licence fee, it may be suggested that future
may be more accurately be seen as being representative of narrow rather
broadcasting.
Terrestrial broadcasting has evidenced gradual, but substantial, reforms in
broadcasting organizational structures, ideology, ethos and outlook. The ITC is legally
a regulatory body and is no longer required to pre-view programmes as a broadcaster.
This has led to the ITV companies increasingly taking on the scheduling power
through a new Network centre which has significantly different aims. 3° As these
companies are no longer legally bound by public service rules and after the franchise
auction need to maximise their profits, commercial factors will determine the schedule
more directly such as high audiences in order to attract advertising. Further, this
strategy is conditioned by the projection of increased subscription revenues and
company executives are keerjcure profits as they believe this will give them an
advantage in the multi-channel future. As a consequence, the ITV sector is
demonstrating a shift away from a regulated private monopolistic system into a
commercially driven monopoly. As a result, the vertically integrated broadcasting-
producers are being replaced by new types of broadcasting-carriers such as 'Carlton'
who commission from other regional franchisees or independents in order to save
money and reduce staffing figures.3'
These developments may be hastened after 1994, as the ITV sector may
become subject to possible takeover bids from European media tycoons such as Silvio
Berlusconi. The ITV sector has argued that this is unfair as foreign take-over bids are
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allowed in Britain, whilst other European nations have tighter regulations over
national broadcasting systems. As with satellite broadcasting, the Act demonstrates a
lack of foresight in actually attempting to legislate for an international broadcasting
system.
The situation remains remarkably fluid and I would qualify any conclusion
with the inevitable rider that it may be superseded by the ever unfolding series of
events. Clearly, the Thatcher government, and the then Home Office Ministers
Timothy Renton and David Mellor, did not foresee how rapidly the industry might
alter and the crisis in profitability that the franchise auction would create within the
ITV sector. For instance, the North-East contractor Tyne Tees has been taken over by
Yorkshire after my cut-off date in November 1992. Indeed, the criticisms of the
dissenting minority within the Peacock Report over this recommendation appears to be
more pertinent than ever. First, it has proved to be difficult for the ITC to choose
between a high cash bid and a bid which offered less money but a better chance of
high quality public service broadcasting. Whilst, the 1981 system of allocating
franchises was understood arbitrary and unpredictable, the 1991 franchise round
served to reinforce these criticisms rather than eradicate them. Second, the public
service undertakings given by the bidders have proved to problematic as the
companies have been forced to chase advertising revenues. The imprecision of the
system has been obvious in the ITC's attempts to make decisions whilst the companies
claim they control programming. Third, the competitive tendering system has reduced
profits. It has made it more likely that companies, through bad luck or bad
management, will make losses or poor profits. The examples of Yorkshire and Tyne
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Tees has shown how difficult it is has proved to enforce standards in these
circumstances.32
Throughout 1993, the ITC and the ITV companies lobbied for an extension to
the moratorium on takeover bids and had the high-level support of establishment
figures such as Lord Whitelaw. 33 In the event, the National Heritage Secretary Peter
Brooke did not extend the moratorium, but swayed by the arguments of the larger ITV
companies, led by Michael Green of Canton and Gerry Robinson of the Granada
Group, succumbed to a relaxation of the ownership rules. Therefore it was clear
that the power struggle which occurred between the major companies and the smaller
regional franchisees, who wished to preserve their status, was won by the larger
franchise-holders. Through Brooke's recommendations the large companies were able
to take-over one other company. 35 However, in order retain the ITV network's
regional flavour and stem outright monopolization Brooke decided that the London
franchise would still remain divided between a weekday and weekend supplier.
To this end, Brooke may be understood as attempting to re-concile two
irreconcilable trends: encroaching commercialism and the networks' regional
traditions. In this respect he has been accused of either tinkering around with the
system to encourage greater monopolization or not been radical enough by
constraining the larger companies. The Labour Heritage spokesperson Mo Mowlan
commented:
" (The move is) the worst of all possible worlds. ... We wanted the moratorium to
continue for at least another year so we could conduct a proper review of cross-media
ownership. ... There will be chaos in the system with a threat to regional programmes
and a huge waste of money."37
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Alternatively, the move did not please those who wanted a greater liberalization of the
ITV network. It was predicted that by stemming cross-ownership the larger ITV
companies would still be subject to acquisition by international media conglomerates:
At present, the UK media sector is hampered by a criss-cross of regulations, of
which the restriction on ITV takeovers is just one. ... if Britainfu1l broadcasting
potential is to be unlocked, a strategic review rather than a piecemeal approach will be
needed. "38
Brooke's announcement left newspapers, broadcasters and City analysts to
speculate over who would attempt to take-over who. Throughout the following
months, a number of 'mergers' have occurred in which the largest companies have
sought to increase their power by taking control of the most profitable regional
franchises. For instance, only days after Brooke announced the changes Carlton
(which already had a twenty-percent stake in Central) bought out Central. 39 Further,
after a protracted board-room battle Granada eventually won its hostile take-over
LWT with the resulting resignation of the LWT's chairman Christopher Bland and
Chief Executive Greg Dyke.
Therefore, the process of transforming the ITV sector from a privately owned
public service monopoly into a monopoly based on a concentration of ownership
appears to be well under way. Further, the ITC, in its capacity of being a licensing
body, may discover that it has to remain busier and more interventionist to simply
negotiate the possible problems that may arise from such take-overs.
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The changes within ITV have had an effect upon the broadcasting ecology. In
response, the BBC has focused its attention on the continued aim to receive the licence
fee, although it already predicts that it will have substantially reduced audience by the
end of the decade. The chief actor within the BBC's plans for its future has been the
current Director-General John Birt. Birt has formally pitched the BBC's future upon;
i) an internal market to promote transparent efficiency within the BBC entitled
'Producer Choice'; ii) a programming schedule pitched around a specialised form of
'Public Service' broadcasting which defines itself against the market in order to
provide innovation which could not exist elsewhere, and iii) greater accountability to
the licence fee payer.4°
'Producer Choice' is designed to make the corporation more efficient and to
demonstrate to ublic, which is synonymous with the political elite according to the
BBC, that the licence fee is being effectively employed. The full implications of this
method of resource allocation remains unclear. The reform of 'Producer Choice'
marks a significant alteration in the BBC's understanding of its public service function
as these values are seen to exist within the programming ends rather than in the
institution itself. 4 ' In many respects, this notion conforms to the Peacock
Committee's description of public seivice and perhaps is indicative of how some of
the report's ideas have entered broadcasting through the back-door rather than through
the overt legislation.
Formally, the BBC has argued that 'Producer Choice' has been designed to
create greater public accountability by transparently demonstrating that the licence fee
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is being efficiently utilised. 42
 Accountability has become the BBC's buzz word and
appears within both their public and internal documentation. This also leads into the
second part of Birt's approach which argues for a public broadcaster who, in response
to the market context of broadcasting, should pursue a specialised form of public
service broadcasting. 43 Whilst, Birt has been at pains to argue that the high-ground
(innovative, British-made, informative programming) does not preclude the
'Himalayan' option, many commentators have argued that this form of programming
strategy may exacerbate the BBC's decreasing audience-share and marginalise its
status as the national broadcaster. Such a development may eventually foment the
collapse of the licence fee as a legitimate method through which to collect revenue.
These developments, cloaked in the shroud of accountability, have effectively
precluded any real public debate about the corporation and the BBC still appears to
remain impervious to any criticism from outside of the political elite. This was made
apparent during the debate which emerged after the revelations of John Birt's tax
arrangements. In the wake of this storm both Birt and the Chairman of the Board of
Governors Marmaduke Hussey faced dismissal. However, in the end, the senior
members of the BBC closed ranks. During this debate the role of the Governors, the
official public trustees, came under investigation and it appeared within the BBC's
power structure that the other official sources of accountability, the General and
Regional Advisory Councils, were impotent in making decisions and intervening
within the centre.
Further, this debate was reflective of a significant cultural change in the
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higher echelons of the BBC's management. John Birt and others were all recruited
from outside of the corporation. The extent of Birt's outsider status was made
apparent when it was revealed that he had been formally contracted as a consultant to
the BBC whilst serving as Deputy DO and DG. He had been paid as 'John Birt Ltd',
registered at Companies House, in order to avoid paying taxes under the usual PAYE
scheme. This practice had been initiated during Birt's period at LWT, and it indicated
the extent to which Birt was rooted in the commercial sector's conventions. Birt
revealin commented:
franidy (it was) a surprise to see the degree of reaction inside and outside the
BBC. I have to accept the view of the BBC staff and those outside who have
commented that it is not appropriate for those who lead the BBC, not to be employed
by it. I, in turn, have been asking our staff to understand I come from another world
[laughter from the audience] a more commercial world."45
At this moment, the BBC is poised to carry out significant reforms both
within its organizational structure and in programme output. The BBC management
appear to be publicly confident that these strategies will be effective and will secure
the BBC's future. In contrast, many employees and commentators have doubted the
wisdom of these plans and suggest that the BBC will no longer be able to perform in
its traditional role as these strategies are implemented. 46 The debate upon the BBC
will centre on the 1996 Charter, however the decisions, in effect, have already been
taken. It remains to be seen whether these will prove to be accurate judgements for an
institution which faces a series of pressures upon political, economic and social fronts.
Finally, within the area of commercial broadcasting regulation similar trends
of continuity, revision and outright changes are becoming manifest. The deregulation,
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anticipated by the Peacock report has not occurred. There is no 'Public Service
Broadcasting Council' or 'Arts Council of the Air'. Instead, there are more regulatory
bodies than existed before. The constitutional position and the jurisdiction of these
authorities appears to be highly problematic and unclear at present.47
In the event, the IBA was replaced by the more light-touch ITC.48 Legally,
the ITC is a regulator rather than a broadcaster and therefore has no pre-viewing
powers. Its legal focus is primarily defined in the supervision of licence arrangements.
However, the Act provides the ITC with a number of negative programming rights as
licences can be withdrawn if the franchisees fail to conform to regional demands or
provide 'quality' productions. Moreover, the ITC continues to be populated by IBA
regulators and shares a number of institutional characteristics, although these may
diminish with the arrival of new appointees and the commission's eventual re-
location. 49 Its role as a licensor may increasingly occup it.time and efforts as the
regional franchises face financial crises and could be subjected to foreign take-over
bids.
Throughout, the franchise auction the ITC attempted to pursue normative
procedures in new circumstances. Its approach was governed by its interpretation of
the legislation which had required the regulator to employ a two-stage process of a
'quality hurdle', based upon programming and financial plans, and then a competitive
tender. In the event, it did not simply award franchises to the highest bidders,
although the Act had significantly bolstered up the 'quality hurdle' after the initial
notion of a competitive tender. Further, the mooted openness of the procedure was
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replaced by internecine bureaucratic practices and an unwillingness to explain the
decisions. The losing bidders, such as TSW, were forced to go through the costly
process of judicial review before the ITC would ipa1 any public announcement over
its judgements.5°
The ITC demonstrates that re-regulation has actually occurred. The ITC has
significantly altered in its legal remit, increasingly within its institutional status and to
some degree within its ideology. However, it still purports to have a role over the
supervision of programming. In this respect, the ITC's legal position may prove to be
increasingly problematic as the more aggressive commercial companies, for instance
LWT until recently led by Chief Executive Greg Dyke, undoubtedly will attempt to
promote advertising-led programming. If the ITC tries to intervene, it may find that
its legal powers are more constrained in practice, than in theory.5'
The changes occurring within broadcasting are on-going, complex and still
embryonic. The ITC and ITV companies have argued that the system needs time to
settle, and originally hoped to extend the moratorium on take-over bids. However, the
government did not allow the ITV network to enjoy such a breathing space and for all
intents it appears that the sector will be subject to a commercial ravaging. The BBC
has started to pursue the strategies made in its policy document 'Extending Choice'.
As a consequence, there will be a constant need for research determining how these
developments are becoming manifest. Therefore a number of relevant future research
concerns are becoming apparent:
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First, an analysis of future British policy-making, announced by the 1992
Green-Paper and the BBC response 'Extending Choice', and the institutional reforms
concerning the BBC and rest of broadcasting throughout the nineties. The post-
Peacock policy-cycle will only reach completion once the 1996 BBC Charter has been
settled. The debate surrounding the Charter will continue to maintain a high degree of
interest due to the political controversy which surrounds the media and its visibility as
a policy issue. The fluidity of the broadcasting environment is being hastened by new
technological developments, financial collapses, arguments over accountability and the
reformed regimes which have been put in place by the legislation. The BBC will have
to face up to difficult questions about its role and status as a public service
broadcaster in this new environment. To this end, as the case study upon 'Producer
Choice' indicates, the BBC has attempted to pre-empt the debate and gain
governmental approval by pursuing strategies which are designed to promote a
transparent efficiency.
The BBC's willingness to promote strategies which its believes will please the
government, whilst being cloaked in the veneer of public accountability, leads into
problematic questions over the political liberty of the national broadcasting regimes
within an increasingly market-dominated environment. As the policy cycle under
investigation in this thesis has demonstrated the mooted independence of the market-
place, advocated by market-liberals and made concrete within the Peacock report, has
become unstuck as political imperatives governed the subsequent legislative process.
In the event, the system has become more commercial but remains highly susceptible
to state intervention through the volatility of broadcasting finance, commissioning,
self-censorship, reformed regulatory practices and the omnipresent threat of constant
legislative changes. Therefore, in relation to my study research formulated to consider
the legal, constitutional and democratic issues, within a more complicated
broadcasting environment, suggests itself to be increasingly relevant.52
Secondly, a concern with 'manifest content' changes to scheduling throughout
this period remains important. Previously, the cultural homogeneity in programming,
advocated by John Reith, was replaced by the introduction of ITV, the BBC's
response and finally Channel Four to reflect a greater concern over the cosmopolitan
nature of British society. The extent of the broadcasted success has been debatable as
the white, male ethno-centrism endemic in the broadcasting institutions and their
output was extensively criticised. In turn, this multi-channel future, could be
benevolently seen to provide the opportunity for greater access for women, ethnic or
minority groups. Alternatively, with the dominance of major media moguls, a rather
bland international cultural dominance may be constructed as programming becomes
dominated by imports and cheap productions.
Such a study would clearly open itself up for cultural and political as well as
sociological or political economic forms of research methodology. It may be
questioned whether the viewer is being perceived by broadcasters more as a consumer
of private goods than as a citizen enjoying his/her's rights to a public good and
freedom of information. This difference in approach could also underpin our
understanding of how the audience actually uses television in a multi-channel future
and the extent to which the traditional patterns of viewing remain stable or change.
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Will, for instance, audience loyalty be retained by the terrestrial broadcasting channels
as a new generation is brought up to use remote controls and has access to a multi-
channel future ? The new technology may also contribute to fragmentation of the
national audience as international media conglomerates begin to dominate the market
through satellite stations or by their ability to buy into the ITV system after the lifting
of the moratorium on take-over bids. This not only has clear ramifications for
programming, but also on whether a national broadcaster is actually required in this
new commercial and international environment.53
This leads onto a third possible area of research. This is an assessment of
industrial and organizational change not only in national broadcasting, but in
international broadcasting throughout the period. The international dimension of the
new media will expand partly due to national reforms such as deregulation and due to
the commercially driven practices of the global media conglomerates. These events
may be also be seen as being dramatically 'pushed' by the new forms of 'digital
compression', in which the current terrestrial band of airwaves, could be extended to
over seventy channels. However, what remains unclear is whether the broadcasting
industry has the capacity of resources, in terms of production bases or profitable
programming, to actually fill this expansion of airwaves.
Therefore, these developments could lead to a variety of academic analysis;
the legalistic implications of a European or supra-national set of broadcasting laws,
the need to use some form of supranational organization; the increasing cross-
media/industrial convergence; whether the entity of national broadcasting system
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remains relevant both in industrial, legalistic terms and cultural practices. Ultimately
it may be asked if we are entering into a world in which world-wide communication
could be realised and if the previously held assumptions, notions and structures are
actually relevant (for instance, some form of enforced industrial post-modernism) or
whether national forms of broadcasting controlled by nation state governments,
regulators, media institutions and personnel still remain intact? It will be necessary to
research the interface which will exist between national and supernational actors and
analyze how this tension may be resolved.
A study of this cycle of British broadcasting policy is relevant to
political, social, economic and industrial issues. The changes affecting British
broadcasting, such as new technologies and the pursuit of deregulatory policies, have
similarly effected other national broadcasting systems throughout advanced western
economies . M
 The British solution to this international force is therefore significant of
a particular set of conditions, ideologies and approaches towards the industry. As a
consequence, this study indicates how national identity, political cultures, deregulatory
theories and broadcasting's status as an industry have all contributed to changes within
this area of activity. Moreover, it demonstrates how broadcasting policy-making is
becoming increasingly complex as new or alternative trends are making themselves
manifest. This thesis has thus attempted to be modest contribution to the debate
surrounding broadcasting and therefore had been written with the desire to widen
knowledge and understanding upon this topic.
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APPENDIX I
Independent Television Commission
Ext. 7743
04/91
EMBARGOED UNTIL 00.01 liRE FRIDAY 15 FEBRUARY
ITC INVITES APPLICATIONS FOR NATIONAL AND REGIONAL
CRANNEL 3 LICENCES
The Independent Television Commission (ITC) today (15
February) invites applications for a national Channel 3
breakfast-time licence and for 15 regional Channel 3 licences
under powers granted by the Broadcasting Act 1990. The closing
date for applications is 15 May and the ITC intends to award the
licences by the end of October 1991. Each ten-year licence will
come into force on 1 January 1993, following the end of the
current ITV contracts on 31 December 1992. Advertisements for
applications appear today in a range of national and regional
newspapers, and next week in certain trade papers.
Channel 3 licences will be awarded by competitive tender.
Tender payments for each licence consist of a percentage, set
by the ITC, of annual "qualifying" revenue (advertising,
subscription and sponsorship income) and a cash bid representing
an annual sum payable which will be submitted in a sealed
envelope with the application. The cash bid will be index-
linked and both parts of the tender will be collected by the ITC
on behalf of the Treasury.
The documents relevant to Channel 3 licences, in particular
the Invitations .,
 to Apply, reflect points arising from the ITC' s
consultation exercise introduced in October 1990. About 300
copies of each of the draft documents were sent on request to
interested parties. Many detailed comments were received and
the exercise was useful in revising and clarifying the documents.
The main changes include additional guidance on networking
following discussion and agreement with the Office of Fair
Trading (OFT) as required by the Broadcasting Act; and
clarification of various programme requirements including a
revision of the requirement for material of European origin.
More detailed financial information is given on licence fees and
tender payments, and further clarification of the circumstances
in which licences may be varied.
Pri'c Ohfirp 7fl Rrnn,rrri,, Pr',- ! 	 c\V'2 flV
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The minimum required regional programme output for viewers
in Wales has been increased from 7 hours 30 minutes to 8 hours
per week and applicants for the East of England licence must
provide some split news provision for separate parts of the
region. The Channel Islands and Borders and Isle of Man licences
will take account of the extension of the Broadcasting Act to
the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man. The format of
information required from applicants has also been clarified to
distinguish "core" and "supplementary" information.
In setting the standards which applicants must attain to
satisfy the requirements for diversity, high quality, regional
programmes etc., the ITC has taken the current ITV service as its
benchmark and endeavoured to balance the expectations of viewers
for a Channel 3 programme service of quality across many
different programme strands with the likelihood of increased
competition for advertising and sponsorship revenues through the
1990s.
After the closing date for applications, the ITC will
publish a list of all applicants and the licences for which they
have applied. Applications will be submitted in a form enabling
the ITC to publish the programme proposals, structure and
ownership. Copies of these published sections will be made
available for scrutiny in ITC offices and selected libraries in
the UK and the Channel Islands. Applicants will each provide a
summary of their published proposals which the ITC will make
available on request. The public will be invited to submit
written comments to the ITC by 26 June. The Members of the
Commission will take these comments into account in assessing
whether applicants have passed the quality threshold.
In addition to assessing whether applicants have satisfied,
for example, the requirements on ownership and for programme
quality and diversity, the ITC will also appraise their ability
to maintain their services over the licence period and the
credibility of the business plans. Qualified applicants will
then have their cash bids considered and, unless there are
exceptional circumstances, the ITC will award the licence to the
highest bidder.
Channel 3 areas have been defined by Government as being
'large' or 'small'. Separate applications may, in line with
ownership rules, be submitted for more than one Channel 3
licence, but no single group or company can own two large
licences or be awarded two contiguous or neighbouring licences.
Neither can an applicant own a national and a regional Channel
3 licence.
From the date of the award of the licences until the end of
1993, the Act gives the ITC discretion to refuse to approve a
change in control of a licensee if the change appears to the
Commission prejudicial to the provision of the proposed service
in that licence area or to Channel 3 services nationwide. In the
case of contiguous licensees takeovers are not permitted under
any circumstances before the beginning of 1992. From 1994
onwards the ITC must continue to satisfy itself that any company
taking over a licensee is a fit and proper person and is in a
position to comply with all the conditions in the licence.
Otherwise the licence would be revoked.
-3-
The ITC is required to draw up rules on multiple bidding.
These require the approval of the Secretary of State and will be
published shortly. These rules will indicate how licences will
be awarded if an applicant is the highest bidder for more
licences than he can own. Those submitting multiple applications
will be required to identify their order of preference for the
licences for which they have applied.
When the licences have been awarded, the ITC will publish
the names of successful applicants together with the amount of
the cash bid; the names of those who passed the quality
threshold, the reasons where the award has been made to a lower
bidder on the basis of exceptional circumstances; and any other
information the ITC considers appropriate.
The Invitation to Apply document explains the application
arrangements, and provides background information on a wide range
of matters arising from the Broadcasting Act 1990. Guidance is
given on the information and financial projections which the ITC
requires in order to consider an application and on the way in
which the information should be presented. There is also a
standard form of the relevant licence which will be issued to
licensees substantially in this form but which will reflect the
proposals each winning applicant puts forward.
Note to Editors
The ITC is the public body, responsible under the
Broadcasting Act 1990 for licensing and regulating all non-BBC
television services. These include Channels 3 and 4, the
proposed Channel 5, cable and other local delivery services, and
domestic and non-domestic satellite services available to UK
viewers.
The ITC licences and the process for awarding ITC licences
stem directly from statutory requirements in the Broadcasting
Act 1990. The licence conditions are basically derived from the
wording of the Act. Discretionary powers have been granted to
the ITC in some areas, such as the drawing of the Channel 3 map.
The Invitation to Apply is intended to give helpful background
information and interpretation on these statutory duties and to
clarify the administrative procedures to be used.
The 14 geographical areas for the Channel 3 regional
licences correspond with the current ITV regions. They include
dual regions in South and South-East England, and for Wales and
the West of England, and a triple region for East, West and South
Midlands. There are also specific requirements for opt-outs in
Yorkshire and the North-East. The new regional licences will
provide for a seven day a week service in all regions except
London which will continue to be split for weekdays and weekends.
The Channel 3 national breakfast time licence will operate daily
from 6 am to 9.25 am.
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FoREWORD
by John Birt, Deputy Director-
General and Chairman of the
Producer Choice Steering Group
Producer Choice will create a BBC in which
programme-makers and resource depart-
ments are empowered to take greater
responsibility for managing their own
activfties.
This folder comes in two parts. First, the
short booklet outlines the main principles
underlying Producer Choice and the
reasons for its introduction in the domestic
services from April 1993.
Second, the reference section lays out the
policy guidelines and how the system will
work.	 The guidelines set out the
considerations which should apply to
flhe BBCs core underlying values - its 	 decision making by managers and
commitment to high quality programmes; to 	 programme-makers. Local managers will
craft excellence; to training and to other 	 set the Guidance and Guidelines in the local
good employer practice - remain	 context. Corporate advice may be sought
unchangeJ	 where appropriate.
Producer Choice will create increased
opportunities for initiative, matched by
greater responsibilities; and it will reduce
administrative costs and structures.
As a result, a higher proportion of the
licence fee will be spent on programmes.
There will be an all-round benefit - for our
viewers and listeners as well as for our
programme-makers.
The Guidelines are still in draft form. They
represent the initial decisions which the
Producer Choice Steering Group has taken
on policy issues in designing the system. In
the next months, the Group wants to hear
from programme makers, resource
managers and other staff who have any
comments or suggestions on the text.
We are introducing new ways of working -
Land striving for a more streamlined BBC,
fering increased value for moneY] The
period up to April 1993 - and probably the
year beyond - will be a challenge for us all.
I am confident that we can make a success
of it - that the outcome will be a leaner
more devolved and vital BBC.
May 1992
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Organisationally, the BBC is
developing a more decentralised structure - with
units which trade with one another, trade with
the outside world, and are linked together by
formal agreements.
Financially, the BBC is becoming
transparent with the costs of each of its main
FUNDING
activities - programme-making, production
resources, support services, and transmission -
open to comparison with external equivalents.
Operationally, the BBC is increasingly
functioning as a mixed economy, with both in-
house and external activfties contributing to, and
supporting, its public service purposes.
BBC INCOME
Figure 1, above illustrates the proposed flow of funds within, and outside, the organisation in future, and ft
also shows the shape of the new contractual relationships which are emerging.
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Summary of Proposals
- Take part in the development of commercially funded specialist television services on
satellite and cable. Examples include:
• A continuous news service.
• Channels which draw on the BBC's archives - like the collaboration with Thames Television
to launch U.K. Gold.
• In its overseas operations, the BBC should:
- Support, extend and enhance World Service Radio.
- Develop World Service Television.
- Intensify the BBC's participation In the international market for programme sales and
co-productions.
HARNESSING TECHNOLOGY
• At least three major new technological initiatives are under way:
- High definition/widescreen television which can offer enhanced quality pictures.
- Digital television which could dramatically Increase the number of services available to viewers.
- Digital audio broadcasting which could dramatically Increase the number, quality and
convenience of radio services.
• It is not clear how quickly these improvements will become available to the in.is
market.
• The BBC's future approach to technology should continue to be (lIu(I1 h the
objective of providing high qualit cost effective programmes and wikes In ursis
and listeners.
THE BBC'S FUNDING
• The BBC has examined a number of options for its future funding. The tesie has
concluded that:
- Commercial funding methods such as subscription, sponsorship and advertising affect
the types of programmes which are made and broadcast.
- There will not be sufficient advertising or similar forms of revenue to sustain the wide range
of television and radio services that the public will wish to enjoy in the future.
- Therefore, the licence fee remains the best available mechanism for preserving the BSC.
independence from political or commercial pressure, guaranteeing universal access and
maintaining a wide range of broadcasting in the U.K.
• How€vet the BBC also believes that licence payers will benefit if it generates further
income from secondary services. This income is likely to be modest compared to Lhe
overall funding needs of the BBC's services. But it can be an important supplement
to the licence fee.
DELIVERING VALUE FOR MONEY
• The BBC must demonstrate that it is managed and structured in the most efficient
manner and therefore offers outstanding value for money to licence payers.
• It has already reduced its staffing, studio and outside broadcast capacity and property
portfolio, and continues to do so. These reductions have increased its productivity,
releasing funds for new programme developments.
• But the principal new initiative is the introduction of the Producer Choice scheme
across the BBC. Producer Choice will allow programme makers to choose whether
to use internal BBC resources or those of outside providers. It will reduce
administrative costs, release more funds for programmes and make the BBC more
financially transparent.
• In the future, the BBC will commission the best programming ideas whether they are
offered internally or by independents.
• But the BBC will remain a substantial production house at the heart of the British
television and radio industries.
• The BBC will set the highest standards of employment working practices. It will offer
its staff:
-	 High quality training.
- A strong commitment to equal opportunities and fair recruitment.
- High standards of care for health and safety.
- Appropriate rewards for the contribution they make to achieving the BBC's goals.
ACCOUNTABILITY
• Public funding brings with it the dut y
 to be properly accountable both to Parliament
and to the public.
• This review proposes a number of initiaties to modernise the BBC's s ystem of
accountabilit.
87
The include clearly separate roles for:
- The Board of Governors: regulating the BBC in the public interest; ensuring the independence
of the BBC from political interference; and holding the Board of Management accountable
for the performance of its executive task.
- The Board of Management: charged with the executive tasks of providing leadership and
direction for the BBC; translating the BBC's mission into an overall strategy; and meeting
an agreed set of quality and performance objectives.
• The BBC's performance will be assessed by the Board of Governors against
qualitative judgements and quantitative performance indicators. The results will be
published annually.
• In addition, the BBC will develop a new, more open system of direct accountability
to licence payers through the following initiatives:
- The publication of a framework document which will set out:
• The BBC's governance and management structure.
Its aims, objectives and accountability systems.
• The arrangements for performance monitoring and reporting.
- A new system of complaint and redress.
- A new modernised system for licence fee payment.
- A transparent system of access to the BBC.
S..
These proposals are the BBC's first contribution to the public debate about its
future. They build on the BBC's heritage and achievements; they respond to a new
and changing environment: and they demonstrate the valuable contribution the BBC
can make in the U.K. and around the world in the 1990s and beyond. We look
forward to the dialogue ahead.
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APPENDIX 5
236
26
262
320
No. of
Complaints
48 (22 programmes/
advertisements)
43
22
IEMBARGOED UNTIL 23.59 Hours13 MARCH 1991
BROADCASTING STANDARDS COUNCIL
5-S THE SANCTUARY LONDON SW1P 3JS
TELEPHONE: 071 233 0544 FAX: 071 233 0397
COMPLAINTS BUT.T.ETIN NO: 2
14 March 1991
THE BROADCASTING STANDARDS COUNCIL monitors the portrayal of
violence, of sex and matters of taste and decency (such as bad
language or the treatment of disasters), in television or
radio programmes or broadcast advertisements. The Council
deals with complaints about these matters and may make
complaints of its own. The BSC became a statutory body under
the Broadcasting Act 1990, with effect from 1 January 1991.
COMPLAINTS SUMMARY FOR FEBRUARY 1991
Complaints received
31 January - 28 February 1991
Complaints carried forward
from period 1-30 January 1991
Total
Total for the year to date
Breakdown of 262 Complaints:
Published Findings of Complaints
Complaints Under Consideration
Inappropriate to Pursue
Outside BSC Remit or
Complaints of a General Nature
(ii
